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ABSTRACT
This study examines the authoritarian ideology and educational policy of two dictatorial 
regimes of 20th century Greece: the Metaxas’ dictatorship of 1936-1941 (the 4th of August 
regime); and the military junta of 1967-1974 (the 21st of April regime). Although viewed 
comparatively, the regimes in question are shown to have been different, due to crucial 
differences stemming from their contemporary international and domestic settings. 
Moreover, their ideologies were shaped by the way dictatorial rulers perceived and 
interpreted their reality. Influenced by the inter-war fascist context, the 4th of August 
regime tried to accommodate a radical fascist rhetoric to a nationalistic and traditionalist set 
of beliefs. Metaxas’ perception of reality was exemplified in his educational policy, 
through which the dictator unsuccessfully tried to mobilise from above the youth, on the 
imported model of the fascist youth movements. The 21st of April regime contrasted 
sharply with the post-war international liberal environment, while its ideology was marked 
by the distinct and often contradictory mentalities of the colonels. The contradictions and 
inconsistencies of the military mind were reproduced at the educational level, as the 
military rulers attempted to demobilise a highly organised youth, to reverse the previous 
liberal educational reforms and to appoint loyalists to key posts. So, while the 4th of 
August saw the legitimation of its authority in the use of an openly authoritarian discourse 
and the mobilisation of the youth, the 21st of April regime, by contrast, torn by the 
conflicting mentalities of its military rulers, sought legitimacy through clientelistic 
networks of support and the demobilisation of the youth.
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INTRODUCTION
Greece, a country at the periphery of European developments or at the semi­
periphery of world developments, has been greatly influenced by the major western 
models of political and social organisation. The 19th century saw the import of democratic 
forms of organisation, the drafting of a constitution, the introduction of a party-based 
parliamentary system and the predominance of liberalism. The 20th century saw the 
introduction of mass politics, the strengthening and modernisation of Greek civil society, 
the industrialisation of the economy. While democratic institutions have been violated in 
several instances -by foreign interferences, absolutist royal tendencies, the interventionist 
role of the military, the clientelistic behaviour of politicians, disrespect for constitutional 
forms- the country, throughout most of its existence as an independent state, has been 
functioning under the rule of competitive politics, representative institutions and universal 
suffrage. Twice, democratic parliamentary rule was interrupted by prolonged dictatorial 
rule during the course of the 20th century; in 1936 by the 4th of August Metaxas regime 
and in 1967 by the 21st of April military junta. Both cases reflected clearly the ills of Greek 
parliamentary democracy and revealed a tendency towards dictatorial forms of political 
domination.
My interest in this project relates to the nature of the two dictatorships. It is 
comparative in nature, in that it seeks to view the two cases, both in relation to each other, 
and in relation to other similar authoritarian regimes abroad. The comparative value of 
Greek domestic developments, in general, has attracted the attention of many social 
scientists. Based on the semi-peripheral, semi-developed status of the Greek polity and 
society, the country has been seen to approximate in many respects to the other European 
countries of the Mediterranean basin and to the more advanced countries of . Latin 
America,, as regards the existence of similar levels of political and economic development. 
Based also on a common historical experience the country has been viewed comparatively 
with the other Balkan: states. This is done in order to show the similarities of different
settings, the fragility of democratic institutions and the tendency towards dictatorial forms 
of political authority.1
The two Greek dictatorial regimes of 1936 and 1967, specifically, have been 
compared with other contemporary authoritarian cases, with similar socio-economic and 
politico-ideological features. As such, the dictatorship of Metaxas has been seen in the 
context of fascism and has been associated with the existence of a number of contemporary 
authoritarian regimes of the inter-war period. The Metaxas regime has been seen to imitate 
the Italian fascist and the Nazi regimes and to approximate to the inter-war imposition of 
the Salazar and Franco dictatorships, in the Iberian peninsula, and to resemble the 
conservative authoritarian regimes of the Balkan countries. Similarly, the dictatorship of 
the military junta has been seen in connection with the Spanish and the Portuguese 
dictatorships, and the post-war Latin American military interventions.
The inter-war fascist context
The subject of fascism has generated a number of scholarly studies on the socio­
economic origins, the mode of political domination, the character of the social base, the 
role of the leader or the particular ideology in fascist regimes. Although most theorists on 
fascism are able to come up with some notions of what the fascist phenomenon stood for, 
the application to the particular cases becomes more problematic. As such, on the one 
extreme, there have been those who have not hesitated to label most of the 20th century 
European authoritarian dictatorships as fascist, while on the other, there have been those 
who have mostly and solely identified fascism with the Italian and the German regimes.
1 Very representative of such a comparison is Mouzelis’ Politics in the Semi-Periphery in the context of 
early parliamentarism and late industrialisation in the Balkan and Latin American societies. The writer 
discerns similar political and socio-economic trends in the development of these societies and offers his 
methodological tools for a comparative cross-regional understanding of the political development of two 
broad areas, as a paradigm for the further understanding of other semi-peripheral or peripheral cases.
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Function o f the regime: Fascism and monopoly capital
The ease with which marxist writers see fascism in every form of authoritarianism 
is expressed in most marxist analyses of dictatorial regimes and reflects a more monolithic 
and mechanistic approach to the phenomenon. On the other hand, the inter-war 
communists were the first to point out the danger of international fascism, the first to form 
an organised resistance to it and the first to come up with a systematic conception of the 
phenomenon. Their views originated in the Third International's discussions on fascism, 
which defined the guide-lines of subsequent marxist approaches. By and large, marxists 
regarded fascist regimes as the dictatorial agents of monopoly capital, dominant at the 
particular inter-war period of capitalist development, the result of contradictions within 
capitalist societies. The definition of the phenomenon is based on the idea that:
Fascism is the open, terrorist dictatorship o f the most reactionary, most chauvinist 
and most imperialist elements o f finance capital. The accession to power o f fascism 
is not an ordinary succession o f one bourgeois government by another but a 
substitution o f one state form o f class domination o f the bourgeoisie by another 
form -open terrorist dictatorship.2
More elaborate marxist theories, like that of August Thalheimer, based on Marx’s 
18th Brumaire o f  Louis Bonaparte, focused on the similarities between the Bonapartist 
type of dictatorship and the fascist regime, and examined the role of the petty-bourgeoisie 
as the social base of fascism, the crucial role of the leader, and the role of fascist ideology, 
the expression of the frustrations of the petty-bourgeoisie and the peasantry. It was 
recognised by them that fascist state power acquires a certain form of autonomy in its 
relation to bourgeois domination, as Marx was the first to admit as early as the 1860s.3
Poulantzas, the most representative of the neo-marxist theoreticians of fascism, 
regarded fascism as a form of the “exceptional capitalist state”, distinct from Bonapartism 
and the military dictatorships, and identified fascism with the regimes of Italy and
2 From Dimitroff’s reports to the Congresses of the Comintern, in Poulantzas Fascism and Dictatorship, 
p. 97 and Kitchen Fascism, pp. 7-8
3 August Thalheimer's views are discussed in Payne's book Fascism; Comparison and Definition, in 
Kitchen op.cit., pp. 71-82, and in Poulantzas op.cit., pp. 59-62.
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Germany.4 He also rightly distinguished between fascism, as a mass movement before the 
seizure of power, and fascism, as a special form of dictatorial regime. He saw the 
evolution of fascism in terms of the equilibrium in the class struggle, the relationship 
between the petty-bourgeoisie and big capital. He examined the specific institutional 
features of the fascist state and their political function in the class struggle, ie. the 
reorganisation of the state apparatuses and the use of the ideological and the repressive 
mechanisms, under fascist regimes. But ultimately for Poulantzas, the prime function of 
fascism was to encourage the economic, political and ideological domination of monopoly 
capital. The extent to which marxist and neo-marxist thought has influenced Greek thought 
on the nature of dictatorial regimes will become evident in the following presentation of the 
main approaches to the Greek dictatorial cases.
Political domination: Totalitarianism
On the liberal side of the spectrum, we distinguish the theory of totalitarianism, 
according to which totalitarian dictatorships are the autocracies of modem 20th century 
societies, their aim being to “remould and transform the human beings under their control 
in the image o f a totalitarian ideology ”. The most prominent and characteristic cases of 
totalitarianism are the regimes of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union.5 The basic 
features of totalitarian dictatorships are 1. an elaborate ideology, 2. a single mass party, 3. 
a system of terror, 4. the monopolistic control of the mass media, 5. the monopoly of 
weapons and 6. a central control of the economy.6 This analysis places its emphasis on the 
repressive and terrorist nature of the organisation of state power and discerns the intention 
of totalitarian regimes to control every possible aspect of human life in a given society, its 
morale, its culture, its education, its economic structures. One of the most important 
characteristics of totalitarianism relates to the adoption and diffusion of a radically new
4  Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship, Verso edition, 1979.
5 Hannah Arendt in her book The Origins o f Totalitarianism and Carl Friedrich with Zbigniew Brzezinski 
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, developed the theory of totalitarianism, a very fashionable theory 
in America in the 1950s given the extent of anti-communism in the American ideological discourse. In that 
sense totalitarianism has been considered by many as a “cold war” term.
6 Brezinski, op.cit., p.22.
ideology which embraces all aspects of social, political and cultural life. This is mainly 
realisable through the systematic use of propaganda tactics, which makes it, par excellence, 
the phenomenon of 20th century authoritarianism.
While the theorists of totalitarianism distinguish this particular form of dictatorship 
from other forms of dictatorships, they concentrate mostly on the totalitarian organisation 
of state power, ie. the regimes’ ability to totally control and transform societies through 
coercive and terroristic means, or through the constant and systematic use of the mass 
media. In that sense, they are able to view the Stalinist and the Nazi cases comparatively, 
while at the same time they ignore such important features as the mode of production, the 
organisation of the economy, the role of private ownership, which were widely different in 
the two cases. The role of totalitarian ideology, for instance, is viewed by Hannah Arendt, 
as the means to control the masses and legitimate the use of terror, its specific content 
being of secondary importance. She believes that the real nature of totalitarian ideologies is 
revealed in the role that these ideologies play in totalitarian domination.7
A more systematic definition of totalitarianism is offered by Juan Linz, according to 
which, totalitarian regimes are characterised by a “monistic centre of power”, “a more or 
less intellectually elaborate ideology” and “active mobilisation through a single party and 
many monolithic secondary groups”.8 The role of the totalitarian ideology -a holistic 
conception of man and society coupled with the systematic manipulation of the ideological 
heritage-, the role of the totalitarian party -a unique type of social organisation in modem 
societies, the concentration of power in the hands of the leadership and the cult of the 
personality, and the use of terror as a useful but not necessary instrument of social control, 
are all considered the defining characteristics of totalitarianism by Linz.9
7Arendt, op. ch., pp.468-474.
8 Juan Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes” in Handbook o f Political Science, pp.191-192.
9 The analysis o f totalitarianism in the Chapter “Totalitarian Systems”, ibid, pp.187-252 .
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Social base: Mobilisation o f the middle classes
One of the most distinctive features of fascism was the large number of people 
attracted by the fascist ideology and party-organisation, who formed the social base of 
fascist regimes. Most of the analysts stressing the social base aspect of fascist regimes be­
lieve that fascism was the result of a radical middle-class movement or the frustration of 
atomised individuals within industrialised societies.10 This analysis, based on Durkheim’s 
concept of ’’anomie", places the emphasis on the way individuals and groups respond to 
social changes and social crises. As a society modernises, social conflicts are generated 
due to the uneven rate of modernisation. Fascism is a middle-class movement which aims 
at the prosperity of the middle classes, a middle way between the extremes of big capital 
and the organised labour.
In those countries in which the middle classes have suffered the effects o f 
particularly traumatic changes, their “displacement " and "availability ” may cause 
their mobilisation through political movements which provide the basis for
fascism The basic raison d'etre o f the regime is to consolidate a state o f affairs
considered able to enforce, for a considerable period o f time, both lower class 
“demobilisation ” and a moratorium on all aspects o f modernisation that may 
threaten the interests o f the coalition, even at the cost o f prolonged economic 
stagnation1
Fascism: A complex phenomenon
It is difficult to refute or disregard completely, any of the above mentioned 
theories, given that each one of them attaches importance to a particular aspect of the fascist 
phenomenon, based on scientific and empirical investigation.12 Although when examined
10 People such as Bloch, Lipsel, De Felice, Arendt among others have contributed to the development of 
this theory.
11 Gino Germani, “Political Socialisation o f Youth in Fascist Regimes”, in Authoritarian Politics in 
Modern Society, p.340.
12 My presentation of the main theories on fascism has been highly selective and I have chosen only those 
which might be relevant to the subsequent analysis on the Greek phenomenon. Stanley Payne in his book 
Fascism, presents the wide variety of approaches to the fascist phenomenon which shows the interest 
which such a theme has generated and at the same time, the very vagueness which surrounds such a term. 
According to Payne fascism has been seen as: 1. a dictatorial agent of monopoly capital (marxists), 2. a 
20th century form of Bonapartism (Thalhcimer), 3. the unique radicalism of the middle classes (Dc Felice),
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separately they may present shortcomings, viewed comparatively these analyses are helpful 
in appreciating all the aspects of fascism. By and large, fascism is a phenomenon of 
developed capitalist states, triggered by severe socio-economic crisis, which in the cases of 
industrialised economies, comes as a response to an organised working class movement; 
its power alliance combines the fascist party leadership, the traditional elites of industry, 
banking and the military; its social base is quite heterogeneous, composed of the 
economically underprivileged and dissatisfied members of society, ie. peasantry, urban 
poor, intellectuals, students and army officers; its social function is to transform to a 
certain degree capitalist property relationships and, at the same time, to ensure the social 
and economic domination of the capitalist class; it is a terrorist regime, fiercely anti­
communist, which rejects parliamentary democracy and allows no political opposition. 
Above all fascism uses an all-encompassing ideology to manipulate its mass following. 
Through the means of party mobilisation, it involves different sectors of the population in 
the support of a distinctively aggressive nationalistic discourse. As such the phenomenon 
of fascism acquires a timeless methodological value, while, at the same time, it is 
commonly regarded as historically specific, in that it is linked with the international 
historical conjuncture of the inter-war period.
The inter-war period saw a variety of types of authoritarian domination in different 
national settings, of a conservative, radical or fascist orientation, varying from the Italian 
fascist and Nazi regimes, to the milder dictatorships of the Balkans supported by the 
monarchy. While all inter-war dictatorships were fiercely opposed to the Stalinist example 
and were highly nationalistic, they differed in their structure and balance of power, the 
degree of social support which they enjoyed and their ideological discourses. The 
international predominance of fascism, however, manifested itself in the wide influence of 
fascist ideology and mode of organisation on most of the countries of Europe during the
4. the consequence of unique national histories, 5. the product of cultural or moral breakdown, 6. a unique 
“meta-political” phenomenon (Nolte), 7. the rise of the amorphous masses (Parsons, Arendt), 8. 20th 
century totalitarianism (Friedrich, Arendt), 9. the result of extreme neurotic and pathological impulses 
(Adorno), 10. resistance to modernisation, 11. a consequence of a certain stage of socio-economic growth or 
phase in the development sequence, (p. 177).
inter-war period. The existence of fascist political movements in almost all the European 
states shows the degree of internationalisation of the fascist phenomenon.
One of the striking characteristics of inter-war fascism was the seductive character 
of its ideology, its ability to attract the masses by offering them radically new ideals and 
expectations. While an indigenous and organised set of ideas was professed in the model 
cases of Italy and Germany, and was adopted whole-heartedly by other European fascist 
movements, most authoritarian regimes of the inter-war period resorted, in one way or 
another, to the importation and incorporation of disparate fascist themes in their political 
ideologies. In that sense, the distinction between the adoption of a fascist ideology by 
fascist regimes and movements, and the use of a fascist rhetoric by many inter-war 
authoritarian regimes, is crucial to the understanding of the influence of the fascist 
ideological discourse during the inter-war period. By fascist ideology, we mean mostly a 
systematic and all-embracing doctrine which claims to provide a complete and universal 
alternative theory of man and society to the already existing ideologies of liberalism and 
communism, and to derive therefrom a programme of political action. Its main themes 
included an aggressive nationalism, fierce anti-communism, a hostility towards democracy 
and liberalism, a cult of the leader and an obsession with collective organisation. Although 
from an intellectual point of view fascist ideology was a remarkable amalgam of disparate 
conceptions -and even claimed to be anti-intellectual-, its specific content was able to win 
massive popular support. The influence of fascist ideology was most prominent in the 
model regimes of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, where it became the official state 
ideology, as well as in the model movements of the Romanian Iron Guard, the Spanish 
Falange, and the Hungarian Arrow Cross. On the other hand, various fascist themes were 
imported and widely professed by most of the authoritarian regimes of the inter-war 
period, of a radical conservative or merely a monarchist-conservative nature, which did not 
claim to be fascist. In this case we are talking of the use of a fascist rhetoric, the 
importation of fascist ideas by non-fascist regimes and their incorporation into the domestic 
authoritarian ideologies.
To complicate the study of fascism further, the relationship between authoritarian 
regimes and fascist movements was even less uniform. The model cases of Italy and 
Germany aimed at subordinating the fascist and Nazi movements to a centrally controlled 
party bureaucracy. The authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe, committed for the most 
part to a fascist rhetoric, adopted a different mode of social organisation and political 
domination. The relationship between the fascist movements and the authoritarian right in 
many parts of Eastern Europe and the Iberian Peninsula took various forms. In some 
countries already existing fascist movements were suppressed by the authoritarian regimes 
-in Romania King Carol persecuted the members of the Iron Guard, in Portugal Salazar 
eliminated the “National Syndicalists” of the Rolao Preto . In others, fascist movements 
were used as a necessary complementary power base, in Spain the Falange was among 
the forces which supported the regime of Franco and became temporarily dominant in his 
right-wing coalition, between 1936 and 1942, and in Romania, the Legionari of the Iron 
Guard participated in the coalition government of General Antonescu in 1940-1941 (one of 
the few fascist movements to come to power and form a government). In some countries, 
such as Portugal and Greece, youth movements on the fascist and Nazi models were 
created from above, by dictatorships of a non-fascist character.
Hence, fascism, a rigo  rously nationalistic and xenophob'cpolitical ideology, 
acquired international appeal, although the way in which fascist influences were imported 
and incorporated into various distinct national contexts makes the comparative study of 
fascism a difficult project to pursue. Even nowadays, with a massive literature on the 
phenomenon and the existence of various methodological tools for such an analysis, there 
is no dominant theory on fascism, and neither is there any agreement as to which can be 
considered the model case. As Guy Hermet argues/tmodel of fascism as such does not 
exist. Instead he labels the Italian case as a “fascist prototype”, which did not manage to 
attain its ideological goal of the totalitarian organisation of Italian society; the Nazi case as 
one which approached most closely the ideal type of fascism, achieving a relative 
approximation between totalitarian Nazi ideology and practice, characterised by the 
imposition of radically new institutional mechanisms to serve the dictatorial functions of
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the state; the Franco period of 1937-1945 is referred to “pseudo-fascist”, and the Spanish 
fascist experiment “fascism by imitation”.13 What is more important in an examination of 
inter-war fascism is to appreciate the appeal of its ideological and organisational aspects 
throughout the European continent, as was shown by the adoption of various fascist 
aspects of ideology and mobilisation by regimes which could barely be characterised as 
fascist, as was the case with the Metaxas dictatorship.
Greek literature on the 4th o f August regime
While fascist regimes in the most industrialised parts of Europe originated in 
periods of severe socio-economic crisis and working class demands, in Greece, at the 
accession of the 4th of August regime in 1936, there was neither such an economic crisis, 
nor an organised and threatening working class movement. Although fascist dictatorships 
and most inter-war authoritarian regimes were preceded by strong fascist parties and youth 
movements, in inter-war Greece, apart from a few insignificant groups, there was no such 
influential movement. Similarly to its European counter-parts, the Greek dictatorial power 
structure involved an alliance of the traditional industrial elites, banking capital and the 
military, but unlike fascist regimes, it lacked the powerful base of a fascist party 
leadership. Whereas fascist ideology had penetrated all European societies either through 
party activists or through intellectuals, inter-war Greece lacked the influence of a fascist 
ideology or fascist intellectual thought. Whilst most fascist or “pseudo-fascist” regimes 
enjoyed support from some sectors of the population or parts of the political world, the 
Greek dictatorship came to power in a climate of apathy on the part of the Greek people 
and of feebleness on the part of the political world. Whereas most authoritarian regimes 
were personal dictatorships of powerful and/or charismatic personalities, Metaxas lacked 
charisma, and his power was mostly based on the King’s acquiescence.
Despite the differences with the fascist context, the 4th of August regime was 
affected by many influences from abroad, adopted much of the radical element in its
3^ Guy Hermet, “La Dynamique du Fascisme” in Aux Froniieres de la Democratic, PUF, Paris 1983, pp. 
125-149.
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government policy from its fascist counterparts, and imported many fascist ideological 
themes, although its nationalism was void of fascist extremities. The Greek dictatorial 
leadership made use of a strong and repressive police force which, however, never reached 
the totalitarian levels of terror achieved by Nazi Germany. The distinctive characteristic of 
the 4th of August regime was its effort to impose a youth movement from above, on the 
model of the fascist and Nazi youth movements, in order to create a social base and to 
legitimise its authoritarian rule.
Such differences and similarities have obfuscated the nature of the 4th of August 
regime, and the Greek dictatorship has been given labels ranging from “fascist”, to “quasi­
fascist”, to “reactionary”, and even “military dictatorship”, leading to a complete confusion 
as to what Metaxas’ rule really was. Above all, the dictatorship of Metaxas was the result 
of parliamentary crisis in inter-war Greek political life, marked by the polarisation of the 
political parties, the interventionist role of the military in politics, the inability of the 
professional politicians to form political alternatives, the peoples* disaffection with party- 
politics, in a society divided by regional, clientelistic and social conflicts.
A fascist regime
The first approach to the Greek authoritarian phenomenon considers it in terms of 
the crisis of the liberal parliamentary system, the frustrations of the petty-bourgeoisie in 
Greece and the latter’s contempt for the way parliamentarism was worked. Richter, baseq1 
on Nolte’s analysis on fascism, concentrates on the political, organisational and ideological 
structures of Greek fascism and claims that the regime of Metaxas was a fascist regime14 
(despite Nolte’s negation of the fascist nature of the Greek case). The persistent features of 
the Greek political context, according to Richter, were the existence of oligarchic 
parliamentary structures and the “petty-bourgeois mentality” of the Greek voter. Although 
there was never a pre-existing fascist party to support the dictatorship, the petty-bourgeois 
mentality of the Greek people, and their contempt for the way parliamentary politics
14 Heinz Richter, 1936-1946 Two Revolutions and Counter-Revolutions in Greece, Vol.l, Athens 1975, 
pp.58-73.
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worked, was a sufficient social base for the subsequent consolidation of fascism in 
Greece. The existing structures of the oligarchy allowed for the direct transformation of the 
clientelistic parties into fascism without the need of a mass movement, (p. 67) The 
dictatorship was a response to the international crisis which had affected the Greek 
economy, to the weakening of oligarchic parliamentarism and to the social unrest of the 
disaffected people. Due to the latter, Metaxas had to resort to the use of a fascist ideological 
discourse, identical to the Italian fascist discourse, as a safety valve for the taming of social 
unrest, (p 68) The “Fuhrerprinzip”, the youth movement, the fascist rhetoric, the security 
battalions and some socialist measures were the means to calm the working classes, on the 
one hand, and to woo the petty-bourgeoisie, on the other, (p.69)
Although Richter never defines the economic base of the Greek petty-bourgeoisie, 
he persistently refers to the latter’s acceptance of the 4th of August regime. It is thus never 
clear whether he talks of an economically dominant petty-bourgeois class or of a powerful 
petty-bourgeois mentality, characteristic of a distinct class consciousness. The petty 
bourgeoisie as a social force is a heterogeneous social formation, its class interests cannot 
be clearly defined, and its ideology comprises an amalgam of diverse and at times 
contradictory elements. Richter implicitly identifies passive acceptance of the dictatorship 
by the Greek petty-bourgeoisie with the active support of the Italian people for Mussolini’s 
institutions, thus separating fascism from its party-organisational and aggressive 
nationalistic aspect. He supports such a claim by stating thafw/iiVe the existence o f a 
fascist movement is crucial to an understanding o f western European fascism, this does not 
apply in the Greek case”, (p.67) However, one of the main features of fascism was the 
active ideological mobilisation of a heterogeneous class base. The passive support of the 
petty-bourgeoisie, by itself, does not constitute the social base of fascism, given that such 
a support can be given to all forms of authoritarian regimes, including to military 
dictatorships which are by no means fascist in character. Moreover, Richter provides no 
evidence for his claim that the petty-bourgeoisie was so tired of clientelistic practices as to 
lend its support to a fascist rhetoric; on the contrary, as he himself points out, “the Greek 
people were deeply anti-fascist, pro-British and anti-monarchist”, (p.71) What was the
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need then for a fascist “anti-capitalistic and anti-plutocratic rhetoric” to calm down the 
middle classes, in what he recognises was a “non-fascist society As to the clientelistic 
aspect of Greek politics, clientelism by itself is not accountable for political changes, as 
Richter seems to suggest, as it is a form of political association, a political relationship 
which reinforces conflicts but does not create them. It is a phenomenon which is common 
to both oligarchic parliamentary democracies and authoritarian regimes and is not, by itself, 
transformable into fascism or any other type of authoritarian regime.
Some Greek leftist historians have also labelled the Greek regime as fascist, 
influenced directly by the marxist conception of the phenomenon. According to them, the 
4th of August regime had all the internal and the external characteristics of a fascist 
dictatorship, ie. dictatorship of the oligarchy, repression, suppression of democratic 
liberties, propaganda against bourgeois democracy, parliamentarism and social- 
communism, and the effort to create a youth movement.15 Their analyses are a mechanical 
application of the original marxist approaches, and reflect no particular elaboration of the 
internal specificities of the Greek inter-war dictatorship. Elefantis, on the other hand, 
employs the marxist methodology of fascism in order to disprove the fascist nature of the 
Metaxas regime and considers it a mere dictatorial rule.16 There is no question in the mind 
of the author that “Greece during the 1930s was dictatorialised hut it was not fascistised ”. 
(p 201) While the Greek dictatorship took place in a period of the international dominance 
of monopoly capital, in inter-war Greece monopoly capitalism was not the dominant 
mode of production; on the contrary, we observe “the coexistence o f  pre-capitalist,
15 Linardalos, The 4th o f  August Regime, Athens 1988, p .96 and Psyroukis, Fascism and the 4th o f  
August Regime, Athens 1975. Andrikopoulos examines the phenomenon of Greek fascism in terms of 
military authoritarianism which had its roots in the period of Metaxas. Accordin^Cndrikopoulos, the army 
during the inter-war penod was divided between the militarist, pro-German faction and the monarchist pro- 
British faction of Greek officers. While he points out that a mass fascist movement w as never developed in 
Greece, the model of fascist control was created during the period of Metaxas and flourished later during the 
post-war period in the hands of a small military faction within the army. The dictatorship of Metaxas, 
according to Andrikopoulos, was supported by the pro-British king, the real leader of the dictatorship, 
banking and industrial capital, while the leader Metaxas had no particular power base and a fascist ideology 
w hich w as never accepted in Greek society. Hence Andrikopoulos sees the existence of fascism in Greece at 
a time when the fascist forces were defeated in the rest o f Europe. Andrikopoulos identifies the fascist 
phenomenon in Greece w ith military authoritarianism, in general, as a type of modem control, identified 
with the militaristic faction within the army .(The Roots o f  Greek Fascism, Athens 1977). Fascism is more 
than a dictatorial seizure of power, a distinction often neglected in many parts of the Greek literature on 
authoritarianism. It may have been supported by the army in Germany and Italy, but neither one o f them 
were military dictatorships, by whatever means one attempts to define this latter phenomenon.
16 Angelos Elefantis, The Promise o f an Impossible Revolution, Athens 1979.
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capitalist and monopolistic forms ofproduction”. (p. 186) Fascism, according to Elefantis, 
requires the fascistisation of the petty-bourgeoisie17 and the peasantry, from an ideological 
and an organisational point of view, which was not the case in Greece, given that the pre­
existing fascistoid organisations operated at the level of mere'*thuggery, strike-breaking 
and ‘paras tat ism' ” . During the 4th of August regime all we had was a 44vulgar fascistoid 
gabble ” . (p. 199) There was neither monopoly capitalism at the socio-economic level, nor 
fascistisation at the ideological/organisational level.
A “quasi-fascist” regime
A second approach, which concentrates on the balance at the elite level, emphasises 
that a strong dictator was able to impose his personal domination, and radically transform 
Greek society from above. Jon Kofas claims that the 4th of August dictatorship evolved 
from a conservative rule into an extreme authoritarian state ,“a quasi-fascist state”.18 At the 
initial stages, the regime rested necessarily on the power of the king and of the military 
establishment. Two years after his seizure of power, Metaxas was able to consolidate his 
authority vis-a-vis the king and to introduce the second phase of the regime, the “quasi­
fascist phase”, (p.vii) It was then, according to the author, that Greek society was radically 
transformed.
Kofas’ analysis is a typical example of the traditional Greek historiography, which 
focuses on individual leaders, and sees political developments as the results of their 
actions, while the masses are perceived as manipulated and repressed individuals. Kofas’ 
inability to grasp basic theoretical concepts leads him to the constant use of the terms 
“fascist”, “quasi-fascist” and “extremely authoritarian” to describe the character of 
Metaxas’ rule, while his misreading of the empirical evidence leads him to false 
conclusions such as “The dictator incorporated all institutions o f the country under the 
4Resurgent State ’. The economy, the labour and agrarian organisations, the press the
17 Elefantis recognises the existence of a highly developed Greek petty-bourgeoisie, which he identifies 
with the classes of tradesmen, craftsmen and un-productive wage-eamers of the private and especially the 
public sector, (p. 186).
18 Jon Kofas Authoritarianism in Greece, Columbia University Press, 1983.
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church, education and practically every institution in Greece was radically transformed by 
the end o f 1938”. (p.207) In other words, we are supposed to believe that the 4th of 
August regime managed to impose a totalitarian rule over the whole of Greek society, and 
that fascist totalitarianism, so incomplete in the “prototype” Italian fascist case, succeeded 
in radically altering Greek institutions between 1939 and the end of the Metaxas 
dictatorship.
A reactionary regime
D. H. Close, by comparing the 4th of August dictatorship with five different 
authoritarian regimes of the inter-war period, - those of Hitler, Mussolini, Petain, Salazar 
and Franco - presents a meaningful attempt at a comparative study of the character of the 
Metaxas rule.19 Based on Stanley Payne’s analysis of fascism,20 he divides the 
authoritarian regimes of the inter-war period into two main categories: “fascist” and 
“reactionary”. The German and the Italian cases fitted the fascist category, and the other 
four, while sharing some elements with the fascist type, were basically reactionary in 
character. He presents the similarities and the differences between the six regimes, by 
pointing out the conservative and the radical elements in their ideas and practices, implicitly 
connecting the radical elements with fascism, and the conservative elements with reaction. 
Or better, while fascist regimes were very radical in their approach towards society at 
large, reactionary regimes shared both radical and conservative elements. The regime of 
Metaxas, on the one hand, established an unprecedented police-state, was anti- 
parliamentary, created a youth movement and showed a concern for the economically 
underprivileged (radical elements) and, on the other hand, promoted the privileges of the 
bourgeois classes, was supported by financial and business circles and was based on the 
anti-Venizelist state machinery (conservative elements).
D.H. Close, The Character o f  the Metaxas Dictatorship; An International Perspective, Centre of 
Contemporary Greek Studies, 1990.
20 See Stanley Payne’s Fascism; Comparison and Definition, where the writer distinguishes fascist 
movements from the non-fascist authoritarian right, and sees three faces of authoritarian nationalism, ie. 
fascism, radical right and conservative right, (pp.16-17).
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Close’s distinction between fascists and reactionaries is based on the regimes’ 
attitudes towards “revolution”, “nationalism”, “religion” and the “official elites”. Thus 
reactionary regimes were anti-revolutionary, non-expansionary in their nationalism, with a 
pacific foreign policy, they extolled the virtues of a religious, puritanical morality and, 
finally, they respected the official establishment -civil service, officers of the armed forces 
and police, the judiciary and the academic world. Fascists on the other hand, had a 
revolutionary dynamism, they pursued territorial expansion, they were openly anti-clerical 
and atheist and they showed no respect for the ethos of the state officials, (pp.l 1-15)
Close’s analysis of the 4th of August regime is a sufficiently documented and 
fruitful comparison with other contemporary regimes, such as is rarely or only roughly 
made by other analysts, who concentrate exclusively on the Greek case. Close is able to 
identify the differences between the natures of the various regimes, and is able better to 
appreciate what is fascist and what is not about their ideology and practice. At the same 
time he draws attention to the special amalgam of ideas and policies of the inter-war 
regimes; while some of them were not fully-fledged fascist cases, they were able to adopt 
some radical fascist elements in their ideologies and dared to pursue some extreme policies, 
which were not congruent with their conservative nature.
While the differences between fascist and reactionary regimes are quite clear-cut in 
Close’s work, the writer fails to give his definition of reaction. Therefore, we are expected 
to take the specific ideas and policies of the regimes as the definitional characteristics of his 
terms “fascists” and “reactionaries”. A discussion on a reactionary regime has to specify 
what exactly “it was reaction to”. A reactionary attitude is usually connected with a 
negative response to a “perceived” unacceptable previous situation. This may imply that a 
reactionary opposes a radical change or reform, wants to re-establish a political order 
which has been overthrown by radicals, or wants to avoid an alternative perceived as 
negative. Nazi attitudes, although radical in most respects, were also significantly 
counter-revolutionary and reactionary, with respect to the country’s recent traumatic past, 
the experience and frustrations of the First World War and the socio-political crisis of the 
1930s. Moreover, fascist ideology, more than anything else, was a synthesis of negations
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towards well established international ideologies. In the Greek case, Close fails to indicate 
whether the regime of Metaxas was a reaction to the previous Venizelist state, or to the 
potential alternative of communism. The reactionaries’ attitudes towards nationalism, for 
instance, were hardly reactionary, given that Metaxas’ pacific and defensive foreign policy 
could hardly be seen as reactionary, constituting as it did a continuation of the previous 
foreign policy. As Close himself points out “the reactionary leaders were like any other 
conventional statesmen in being guided by a level-headed calculation o f national interests 
and viewing domestic stability as more important than foreign expansion ” . (p.l 1) The 
same was true of the attitudes towards religion and the state bureaucracy, in that the 4th of 
August regime’s support for the Church and its respect for the previous hierarchies 
reflected a conventional attitude towards the status quo, with no will to change the previous 
conservative nature of the state establishment. The Spanish regime of Franco, on the other 
hand, was still more reactionary, due to the deep divisions in Spanish society during the 
civil war and the preceding radical policies of the Republican government.
Be that as it may, the term “reactionary” cannot be considered a category in the 
classification of authoritarian regimes, as it mostly refers to the type of ideology adopted 
and the particular policies pursued by a given regime. It can also used to describe a 
right-wing parliamentary regime which holds reactionary attitudes with regard to a 
previous more radical system of beliefs. Usually reactionary regimes, as such, are unable 
to provide specific alternatives, they are backward-looking and rarely innovators of any 
type of change. As will be shown later, in the case of the 21st of April regime, the military 
junta was of a much more reactionary nature than the 4th of August regime, and the bulk of 
its ideology and policy was oriented towards the negation and reversal of the previous 
Centre-Union reforms, and an all-embracing reaction to the 1960s socio-political 
mobilisation.
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Contradictions among the hegemonic forces
There is a tendency to view the dynamics of the Metaxas regime as a result of the 
conflicting interplay between the hegemonic forces, at the elite level. The conflict is 
personified in the different attitudes and perceptions of the king, on the one hand, and the 
dictator Metaxas, on the other. The king, influenced by his admiration for the British 
liberal system, regarded the coup as an authoritarian interval, and stressed the provisional 
character of the dictatorship. Metaxas regarded the dictatorial form of government as the 
most appropriate political form, being influenced by the authoritarian international context. 
This difference in attitudes reflected, according to Alivisatos, the different orientations of 
the pro-German and the pro-British factions of the Greek dominant classes.21 The 
competition between these two took form within the context of the political and economic 
influence of the two Great powers, Germany and Britain, over Greece. Both factions, 
however, were in agreement as to the abolition of parliamentary institutions at that 
particular point in history.
The basic contradiction, according to Alivisatos, was between the attraction of the 
fascistoid discourse of the dictatorship, on the one hand, and the country’s strategic 
position in relation to the liberal democracies of the West, on the other. The “New State” of 
Metaxas, claims that author, was characterised by a lack of popular support and an 
ideological and organisational confusion, which prevented it from imposing a fascist 
ideology on Greek society. The ideology of the 4th of August regime never managed to 
rise above the level of “chanting o f slogans and propaganda ”, marked by a “vulgar anti­
communism, a moralistic anti-parliamentarism and a vague nationalism ” and remained at 
the level of “an ideological and organisational empiricism ”, according to which the 
formulation of governing principles remained constantly on the agenda, (p.l 10)
The post-war liberal context
The Greek dictatorship of 1967 took place within the post-fascist international 
context, marked by the dominance of liberal democracy in the countries of Western Europe
21 Nicos Alivisatos, Political Institutions in Crisis, 1922-1974, Athens 1986.
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and the imposition of communist rule in the countries of Eastern Europe. The only 
remnants of the fascist formula in Western Europe, the Spanish and the Portuguese 
dictatorships, survived the post-war transition to the western liberal context by abandoning 
the fascist elements of their political philosophy, and by becoming part of the Western 
European, anti-communist capitalist bloc. The 21st of April regime, a post-war “liberal” 
dictatorial regime, has been viewed in the context of right-wing military regimes in the 
more developed parts of the developing world, and has been mostly compared with the 
Southern European dictatorships of Spain and Portugal, and with the Latin American 
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes, while it has also been confused with fascism. Let it be 
said at the outset that the use of the term “liberal”, does not imply any connection with 
liberal politics practiced in pluralist democracies, with their emphasis on political freedom, 
the defence of human and constitutional rights, and a stress on welfare economics. On the 
contrary, the regimes we are about to examine had nothing to do with the promotion of 
such liberal issues. By “liberal”, in the post-war authoritarian context, we mostly want to 
emphasise the regimes’ connection with the Western capitalist bloc, their antipathy towards 
communism, and, in particular, their contrast with the anti-liberal rhetoric of the inter-war 
fascists. By and large, the “liberal” authoritarian regimes of Western Europe and Latin 
America focused on the promotion of market economic activity, supported close links with 
domestic capitalist elites and foreign capital, favoured the private sector of the economy 
and held pro-Western affiliations in their foreign policy. Indeed most of the right-wing 
military regimes intentionally used the euphemistic term “liberal” to point out the benign 
character of their rule, to cover the repressive aspects of their authority under the veneer of 
a constitutional legality.
The difference with the fascist context
The comparison of the post-war “liberal” dictatorial regimes of Southern Europe 
and Latin America with the inter-war European dictatorships has been unavoidable, due to 
the special role of the military as a supporting pillar of these regimes in both cases, and the 
fiercely anti-communist character of all these dictatorships. Let it be said, at the outset, that
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the two historical periods presented wide differences both at the national and the 
international levels. All the inter-war dictatorships were in one way or another vulnerable 
to fascist influence, in terms of ideology, style and the attraction of more extreme 
solutions. Most of them enjoyed the legitimising support of the monarchy. They were tom 
by ethnic, linguistic and cultural conflicts, which aggravated social tensions. During the 
inter-war period there was a compromise between the fascist radical authoritarianism and 
the conservative right-wing authoritarianism, leaving in many countries the blurred and 
confused image of “fascistoid” dictatorships. Whether one likes to call the authoritarianism 
of the inter-war period fascist or not, the fact remains that it was a special type of 
authoritarianism in a completely idiosyncratic style of domination and with a distinct 
ideological and organisational structure.
On the other hand, the post-war period saw a radically different international 
context, marked by the militaiy defeat of international fascism, the decline of the European 
imperialist powers, the onset of the bipolar cold-war period, higher levels of growth in the 
western economies, greater levels of organisation and mobilisation within western civil 
societies, and the internationalisation of capitalist production. The legitimate post-war 
international alternatives were limited to the division between liberalism vs communism. At 
the domestic level, the Southern European and Latin American dictatorships lacked the 
legitimising pillar of the monarchy, the ethnic and cultural conflicts of the societies of inter- 
war Europe (with the exception of Spain) and the influence of a fascist authoritarian 
framework, and were placed under the dominant US sphere of influence. They imposed 
their authoritarian rule in the midst of higher levels of economic growth and 
industrialisation, more modernised civil societies, the unequivocal acceptance of liberal 
capitalism and the fierce opposition to communism.
The exceptional state
Poulantzas considers the distinction between the two authoritarian cases of the 
inter-war fascist and the post-war military regimes and regards them as different forms of 
the “exceptional capitalist state”. The prime function of fascism, according to Poulantzas,
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was to encourage the economic, political and ideological domination of monopoly capital. 
Extending his functionalist analysis of authoritarian regimes to the post-war dictatorial 
regimes of Southern Europe, the author emphasises the relationship between the nature of 
the regimes and the stage of international capitalist development which had been reached in 
the post-war era, and the particular phase of imperialism.
The question can only be posed accurately by studying both the political crisis to 
which the exceptional state is a response, and the particular kinds o f political crises 
to which its specific forms correspond. But this requires, first o f all, an analysis of 
the question o f the historical period o f capitalist formations within which these 
political crises and exceptional regimes occur. To avoid foundering in abstract 
typology, we have to make clear that the kinds o f political crises which produce 
any given form o f exceptional regimes, still have features which vary according to 
the period in which they arise. Nineteenth-century differs from twentieth-century 
Bonapartism, and the same is true for military dictatorships and fascism. 22 
Moreover Poulantzas argues that the post-war military dictatorships of Spain 
Portugal and Greece, a different form of the “exceptional state”, coincided with a new type 
of industrialisation, dependent on foreign capital. The character of these dictatorial regimes 
was marked, at the internal level, by the conflict between two factions of the bourgeoisie, 
the “domestic bourgeoisie” and the “comprador bourgeoisie”. Poulantzas sees the domestic 
divisions and strategic differentiations of endogenous capital in the light of a 
polarisation between those who leaned towards American capital and those who leaned 
towards the ascendant European capital. The domestic bourgeoisie sought closer links with 
the EEC, as a counter-weight to the US comprador connection, whose interests were 
overwhelmingly promoted by the dictatorial regimes.23 The reorganisation of the state 
apparatuses, however, entailed contradictions and increasing tensions, which had the effect 
of setting under way the processes which led to the overthrow of these regimes. While the
22 Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship, p.16.
23 Nicos Poulantzas, The Crisis o f  the Dictatorships: Spain, Portugal, Greece, New Left Books 1976.
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fascist regimes were militarily defeated, the military dictatorships’ downfall was caused by 
their inherent contradictions.24
Poulantzas’ analysis has been criticised in that it does not establish the existence of 
a domestic bourgeoisie and the latter’s conflicts with the comprador, which he sees as the 
dynamic behind the rise, and collapse of these regimes. It is also seen as an economistic 
analysis, in that Poulantzas tries necessarily to find an economic reason for every 
transformation in the political superstructure. Moreover despite the author’s intention, there 
is a “dysfunctional! st bias” inherent in his approach to military dictatorships, in that he 
emphasises the internal contradictions of the military dictatorships, and a “functionalist 
bias” in the analysis of fascist regimes, the latter, having been functional for monopoly 
capital, collapsed because they were defeated militarily.25
The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian model
The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian (B-A) model, based initially on the conception of 
Guillermo O’Donnell, was prevalent in the more advanced Latin American countries, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, and has largely influenced the perception on the 
Latin American military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s. As with the exceptional state 
model, this analysis searches for socio-economic structural determinants in the dynamics 
of the post-war liberal dictatorships. Their rise is connected with the inter-play of three 
crucial aspects of socio-economic growth: (a) the exhaustion of the Import-substitution- 
industrialisation (ISI) phase and the need for the “deepening” of industrial production, (b) 
the mobilisation of the popular sector and (c) the growing importance of “technocratic 
roles” in these societies. The B-A systems were exclusionary and non-democratic, in 
character, and their dominant coalition included high-level technocrats, military officers
24 He claims that increasing tensions and divisions within the stale itself -ideological state apparatuses 
(ISA) and repressive state apparatuses (RSA)- resulted from ideological and political differences between the 
power bloc and a state personnel predominantly recruited from the pctty-bourgeoisie and the peasantry. 
These contradictions within the state apparatuses of the military dictatorships resulted in the overthrow of 
these regimes “by virtue o f  their accumulation and condensation”, ie. internal splits within the ISA - 
Church, education, Press, legal system- and the RSA itself. See Poulantzas, The Crises o f  the 
Dictatorships: Spain, Portugal and Greece, pp.90-126.
25 For a critique on Poulantzas’ analysis see Bob Jessop, Nicos Poulantzas, pp 280-281, and Nicos 
Mouzelis, Facets o f Underdevelopment, pp.132-133, and “Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece” 
in New Left Review, No 76, March-April 1976, pp.78-79 .
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and civilians, and was associated with foreign capital. These regimes were, in some 
respects, dynamic and forward-looking, in that they sought for a fundamental restructuring 
of the domestic economy, particularly in its relationship to foreign capital. The 
bureaucratic-authoritarian model has been extended to cover the later Franco period in 
Spain and to several of the inter-war dictatorships in eastern Europe. However, with 
respect to the latter cases, there is the distinction between the bureaucratic-military- 
oligarchical power alliance of the inter-war dictatorships and the bureaucratic-technocratic- 
military coalition of the post-war Latin American dictatorships. I shall not dwell on any 
critique of O’Donnell’s B-A thesis, as this has been amply done by numerous authors, 
with respect to the model’s methodological value and its applicability in the different Latin 
American countries. Despite criticism, the B-A model remains a very systematic and 
powerful analysis of post-war Latin American development.26
Right-wing military rule
The above presentation shows the lack of a systematic comparative framework, as 
was the case with fascism, in which to incorporate the post-war “liberal” dictatorships. The 
distinctive feature of post-war liberal authoritarianism, and a common point among the 
various military dictatorships of the more developed semi-periphery, lies in the crucial role 
of the army in politics and the officers’ tendency to intervene in the political process and to 
assume the role of political rulers. A whole range of analyses, concentrating on the role of 
the militaiy in politics and the state of civil-military relations in different national contexts, 
have tried to view comparatively the various cases of militaiy interventions in politics and 
the dynamics behind the military regimes. While these works present as broad a range of 
theories as the cases involved, there are some very general common themes on the subject 
of right-wing military rule. Robert Pinkney, for instance, believes that right-wing military 
governments are most commonly found in the economically more developed countries of 
the Third World -Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, South Korea, Turkey- while the
26 See Guillermo O’ Donnell, Modernisation andBureaucratic-Authoritarianism, for the original analysis, 
and the New Authoritarianism in Latin America, by David Collier (ed), for the application, the extension 
and the critique of the model.
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phenomenon of armies actually taking over governments belongs mainly to the second half 
of the 20th century. He then identifies some of the common themes of right-wing military 
attitudes, such as: (a) exclusion from power or repression of working-class groups or 
groups favouring equality; (b) preference for the private sector; (c) willingness to pursue 
policies which lead to greater social inequality; (d) discouragement of popular participation 
in politics; (e) pro-western foreign policies; (f) use of anti-communist and anti-socialist 
rhetoric; (g) appeals to traditional values extolling such institutions as the family, the 
church, past national glory; (h) claims to legitimacy based on the need for “order”; (i) close 
links with civilian landed and capitalist elites; (j) the involvement of soldiers in business 
activity; (k) a free market orientated economic policy, as regards the internal economy, and 
in relation to foreign capital.27 Such common attitudes give a very general impression of 
most right-wing military regimes and clearly distinguish them from the authoritarian cases 
of the inter-war period.
Greek literature on the 21st of April regime
The intervention of the 1967 military regime came at a time when Greek society 
was markedly different, in terms of its level of organisation, mobilisation and 
modernisation, from what it had been in the inter-war period. The 21st of April regime was 
a reaction to the socio-political mobilisation of the 1960s and the crisis of the post-war 
parliamentary system. Unlike the B-A regimes of Latin America, the 21st of April regime 
did not originate in an economic crisis, and its power structure did not include a coalition 
of politicians, technocrats and the military. The military junta alienated the professional 
political world and included in its ranks mostly military officers and a few loyal civilians. 
The 21st of April regime was a typical case of a collective military dictatorship, distinct 
from the personal character of the 4th of August regime. Apart from the very early stages 
of the dictatorship, the Greek authoritarian regime did not even enjoy the legitimising 
support of the King. Unlike the regimes of the inter-war period, the regime did not employ 
a consistent authoritarian ideology, apart from an extreme anti-communist rhetoric. On the
27 Robert Pinkney, Right-Wing Military Government, London 1990, pp.14-21.
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contrary, it tried to present a pseudo-liberal ideology, to match its pro-Western foreign 
policy and its free-market orientated economic policy, similar to the Iberian and the Latin 
American dictatorships. The 21st of April regime did not attempt to create a party or a 
youth movement, but ruled mostly through the means of repression and the exclusion of 
any opposing tendencies.
The 1967 military dictatorship has been analysed by many authors and journalists, 
but due to its recentness, most of the analyses have largely reflected the ideological 
predilections of the writers rather than a more systematic approach. It has been seen in the 
context of US hegemony over Greek internal affairs, in the context of post-war neo- 
fascism and for what it was, a military coup d’etat, distinct from both fascism and 
totalitarianism.
A US satellite
An interpretation much favoured by Greek analysts of a communist affiliation, 
regards the military dictatorship of 1967 in the context of the post-war superpower conflict 
and behind-the-scenes machinations of US agencies. It is mostly through the 
spectrum of US hegemony and the country’s subordinate position, that the nature of the 
dictatorship is best appreciated. Analysts of such an orientation go as far as to characterise 
the military junta as a totalitarian and fascist form of political rule. It was established and 
sustained by the Americans in order to promote US interests in the Mediterranean basin, 
given that the strategic, geopolitical location of the country was vital to American military 
planning.28 This type of approach leaves little room for an examination of the domestic 
elites’ choices, and does not consider their ideological allegiances and policies, which are 
seen as being exclusively dictated by the superpower. Naturally such an analysis is totally 
insufficient, in that it minimises the importance of the domestic variables and focuses on 
factors outside the country’s internal domain. However, the fact remains that even in cases 
of high superpower dependence, there is always some room for domestic manoeuvre, at
28 See Nicos Psyroukis, History o f  Modern Greece (1967-1974), Athens 1983. He claims that the 
imposition of the military dictatorship was encouraged by the US administration in order to achieve the 
of Cyprus. Once this goal was accomplished in 1974, the junta lost its raison d'etre  and 
collapsed, being of no more use to the Americans.
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least to the extent that such an international interference is accepted and supported by 
domestic forces. Although the US acted as a sustaining and legitimating pillar of the Greek 
and the Latin American dictatorships, just as the Soviet Union sustained the eastern 
European and the Third World dictatorships of a communist orientation , to attribute the 
preponderant role to the secret machinations of powerful international agencies is both hard 
to prove and to disprove. Superpowers, in the post-war period, tried by various ways to 
secure the allegiance of their “satellite states”, while at the same time those “satellites”, to a 
greater or lesser degree, allowed such interference. Be that as it may, it is all too clear that 
during the post-war period the United States played an exceptionally interventionist role in 
Greece’s internal affairs at the political, economic and ideological levels. The US, through 
its contribution the victory of the anti-communist forces during the civil war, secured a 
major posi boy] in the political and economic development of post-war Greece and was a 
powerful pillar of the 21st of April regime.
A neo-fascist dictatorship
According to other analysts, the 21st of April regime was characterised as “neo- 
fascist”, a post-war form of the inter-war fascist regimes. Its main pillars of support were 
the military, the Security Police, the secret agencies and the “para-state” organisations.29 
Moreover, in order to strengthen their claim, the supporters of the neo-fascist theory argue 
that there were connections between the 21st of April regime and the collaborators from the 
period of the Nazi occupation, and also with people who had been associated with the 
Metaxas regime and with neo-fascist organisations in Italy or Germany. Since neo-fascist 
regimes lacked the inter-war type mass parties, they had to rely on the most reactionary and 
militaristic forces of their respective societies. Those who argued the neo-fascist character 
of the Greek regime, saw Greece’s neo-fascist counterparts in the dictatorships of Spain, 
Portugal and the Latin America military regimes, all of them similarly backed by the 
“hegemonic classes” and the imperialist powers. The extreme anti-communism of these
29 Stavros Zorbalas, Neo-fascism in Greece (1967-1974), Athens 1978 and Giuseppe Gandi, Neo-fascism 
in Europe, Athens 1975.
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post-war neo-fascist regimes was considered to be the common link with and the main 
legacy of the inter-war fascist ideology.
While there have indisputably been neo-fascist movements in many post-war 
western, capitalist societies, to label an authoritarian regime “neo-fascist” requires more 
proof than some international neo-fascist connection. In fact it is completely erroneous to 
speak of the existence of neo-fascist regimes at all, given that such movements have not 
succeeded in capturing power. The phenomenon of neo-fascist movements which have 
spread all over Europe, the United States and South Africa has been a reality since the 
military defeat of fascism, and has taken the form of conspiratorial groups, movements and 
parties. Especially currently, in many European countries, neo-fascist tendencies have 
acquired frightful proportions.30 Characterised by fanaticism in their beliefs, the neo- 
fascists concentrate mostly on the use of a racist, anti-Semitic and highly nationalistic 
rhetoric, and do not have a consistent ideology as was the case with the all-embracing and 
influential inter-war fascist ideology. Moreover, the racist rhetoric of the neo-fascists is 
different from that of their predecessors, aimed at immigrant workers more than Jews, 
who are currently blamed for economic problems such as unemployment. As regards 
Greece, it would be difficult for a country which barely produced any fascist organisations 
during the period of fascism, to have neo-fascist groups after the defeat of fascism. To call 
the regime of the 21st April regime fascist or neo-fascist is a misreading of the military 
junta’s authoritarianism and attributes an ideological consistency nonexistent in the minds 
of the military rulers.
A military coup d' etat
Among the few systematic analyses of the nature of the military dictatorship, that of 
Hariton Koryzis, tried to place the Greek case in the wider typology of authoritarian 
regimes.31 Having clearly distinguished the Greek military dictatorship from totalitarian
30 Among the most commonly known are the National Democratic Party (NPD) in West Germany, the 
Italian Social Movement (MSI), and the currently powerful National Front in France and the Freedom Party 
in Austria.
31 Hariton Koryzis, The Authoritarian Regime, Athens 1975.
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and fascist regimes, Koryzis claimed that the 1967 dictatorship was a coup d’ etat, 
exclusively military in character, a typical case of a military dictatorship, whereby a faction 
of military rulers tried to institutionalise a “dictatorialised democracy” or a “democratic 
dictatorship”. The Greek inter-war coups d’ etats, on the contrary, were connected with 
political parties or movements and the army officers intervened in the political process, 
either backed by or in collaboration with politicians. They never assumed political power 
directly as was the case with the military junta. ( p. 147) Koryzis concluded that the 
instigators of the 1967 coup d’etat, motivated by personal interests and ambitions, ruled by 
conspiratorial means, their main effort being to promote the interests of the military within 
the power structure.
The two authoritarian cases compared
While the subject of the two Greek dictatorial regimes has been approached in quite 
a large variety of ways, their comparative nature has not been adequately analysed. Where 
such comparison has been undertaken, it has not been the central issue in most works, and 
has basically concentrated on similarities between the two dictatorships, leaving the 
impression that the dictatorship of Metaxas had in many ways been the precursor of the 
1967 military junta or that the Metaxas dictatorship influenced the ideology and policies the 
1967 military regime. Apart from some broad and obvious generalisations regarding the 
authoritarian exercise of power, the specificities of the two dictatorships have never been 
viewed in a comparative way.
The dictatorship of Metaxas, a regime during the inter-war period of fascist 
authoritarianism in Europe, was a personal rule, enjoying the support of the king, the 
senior hierarchy of the military establishment and the official anti-Venizelist elites, 
dominant at that particular historical juncture. The dictatorship of the military junta, on the 
other hand, was a military dictatorship, in that for the first time a group of Greek military 
officers became state rulers, in a period when west European liberal democracy was 
dominant. They were both right-wing conservative dictatorships, of an exclusionary,
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repressive, anti-communist and anti-parliamentary character. Both cases meet Juan Linz’s 
widely accepted definition of authoritarianism, according to which:
Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited’ not responsible political 
pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, 
without extensive nor intensive political mobilisation, except at some points in their 
development, and in which a leader, or occasionally a small group, exercises 
power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones. 32 
According to this definition, authoritarian regimes are regarded by Linz in the light 
of three very important aspects. Firstly, they allow a degree of limited pluralism, unlike the 
almost unlimited pluralism in democracies, on the one hand, and the complete lack of 
pluralism -’’monopolistic control” by the central authority- in totalitarian regimes, on the 
other. Secondly, the specific nature of their belief system is of a non-elaborate ideology, as 
opposed to the more or less intellectually elaborate totalitarian ideology -a “holistic 
conception of man and society”. Thirdly, they have a limited level of political mobilisation, 
tending to encourage political apathy and the demobilisation of the population, or a limited 
and controlled mobilisation, as opposed to the active one encouraged, and controlled by 
totalitarian elites.
Based on these defining characteristics of authoritarianism, Linz offers a typology 
of authoritarian regimes, a number of sub-types -’’bureaucratic-military authoritarian 
regimes”, “organic statism”, “mobilisational authoritarian regimes”, “post-independence 
mobilisational regimes” and “post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes”- ideal types in the 
Weberian sense which do not fully correspond to any particular regime but approximate to 
one or another case. Of these types, the “mobilisational authoritarian regime” type, and the 
“bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime” type are relevant to the two dictatorships in 
question. The mobilisational authoritarian regimes existed during the inter-war period, and 
were “the outcome o f the fascist mobilisation o f a variety o f interests and ideological and 
emotional commitments among the citizens o f the democracies in crisis in the Europe o f the 
inter-war years.” (p.279) Fascism, according to Linz introduced a mobilisational, populist
32 Linz, ‘Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes”, op.cit., p.264.
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component, with some types of voluntary political participation, inspired by ideological 
discontent with the status quo and demanding social change, which differentiated 
authoritarian mobilisational regimes from other types. While in the cases of the 
mobilisational authoritarian regimes the rulers tended to rely on ideological formulations to 
sustain the mobilisational organisation, in the cases of bureaucratic-military rule, one can 
mostly only speak of the mentalities of the rulers and should pay less attention to the 
ideological formulations of such regimes, (p. 320) Bureaucratic-military authoritarian 
regimes are composed of a coalition in which army officers predominate, who lack 
commitment to a specific ideology, but who act pragmatically within the limits of their 
bureaucratic mentality. Moreover, they do not tend to create a mass party, (p 285) Fascist 
mobilisational authoritarian regimes are “less pluralistic, more ideological and more 
participatory than bureaucratic-military regimes....further from liberalism, from individual 
freedom from political constraint but closer to offering citizens a chance to participate, less 
conservative and more change oriented ”. (p.321)
The 4th of August regime incorporated many elements of the fascist mobilisational 
authoritarian type, with respect to its ideology, and its attempt at mobilisation. It also 
shared some characteristics with the bureaucratic-authoritarian type with respect to the 
composition of its elite structure. The 21st of April regime, on the other hand, shared a few 
characteristics with the bureaucratic-military cases, with regard to the lack of a coherent 
ideological discourse and of an active mass party, although the predominance of military 
officers in the elite structure, and the lack of high-level technocrats clearly differentiates it 
from the B-A regimes of Latin America.
Both dictatorships followed previous domestic socio-political and ideological 
crises. Each of them responded in a particular way to the perceived crises in which they 
intervened. The differences in the dominant international environments, the pre-existing 
socio-economic context and the level of the previous political and ideological crisis 
determined the internal logic of each dictatorial intervention, La, the way authoritarian 
power was exercised, organised and linked with society, as well as the nature of the belief 
system which sustained its power. I shall be viewing these issues through the examination
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of two inter-related aspects of Greek authoritarianism, the use of authoritarian ideology and 
the control over the education of the youth.
Authoritarian belief system: Ideologies vs mentalities
Dictatorial rulers, once in power, are forced to create an alternative base of 
legitimacy to replace that of the democracies they have destroyed, since they cannot base 
their rule solely on mechanisms of coercion and fear. Legitimacy is what is required in 
order to achieve a measure of support and consent from civil society, offering justification 
for the ruler to rule and contributes to the maintenance of authoritarian power. It relates to 
the peoples’ support and compliance, based on a conviction of the rightfulness of the 
regime and of the ruler’s commands. While authoritarian elites regard their intervention as 
necessary and inevitable, they feel compelled to persuade the people of the “beneficiary” 
character of their rule. The ideological formula is deemed necessary for the legitimation of 
all authoritarian regimes and, for that reason, dictatorships make a constant use of the 
ideological means of communication. Every dictatorship attempts to justify its imposition, 
to legitimate its exceptional nature of domination and to stabilise its rule on the basis of an 
authoritarian ideological discourse. Hence, the dictatorial elites make ample use of a 
garrulous rhetoric, in order to achieve the necessary popular acceptance of their supporting 
authoritarian ideologies or even myths. By authoritarian ideology we mean the set of ideas 
espoused by the authoritarian elites and their theoreticians by which they interpret their 
current reality, justify their actions and define their goals.33 The specific system of ideas 
which is imposed upon civil societies, reflects the rulers’ perception of their contemporary 
economic, social, political and cultural environment.
Inter-war authoritarian regimes relied extensively on the adoption of an ideological 
discourse for the interpretation of their environment, and claimed to hold an all-embracing 
political philosophy. Indeed a relatively large amount of research has been devoted to
33 According to Mark Hagopian, the specific functions of ideologies under authoritarian rule consist in: a. 
the interpretation of reality, b. the mobilisation of the social sectors and c. the legitimation of authoritarian 
ru\e.(Ideals and Ideologies o f  Modern Politics, pp.7-lQ) Another function of ideology, according to 
Schapiro, prevalent in totalitarian regimes, is “the inducement of moral anaesthesia by means of ideology”, 
the neutralisation of the masses by means of ideology in order to direct the hatred of the masses against a 
particular class or race. (Leonard Schapit o ,Totalitarianism, Macmillan 1972, p.57)
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fascist ideology and its influence throughout Europe, and it has been treated as one of the 
main ideologies of the 20th century. Post-war liberal dictatorships, on the other hand, 
lacked a consistent system of beliefs and their ideologies reflected clearly the mentalities of 
the rulers. The subject pf mentalities, as an important determinant of social and political 
behaviour has been scarcely examined by analysts, due to the difficulty of carrying out an 
empirical analysis of it. While ideologies which form a theoretical framework have been 
studied systematically by several influential schools of thought, the study of mentalities is 
more empirical and thus much more difficult to detect and prove. Yet, it is a concept useful 
in many discussions of the way rulers and anonymous masses perceive their social 
environment and highly explanatory of the way certain ideas and attitudes have endured 
through time and space. According to Theodor Geiger
Ideologies are systems o f thought more or less intellectually elaborated and 
organised, often in written form, by intellectuals, pseudo-intellectuals, or with their 
assistance.Mentalities are ways o f thinking andfeeling, more emotional than 
rational, that provide non-codified ways o f reacting to different
situations Mentality is intellectual attitude; ideology is intellectual content. 34
Michel Vovelle, a historian of mentalities, examines the history of collective 
behaviour in its relation to the endurance of certain mentalities towards religion, death, and 
culture in general. He perceives history in the context of the autonomy of the mental 
universe and the latter’s irreducibility into economic and social factors. He considers the 
notion of mentalities as wider in scope than the notion of ideology.
Mentalities include a system o f mental realities which are unformulated, apparently 
meaningless and which lead an underground existence at the level o f unconscious 
motivation....By their undeniably vague nature, mentalities are more adaptable and 
capable o f responding to the needs o f a research undertaken without 
presuppositions. 35 
Moreover, Markoff adds that
See Juan Linz ‘Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes”, p.267.
33 Michel Vovelle Ideologies and Mentalities, Polity Press 1990.
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An ideology is a more or less elaborate doctrine which embraces the holder with 
sufficient force, which is sufficiently elaborate in its details and which has 
sufficient coherence that it can seriously constrain behaviour. A mentality, on the 
other hand, is more a set o f attitudes than a cognitive structure, more a global 
orientation than a detailed guide, in short, not a set o f deep and clear 
commandments to which action must adjust. In that sense we are talking o f a 
construction o f a pseudo-ideology to be thrown off as circumstances dictate. 36
Linz, in his study of authoritarian regimes, recognises the importance of 
mentalities in the examination of authoritarian ideas and suggests the concept for the 
purposes of political science. He argues that
the elusiveness o f mentalities, the mimetic and derivative character o f the so-called 
ideologies o f authoritarian regimes, has limited the number o f scholarly studies o f 
this dimension o f such regimes, although the mentalities o f the rulers, not having to 
be equally explicit as the ideologies, might reflect more the social and political 
realities. 37
In the light of this distinction, I shall be comparing the authoritarian ideas of the 
two regimes and the way dictatorial rulers interpreted their contemporary reality, justified 
the imposition of their rule and set their main goals as governmental authorities. In the case 
of the 4th of August regime, the dominant fascist ideological discourse inspired the leader 
of the regime, and he incorporated many of its elements into the inter-war Greek 
nationalistic discourse. Against a climate of the influence of fascism, on the one hand, and 
a pluralist nationalistic domestic debate, on the other, the ideology of the 4th of August 
regime reflected much more than the mentality of the dictatorial elite but it was much less 
than a consistent ideological framework. It was an amalgam of various influences of 
fascist, conservative and reactionary origins. In the case of the military junta, while most 
analysts speak of a “pseudo-ideology” -an inconsistent ideological context-, it is more 
accurate to speak in terms of the mentalities of the military rulers, their attitudes rather than
3^ See Markoff/Baretta “Professional Ideology and Military Activism in Brazil”, pp. 184-185.
37 See Linz, op.cit., p.269.
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their perceptive ability. The 1967 military mentalities were indicative of the officers’ own 
military mind, their attitudes towards the civilian elites and the military’s internal ideology. 
Against a liberal international climate, on the one hand, and a modernised but highly 
polarised domestic context, on the other, the military elites imposed their puritanical, anti­
communist, clientelistic and conspiratorial military mind, their contempt for civilians and a 
pseudo-liberal facade, ie. an amalgam of disparate mentalities and contradictory goals.
Authoritarian education of the youth: Mobilisation vs demobilisation
Education, part of the wider network of the state ideological apparatuses, according 
to the Marxist vocabulary,38 and part of the wider network of the means of political 
socialisation, according to liberal terminology, reflects the specific ideas diffused by the 
dominant political elites and the way state power is exercised. Education being the principal 
means for the spread of ideas and values among the youngest members of society, is 
particularly important for the survival of authoritarian regimes. Dictatorial educational 
policies clearly reflect, directly and indirectly, the authoritarian ideas of the dictatorial 
elites, and are often the clearest guides as to their long-term political aims. They reproduce 
the mind of the rulers, their intentions as political governors, their limited choices, their 
specific strategies and the contradictions within the power structure. But most important, 
they reflect the existence or not of an ideology, in the form of an authoritarian pedagogy.
Authoritarian regimes more than anything else aspire to dominate and manipulate 
education, by centrally controlling its administration, and by censoring and directing the 
content of knowledge. On top of this, inter-war authoritarian regimes attempted to 
manipulate the education and socialisation of the youth through the promotion of a 
controlled political activism, ie. mobilisation of the youth into youth movements, on the 
basis of new ideologies and new pedagogies. Ideological mobilisation, under authoritarian 
rule, usually refers to the recruitment of political militants who would participate in the 
political activity of a political party or a social movement created and controlled by the
38 Althusser who discusses extensively the distinction between ideological state apparatuses and repressive 
state apparatuses, regards the function of the educational state apparatus as the dominant ideologicaf 
mechanism in capitalist social formation. See “On the Reproduction of the Conditions of Production” pp 
135-149.
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regime. Charismatic leaders, orators, preachers, and journalists can be the true originators 
of ideological mobilisation, and their role is deemed necessary for the success of a party or 
a movement.
Goran Therbom introduces two relevant modes of ideological mobilisation 
“mobilisation by revival” and “mobilisation by example”. The first is achieved on the 
basis of the past, of what has existed, of past experiences, values, symbols and so on. It 
refers to the nationalist mobilisation, mostly used by reactionary and counter-revolutionary 
regimes. An authoritarian regime can either approach the past in a positive way and glorify 
certain elements in the history of the nation or it can place the emphasis on the negative side 
of immediate past developments. The fascist ideological mobilisation offered a therapy to 
the inter-war crisis by resorting to the revival of past values and emphasising successful 
historical events. The second type of ideological mobilisation, according to Therborp, is a 
very potent source of mobilisation and links directly domestic developments to the 
influential international ones. The historical cases of the French revolution, the October 
revolution, the fascist regimes and movements, the Chinese and the Cuban revolutions are 
some exemplary events, which have been influential sources of the latter type in different 
national contexts. Ideological “mobilisations by example” usually fail because the 
constellation of forces is hardly ever the same in the different national contexts.39
The regime of Metaxas did not create a mass movement on the model of the fascist 
ideological mobilisation. He tried however to mobilise the Greek youth by creating a Greek 
youth movement, importing the fascist model of youth organisation, “mobilisation by 
example” , into the Greek inter-war context. On the other hand, “liberal” dictatorships, due 
to the absence of an overall ideological framework, aim instead at the demobilisation of the 
youth and the promotion of political apathy. They are highly exclusionary in character, and 
seek legitimacy through economic achievements and “pseudo-liberal” policies, rather than 
mass parties and youth movements. The military junta of 1967, in the educational field, 
aimed at a “demobilisation by reaction”, of an already mobilised student movement.
39 See Goran Therbom, The Ideology o f  Power and the Power o f Ideology, V enso 1980, pp. 121 -123 .
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Control was achieved through the promotion of clientelistic channels of support, a clear 
example of “authoritarian clientelism”.
Based on the concepts and methods presented above, the following project will 
focus on a comparative examination of authoritarian ideas and education in the two 
dictatorships in question and will rest on the following structure:
1. Greek ideology and education: In an introductory chapter, the main features of the 
development of Greek ideology will be presented, in a historical perspective. The 
traditional themes of history, religion and language will be introduced in the context of the 
Greek nationalist discourse, as these were developed, articulated and affected by the 
dominant European influences, during the development of the 19th century independent 
state. This will be accompanied by an examination of the main features of Greek education 
during the course of the same period. (Chapter 1)
2. The inter-war period: Some “background factors”40 are deemed necessary for an 
appreciation of the ideological and mobilisational character of the Metaxas regime: A 
domestic inter-war socio-political climate divided along ethnic, geographical and class 
lines, polarised by the schism of Venizelism versus anti-Venizelism, in the search for a 
new nationalist ideology; the lack of an influential fascist ideology and an organised fascist 
movement, contrary to most inter-war European societies; the ideas of the leader Metaxas 
prior to the imposition of his authoritarian rule; the elite structure of the regime and the 
counter-balancing role of the King. (Chapter 2)
3. The ideology of the 4th of August regime: The 4th of August regime’s interpretation of 
inter-war realities reflected the international fascist influence, the rhetorical strengthening of 
Greece’s traditional elements and some reformist/populist innovations. It will be seen in 
relation to the Italian and German models and the Iberian and Balkan cases. (Chapter 3)
40 I have borrowed the term from David Collier in his comparative examination o f the Bureaucratic- 
Authoritarian regimes, which refers to explanatory variables that contribute to the understanding o f the 
major differences among the various national socio-political settings, the previous contexts of crisis, in 
order to understand the differences between the dictatorships. See David Collier, “The Bureaucratic- 
Authoritarian Model: Synthesis and Priorities for Future Research” in The New Authoritarianism in Latin 
America, pp 385-392 .
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4. The mobilisational aspect of the 4th of August regime: The regime’s policy towards the 
youth involved the imposition of a youth movement accompanied by the use of a fascist 
rhetoric directed at the youth, and the authoritarian and centralised control of the 
educational mechanisms. (Chapter 4)
5. The post-war period: The “background factors” included the post-war exclusionary 
parliamentary state, the anti-communist ideological discourse and the autonomous role of 
the military apparatus within a society in the process of modernisation and political 
mobilisation during the 1950s and 1960s. The military mind was marked by fierce anti­
communism, apparent royalism, factionalism, interventionism and conspiratorial 
behaviour. The power structure of the 21st of April regime was based on a faction of the 
army which intervened in politics but lacked any connections with the civilian elites. 
(Chapter 5)
6. The mentalities of the 21st of April regime: The military mentalities of the dictatorial 
rulers were reactionary towards the earlier process of mobilisation; puritanical in the 
promotion of traditional values; pseudo-liberal in the imposition of a constitution; 
clientelistic towards those civilians who were included in the regime; and conspiratorial 
towards army officers and the Church. (Chapter 6)
7. The demobilisational aspect of the regime: The regime’s policy towards the youth 
involved the reproduction of military attitudes in education: puritanical towards their 
perception of the youth; reactionary towards the mobilised student movement and the 
intellectuals; authoritarian in their control of education; clientelistic towards the appointment 
of regime people; and pseudo-modemising, as was dictated by the objective necessity for 
educational reform. (Chapter 7)
8. Conclusion: Some comparative points regarding the two regimes. (Chapter 8)
3 7 a
The aim of the present volume is to contribute to the comparative understanding of 
authoritarianism. It is a comparison across authoritarian regimes, in general, and across the 
two Greek authoritarian regimes, specifically, the comparative nature of which has been 
seriously ommitted by all the analysts of the Greek authoritarian experience. In this 
comparative approach, the international context of authoritarianism will be of vital 
importance, in that both regimes will be seen in the context of other contemporary 
authoritarian cases, abroad. Moreover, the comparative presentation of the background 
climate will contribute to a better understanding of the specificities of each regime. It will 
be shown that different political, socio-economic and international conditions, in one and 
the same country, may support different types of authoritarian regimes, when these latter 
occur. It will be evident that the two dictatorships shared many common themes when 
compared with similar authoritarian cases and, at the same time, they presented unique 
features when viewed in the light of the specific domestic historical conjuncture that led to 
their rise and stabilisation.
The central focus of this study is to show the relevance of ideology to the 
understanding of authoritarian regimes. It will be seen how authoritarian ideologies 
expressing the rulers’ perceptions of their contemporary realities can either be shaped into 
intellectual discourses, reflecting the influence of international authoritarian ideologies, or 
can remain in more unorganised thought-systems, reflecting the peculiarities of the rulers’ 
mentalities. The relevant field of education expresses clearly the ability or inability of 
dictatorial elites to shape an authoritarian pedagogy and to mobilise or demobilise their 
respective youths. The concept of clientelism will be introduced in the context of non- 
democratic societies, as was actually practiced in the field of education.
The following analysis rests primarily on its comparative, synthesising ambition 
rather than on an extensive empirical, primaiy research. The aim is mostly to present a 
satisfactory comparison of the two cases, rather than come up with previously 
undiscovered primary evidence. Most historical findings are based entirely on secondary 
sources, research monographs, analyses in books and articles on various journals. These 
have been reviewed, selectively and critically, in the comprehensive presentation of the
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different historical realities. However, the use of primary and archival research has also 
been deemed necessary and has been pursued extensively regarding the fields of ideology 
and education.
The ideas of the 4th of August regime are taken from the public speeches of 
Metaxas and his ideologues, the personal diary of the dictator and the regime’s periodicals 
and journals, given that the press policy of the regime was extensive and systematic during 
the period 1936-1941. For the more recent 21st of April regime, the material is abundant, 
varying from personal memories to publications, covering a wide range of issues. The 
ideas of the military junta were found in the public speeches of the military rulers, in the 
few theoretical documents of some theoreticians, in the Greek and foreign press, during 
the period 1967-1974, and in the personal memories of supporters and dissidents. 
Moreover, very valuable were a few personal interviews with military officers who, 
through their personal account of the military’s internal ideology, were able to convey the 
post-war military way of thinking.
Regarding the field of education in general, there are a number of alternative 
sources in the analysis of governmental policy. Public speeches in Universities and 
schools, ministerial councils concerning the drafting of laws, the actual legislature, the 
school curicula, the content of textbooks and the publications of pedagogists can be part of 
a vast primary research material.
With respect to the regimes in question, both dictatorships lacked any pedagogues, 
specialists in the field of authoritarian education with long-term organised perceptions. As 
will be shown, Metaxas, himself not a pedagogue, took over the ministry of education, 
and for the most part consulted non-fascist supporters, while the military junta resorted 
primarily to loyalism based on political and not necessarily ideological support Therefore, 
the texts by relevant ideologues were very limited and not radically different from the 
previously applied ideas on education. The short duration and the non-totalitarian character 
of both dictatorships did not allow for the overall transformation of textbooks, which is 
why their content is not particularly accounted for in the following analysis.
The method of research on education was mostly based on the actual legislature of 
the periods 1936-1941 and 1967-1974, the clearest indicator of the rulers’ ideas, intentions 
and policies. The abundance of relevant laws will testify to the indecisiveness and 
vagueness with which the dictatorial rulers approached education. At the same time, the 
legislature on education is very representative of the conflicts regarding the actual 
orientation to be adopted. Finally, a few interviews with professors and students, 
discredited by the regime, were very helpful for a more vivid understanding of the general 
climate in Greek education during the period of the military junta.
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Chanter 1: IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATION IN A HISTORICAL  
PERSPECTIVE: GREECE 1821-1922
The development of a state ideology in independent Greece
The national consciousness of the Greek people preceded the creation of an 
independent Greek nation-state. Under the intellectual predominance of the Greek 
Orthodox Church, common history, religion and language united the Greeks during the 
Ottoman domination. Towards the end of the 18th century, Greek national consciousness, 
through the influence of a Greek diaspora merchant class and the work of Greek 
intellectuals, influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment, was transformed into a 
nationalist drive for the revolutionary purpose of the creation of an independent nation­
state.
As a newly formed nation-state, 19th century Greece struggled to ascertain its 
political and economic position within a constantly changing international environment, 
divided into a few large competitive Empires, themselves the battlefields of conflicting 
nationalist ideologies. It was a period when most revolutionary movements in Europe 
combined ideas of nationalism, liberalism and secularism. Nationalism, the ”child o f the 
double European revolution ”, was the result of the industrial revolution, initiated in 
England, and of the political and ideological revolution, originated in France.1 The ideas of 
the Enlightenment were a strong stimulus to the revival and organisation of the European 
nationalist ideologies. They were the main influence on the thought of the Greek diaspora 
and of the Greek intellectuals, through their contact with the West and its secular ideology. 
Nationalism was then perceived as “a state o f mind, permeating the large majority of 
people which recognises the nation-state as the ideal form o f political organisation.” 2
Two names stand out as principally linked with the new revolutionary ideas, 
Adamantios Korais and Rhigas Pheraios. Both of them typify the pre-revolutionary 
“intelligentsia” which contributed to the transformation of Greek national consciousness
1 This is one of the central ideas in Hobsbawm’ s book The Age o f Revolution, Abacus 1977.
2 Definition of Nationalism offered by Hans Kohn in The Idea o f Nationalism, Macmillan 1961.
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into an organised set of ideas, combined with a political revolutionary strategy. Korais was 
directly inspired by French revolutionary thought and looked to the intellectual heritage of 
Greece, as the basis of a new independent nation. As a consistent advocate of Western 
thought, he idealised the classical world of the ancients, he supported the idea of the 
historical connection between the ancient and the modem Greeks, while he underrated the 
importance of the Byzantine and Ottoman eras, which he considered backward-looking and 
obscurantist periods of history. He disputed with fervour the ideological omnipresence of 
the Christian Orthodox Church and in its place he professed the freedom of political and 
religious beliefs, the devotion to the ideas of the French and American revolutions, the 
application of liberalism in the economic sphere, the existence of a stronger legislative 
power in relation to the executive, and was against any monarchical form of government.3 
Parallel to Korais' westernised ideas, Rhigas Pheraios’ dream to establish a federation of 
free people in the Balkans, following the political organisation set out by the example of 
the French revolution, stood as the ideological forerunner of an "early obscure and 
possibly pan-Balkanist movement ”.4 In this Balkan federation, the hegemonical role was 
attributed to the Greeks due to their economic, religious and intellectual superiority among 
the Balkan subjects of the Porte. The sources of inspiration for his work were the classical 
Greek ideals, the Byzantine tradition and modem Western ideas.
The development of the Greek nationalist ideology, the way it was organised and 
nurtured among the Greek people was directly linked with the position of the Greek 
diaspora in various European centres, during the pre-revolutionary period. The existence 
of Greek merchants, settled in minority communities within the Ottoman Empire and 
abroad, and coming into close contact with Western thinking, was of great importance. 
Moreover, the influence of Greek language and culture in the Balkans, the predominance 
of the Greek element in the Patriarchate of Constantinople, had led to the "Hellenisation of 
the Balkans”, in financial, social, educational and ecclesiastical affairs, a sort of Greek
3 Further analysis o f the Greek Enlightenment and the contribution of Korais is provided by Dcmaras in 
The Greek Enlightemnent, Athens 1989 and by Kondylis in The Greek Enlightenment; The Philosophical 
Ideas, Athens 1988.
4 See Hobsbawm’s op.cit., p. 174.
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cultural and economic superiority, during the course of the 18th century,5 which largely 
explains the early demands for independence for the Greek nation, compared to the other 
Ottoman subjects.6
With the achievement of independence,7 the first task was to create an independent 
national government that would settle important political issues, vital to the nation-state's 
existence and survival. Emphasis was laid on the form of political organisation and the 
institutionalisation of political life. The goal was the formation of a modem state following 
Western political ideas and forms of organisation. The first acts of the new state were to 
create a new administrative system, a new judicial system independent of church 
interference, a new educational system under the auspices of the state, a new codification 
of the law, the organisation of a national army and a new legal setting for religious affairs. 
At the ideological level, the organisation and the strengthening of national consciousness 
was required in order to support the new political establishment; ie. the creation of an 
official state ideology. This meant the settlement of the vital issues that defined the meaning 
of Greek nationality, so persistent throughout the centuries. The building of an 
independent nation-state, therefore, led to the creation of a new “state ideology”, a 
common denominator of Greek society, within or without Greece’s boundaries.8
The formation of a modem Greek national ideology for the independent nation-state 
is generally seen as the struggle between forces tied to the previous status quo, sceptical of 
any Western-oriented changes, and forces heavily influenced by the ideas of the 
Enlightenment, as they were set out by their foremost representative, Korais. It is seen by 
most analysts in the context of a cultural dualism which made its impact on the subsequent
5 The term “Hellenisation” is used by several analysts of the Greek case, in order to indicate the superior 
position of the Greeks in their relation to the other nationalities of the Ottoman empire.
6 Before the Greek national uprising, a large scale Serbian national revolt against the Ottoman rule had 
been launched in 1804 by Karadjordje, who seized Belgrade and proclaimed himself prince of Serbia (1808- 
1913). However in 1813, the Ottoman forces occupied Serbia and destroyed the forces of Karadjordje, only
 ^to grant partial autonomy to the Serbs in 1815.
7 The creation of the Greek independent state was officially proclaimed by the Great Powers in the 1832 
Treaty of London.
8 Elli Skopetea in The “Kingdom-Model” and the Megali Idea , (Athens 1988), offers an excellent account 
on the development of the national identity in the years 1830-1880, based on primary material of the 
period. She presents the main elements of the dominant Greek ideology, the product of a conflict betw een 
domestic forces, concentrating basically on the European identity of the Greeks, as perceived by the Greeks 
of the independent state.
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ideological development of the new state; the ideas of the influential western international 
environment, on the one hand, and the ideas of a long already existing cultural Greek 
tradition which had been preserved and nourished by the Church under the tolerance of the 
Ottoman authorities. At its most extreme, it grew out of the conflict between two schools 
of thought; one emphasised the Eastern Orthodox character of Greekness; the other 
emphasised modem secular ideas and the evocation of the ancient classical spirit. As Smith 
has eloquently put it, the history of the Greek state can best be understood as the conflict 
between “two ideals o f the nation, the territorial vs the ethnic, and two models o f national 
integration, the civic vs the genealogical cum religious ”. The first followed the ideas of the 
French Revolution, the second followed the Orthodox Byzantine tradition of the Greek 
“ethnie”;9 a fight between the forces of the preservation of the cultural tradition and the 
progressive/modernising forces of a western orientation.10 Moreover, it has been 
attempted by many authors of the 19th century Greek period, to relate the development of 
the Greek ideology to the existence of a Greek bourgeoisie strongly influenced by the 
liberal centres of Europe and in opposition to the more traditional pre-capitalist forces 
within Greece.11 While it is true that the dominant bearer of western liberal ideology was 
the diaspora merchant class and not a domestic bourgeois class, the ideology of the 
diaspora bourgeoisie was in itself characterised by striking contradictions.12 Hence, the
9 Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, Basil Blackwell 1986, pp. 145-146.
10 The crudest developmental theories regarding the Third world context, saw the dichotomy “tradition- 
modemity” as a unilinear path from the first to the second, in that all countries of a third world 
development travel historically through the same stages, ending up in modernity and development. They 
see the two elements of the dichotomy as a zero-sum game, whereby by achieving modernity they 
eliminate tradition.
11 This approach was followed by the Marxist tradition, and the Greek marxists, who, at one point in 
Greek history, saw the Greek development as a process of revolutionary stages, in the ultimate effort to 
advance socialism. See Skliros Our Social Problem, Athens 1907, where he wrote his account of the Greek 
social development. Skliros was the first Greek marxist to state plainly that only the complete 
liberalisation and Europeanisation of Greek society would be able to provide the country w ith the objective 
conditions for the transition to socialism; an application of historical materialism in the Greek case. 
Skliros’ example was later adopted by Kordatos, who, during the 1920s perceived the 19th century 
ideological conflicts, as the social struggle betu'een the forces of feudalism and the bourgeoisie. Kordatos, 
Demoticism and lntellectualism, Athens 1974.
12 The Greek diaspora tried to get incorporated socially and ideologically within the bourgeoisie of the 
societies in which they lived, and they were not able to form a conscious bourgeois ideology, but simply 
imitated the foreign way of living; on the other hand, they tried to preserve the basic elements of their 
Greek national identity and some traditional aspects of their cultural past. Their ideological contradictions 
were further exacerbated by the different geographical areas in which they lived and prospered. There was a 
different type of Greek diaspora ideology in the countries of the West and a different ideology in the 
diaspora under the Ottoman occupation. See Dertilis, Social Transformation and Military Intervention 
1880-1909, Athens 1977, p.78.
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social and ideological cleavages were not so clear cut, and the Greek ideological and 
political reality was much more complex than a fight between the romantic eastern tradition 
and the modem western liberalism. As Salvador Giner argues “the cultural polarisation 
represented by the dichotomy o f religious traditionalism versus liberal radicalism entailed 
more opposing sets o f attitudes than are explicit in its two terms”. He correctly sees it as a 
more agonising and contradictory process whereby “polarisation created a duality and a 
cleavage that consumed energies and paralysed minds ”. 13
The ideological discourse within the new state reflected the way the various Greek 
socio-political forces incorporated the influences from the western models of development, 
and the latter’s articulation with the already existing elements of Greek cultural identity. 
The varieties, differences and conflicts between the various dominant western European 
societies had a decisive impact on 19th century Greek development and presented a far 
from homogeneous Western political model.14 To be sure, this contradictory process of 
ideological formation was the result of the importation of different dominant western 
influences, a combination of western models of organisation and the imitation of western
13 Salvador Giner, “Political Economy, Legitimation, and the State in Southern Europe”, Transitions from  
Authoritarian Rule:Southern Europe, The Johns Hopkins University Press 1986, pp.31-32. Similar to 
Giner, Tsoukalas claims that the “tradition-modernity’’division, according to which models of 
institutionalisation imported from the west contradicted the romantic visions of resistance and Greek 
authenticity, w'as a pseudo-dilemma. Instead, the Greek ideological context was characterised by a 
contradictory amalgam of pre-capitalist cultural themes and liberal economic and political choices, the 
result of the Greek incorporation into the world capitalist system and the peripheral development of 
countries such as Greece. The weakness of Greek civil society and the lack of liberal forces w'ith genuine 
libera] interests differentiate the Greek case from the European ones. In the Greek context, the two poles of 
the dichotomy were articulated in a contradictory and polarised way, as opposed to the smoother and more 
constructive articulation in western societies. See “Tradition and Modernisation; Some general questions” 
in Hellenism and Hellenicity, pp. 37-48. Moreover, Milios sees the development o f Greek nationalist 
ideology not as the result of the peripheral status of the Greek economy in the international system, but of 
its high degree of incorporation within the capitalist system, the advanced development of the Greek 
commercial and shipowning bourgeoisie, which pursued the nationalistic scheme in order to promote its 
interests; there remains however the problem of whether the diaspora bourgeoisie formed part of the Greek 
independent society or of the countries where they lived and prospered which Milios does not manage to 
solve very convincingly. Hence Milios sees the nationalist ideology as the domination of the bourgeois 
political ideology over the previous religious and “communal” ideologies. He sees the transformation of the 
modern Greek state as the transition from the asiatic mode of production to the capitalist mode of 
production, the development of a system of capitalist class domination. The Greek Social Formation; From 
Expansionism to the Capitalist Development, Athens 1988.
14 Many analysts in their effort to juxtapose the western influence with the eastern Greek context, present 
the European influence as a more or less homogeneous influence and fail to recognise that the various 
European societies adopted a different perception of the 19th century liberal context. Moreover, the British, 
French or German powers viewed differently their relationship with the Greek independent state and 
movements such as the English Philhellenism, the French perception of the classical thought, the German 
adoration for the ancient spirit or the various anti-Hellenic expressions were all incorporated differently in 
the domestic ideological discourse.
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styles of living with persistent historical domestic cultural mentalities, pre-independence 
forms of political organisation and patterns of behaviour, which had been dominant during 
the Ottoman period. The result was an accommodation between the various tendencies, an 
amalgam of different ideological and cultural styles and the political implementation of 
what many authors have called “oligarchic parliamentarism”.
Religion: The State and the Church
The first important transition from the Ottoman era to the independent state context, 
in the ideological field, was the displacement of the previous dominant role of the religious 
priesthood in transmitting and disseminating the national cultural values, the essence of the 
Greek common identity. The new independent national authorities acquired the role of 
diffusing the new cultural social values and ideals of rational planning and social 
education.15 In most 19th century Western European societies, the secularisation of the 
national states had changed radically the role of their Churches and religions. Churches 
were weakened while many religious organisations lost their political and educational 
functions and much of their land and wealth.16 In the words of Althusser, while the 
Church, in the pre-capitalist historical context, was the dominant ideological apparatus, 
which concentrated in its hands not only religious functions, but also educational ones - 
functions of communication and “culture”- with the French Revolution the dominant role 
of religion in the ideological sphere was replaced by new state ideological apparatuses.17 
Equally in independent Greece, with the advent of western secularism, the role of the 
Church in determining the national consciousness of the Greeks was weakened. While the 
religious sentiment during the Ottoman occupation held the dominant role in Greek 
ideology, with the import of the western secularist ideology the religious issue became an
15 See Anthony Smith’s mention of the “new priesthood” in op.cit., pp. 157-161. Skopetca (op.cil., 
p.433) attaches primary importance to the thinking of the Greek intellectuals of the period since al'ler all 
“the construction o f  the national history, the transformation o f the language, the organisation o f  
education...and the very criticism on the Greek development, form ed a 'par excellence’ intellectual 
competence". Although it is problematic to talk of a professional intelligentsia in the 19th century Greek 
context, the development of the independent national identity involved a serious debate among Greek 
intellectuals.
16 See Smith, op.cit., p. 158.
17 Louis Althusser, “On the Reproduction of the Conditions of Production”, in Lenin and Philosophy and 
Other Essays, pp. 143-144.
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essential element in the new official ideological discourse, one of the important cultural 
themes but not the dominant one.
The first open conflict which erupted in the new free society had to do with the 
Church’s position vis-a-vis the State. The issue was of an urgent character for three 
reasons; first, as previously mentioned, the Greek Orthodox Church had held a 
predominant position in Greek national life during the Ottoman period;18 second, the 
Western ideological secularist orientation of the independent state regarded the church as 
subservient to the state; and, third, the authorities of independent Greece demanded a break 
with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, due to the latter’s dependence on the Ottoman 
authorities.19
Under the rule of the Bavarian Regency, a new Ecclesiastical Constitution, 
promulgated in 1833, declared the independence of the autocephalous Church of Greece 
from the Patriarchate and established the Holy Synod as its highest organ. This signalled 
the first rupture with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Further state policies interfered in 
the Church's organisational and financial affairs and placed the religious establishment 
under the power of an extensively authoritarian state. The Greek church was transformed 
into an ideological battlefield between secular and Orthodox, traditional influences. The 
secular influences, dominated by the spirit of the western Enlightenment demanded the 
total autonomy of the Greek church from the Patriarchate and the subordination of the 
Church to the power of the State. The traditional forces demanded greater autonomy from 
state intervention and close links with the Patriarchate. The latter's principal aim was to 
prove that the Greek Church, although independent, was close to Orthodox Christianity, 
and it was not willing to make any concessions to the Catholic Church.20 The turmoil in 
ecclesiastical matters lasted until the Patriarchate recognised the independence of the Greek
18 George Amakis in his article on "The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism" 
examines the contribution of the Greek Orthodox Church in preserving Christianity in the Balkans and in 
the transition of the Balkans from its mediaeval antecedents to the era of nationalism. See The Balkans in 
Transition, University of California Press 1963.
19 On the relation between the Ottoman Authorities and the Greek Patriarchate, see Runciman, The Great 
Church in Captivity, Cambridge University Press 1968, and Kitsikis The History o f the Ottoman Empire, 
Athens 1988.
20 See Demaras, The Greek Romanticism, Athens 1985, p.375 .
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Church in 1852.21 Although the negotiations were far from easy, the result was an 
accommodation between the two sides; on the one hand, state interference in religious 
affairs was institutionalised; on the other hand, Orthodoxy proved a durable factor in the 
formation of ideology within Greek society, and retained a relatively strong role in the 
choices of the national authorities.
The religious issue within Greek society has been one of the utmost importance for 
an understanding of the general cultural national context, as well as of the role of the Greek 
Church within the socio-political environment. Historically, the relationship between the 
Orthodox Church and the secular state has been an issue of nervous cooperation. The 
political and ideological divisions between leaders and parties were always reflected in the 
ecclesiastical sector, and clerics were always compelled to take sides in the political 
debates. In this respect, the instability of Greece’s political life was manifested in Church 
matters with politicians intervening to appoint figures loyal to the political leadership to the 
Church hierarchy.22 The government tended to control the Church through: the creation of 
new constitutions; the imposition of Archbishops loyal to their policies; the control of the 
Holy and the Hierarchical Synods.23 The ideological role of the Church was subsequently 
supportive of the established status quo, being sceptical of any radical changes that could 
threaten its position as an ideological mechanism and an influential political force.
21 The best historical account of the relation between Church and State in Independent Greece is made by 
Charles Frazee in his book The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece 1821-1852, Cambridge 
University Press 1969. Elli Skopelea focuses on the failure of the forces of Enlightenment to influence the 
subsequent development of religious matters in Greece. Skopctea argues that the Greek religious domain 
was the only ground which allowed for the conflict between the progressive forces of the Enlightenment 
and the traditional forces of orthodoxy. The result was the failure of the forces of the Enlightenment to 
bring about changes in the Church establishment, which preserved thereafter its conservatism. She claims 
later that the role of the Church was degraded from the carrier of ideology to an element of the dominant 
ideology (op.cit., pp. 132-134). She fails to appreciate however, that this in itself marks a major cultural 
transformation and proves the impact of the Enlightenment on Greek ideology.
22 A typical case was the inlcr-war period in church affairs when the altcrmtfl*T in power of the Vcnizelists 
and anti-Venizelists w as reflected in the subsequent appointments of loyal bishops to the Church hierarchy, 
by the political leadership.
23 See Charles Frazee, “Church and Stale in Greece” in Greece in Transition, Zero London 1977.
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Language: The problem o f “diglossia”
The second element of national identity, language, had already been a cause of 
discontent among different social forces, during the pre-revolutionary period. The problem 
stemmed from the lack of a single, homogeneous Greek language; on the one hand, the 
Patriarchate and the educated aristocracy in Constantinople favoured the use of the archaic 
language; on the other hand, the people used a popular Greek idiom. Throughout the 
period 1780-1820, there was a major disagreement over the language issue between the 
Patriarchate, and the flourishing Greek merchant class. The latter demanded the 
establishment of a single official Greek language which would overcome the problem of 
“diglossia”. Korais tried to reconcile the different tendencies, by professing a "middle 
way" and creating a single purified language, the result of the combination of the two; this 
meant simplifying the archaic language and cleansing the popular language from foreign 
words and expressions.24
Following independence, the pre-revolutionary disagreement between the different 
tendencies became latent. There was a reconciliation between the Church/Phanariot 
aristocracy and the merchant classes over the language issue. The katharevousa became the 
official language of the State; the popular idiom continued to be the language of the simple 
uneducated people. However, the katharevousa used by the State was, far from what 
Korais had initially advocated, full of archaic forms, katharevousa, the language of the 
State and the educated, which was used by the privileged social strata, became the symbol 
of social ascendancy for the lower classes. “Diglossia” was institutionalised in Greece with 
the use of two languages and was best reflected in the existence of two schools of thought 
among intellectuals; the culturally western-dominated Ionian school, which supported the 
popular-demotic language and tradition, and the Phanariot/Patriarchate school which 
supported the archaic language and tradition. The language issue was brought to the 
forefront of the ideological battles towards the end of the 19th century and after, and was 
tied closely to the pressing demands for educational reform.25
24 On the language issue during the pre-revolutionary period see Kordatos Demotic.ism and  
Intellectualism, Athens 1974, pp. 11-66, a marxist perspective on the language question, and Tsoukalas 
Dependency and Reproduction, Athens 1985, pp.532-551, a neo-marxist perspective.
2  ^This will be treated separately in the following pages on education.
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History: Interpretation o f the Greek past
The third cultural question in the debate over the formation of the Greek national 
consciousness concerned the perception of the country’s past, the official history of the 
Greek nation. Much importance was attached to the identification of the modem Greek 
state with the roots of the Greek nation. As Demichel points out “the history o f Greece is 
ancient and very recent, at the same time ”.26 The modem history of Greece involved the 
creation of a modem state, based on western forms of political organisation on a nation 
where the ancient, Byzantine and Ottoman historical legacies weighed heavily on the 
present. The task was to define the historical significance of these legacies and their 
relevance to the new independent state. It was assigned to the historians to reveal and 
present the unexplored aspects of the nation’s past and to the state officials to choose the 
most glorious aspects among them, in order to create a national history that Greek people 
would be proud of. As Smith points out, the rediscovery of the national self was not 
merely an academic matter; it became a "pressing practical issue, vexed and contentious, 
which could spell life or death for the nationalist project o f creating a n a t i o n 27
The Greek understanding of Greek history was, to a large extent, the reflection of 
the European perception of Greek history and, at times, that perception, in large measure, 
determined gravely domestic attitudes towards the nation’s past. Perceptions of Greek 
history during that period were greatly influenced by the attitudes of the European 
Enlightenment towards the Greek antiquity. It was the conviction of the Europeans, that 
the age of reason and logic was a direct decendent of the ancient Greek thought while the 
Medieval period in Europe, including the Byzantine and Ottoman rule in the East, were 
backward looking and regressive. During the period of Bavarian rule, a German 
interpretation of the ancient Greek spirit, resulted in a strong predisposition towards the 
neo-classicist style, a result of their admiration of the ancient past. Modem Greek history, 
as interpreted by the Bavarian school of thought, was considered to be the direct heir of
2  ^Andre et Francine Demichel Les D id  a lures Europeenes, Paris 1973, p.56.
27 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, p.148.
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ancient Greek history. According to the Bavarian perspective of Greek history, the 
Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman pasts were simply ommitted.28
In the late 1840s and the 1850s in Greece, we observe the appearance of a 
domestic, more pluralistic approach to historiography, regarding the matter of Hellenism. 
The immediate causes for this had to do with the anti-popular and authoritarian Bavarian 
rule, the termination of European Philhellenism, as had been expressed by the English and 
French during the War of Independence, and Fallmerayer's provocative arguments as to 
the Slavic origins of the Greeks. These factors consequently generated a turn towards 
"Helleno-centrism" in Greek thought, a more Greek perspective on the country's history. 
Greek intellectuals in their effort to refute Fallmerayer's theories and prove the European 
character of their identity to the Europeans and to themselves, embarked on an examination 
of Greek history, re-evaluating and analysing more deeply the organic characteristics that 
constituted Greek nationality.29
The ideological “restoration” of the Greek past came with the historians Zambelios 
and Paparrighopoulos, both of whom professed the idea of continuation in history and the 
unity between different historical phases. Paparrighopoulos’ History o f the Greek Nation 
was the first major modem Greek presentation of the national history, which dealt with the 
specifics of Greek history, presented in continuum, Ancient-Byzantine-Modern. He thus 
contributed to the ideological “redress” of the Byzantine period which automatically 
became not just a part of Greek history but also a symbol of the Christian element within 
Hellenism. At the same time, he also stood against the European dominance in the Greek 
historical perception by presenting a Greek version of the Greek past.30
To summarise, the settlement of cultural issues, during the first decades after the 
achievement of independence, and the framing of an official state ideology involved a 
conflict between various intellectual forces and took a different form with each cultural
2  ^ On the Bavarian influence with respect to the matter of Greek history see Demaras K., op.cit., pp. 
325-348, and Skopetea, op. cit., pp. 190-204.
29 See Vergopoulos The Agrarian Question, Athens 1975, pp. 297-315 and Demaras, op.cit., pp. 405- 
452.
30 Sec Demaras’ Paparrighopoulos (Athens 1986) where he examines the life and the work of the historian, 
as well as the historical context which influenced and shaped the ideas of Paparrighopoulos.
49
issue; it took the form of a Church vs State conflict in religious matters; archaic vs popular 
language in language matters; ancient vs medieval past with regard to the present's 
relationship to the past. Clearly the final solution was an accommodation between the 
different points of view: the state interfered in the country’s religious establishment, while 
the Church retained a strong role in the ideological field, in the first case; katharevousa, the 
middle way between the archaic and the popular language was institutionalised within the 
context of “diglossia”, in the second case; the continuity of Greek history was affirmed by 
the national historian Paparrighopoulos, in the third case.
Nationalism: The “Megali Idea ” and the territorial implications
The common cultural elements of Greek identity and their survival was linked to 
the existence of the non-liberated diaspora Greeks within the boundaries of the Ottoman 
Empire. Their liberation shaped and sustained an ambitious nationalist scheme which 
managed to hold the Greeks ideologically together until the 1920s. The central focus of the 
Megali Idea was the expansion of Greek territory to include all the Greeks with a common 
national identity. As Gellner points out, the existence of a “diaspora nationalism” places the 
acquisition of territory as the foremost objective of nationalism, the first and perhaps its 
main problem.31
The Megali Idea as a concept was officially introduced into the Greek ideological, 
nationalistic language by Kolletis in a speech in the Assembly in 1844. The immediate 
cause which gave rise to such a concept was a political controversy over who should be 
considered an "indigenous" Greek as opposed to an "outsider" Greek, in the context of the 
making of a new constitution. The Megali Idea can be defined as the Greek people's will to 
identify the Greek Nation with the Greek State. Initially, it took the form of a very 
ambitious project of territorial expansion whose aim was to achieve a "Greater Greece of 
three continents and five seas ". The idea was that the Greek borders should encompass all 
the Greek communities within the Ottoman Empire, in the Balkans, Asia Minor and North 
Africa, where Greek merchant capital, Greek language and culture were predominant. It
31 Ernest Gellner Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell 1983, p. 101.
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looked to its centre in Constantinople and aimed to substitute the Ottoman Empire with a 
Hellenic Empire, heir to the Byzantium. It started as a will to spread the Helleno-Christian 
civilisation in the backward-looking East. The Greek nation was thus seen as the civilising 
model for the East, as it had been centuries before, the model for the West.
The Megali Idea may be considered to be a vivid expression of Romantic 
Nationalism which governed Greek ideology throughout the whole of 19th century. This 
romantic spirit was also connected with Western Romanticism and was adjusted to the 
ideological discourse within the Greek context.32 Its nostalgia for past glory, affinity 
towards Medieval values and the strong role of religious beliefs helped shape the core­
values of the Megali Idea. The most characteristic element of Greek romanticism was the 
idea of unity that it inspired; unity in both historical time and geographical space. 
Paparrighopoulos, the national historian and the central figure in Greek romantic 
historiography, affirmed this principle of unity in history, ancient-Byzantine-modem, 
which presented perfectly legitimate demands for the acquisition of territories, where the 
Greek culture had flourished during the classical and Byzantine periods. The notion of 
unity in space was strengthened by the fact that affluent Greek merchants continued to 
spread Greek cultural and economic hegemony over the same territory.33
The ideology of the Megali Idea, due to its vague and ultra-nationalistic character, 
was able to create a consensus among the Greek population and to diminish the influence 
of the class character of the various conflicting social demands. The actual strategy for its 
implementation, however aroused a lot of disagreement as to the way in which the 
territorial gains would be made. Different political actors proposed different strategies to 
realise the same dream, a reflection of the political divisions within Greek society. A first 
strategy, held initially by the “French” and the “Russian” parties favoured the acquisition
32 The movement of Romanticism in Europe which dominated the first half of the 19th century had 
replaced the previous age of the Enlightenment. Its anti-bourgeois, anti-materialistic character professed a 
tendency for change, a nostalgic feeling for the past. The Medieval period, neglected by the intellectual 
forces of Enlightenment, was re-evaluated under the new era of Romanticism, accompanied by a new 
interest in Christian faith. The Greek war of Independence had gained the support of many romantic 
intellectuals in Europe, who considered the Greek struggle against the oppressor a myth inspiration for all 
nationalists and liberals everywhere in Europe. On the movement o f European Romanticism, see Eric 
Hobsbawm The Age o f  Revolution, pp.307-335.
33 The idea of unity, according to Demaras in The Greek Romanticism, (Athens 1985) is central in the 
analysis of the Romantic movement in Greece.
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of new lands through the participation in Balkan conflicts, which might result from 
possible Ottoman defeats in international wars. A second strategy, held by the “English” 
party, promoted the idea that the Greek kingdom should reach a level of economic, military 
and administrative maturity before it embarked on the realisation of any irredentist 
ambitions. A third strategy, held by the Greeks in Constantinople, favoured Helleno- 
Ottoman cooperation, believing that the economic and cultural hegemony of the Greek 
Patriarchate and of the Greek aristocracy in Constantinople would inevitably result into the 
displacement of the Ottoman hegemony.34
While the Megali Idea lasted for almost a century, its content varied or evolved 
according to international and domestic developments. During the period of the duet of 
Prime Minister Kolletis/King Othon, the vision of the Eastern Greek Empire with its centre 
in Constantinople, heir to the Byzantine Empire, was the predominant expression of the 
Megali Idea. The Crimean war was the first major blow to the over-ambitious form of the 
dream since it signalled the birth of other competitive Balkan nationalisms.35 Thereafter the 
Megali Idea was not solely connected with the Ottoman position in the Balkans but with the 
position of the other nationalisms in the area, as well. In particular, Bulgarian nationalism 
was perceived as the most competitive Balkan nationalism, backed as it was, by the 
Russians, and this resulted into the addition of the anti-Slavic dimension to the external 
threat which at times outweighed even the Turkish one. The competition and hostility 
among the Balkan peoples, with the single exception of the First Balkan war, ruled out any 
hope of Balkan cooperation against the Ottomans. Trikoupis’ political leadership, during 
the 1880s, tried to connect the Megali Idea with western style capitalist development, in his 
effort to forward policies that would create an integrated national and economic whole
34 Sec Antonis biakos,Italian Risorgimiento and the Megali Idea , Athens 1985,
pp.93-97. A current, relatively anachronistic, supporter of Helleno-Turkish cooperation and of the creation 
of a confederation of the two countries, Kilsikis believes quite fanatically that the Greek expansionist desire 
of the Megali Idea was the product of European imperialism which resulted in a “racist mentality of the 
modem Greek man” towards the barbarian Turk. Dimitris Kitsikis, History o f the Ottoman Empire, p. 152. 
Although a prolific - writer, however, Kitsikis is so obsessively influenced by his personal wishes that 
his analysis is of little historical value.
35 On the repercussions of the Crimean war in Greek politics and ideology see Antonis Liakos’ op.cit., 
Gerasimos Avgoustinos1 Consciousness and History, New York 1977, and Theodoros Tatsios’ The Megali 
Idea and the Greek-Turkish War o f 1897, New York 1984. For the connection between the Crimean war and 
the birth of Balkan nationalisms see Barbara Jelavich’ The History o f the Balkans, Vol.I, Cambridge 
University Press 1984, and M.S. Anderson’s The Eastern Question, Macmillan 1987.
52
under the aegis of private capital. The new nationalism of Trikoupis centred geographically 
in the areas around the Aegean and was based on the popular language and the popular 
tradition.36
Overall, the Megali Idea had both a “realistic/understandable” and a 
“romantic/utopian” side to it. The Greek desire to expand was realistic in that it was 
founded on the wish to include the large number of ethnic Greeks living outside Greek 
boundaries within a greater Greek state, i.e., Greek communities which flourished and 
prospered economically out of the country. The enlargement of Greece’s territory to 
include the whole of the Greek community was presented as a prerequisite for the 
country’s further successful socio-economic and political development. The same dream, 
the product of the romantic nationalistic climate in 19th century Greece, was also 
unrealistic, firstly because the Greek army, considering its level of professionalism and 
organisation, was not equal to such a grand scheme, and secondly, because of the 
country’s weak economic and diplomatic position.
Indeed, the Megali idea received major blows throughout the period when it was 
popular in the 19th century, which were caused by a series of major defeats at times of 
international crises. The Crimean War in 1854, the 1866 revolt in Crete, the Greek 
participation in the Russo-Turkish war in 1878, the 1886 Balkan crisis which resulted 
from Bulgarian expansionist aims and finally, the severe defeat in the Greco-Turkish war 
of 1897, produced important set-backs to the Greek nationalist, irredentist plans. All the 
above crises involved, among other international issues, attempts by the Greek authorities 
to achieve the objectives of the Megali Idea, which finally failed due either to the Great 
Powers' reluctance to support Greek demands, compounded by Greek foreign policy 
miscalculations or to competition from the similar territorial claims of other Balkan 
nationalities. The crisis of 1897, the most severe of them all, left the Greeks with the bitter 
taste of defeat, and was followed by a wider crisis in the political, economic and military
3  ^ Trikoupis is considered the first Greek modcmiser-politician influenced by the period of European 
capitalist expansion. See Vergopoulos and his chapter on "Renewed Nationalism" in the History o f  the 
Greek Nation, Vol. 14, pp. 56-60. Trikoupis favoured a development based on private capital, on the 
English model, Dcligiannis his political competitor favoured the path of statist capitalism, a development 
patronised by a strong slate, i.e., the civil servants, the bureaucracy and the military.
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spheres during the first decade of the 20th century which led to a major organised 
intervention by the military in politics, in 1909.
The period from 1909 to 1922 marked the near-realisation and the final defeat and 
disappearance of the Megali Idea. During his period in power Venizelos profited from 
international circumstances, namely the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. As a result 
of the Balkan wars Crete, parts of Macedonia and Epirus and the islands of the northern 
Aegean were incorporated. The First World War brought new opportunities for the 
incorporation of more territories, only this time consensus regarding participation in the 
war was not achieved. It was this very issue of participation in the war that resulted in the 
division of Greek society into two factions. The monarchical side supported neutrality, the 
Venizelist side supported participation on the side of the Entente. Two completely opposite 
national strategies defined the essence of “Dichasmos” (National Schism), the politics of 
the period, at a time when the ideology of the Megali Idea was approaching its limits. 
While the Balkan wars and the disintegration of the Ottoman empire after the first world 
war secured the enlargement of Greece’s territory, the 1922 Asia Minor disaster signalled 
the final end of any aspirations bared upon the Megali Idea, offering the tragic epilogue to 
the unattainable and unrealistic dream which had excited the Greek nation for a century, but 
had ultimately proved to be beyond Greek capabilities. Thereafter, Greek nationalists 
abandoned their territorial ambitions and the inter-war period was characterised by the 
search for a new Greek identity within confined and stable boundaries, with the majority of 
the Greek ethnics living within the territory of the Greek state.
The development o f state education in independent Greece
One of the most important tasks for the authorities of the independent Greek state 
was the creation of an educational system. Due to the ideological affinity towards Western 
political ideas and practices, policy-makers attributed a special role to education, as the 
state's most important ideological apparatus, for the reproduction of the new official 
ideology and the substitution of the previous dominance of the Church in educational 
matters. With the independence of the Greek nation-state, a fundamentally different
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educational system was introduced. 19th century Greece saw the development of all three 
levels of education, primary, secondary and higher, of a highly classicist orientation, under 
the authority of a highly centralised state, which assured access to all social classes. The 
period after the 1880s saw the first organised attempts to reform the system, with a 
remarkable intellectual battle over the issue of education, at the core of which was the 
language issue.
The Centralised, Classicist and “Democratic” Character o f Greek Education
A major purpose of state education was to consolidate national consciousness and 
contribute to the achievement of national uniformity and consensus. As was the case with 
the wider political organisation of the independent state, the main influence came from the 
enlightened West, as to the nationalistic and liberal character of education, perceived as 
crucial for the subsequent survival of the Greek nation-state.37 The principles behind the 
educational system, implemented during the Bavarian period of absolutist monarchy, were 
based on a combination of the Bavarian and French models, themselves based on 
Napoleonic principles of a strong, centralised and liberal state. The Bavarian authoritarian 
bureaucracy, introduced the centralised system of education, whereby a wide range of 
educational matters were controlled by the central government, in the form of the Ministry 
of Education. This political interference was to remain a perennial feature in the way 
government education policy was to be exercised subsequently.38 This left little room for 
administrative, cultural or pedagogic initiative at the subordinate or local levels.
The organisation of primary and secondary education as set up by the Bavarians 
remained unchanged, in general terms, for almost a century. It consisted of a seven-year
37 The initial rhetoric of the independence fighters was very optimistic and liberal as to the establishment 
of a “free and constitutionally guarranteed education for boys and girls, for the tnaking o f free-willed and 
responsible citizens”. Demaras A., The Reform which did not Take Place, Vol. 1, Athens 1988, p.kz’.
38 One typical example of the highly centralised authority was a 1844 law which enhanced the pow er of 
the ministry to transfer professors and teachers at its own convenience. This type of provision was 
frequently used by various ministers for political purposes, an issue of distress to the school and University 
staff. It gave the minister the pow'er to transfer teachers and professors by a mere ministerial decision. If 
one considers the fact that during the period 1833-1862 the ministry saw 77 changes of ministers and 60 
ministers of education, one is able to appreciate the extent of the abuse of such a law' and to explain why 
the teaching personnel were forced to submit to the will of the political rulers. Demaras A., op.cit., p. 104 
and Skopetea, op.cit., p. 140.
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compulsory primary education (“demoticon”), followed, after 1837, by a seven-year 
secondary education (the “Hellenicon”, an imitation of the German “Lateinische Schule”, 
and the “Gymnasium”). Primary education was free and compulsory, and of a "democratic 
character" with no institutional restrictions on the right to education. At the higher 
educational level, the creation of the Greek University (founded in 1837), was initially 
based on the School of Archaeology and the Architectural School.39 The most striking 
characteristic of the organisation of Greek education was its one-dimensional character. 
Lack of autonomy at the different levels of education resulted in a unilinear path whereby 
each level was the continuation of the previous one; primary education prepared the pupil 
for the secondary level which in turn was a preparation for higher education.
The classicist orientation, so dear to the Bavarians during their rule, remained 
another perennial feature of Greek education and found notable expression in the 
glorification of Greece’s ancient past. It was reflected in the school programmes, in which 
an over-emphasis on classical lessons worked to the detriment of technical and practical 
learning. The purpose of the Greek University was to preserve the unity of the Greek 
nation and to transfer the lights of Western civilisation to the “backward-looking East”.40 
The nationalistic and civilising purpose of Greek educational mechanisms was justified by 
the geopolitical position of the country, the legitimacy of modem Greece’s link with the 
ancient past and the fact that Greek culture had been predominant in many parts of the 
Ottoman Empire and continued to be so in a large number of educational and cultural 
centres. The Greek University financed heavily by the rich Greek diaspora, was looked 
upon by all Greeks, in the country and abroad, as the main regulator of Greek intellectual 
development.41
39 This was an indication of the Bavarian love of antiquity, and the Bavarian rule saw the erection of major 
neo-classical buildings in Athens.
40 The civilising function of the University resulted in the early politicisation of Greek higher institutions 
and the active involvement of the students in the country’s political affairs. For the 19th century history of 
the Greek Students see Lazos, The Greek Student Movement; 1821-1973, Athens 1987.
41 While the educational system of the independent state was highly centralised, the educational system of 
the diaspora was basically private, communal or ecclesiastical, and its finance was mainly undertaken by 
the Greek bourgeoisie abroad under the intellectual guidance of the Church. Until the 1870s, one can still 
talk of a Greek cultural domination in the Balkans, related to the Greeks’ economic superiority. Following 
the 1870s and the rise of Balkan nationalisms, there was an educational/cultural competition among the 
various Balkan nationalities. Thereafter, Greek educational policies concentrated in the areas of Macedonia,
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The 19th century in Europe was a period of rapid educational development, and by 
mid-century the existence of mass education and of adequate institutions of higher 
education were perceived as increasingly crucial for the development of industry. In a 
period of capitalist expansion in northern Europe and Liberal America, it became clear that 
the need to grasp and exploit the potential of science necessitated a substantial expansion of 
educational systems.42 As was the case with the import and introduction of foreign forms 
of political organisation, so the development of the educational system in Greece came 
early and was of a mass character. So public and free education infiltrated quickly 
throughout the population.43 Equally, secondary and higher education increased 
substantially at a rate disproportionate to the country’s industrial development, the student 
population of the Greek Universities, and the number of Greek students in foreign 
institutions of higher education, was unusually high compared with the developed nations 
of the West.44 Despite the expansion of education, the country was lagging behind the 
developed nations in industrial development, while the educational system perpetuated the 
non-industrial character of the Greek economy by emphasising a classicist orientation, at 
the point of discriminating against studies of a more practical -commercial, agricultural and 
industrial- character.45
Education was, at all levels, accessible to all social classes from the beginning. 
Lacking a class character, Greek education became the basic means to social ascendancy 
for the Greek peasant classes. The acquisition of a degree, “a diploma”, paved the way to
Thrace, Epirus and Asia Minor and struggled through school mechanisms to preserve the importance of 
Greek culture.
42 Between 1840 and the 1880s the population o f Europe rose by 33% but the number of its children 
attending schools by 145%. (The Age o f  Capita/, Abacus 1985, p .l 18).
43 The rate of illiteracy, although high by European standards was progressively dropping in Greece, during 
the second half of the 19th century. From 90.95% in 1830 it dropped to 69.20% in 1879, and 50.20% in 
1907, for the male population; for the female population the percentages were much higher. Indeed, around 
the 1880s and after, while the rate of illiteracy remained higher than the countries of the developed West, it 
was lower than the rates in the Balkan countries and the Iberian Peninsula and similar to the Italian one. 
(Tsoukalas, Dependence and Reproduction, p.394).
44 Tsoukalas talks, on the one hand, of an “over-education” at the secondary and higher levels and, on the 
other, of relatively high percentage of illiteracy, a very' contradictory' phenomenon which led to the deep 
cultural differentiation of the Greek population. (Tsoukalas, op.cit, on secondary education, pp.397-403, on 
higher education,pp.430-435).
45 Indicative of the classicist orientation was the conviction that only the classical gymnasium was equiped 
to provide the University with students, while even graduates from commercial gymnasia had to be taught 
Latin before entering University. Demaras A., op.cit., pp. 134-136. Greece had presented the highest 
percentage of law students in the w hole of Europe, another indication of the counter-productive character of 
higher education and its lack of practical orientation.
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employment in the state sector. The katharevousa idiom, the official language of the state, 
became a distinctive sign of literacy and social status. The classicist/anti-vocational 
orientation, the free access to education, the one-dimensional character of all three levels 
and centralised control, created an educational system, traditional and authoritarian in 
character, democratic and accessible in form, another typical accommodation of the various 
19th century Greek ideological forces.
At the same time, the educational apparatus reflected, reproduced and perpetuated 
the nationalistic orientation of the Greek state, inspired, during the 19th century, by the 
unrealisable Megali Idea. Its principal expression was the dominant Helleno-Christian 
spirit which formed the basic value of Greek education, a remarkable combination of 
reverence for the nationalist classicist glorious past and the Christian orthodox religious 
culture promoted during the Byzantine period. The nationalist character of education took 
the form of emphasis on past glories. In schools, ancient and Byzantine Greek histories 
were taught excessively at the expense of modem Greek history. History was neither 
critically appraised nor questioned but merely learned by heart. The most glorious aspects 
of the past were selected while shameful and degrading moments of history were 
ommitted. The teaching of the ancient texts was characterised by an overwhelming 
emphasis on grammar and syntax and not on a critical appreciation of the classical ideas, 
which reflected the difficulty in connecting the imported modem forms of democracy with 
the ancient Athenian democracy. The religious character of education was equally 
overwhelming. While the position of the Church was significantly weakened, on the whole 
it managed to keep a stronghold in the Greek educational system. The religious 
establishment concentrated on the practice of various symbolic acts -compulsory morning 
prayers, school attendance at Sunday Mass, the predominant position of religious 
instruction in the school curicula- which reinforced its position and made its role 
unchallengeable.
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Demands for reform: The “demoticist ” movement
As had been the case with the religious issue during the 1830s and 1840s and the 
debate over national history during the 1840s and 1850s, the language question and the 
field of pedagogy offered the battleground for a fierce ideological conflict towards the 
latter part of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th. Having secured the 
democratic character of education, the result of organisational forms imported from abroad, 
rather than a long ideological and social struggle, as was the case with the more advanced 
European countries, Greek struggles over education, centred around the 
ideological/cultural content of education. The content of school curicula, the pedagogical 
methods and the language question took the predominant position in the ideological debate 
which became very acute and polarised, among politicians and intellectuals.46
The authoritarian nature of the Greek educational system, the excessively classicist 
orientation, the lack of practical training, the lack of teaching staff, the inadequacy of 
accommodation led to the disfunctionality of the educational system and occasionally to 
student uprisings. While the educational system had worked during most of the 19th 
century without any major alterations, the deficiencies of public education had become a 
matter of urgent attention by the 1880s. The initiative for educational reform came mostly 
from intellectuals who, inspired by the ideas of the "new enlightenment" in Europe47 
started to show a lively interest in Greek popular tradition and Greek popular language. As 
we have already‘stated, the international situation by the 1880s had changed radically and 
there was a need to re-define the content of Greek national identity, which was by now in 
competition with the emerging Balkan neighbours. The generation of the 1880s was the 
first to fight for the introduction of liberal reforms in the cultural and educational fields in 
order to assist the modernisation of society and demanded the recognition of the demotic 
language as the official language of the state.48 Given that the central focus of the conflict
46 Tsoukalas, op.cit., p. 516.
47 Its expression in European education was marked by the massive advance o f popular education, the 
dramatic retreat of traditional religion and the promotion of social sciences. See Hobsbawm, The Age o f  
Empire, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1987, p. 262.
48 The foremost intellectual of this generation Psycharis wrote his book To Taxidi (The Trip) in 1888 
w hich became the biblc of modem demolicism in the fight against katharevousa and for the introduction of 
a popular idiom throughout the w hole Hellenic w'orld.
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among Greek intellectuals became the demotic language issue, the new movement was 
labeled “demoticism”.49
The need for educational reform was also recognised by the authorities, and the 
period after 1880 saw the drafting of a series of new laws, which were however never 
implemented.50 The general idea behind the drafting of these laws was to liberalise the 
educational system, to adjust the system to the needs of economic development and to 
introduce vocational studies. But it was the language question which took the predominant 
position in cultural and educational debates among intellectuals, and thus remained an 
unsettled issue throughout most of the 20th century, at times very polarised positions 
being adopted, on the one side, by extreme supporters of the demotiki and, on the other, 
by extreme supporters of katharevousa.
The first decade of the 20th century marked the emergence of the first Marxist 
thinkers in Greece who joined forces with the liberal intellectuals in a common effort to 
combat “traditionalism and reaction”. Their aim was the bourgeois transformation of Greek 
society, as the necessary intermediate stage before socialism. They too participated in the 
spread of the demoticist movement. This common strategy took shape in the formation of 
the “Omilos” (Educational Society), the purpose of which was to promote the use of 
demotic language. The reformist changes demanded by progressive intellectuals can be 
summed up as follows: change in the socio-ideological orientation of the educational 
system to reflect principles of bourgeois liberalism; creation of a truly "popular" primary
49 On the demoticist movement and the role of the liberal and socialist intellectuals see Kordatos op. cit., 
Anna Frangoudaki Educational Reform and Liberal Intellectuals, Demaras A., "On Education" in the 
History o f the Greek Nation, Vol. 15, pp489-494, Vergopoulos op. citv pp.315-383.
50 In 1877 and 1880, two draft laws of the ministry proposed the abolition of the Hellenikon and its 
substitution by six years of gymnasium, the introduction of a modem Greek course and the founding of a 
Teachers’ College. It was the first attempt at the vague liberalisation of education but was not realised in 
legislation. In 1899, a new draft law proposed the elimination of ancient Greek from the demotico, the 
introduction of new courses, including agricultural courses. The 1899 draft laws were the first attempt to 
reorientate all educational levels towards a more vocational education which would coexist w ith the 
dominant religious and nationalistic education. They were a more systematic approach than the 1877 
attempts and of a more general nature. Although these drafts were discussed in the parliament, they were 
not implemented. In 1913, under the Veni/elos government, the most liberal approach to reform drafted by 
the pedagogist Glynos, demanded an autonomous and uniform primary education, a practical orientation for 
education, education for women, a new type of a 3-year vocational “civil school”, and of a 6-year 
gymnasium. Neither were the draft laws of 1913 implemented. Oddly enough the issue of the demotiki 
language did not feature in any of these proposals. The same themes of this last draft were to be repealed in 
subsequent decades in the 1920s, 1950s and 1960s. See Frangoudaki, Educational Reform and Liberal 
Intellectuals, pp. 17-34.
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education; special concern for those excluded from the benefits of education; an end to the 
predominance of the classicist element; a combination of educational and language reform.
The second decade of the 20th century saw an ever greater consensus among 
socialist and liberal intellectuals which culminated in the collaboration of the socialist 
Glynos, and the liberals Delmouzos and Triantafyllides, three major pedagogues, in the 
1917 Venizelist educational reform. The reform of 1917 introduced the demotic language 
for the first time in Greek education, new reading books were introduced at the primary 
level, written in the demotic, and a new, progressive and anti-authoritarian pedagogy was 
institutionalised. It was the first and single time that the demoticist ideas dominated entirely 
educational thinking.51 It was a short-lived one that went down with the Venizelist party at 
the elections of 1920. There was a strong reaction against the liberal reforms on the part of 
social sectors which fought for the use of katharevousa and the preservation of the 
previous status quo in the cultural and educational field. The pillars of these traditional and 
conservative policies were the Philosophical Faculty, the Church and the Press. The fight 
between reformers and anti-reformers divided sharply the ideological life of the nation at 
the beginning of the 20th century, and left a strong legacy of reforms and counter-reforms 
to the subsequent educational development of the country.52
51 The 1917 reform concentrated mostly on primary education and the new reading books, which were 
introduced, are still regarded highly by many pedagogues, and are considered among the most appropriate for 
primary pupils, and of significant historical value. (See Frangoudaki, The Textbooks o f  the Demotic 
School, Athens 1977). The 1917 reform also created new administrative positions, founded a School for the 
history of the arts, introduced new syllabi for the first three years o f primary education, and created a 
department of Chemistry at the University of Athens.
52 Some very typical incidents, indicative of the fervour w ith which anti-reformers reacted against the ideas 
professed by the liberal intellectuals were: In 1901, the "Evangeliaka" was a reaction by the University, the 
Church and the Press, to a translation of the New Testament into the demotic language; the attempt was 
condemned as atheistic and pro-slavic. A student uprising followed and the translation was banned. In 1903, 
the “Oresteiaka” against the translation and performance by the National Theatre of Aeschylus’ tragedy 
Oresteia in the demotic. In 1914, there was a trial, the "Atheika", concerning the opening in 1908 of an 
experimental school in Volos by Delmouzos; the aim of the school w-as to educate Greek girls on a modem 
and vocational basis with lessons in the demotic and only limited teaching of the classics. This w as equally 
criticised by the “reactionary forces” as anarchic, atheistic and socialist. In 1920, the monarchist anti-reform 
targetted the new reading books of the 1917 reform and the introduction of the demotic language. The new- 
reading books were all burned.
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To summarise, the history of the development of the Greek educational system 
centred on the following factors: A powerful ministry of education, which involved itself 
in every possible aspect of education; the diaspora, which financed heavily Greek 
education both in Greece (which was crucial, given that the Greek state was economically 
incapable of meeting the needs of the country’s educational development)53 and outside; 
the divisions between various schools of thought, some reformist and others seeking to 
preserve the status quo. Greek education presented one of the major fields for fierce 
ideological conflicts among the various Greek political, social and intellectual/cultural 
forces. The accommodation of these tendencies resulted in compromise settlements 
whereby the “democratic” and accessible character contradicted with the central 
authoritarian control; the institutionalisation of “diglossia” left the country divided between 
the demotic, the spoken language of the people, and the katharevousa, a symbol of social 
ascendancy; the veneration of the ancient spirit contrasted with the preservation of a strong 
Christian identity; the high levels of education at the secondary and higher levels contrasted 
with the high level of illiteracy. The Greeks’ efforts to emulate the West and their attempt 
to incorporate a western-inspired rationality in many ways contradicted their emotionally 
charged historical values and practices. Much of this was attributable to the cognitive 
traditions of a country which had not undergone the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, 
and where, in consequence, the liberal educational system was an alien import.
53 As Mouzelis argues, one cannot understand the ‘over-inflated” character of Greek education w ithout 
reference to the Greek diaspora. The latter created the demand for educated men and gave considerable 
amounts for the development of educational establishments, w hich is shown by the fact that up to 1870, 
the state budget for education was much lower than the donations of expatriate Greeks. Mouzelis 
“Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece”, New Left Review  76, p. 61.
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PART Is THE 4TH OF AUGUST REGIME
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Chapter 2 : INTER-WAR PERIOD
Background factors to the 4th of August regime
The end of the First World War in Europe marked the final demise of the old 
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, their replacement by modem states, the 
introduction of liberal democracy and the spread of mass politics in all the countries of 
Europe. Although the beginning of the inter-war period was characterised by optimism as 
to the future of all the independent nation states of Europe, such hopes were rapidly 
disappointed due to the failure of most democratic regimes and the consolidation of 
dictatorial governments. The inter-war period was a period of mass politics, and organised 
demands for social reforms, the result of ethnic, class or regional cleavages which created 
severe pressures from below. Fascist authoritarianism appeared a seductive alternative to 
the threat of mobilisation from below and to the massive influence of the socialist Russian 
Revolution. The inter-war era saw the organised response to communism by a vast number 
of right-wing organisations, movements and parties, varying from the conservative right, 
to the radical and fascist right, in most cases competing through the parliamentary 
machinery, in othenfthrough extra-parliamentary activities and through paramilitary 
formations.
Inter-war Europe saw the consolidation of anti-communist dictatorships of a 
fascist, fascistoid, or conservative nature in most countries, to such an extent that the 
period of 1919-1940 can be characterised as the “Period of the Dictators” in Europe. In 
some settings fascists or National Socialists achieved, or at least shared, power and 
established authoritarian regimes (Italy, Germany, Spain) and in others royal or military 
dictatorships were imposed (Yugoslavia, Romania). The character of each dictatorship was 
determined by the previous socio-political crisis which led to the imposition of dictatorial 
rule and the balance of power among the dominant domestic elites. Fascist type of 
organisation and fascist ideas, related to a certain nationalism and a distinct style of political 
authority, found fertile ground in many different national settings. Even in the countries 
with no strong, influential fascist movements, the organisational and ideological aspect of
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fascism proved to be particularly influential. What characterised fascism was the centrality 
of the ideological factor, in offering a new interpretation of the human reality, in the active 
mobilisation of certain social sectors, and in the legitimation of its extreme 
authoritarianism.
The dictatorship of the 4th of August regime was the Greek expression of 
European inter-war authoritarianism, the dictatorial sequence to the social cleavages which 
the parliamentary system had failed to cope with. The dictatorship of Metaxas, by no 
means a fascist regime, was one of those dictatorships which having been established and 
having consolidated itself firmly in power through the support of the monarchy and the 
military, explored other alternatives of legitimation and attempted, with little success, to 
transform itself into a mobilisational regime, based on a more or less organised set of 
beliefs. The particular character of the 4th of August ideology, the incorporation and 
articulation of various ideological influences was clearly affected by inter-war 
authoritarianism. Although not an indigenous fascist discourse, the ideology of the 4th of 
August employed extensively some of the most dominant and influential fascist ideas, 
regarding corporatism and the omnipresence of the state, as well as dominant fascist forms 
of organisation, such as the imposition from above of a youth movement, as the future 
legitimising pillar of the regime. As had been the case with the official state ideology, 
Greece, due to its peripheral position in relation to the main ideological centres of Europe, 
at this juncture in its history again felt the need to import and imitate ideas and styles of 
authority and forms of social organisation.
The ideological aspect of the 4th of August regime was determined by both 
domestic (national) and external (international) factors and the interplay between these. The 
fascist/radical element in the nature of the ideology and policy of the regime during the 
period 1936-1941, as well as its reactionary and conservative side, was determined by 
three principal factors: The international position of the country economically and 
strategically; the previous domestic socio-political and ideological crisis; the composition of 
the authoritarian elite structure. In the following presentation, I hope to show that the 
regime’s ideology and policy were an amalgam of contradictory themes and actions, thus
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demonstrating that a single label should not be applied to the 4th of August regime and, at 
the same time, drawing attention to the internalisation of different influences by the 4th of 
August authoritarian regime.
The transition from inter-war parliamentary pluralism to the authoritarian regime’s 
limited pluralism was marked by the following aspects which will be briefly examined:
1. The 1936 dictatorship was a response to the previous socio-political crisis of the inter­
war Greek parliamentary system, marked by the quest for a new national identity following 
the end of the centuiy-long influence of the Megali Idea irredentist nationalism. This new 
nationalist climate determined the authoritarian nationalism in Metaxas’ ideology.
2. The ideological context of inter-war Greece was marked by a pluralist circulation of 
ideas, but the influence of fascist ideology was very limited. Greece lacked an influential 
fascist or Nazi type movement which might have provided the Metaxas regime with a solid 
base on which to consolidate its power.
3. The 4th of August regime was primarily a dictatorship backed by the King, a royal 
dictatorship, enjoying the support of the influential British ally which transferred political 
power to a minority party leader, largely limiting the latter’s ideological choices.
4. The 4th of August ideology bore basically the imprint of one man’s ideas. I shall briefly 
examine the inter-war evolution of Metaxas' ideas, when he was leader of a parliamentary 
party.
A. The Inter-war Period: Socio-political Crisis and the Quest fo r a New 
National Identity
The post-1922 period in Greek history marked the final end of Greek irredentism, 
and brought social, economic, political and ideological changes in inter-war Greek society. 
The defeat in Asia Minor in 1922 set the frontiers of the Greek state and settled the 
question of the inclusion of as much as possible of the Greek people within Greece’s 
boundaries.1 It was a period of major changes and new divisions within Greek society in
1 The final settlement of the nation-state’s frontiers took place in 1948 with the recovery of the Dodecanese 
islands from the Italians.
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that the Asia Minor disaster brought a turn in the country’s development, marked by rapid 
capitalist development, political instability and ideological transition. The country’s 
territorial expansion after the Balkan wars and the First World War, the influx of 1.5 
million refugees, in a country of less than 5 millions, and the inclusion of the Greek 
entrepreneurial classes within the boundaries of the Greek state resulted in the overall 
reorganisation of Greek society. 2
At the political level, the inter-war period of democratic mass politics, and the 
rising influence of the middle classes, was mainly characterised by the fragile exercise of 
parliamentary democracy, the continuous intervention of the military, and the short-lived 
Republic, and the polarised division of the party-politics between Monarchists and 
Republicans: the People’s party and the Liberal party.3 The unstable political climate of 
inter-war Greece included seven military interventions in politics, a series of minor military 
conspiracies, the Pangalos dictatorship in 1925, seven parliamentary elections in each of 
which approximately 10 to 13 parties participated and two referenda on the issue of the 
monarchy.4
The role of the military during the inter-war period and its active participation in 
politics through military interventions and conspiracies determined the non-military 
character of the 4th of August regime, given that the army was already divided into 
Venizelist and anti-Venizelist factions. The Dichasmos politics, which began during the 
first world war, resulted in a Dichasmos in the military as well, which until the second 
world war, saw the officers divided between royalists and Venizelists. The first faction of 
royalist officers, was dominant during the periods of 1920-1922 and 1933-1940. The 
Venizelist military bloc was dominant during the republican period of 1922-1932, when 
the Venizelists were mostly in power and was in its turn split by minor internal Venizelist
2 Al the same time, with the exchange of populations, 400,000 Muslims and Bulgarians left the country 
after the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
3 In fact the division Venizelism/anti-Venizclism in itself comprised a scries of major and minor parties, 
among which the two mentioned were the largest. Regarding the monarchist party, some call it “popular” 
(Andrikopoulos), while others call it “populist” (Mouzclis) and others “People’s Party” (Mavrogordatos), 
all referring to the same “Laiko Komma” of Tsaldares. I will adopt the third term since it a more accurate 
translation of the Greek term.
4 The situation is comparable with Portugal, where the period 1910-1926, the republican period in 
Portuguese history, was also characterised by unstable parliamentary rule: 9 Presidents; 44 governments; 
25 uprisings; and a series of military interventions, which established 3 dictatorships.
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divisions and disagreements, typical of the political and partisan divisions of the Venizelist 
political group. The army intervened frequently in politics, always to deliver political 
power back to the politicians. During the period of the politics of Dichasmos, alternate 
governments of Royalists and Venizelists pursued their personal promotions and purges, 
according to their allegiances and affiliations. This special relationship between the army 
and the politicians brought a relationship of interdependence between the two; the 
politicians required the intervention of the military to safeguard and stabilise their authority, 
while the officers needed the politicians to secure their positions and promotions within the 
army. This situation which prevailed during the inter-war period, signalled the significance 
of two distinct developments; on the one hand, it secured the crucial and strategic 
importance of the army to the stability of the political status quo and on the other, it kept 
military officers far from governmental posts. As long as the military hierarchy was 
satisfied with the political rulers, they never assumed political power directly since their 
position within the military establishment was not threatened.5 The 4th of August regime 
was supported by the dominant royalist military hierarchy which did not participate, as 
such, in the governmental alliance.
At the social level, we observe the existence of regional tensions (New Lands vs 
Old Lands), ethnic tensions (native Greeks vs Refugees and various minorities) and class 
tensions (bourgeois factions, workers and peasants). The most pervasive division 
however, related to the party political context of Venizelism vs anti-Venizelism. According 
to Mavrogordatos, Venizelists represented the entrepreneurial section of the bourgeoisie, 
the liberal intellectuals, the new peasantry of smallholders, sectors economically and 
culturally deprived, and the new lands that needed to be incorporated into the Greek state. 
The anti-Venizelists represented the state officials, the judiciary, the academic world, the 
Church, the traditional petty-bourgeoisie, the old smallholders, the old lands, those who 
had so far enjoyed a higher level of opportunities for consumption, education and mobility. 
The complexity of Greek society in the inter-war period, the allegiances of the different
5 The most complete analysis of the role of the military in inter-war politics is presented by Vcrcmis’ The 
Interventions o f the Military in Greek Politics 1916-1936, Athens 1983.
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social sectors and their connection to politicians were related to ideological orientations, 
clientelistic networks and charismatic appeals.6 The decline of the democratic regime was 
undoubtedly due to the inability of the Greek parliamentary system to control the inter-war 
social tensions. On the other hand, Greek civil society was still relatively weak and was 
marked by a lack of organised pressure from below. Neither the urban proletariat, nor the 
poor peasants posessed capable organisational entities which would promote their interest. 
While the danger from the socially under-privileged in the form of strikes provided the 4th 
of August regime with the pretext for intervention and legitimated a rhetoric against 
communism, the politicisation of Greek labour and peasantry along class lines was weak.
At the economic level, the influx of refugees increased the Greek domestic market 
and offered the Greek economy a cheap labour force. Inter-war capitalist development was 
combined with agricultural reform, the expropriation of more lands and the increase in the 
number of small proprietors in the new lands. Greek industry during the period 1923-1938 
was marked by rapid growth, the import-substitution phase of Greece’s industrialisation.7 
On the other hand, the fact that the position of the country always depended upon 
international events, and that it was heavily indebted to the great powers, meant that Greece 
was in a dependent economic position within the international system, and that 
international fluctuations had severe repercussions at the Greek domestic level. Although 
the country suffered the effects of the 1929 crisis, by 1933 the economy recuperated, 
marked by industrial growth and a policy of self-sufficiency. In that sense, contrary to 
other European cases like Germany, Italy and Portugal, the decline of parliamentary 
democracy happened in a period of economic upswing.8
At the ideological level, the country urgently needed a re-definition of the Greek 
identity following the end of the Megali Idea and the radical change in Greece’s geography
6 On the significance of inter-war mass politics, sec George Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic; Social 
Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece 1922-1936, University of California Press,1983, the best account 
so far of the inter-war Greek society.
7 During this period, the industrial production doubled in value and increased in a 68% rate in volume, 
Vergopoulos, Nationalism and Economic Development', Greece in the Inter-War period, Athens 1978, p. 
99.
8 The upturn was linked with a radical change in Greece’s economic relations with the outside world, and a 
policy of “autarky” connected with an import-substitution in agriculture, acceleration of industrialisation 
and private capital accumulation; the boost of wheat production and the reduction of the trade deficit in 
foodstuffs. See Mazowcr, Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis, p. 276.
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and population. The death of Greek irredentism was followed by various ideological 
tendencies within the context of ideological pluralism and resulted in the formulation of a 
variety of ideas as to the new national identity of the Greek nation. Indeed the inter-war 
ideological climate was one of pluralist intellectual and cultural thought. Ideas of extreme 
anti-western nationalism co-existed with liberal, socialist and the crudest forms of 
communist thought. As Vergopoulos argues,
the ideological product o f the inter-war years was defined by the social differences 
and conflicts which culminated', during the final part o f the period, in the objective
need o f the development o f the element o f a national identity the crisis in Greek
society during the inter-war period, instead o f resulting in the creation o f a 
revolutionary movement, ended with the formation o f a broad nationalist modernist 
movement, with right and left variations, democratic and monarchic 
orientations. The Greek fascism that followed was the logical consequence o f this 
contradictory nationalism.9
The equally confusing international environment was another factor in the domestic 
instability. The predominant international influence came from Britain, and there was also 
increasing influence from fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In Europe, the new enemy was 
identified as a class enemy, in the form of organised communism. The 1920s was a period 
in which communist parties were strong all over Europe, their aim being the dismantling of 
the capitalist states and their substitution by communist ones. While the fear of 
communism could easily be justified at international level, especially in countries with 
stronger and more organised civil societies, in the case of Greece with its level of social 
development this was debatable.10 Whether the country was really threatened by the ideas 
of communism is a question which has aroused contradictory views. Suffice it to say, that 
the massive influx of the new disadvantaged population and their potential for communist
9  Vergopoulos, Nationalism and Economic Development, p. 139 and p. 150, [in Greek].
10 Communist movements or a trade-union movements controlled by communists, socialists or liberal 
reformers did not achieve the kind of influence or massive strength and autonomy that they did in the more 
advanced countries of Europe. Even compared with the Balkan countries of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the 
numerical strength of the communist party was much less in Greece. See Mouzclis, Politics in the Semi- 
Periphery, p. 61. In 1930, according to a Comintern Report, the total membership of the Communist 
Party was no more than 1,500. Mazowcr, op.cit., p. 36.
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mobilisation was enough to constitute a real threat in the minds of many people. 
Furthermore, the Communist party's position on the Macedonian question legitimised the 
belief that communist ideology was anti-national.11 Hence, the new threat to the country's 
national security became the communist ideology which was perceived to undermine the 
socio-economic establishment. Anti-communism became a powerful ideological instrument 
of legitimation, to fill the ideological vacuum created by the death of the Megali Idea.12 In 
1929, the "Idionymon Act” (Special Law) signalled the official introduction of the anti­
communist state, and legitimised authoritarian state practices against those considered anti­
nationals.
Within such a domestic and international context, the content of Greek nationalism 
was re-defined. There was an end to irredentist aspirations, in that the people ceased to 
demand the expansion of Greece’s territory, and, unlike the increasing nationalistic claims 
of other European countries, all political elites, including the 4th of August leadership, 
professed a pacifist and non-expansive nationalism.
B. Fascism in Greece: A negligible influence
The distinction between fascist regimes and fascist movements is very relevant to 
the subject of inter-war authoritarianism. Fascist movements emerged in most European 
countries and either preceded the fascist regimes (Italy, Germany), participated in the 
exercise of authoritarian power (Spain) or found themselves in competition with the 
conservative authoritarian regimes and were suppressed by them (Portugal, Romania).
In Italy, the prototype fasci movements presented their first programmes in 1919 
and were initially supported by students and war veterans before the acquisition of power 
by Mussolini. Despite the local differences between the various fasci, the initial fascist
11 In 1923, at the Congress of the Balkan Communist Federation in Moscow, the decision in favour of “an 
autonomous and independent Macedonia and Thrace” was adopted, which the representative of the Greek 
Communist party accepted and signed. In 1924, the same decision of “a united and independent Macedonia” 
was adopted by the Comintern and the Greek representatives. Only in 1931 was the position of KKE 
slightly transformed and there was talk of “an independent" but not “uniled” Macedonia and, in 1935, it was 
recognised by the Greek Communist party that the majority of the population in Macedonia was Greek 
(K.Vasileiou, Anti 475, September 20, 1991, pp. 40-43).
12 George Catephores, “The Construction of the Anti-Communist State” in The legisla tion  o f  the 
Barbarians, pp. 31-88.
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ideology was a vague amalgam of nationalism and national-syndicalism.13 Moreover Italy 
had a notable intellectual tradition, which inspired the creation and expansion of fascist 
ideas. The nationalistic ideas of the Italian poet D1 Annunzio, with their emphasis on 
Roman histoiy, were easily incorporated into fascist doctrine. Elite theorists such as 
Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca professed the country's need for a strong leadership, 
calling for a determined drive for power, and adopting an elitist attitude towards the 
impulsive masses. Roberto Michels developed his powerful analysis on the “iron law of 
oligarchy”, referring to the organisation and bureaucratisation of the socialist parties. Elite 
theorists claimed the inevitability of a strong leadership, criticized Marxist theory and 
practice, attacked liberal democracy and without being open proponents of a fascist 
philosophy, they were adopted by many fascist ideologues of the 1920s and 1930s.14 
Moreover the Italian fascist regime was surrounded by a number of "intellectuals" such as 
Gentile, the philosopher of fascism, and Rocco, the originator of the “organic” theory of 
the state, who contributed to the systematic making of fascist thought into the official 
ideology of the Italian fascist state.
In Germany, equally, a long intellectual tradition going back to the 19th century 
paved the way for the Nazi ideology and the creation of the NSDAP the strongest 
mobilisational party, the indisputable base of Nazi power. At its birth, the NSDAP was 
predominantly lower middle-class party, but it very soon attracted army officers, university 
students, intellectuals, peasants and young urban workers, a heterogeneous disaffected 
social base, as a result of the first world war and the economic hardships of the inter-war 
period. Anti-Semitism, aggressive nationalism, a neo-romantic attitude towards life 
together with some socialist overtones constituted the general ideological framework of the 
Nazi ideology. Similarly, the Nazis found their intellectual inspiration in 19th century ideas 
of philosophers likeNietzsche, elite theorists like Ernst Juenger and composers like
13 S. J. Woolf "Italy" in Fascism in Europe edited by Woolf, pp. 39-63.
14 For a discussion of the role of elite theorists on fascist ideology, see among others, Eugene Weber's 
Varieties o f Fascism, Mark Hagopian's Ideals and Ideologies o f Modern Politics, Stemhcll, “Fascist 
Ideology” in Laqueur W., ed., Fascism; A Reader's Guide, Mosse's The Culture o f Western Europe, and 
Dunleavy/O’Leary’s Theories o f the State. See also the original works of the elite theorists, Robert 
Michels' The Political Parties, Vilfredo Pareto's The Mind and Society and Gaetano Mosca's The Ruling 
Class.
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Wagner. These were interpreted in such a way as to justify the Nazi racist claims of a pure 
Aryan society, led by the “new man” would radically change Germany.15
The Romanian Iron Guard, under the undisputed leadership of Codreanu for 
almost 20 years, can be seen as one of the major European fascist movements. It was the 
only Balkan fascist movement on the model of the Western European ones able to attract a 
mass following. The movement was consolidated during the 1920s and consisted initially 
of student groups. In 1927, Codreanu founded the Legion of Archangel Michael, the 
prototype of fascist organisation in Romania. Its ideology contained anti-Semitic elements, 
a cultural identification with Romanian Orthodoxy, nationalistic overtones, the cult of the 
leader, and differed from other fascist movements in its belief in the primacy of the 
interests of the poor peasant and its demand for a radical land reform. Its anti-Semitism 
was linked with the existence of an economically powerful Jewish community in Romania. 
Its social base consisted mostly of peasants, intellectuals and poor University students. Its 
electoral support reached 16% of the national vote in 1937, but its way to power was 
blocked by the royalist dictatorship of King Carol who suppressed the movement.16 The 
Iron Guard, under the leadership of General Antonescu, was among the few fascist 
movements to share power, although it was later destroyed by the same leader during the 
Nazi occupation of the country.17 Romania was also a country which, during the 1930s, 
produced a few intellectuals on fascism including Manoilescu, Europe’s leading 
theoretician of practical, developmental authoritarian corporatism, and Cuza, the father of 
20th century Romanian anti-Semitism. Indeed, Romanian fascism was a unique case of 
fascism in Europe given the under-developed character of its economy when compared 
with countries such as Italy, Germany and Hungary. Its fascism was tied to the specific 
nationalistic aspirations of the Romanian people, characterised by the exaltation of peasant 
life, with a country of a large peasant community, and hostility towards the Jews, in a 
country with a prosperous Jewish community. But the unique feature of Romanian fascism
^  Mosse, op.cit., pp. 297-298.
16 See Zeev Barbu, “Rumania”, in Fascism in Europe, edited by Woolf, pp. 151-170.
17 Polonsky The Little Dictators, Roullcdge and Kcgan Paul 1975, pp. 78-93.
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lay  in the fusion of Christian Orthodox mysticism and fascism, the emphasis of the 
Romanian Orthodox heritage with the anti-Semitic, aggressively nationalistic ideas.
Greece neither had a fascist intellectual tradition nor did any fascist or Nazi type 
movement emerge which could successfully adapt itself to the context of Greek society and 
challenge the existing alternatives. In Greece, the inter-war social divisions were contained 
within the rivalry between Venizelism and anti-Venizelism which did not allow for the 
emergence of a radical movement like fascism. Both leading parties subscribed to a number 
of authoritarian doctrines and practices and shared the notion of the communist threat. 
Moreover, the significant role of military intervention in Greek politics functioned as a 
safety valve against the excesses of the extremes. We are thus left with the examination of 
individual cases, like that of Metaxas, and the appearance of a few insignificant fascist or 
Nazi movements whose impact was negligible.
Fascist and National-Socialist movements in Greece were fragmented and they 
never managed to secure a significant social base. The few movements which appeared 
were basically influenced by the ideas of German National Socialism, anti-Semitism, anti­
communism and militaristic nationalism.18 The most important of them was the "National 
Union of Greece" (EEE), founded in 1927, and based in Salonica, a national patriotic 
organisation, violently anti-communist and anti-Semitic which split in 1933 when trying to 
turn itself into a political party. A large proportion of its 7,000 members were refugees, ex- 
soldiers and people who had been in anti-Slav bands in the pre-1912 era.19 The anti- 
Semitic movement "National-Socialist Party of Macedonia-Thrace" was of an even minor 
importance. The 80,000 strong Jewish community (86% of which was concentrated in 
Salonica) was too small to be the target of a pan-Hellenic anti-Semitic movement.20 The 
"National Pan-Student Movement" created by students of the University of Athens was 
fiercely anti-communist, but had a very small number of members. Finally, the “National- 
Socialist Party” was founded by the pro-royalist politician Mercouris, but was a poor
18 In Andrikopoulos The Roots o f Greek Fascism , pp. 12-13 and pp. 56-57.
19 David Close “Conservatism, Authoritarianism and Fascism in Greece, 1915-1945” in Fascists and 
Conservatives, p. 203.
20 Anti-Semitism erupted twice in Salonica in a 1931 pogrom by the EEE and the newspaper Macedonia 
and in 1933 during a Salonica by-election. Mavrogordatos, op.cit., pp. 253-262.
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imitation of Hitler’s party. Mercouris was among the very few Greeks to produce a 
systematic discussion of fascist thinking in his book “The Corporatist State”.21
Fascist ideology found some admirers among the military, but the principal 
attraction was not so much to the ideas as to the style of authoritarian leadership. The most 
vociferous disciple among the military was General Kondyles, a great rival of Metaxas, 
who in 1924 created his own party based on the principles of Mussolini’s fascism. His 
programme consisted of a promise of “national regeneration”, an appeal to military glory, 
and vague socialist proposals to reform the tax system and remedy the abuses of 
capitalism .22 In a visit to Rome in 1935 General Kondyles, expressing his open 
admiration for Mussolini’s political deeds, stated among other things:
so far we have only seen one man who resisted the Russian enemy, the
Duce.Having created fascism he saved the world from a return to
barbarism he has created a new regime which was imitated by Germany,
while in all the other nations fascist nuclei will sooner or later prevail Vive the 
Duce.23
However Kondyles’ fascist predilections should not be regarded as an indication of 
fascist influence on the general’s thought, given that Kondyles was independent-minded, 
having started by the side of the radical Venizelists and later joining the People’s Party. 
Moreover, although in 1924 he was among the protagonists in the establishment of the 
Republic and the expulsion of the king from Greece, in 1935 he was the protagonist in the 
restoration of the Monarchy. Hence he should be regarded as a typical example of an
21 The Italian authorities and the Fascist International in their estimates on the various fascist movements 
in Europe considered Mercouris’ movement to be the only one to have the potential to become a genuine 
fascist party in Greece, provided that it abandoned its admiration for the Nazi organisation and ideals and for 
Hitler’s personality. (Report of the Directory of Political Affairs of the Italian Foreign Office under the title 
“Foreign Fascist Movements”, April 1934). In general, however, the Italian Fascists were not so keen on 
helping the creation of international fascist movements w hich might threaten the dominance of the Italian 
one, and their foreign policy was mostly based on the upsetting of the democratic regimes and the creation 
of authoritarian dictatorships rather than the creation of strong international fascism. Romain H. Raneiro 
“The Coup of Metaxas and its Appeal on Fascist Italy” in Greece 1936-1944; Dictatorship, Occupation, 
Resistance, Flaisher & Svoronos, eds., Athens 1989, p. 33-49.
22 Close, “Conservatism, Authoritarianism and Fascism in Greece”, in Fascists and Conservatives, p. 204.
23 Eleftherotypia, October 28, 1990, [in Greek].
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opportunist military officer who believed in the military’s involvement in politics, but 
vacillated from one ideological tendency to another.24
Apart from Kondyles, there were other army people during the inter-war period in 
Greece, who admired the style of leadership of Mussolini and wanted to see its 
implementation in the Greek political arena. The dictatorship of Pangalos (June 1925- 
August 1926), was a case to point in that this Venizelist officer aimed at establishing a 
personal regime, inspired by the example of Mussolini. His intention was to solve the wide 
political divisions of the inter-war period, but he ended up in alienating all the political and 
military forces (even those who had initially supported him) and was overthrown by the 
then Venizelist officer Kondyles.25 In several instances during the 1930s, various military 
officers of a Venizelist affiliation (Plasteras) or not, and politicians had proclaimed their 
admiration for the authoritarian practices of the West and favoured the imposition of a 
Greek dictatorship as the only solution to the political crisis. But their rhetoric never went 
as far as the adoption of a fascist ideology and stopped short of what Veremis calls 
“demagogic despotism”.26 It was only Metaxas, however, who professed openly his anti- 
parlamentarian ideas and spoke in favour of a permanent dictatorial regime. However, the 
continuous military interventions in politics and the anti-parlamentarian practices of many 
politicians gradually introduced the shadow of a more permanent dictatorship closer to the 
Greek perception of political reality. Seraphim Maximos, in the introduction to his book 
Parliamentarism or Dictatorship wrote as early as 1928:
The advocates o f a clear parliamentarism are getting fewer. The appeals and 
speeches resemble to psalmodies which do not move. The most popular democratic 
newspapers o f Athens fill their articles with memoirs and images o f 
Mussolini. They admire his achievements and praise him. The republican army
24 As Andrikopoulos says, Kondyles saw himselF in the role of a Greek “Duce” and the King in the role of 
Victor Emmanuel, but was neither trusted by the king, nor by the Greek political parties nor by the 
British. “The Power Base of Greek Authoritarianism” in Who Were the Fascists, p. 575.
25 The Pangalos dictatorship was followed by parliamentary elections and the formation of a coalition 
government. The one year survival of the regime was solely due to the factional divisions within the 
political w'orld and the military and their inability to find a viable alternative. Apart from several 
authoritarian law's, the dictatorship of Pangalos left no particular impact on Greek society and, on the 
contrary, gave a boost to the subsequent parliamentary process. See Veremis, op.cit., pp. 123-131, and 
Mavrogordatos, op.cit., pp. 33-34.
26 Veremis, op.cit., p .135 .
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is also filled with prospective dictators who deliberate on the future o f Greece 
under a “noble” dictatorship (p.7).
Despite dictatorial and authoritarian tendencies in several quarters, fascist ideology 
never took root in Greek political thought, although a number of Greek politicians and 
parties were alarmed by it. In the 1930s, following the consolidation of the Italian 
dictatorship and the rise to power of the Nazis, the Greek communist party in particular, 
was alarmed by the international expansion of the fascist phenomenon, and called for its 
defeat, both internationally and in Greece. Greek communists saw the existing anti­
communist climate as highly conducive to the establishment of a fascist dictatorship.27 
Debates on fascism among intellectuals centred largely on the international impact of the 
fascist phenomenon and its influence on Greek internal affairs. But they could never 
substantiate their claims based on the existence of any influential Greek fascist movement.
C. The power structure o f the 4th o f August regime: A royal-supported 
personal dictatorship
One of the most essential aspects of the regime was that it was not simply the 
personal dictatorship of Metaxas, but was jointly organised by both King George and 
Metaxas. The very imposition of the regime was based on two decrees signed by the king 
concerning the suspension of the most important constitutional articles, connected with the 
exercise of individual and collective liberties, on the one hand, and the dissolution of the 
Parliament, on the other.28 Both decrees were blatantly unconstitutional but, at the same 
time, they followed a long tradition of constitutional violations during the pre-1936 
period.29
27 Noutsos in "The Ideological Components of the 4th of August Regime" in Historica, pp. 139-150, 
where the author discusses the attitudes of the communist forces towards fascism, prior and during the 
regime of Metaxas.
28 Royal Decree "On the dissolution of the Third Revisionary Assembly" because it, allegedly, failed to 
provide the country with a revision of the Constitution or to form a stable and strong government. Royal 
Decree "On the suspension of the articles 5,6,10,11,12,14,20 and 95 of the Constitution throughout the 
country".
29 See Alivizatos’ Political Institutions in Crisis, on the development of constitutional practices in post- 
1922 Greece.
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Without the consent of the king, Metaxas would neither have been able to attain 
power nor to retain it subsequently. It was a monarchical dictatorship which derived its 
power essentially from the King, in a similar way to the other Balkan dictatorships of King 
Carol in Romania30 and King Alexander and later Prince Paul in Yugoslavia3.1 The King, 
however, struggled to give the impression that he was over and above the every day 
exercise of political power, thus distancing himself from the exercise of many authoritarian 
practices employed by, and the authoritarian ideology of Metaxas 32 The views of the two 
people on the nature, duration and governmental policies of the regime differed radically. 
Their collaboration had its strained moments and was based on a subtle agreement but the 
supremacy of the King limited the authoritarian style of Metaxas 33
At the international level, the 4th of August regime enjoyed the backing of Britain. 
It has been repeatedly acknowledged that the British were persuaded to sustain the regime 
through the intercession of the king, who was an ardent anglophile, even though at times 
they realised that it was becoming excessively authoritarian. The following extract from a 
memorandum sent from Sir Orme Sargent to Halifax clearly shows the extent of British 
support:
Under the present circumstances, the importance o f Greece to Britain is so 
significant, that we would be justified in preventing a revolution from breaking out, 
in the present crisis. With respect to the foreign policy o f Greece, the current 
regime suits our interests so well, and i f  Greece became the battleground for a 
conflict between various politicians, this situation would offer the Germans and
30  In Romania, the constitutionally powerful king Carol, dominant within the army and the 
administration, appointed a leader of a minority party, Goga, as Prime Minister in 1937, whom he later 
dismissed, establishing a more or less personal dictatorship and a government under the patriarch composed 
of politicians from the other parties. Anthony Polonsky, The Little Dictators, pp. 88-91.
31 In Yugoslavia, King Alexander had suspended the constitution in 1929 and had established a personal 
dictatorship which after his death was taken over by the Regency of Prince Paul and the Premiership of 
Stojadinovic.
32 Similarly in Yugoslavia, Prince Paul was also a supporter of British institutions. Under the premiership 
of Stojadinovic, the latter tried to establish closer relations with Germany and Italy and adopted some of the 
fascist rhetoric.
33 Metaxas in his diary refered constantly to the King’s objections to his leadership and policies and had to 
take account of the King’s reactions in most of the political steps that he took. His Personal Diary, Vol.4.
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the Italians the perfect opportunity for fruitful conspiracies at the expense o f
British interests 34
As with their overall policy during the inter-war period, the British pursued a policy of 
non-interference which was rather ambiguous, given that they collaborated fully with the 
regime of Metaxas from an influential position. On the whole they approached Greek 
politics in a business-like manner irrespective of regimes and governments, so long as the 
latter did not threaten their dominant position in the Mediterranean.35
Those who see the dynamic of regimes in the context of the contradictions 
between the various factions of the dominant elites, view the 4th of August regime in terms 
of a fight between the German sphere of influence represented by Metaxas and the British 
sphere of influence represented by the King, and the struggle of the British and the 
Germans to dominate economically Greece and the Balkans in general. Indeed, during the 
1930s German capital had penetrated the dependent Greek economy, while, at the same 
time, there was a substantial restructuring in the external commerce of the country to the 
advantage of the Germans.36 These spheres of influence were reflected at the economic, 
political and military elite levels, which were divided according to their international 
allegiances and material interests.37 The leadership of Metaxas and King Georgy caught in 
the middle in the international competition of the Great Powers strove to keep a balance 
between the two influences. While it is true that King George represented the British 
sphere of influence and consistently pursued a pro-British foreign policy, it is an 
exaggeration to claim that Metaxas promoted German interests in Greece, although his 
ideological rhetoric seemed to imply such an inclination and his personal ideals were closer 
to the German way of thinking. But Metaxas was also a realistic politician, who had a clear
34 Memorandum from Sir Oime Sergant to Lord Halifax, R 1210/64/19/1939, London 16 February 1939, 
in Andrikopoulos, The Roots o f Greek Fascism, pp. 96-97, [in Greek].
35 Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941, p. 1.
36 Similar developments took place in the other Balkan countries of great interest to Germany, Britain and 
Italy. Overall, the Balkan authoritarian regimes of King Carol and Prince Paul, but not Bulgaria which 
sided with the Germans, strove to maintain a neutral attitude towards the great powers, a policy of 
balancing between Germany and the Allies.
37Ali\ izatos sees the conflict as one between the pro-German and the pro-British factions of the dominant 
classes (Political Institutions in Crisis), Andrikopoulos examines the same factions w ithin the military 
itself (The Roots of Greek Fascism), kitsikis sees the division w ithin the political ehies(Greece o f the 4th 
o f August and the Great Powers).
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understanding of the country’s peripheral status and an ambitious political figure who, 
more than anything else, sought to promote his personal authoritarian power at the expense 
of the king. In one of his interviews he stated that:
All our interests connect us with the British. Germany is not a Mediterranean 
power. We are distanced from her by the whole o f Central Europe. How is it 
possible for me to let my feelings influence my foreign policy, contrary to the 
interests o f the country ? 38
The dictatorship managed to sustain itself mostly due to the lack of a viable political 
alternative among the Greek political parties. The political world was tired of the previous 
anomalous political process and therefore displayed a degree of apathy towards the 
dictatorship which was enough to ensure the endurance of the regime through the years. 
Greek politicians for the most part, followed a policy of passive acceptance of the 
authoritarian regime, only presenting unorganised and incoherent political alternatives, 
having basically accepted the King’s supremacy.39 But most important, passive acceptance 
towards the 4th of August regime was due to a general conviction that democracy had 
failed in Greece and Greek society towards the end of the inter-war era was left disunited 
and disillusioned.
D. The personality o f the leader: Inter-war ideological vacillations
The fascist regimes of the inter-war period were among other things dictatorships 
of powerful and/or charismatic leaders who for the most part enjoyed an unchallengeable 
authority. Hence, Nazi rule is identified with the personality of Hitler, and the Italian 
fascist regime with that of Mussolini. Similarly, other authoritarian regimes of the same
38 From an interview to the correspondent of the Sunday Times, June 24, 1937, stated in Kilsikis Greece 
of the 4th o f August and the Great Powers, p. 91, [in Greek]. Being a practical man Metaxas was trying to 
endear himself to the British and as a dictator he tried to keep a good relationship with both the British and 
the Germans.
39 See their memoranda to the King during the dictatorship. The politicians’ reaction was limited to the 
personal initiatives of Kanellopoulos, Mylonas, Papandrcou, Kafandaris and Theotokis. It was mostly the 
leaders of the small political parties who approveo/more militancy towards the dictatorship. They were 
limited however to the clandestine publishing o f newspapers or memoranda to the King, their intention 
being to undermine the King’s trust »^Metaxas. (His Personal Diary, Vol. 4, pp. 255-257.) This does not 
imply that Metaxas never faced any opposition. On the contrary, in several instances he had to eliminate 
the opposition coming both from the political elites as well as from the masses ( revolt in Crete on the 
29th of July 1938).
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period were marked by the strong leadership of a dictator as was the case with the 
prolonged dictatorships of Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal. It is a commonplace 
that each of the above dictators left his personal stigma on these regimes to such an extent 
that some analysts went as far as to explain the phenomenon of fascism in terms of the 
personality of the leader. The most fruitful case for such an approach is presented by Nazi 
Germany, in that the uniqueness of the Nazi state can be largely attributed to the per­
sonality and the ideology of Hitler. It is hard to conceive that Nazi rule could have 
displayed its specific traits and aggressiveness without the idiosyncratic character of its 
leader. Most of these explanations have centred on a psychological evaluation of the 
leader's appeal to the masses. In drawing their psycho-portrait of the leader, many analysts 
have attributed to him almost supernatural powers, in that he was able to mobilise large 
mass followings through the appeal of his personalised ideological vision.40
Different from the purely psychological approaches, the particular nature of the 
Nazi state has also been attributed to the exceptional power position of Hitler, following 
Weber's notion of "charismatic authority". Max Weber's concept of 'charismatic rule' is 
valuable in comprehending the character of Hitler's power base within the Nazi movement, 
the growing autonomous force of Hitler's authority within the complex power relations of 
the Nazi state and the corrosive impact of Hitler's power when superimposed upon a 
contradictory form of domination.41
Naturally in the Greek case we are neither dealing with the same level of radical 
ideology nor with the same force of repression and destructive capacity as in Germany. 
The role of a charismatic personality, however, has been used in many instances as a way 
of understanding Greek politics. The case of Venizelos is a clear example of this, in the 
sense that his charisma played an integrative and legitimating role for the exercise of his 
authority while, at the same time, his personality, his party and his ideology were central to 
the divisions in Greek society during the inter-war period.42 Metaxas cannot be viewed as
40 Reich in his book The Mass Psychology o f Fascism, Adomo in The Authoritarian Personality among 
others, also sections in Kitchen and Payne in their respective books.
41 Ian Kershaw "Defining the Nazi State" in New Left Review 176, pp. 47-67.
42 See Mavrogordatos’ application of the concept of "charismatic leadership" to the personality o f  
Venizelos in his book Stillborn Republic, pp. 55-60.
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a "charismatic personality" like Hitler and Mussolini, in the context of fascist regimes, and 
like Venizelos in the context of Greek inter-war parliamentary politics. Metaxas did not 
even have the intellectual appeal of Salazar, who was a professor, and the theoretician of 
the national-corporatist state, who established the Portuguese “dictatorship of professors”.
A leadership becomes charismatic only when it is recognized as such by its subjects 
who acknowledge its genuineness and act accordingly.43 Metaxas was not able to earn the 
recognition of his authority by the Greek community which alone would have 
demonstrated a genuine charisma, either during his parliamentary career, or as the 
powerful dictator of the 4th of August regime. Moreover, as Weber points out, 
"charismatic authority is specifically irrational in the sense o f being foreign to all
rules it repudiates the past and it is in this sense a specifically revolutionary force ",44
Metaxas* ideology, as will be shown later, cannot be considered a radical break with the 
past since he tried to base his doctrine on the traditionally held Greek national values, 
although he did repudiate the immediate political past.
Although his dictatorship is regarded as a personalistic type of dictatorial power, he 
is mostly remembered, by those who experienced his rule, as a ludicrous dictator who tried 
to imitate with little success the ideas of the Italian and German fascist regimes and was 
obsessed with the Nazi type of youth organisation. To those who did not experience his 
regime, there is little mention of him in the history books; he will only be remembered as 
the man who replied with the heroic "NO" ("OXI") to the Italian ultimatum, that preceded 
the Italian invasion in October 1940 and brought victory over the Italian forces in Albania - 
which is commemorated by a national holiday every year on the 28th of October. This fact 
has largely exonerated him in the minds of the Greek people, in spite of his authoritarian 
practices, for he is remembered as an ardent nationalist who despite his ideological 
agreement with and admiration of the fascist type of social organisation, heroically 
opposed Italian aggression.
43 Max Wcbcr Economy and Society, p. 242.
44Ibid, p. 244.
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Metaxas' roots were in the aristocracy of the Ionian islands, although he suffered 
financial hardships as a young person. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1890 
and participated in the 1897 Greco-Turkish war. The Greek defeat is said to have affected 
his ideas on nationalism. His close relationship with Prince Constantine helped him 
immensely in the early stages of his career.45 His formative years were in Germany, where 
he studied for three years (1899-1903), at the War Academy in Berlin and had the 
opportunity to come into close contact with the German way of thought.46 His stay in 
Germany coincided with a period of intellectual debate in Europe, as the intellectual roots 
of subsequent fascist thought, the notion that materialism, liberalism and democracy had 
brought about the decay in bourgeois society, were taking shape. It was also the period 
which saw the formation of the first "Socialist-Nationalist” ideologies in France, Germany 
and Austria, the direct precursors of the subsequent fascist ideologies, which promoted 
ideas of new nationalism devoid of economic and social injustices. It is safe to assume that 
Metaxas was influenced by such ideas, some of which he incorporated into his discourse 
when he became a dictator but also that his personal sympathies were with the German 
way of thought and organisation.
His involvement in Greek political life began as the Chief of Staff of the armed 
forces under Venizelos' government, in 1914. He opposed Greece’s entry into World War 
I, resigned from his post and from then on regarded suspiciously the expansionist 
ambitions of the Venizelist camp. His disagreement with the Straits Operation brought him 
into the royalist camp and later into the ranks of the People's party. This made him, in the 
eyes of his Venizelists enemies, a supporter of the German camp in European affairs, and 
he was subsequently considered responsible for the failure of the Straits Operation. 
However, he stuck to his non-expansionist nationalism with remarkable consistency and 
disagreed once more with both the Venizelists and the Royalists on the issue of the 
continuation of the Asia Minor expedition. During 1920-1922, when the anti-Venizelist
45 According to Veremis, Metaxas’ relationship with Prince Constantine, -the prince granted Metaxas a 
scholarship for his studies abroad, while the latter showed a personal allegiance to the King- was a typical 
example of the larger patron-client network between army people and politicians that characterized civil- 
military relations during the inter-war period. See op.cit., p. 86.
46 Christedes’ introduction to His Personal Diary, V ol.l, pp 57-59, where the writer informs us that apart 
from his military studies, Metaxas showed a lively interest in the fine arts, music and literature.
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were in power, Metaxas formed a far right royalist opposition, outside parliamentary 
politics. The first important characteristic of Metaxas1 nationalism, which manifested itself 
very early on, was his fierce antipathy towards Greek irredentist policy, in sharp contrast 
with the fascist nationalist ideology. He was a supporter of national autarky believing that 
Greece was in no need of any new lands to promote its economic interests or its political 
and ideological influence.
Following his political disagreement with the People's party, Metaxas followed a 
political path of his own and, in 1922, he created his own party, the Free Opinion Party 47, 
which participated in the electoral arena, on the anti-Venizelist side of the political 
spectrum, until the start of his dictatorship in 1936.48 In the initial political programme of 
his party, Metaxas emerged as an ardent supporter of "perfect individual and political 
freedom for the Greek people ” and condemned the undemocratic and illiberal methods 
employed by the previous governments, both Venizelist and anti-Venizelist. His party 
allegedly sought the support of the petty-bourgeois classes and the peasants.49 In 1924, 
following the proclamation of the Greek Republic, he was among the first anti-Venizelists 
to recognise openly the outcome of the referendum, and agreed to participate within the 
new Republican constitutional framework.50
In 1926, in a speech against the Pangalos dictatorship, Metaxas spoke in favour of 
political parties, against the dictatorial methods of Pangalos and opposed the intervention 
of the military in politics.51 He also favoured "genuine and free elections " as the only 
means to stabilise the internal affairs and foreign policy of the country.52 He even went as 
far as to condemn dictatorial methods as a form of political authority when he said in 1928: 
There appears the dictatorial solution which is a very dangerous road, since we 
never know where it leads us. After one dictator there is the next; there is not a
47 Once again I am using Mavrogordalos’ translation of the Greek term “Party Elefthcrofronon”.
^  Due to his participation in the failed 1923 military anli-Vcnizclist counter-offensive, he fled the country 
and did not participate in the 1923 elections.
49 “The Political Program of the Free Opinion Party”, October 13, 1922, in His Personal Diary, Vol.4, 
pp. 778-782.
50 The People’s Party only accepted the result of the referendum in 1933.
51 Statement made on 15 July 1926, in His Personal Diary, Vol.4, p. 827.
52 Statement made on 1 October 1926, ibid., p. 829.
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greater danger today in Greece than the danger o f a dictatorship which smashes 
every freedom and every feeling. 53
Such statements and speeches show that Metaxas was not like the other military 
officers who had espoused several fascist notions and ideas, for he$uctcssf*Hy participated 
in Greek parliamentary politics and declared himself against any form of dictatorial 
authority. His major concern though was the rivalry between the two large parties, the 
Liberals and the People’s Party, which exacerbated the divisions in Greek society and split 
the country into two opposing camps hostile to each other. He believed that,
both parties favour their own petty party interests, promising positions and favours 
to prospective voters. Once in power they manipulate state mechanisms according 
to their party interests instead o f promoting the national interest. The major threat is 
the fear o f communism and anarchism, as the result o f this rivalry 
His solution consisted of “cooperation between the different political factions and 
compromise between the parties".55 This concern seemed genuine enough given the fact 
that although Metaxas had the opportunity to join either party, he chose to follow his own 
political path and create his own party.56
From 1933 onwards Metaxas became a radical anti-Venizelist and the major 
persecutor of Venizelos himself in the parliament.57 It was only in 1934 that Metaxas 
started to declare openly his resentment towards parliamentary politics and to talk about the
53 Statement made on 28 June 1928, ibidn pp. 911-912, [in Greek].
Response toTsaldares on 4 October 1926, ibid., p 831, [in Greek].
55 Metaxas' "Intervention on the subject of education" from the parliamentary proceedings on 6 December 
1927, ibid ., p. 853.
In the elections of 1926, Metaxas' party gained 52 seats in the parliament against 108 Liberals, 63 of 
the People's Party, 18 of the Democratic Union, 3 of the Farmers' Parly and 9 Communists. That was his 
major electoral success as a leader of a political party, and shows that he managed to attract a certain 
percentage of the floating voters at that period, and came close to displacing the People’s Party from its 
central position in the anti-Venizelist camp. He subsequently participated as a minister of Transport in the 
Coalition government, the “broad” Coalition of “democratic parties” and in the following "partial" 
Coalition Government of the Liberal Party and the Free Opinion Party. In the elections of 1928 however 
the party of Metaxas gained only one seat, it went through a total defeat and Metaxas was not even elected 
as a deputy in his own constituency. Thereafter, his parly was a minor party in the electoral and 
parliamentary arena
57 He accused Venizelos of being the instigator of the Plastcras coup on 6 March, 1933. Venizelos for his
part accused Metaxas of being the instigator of an attempt to assassinate him. This was followed by a 
correspondence in the newspaper Kathemerini between Metaxas and Venizelos on the real causes of the 
Dichasmos of the 1910s.Thcre was a marked conflict and ideological divergence between the two men 
although many historians have talked about the existence of a mutual admiration between them.
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bankruptcy of the parliament as an institution. His solution involved "the exit o f 
parliamentarianism and the emergence o f a new, more permanent and strong executive 
power ". He argued that it was too late to bridge the gap between the two major political 
factions, given that "people did not act logically hut were driven by passions which were 
destined to prevail and to lead the country to more troubles and rivalries".58 That was the 
beginning of his open espousal of anti-liberal and anti-parlamentarian ideas, with a fascist 
undertone. Parliamentarism, according to Metaxas, had been a political system associated 
with 19th century capitalism and its economic expression, the free market, had 
accompanied the rise of the middle classes to power. The capitalism of the 20th century 
was in need of state intervention to solve the problems created by the shortcomings of the 
free market economy. Accordingly, the circumstances which gave birth to and bred 
parliamentarism had ceased to exist. Parliamentarism was incapable of dealing with the 
new social conflicts and the new problems of free society. "The problem is no longer how 
to remain within parliamentarianism, but how to get out o f it. Through the door of 
communism or through the door o f the national state " f9 The proposed “National State” of 
Metaxas was based on grand ideals, the carrier of which would be the youth. Given that 
the Megali Idea had collapsed in its territorial expression, the new national ideal had to be 
an intellectual re-creation of the Greek civilisation, not connected with any territorial 
claims. He stated that lthe genius o f the Greek people is that they always lived without 
boundaries. The new ideal, the National Ideal, is common to all Greeks wherever they 
are".60
From 1935 onwards Metaxas worked hard for the restoration of the monarchy. In 
the elections of 1935 his party, then named the “Union of the Royalists” , received 14% of 
the national vote and gained 4 seats in the Parliament. It should be stated however that the 
Venizelist parties did not participate in these elections, which proves that the performance 
of Metaxas' party was a very meagre one and that]support F>Khis ideas was insignificant.
^  From an interview in the newspaper Free Man, on 4 January 1934, His Personal Diary, Vol.4, pp. 
592-593.
Interview in Kathemerini, on 6 January 1934, ibid  , pp. 593-595.
60  From Metaxas' epilogue in a series of 70 articles addressed to Venizelos, on 23 January 1935, ibid, pp. 
611-615.
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So it is safe to assume that Metaxas did not have a loyal social base among the Greek 
population a year before the imposition of his dictatorship.61 With the restoration of the 
monarchy and the elections of January 1936 the final stages of parliamentarism were 
controlled by the King and Metaxas, who worked his way to the top with the support of 
the King.62 From minister of War, he became vice-President of the government and with 
the death of the Prime Minister, he became Prime Minister himself.
It has become evident that Metaxas’ personal political ideology was at times 
controversial and obscure; First, he started by collaborating with Venizelos in the 1910s, 
while in the 1920s and 1930s he became an ardent anti-Venizelist; second, he accepted the 
outcome of the referendum on the Republic in 1924 although he had previously been an 
eager supporter of the king, while in 1935 he urgently asked for the return of the king, 
creating the Union of Royalists; third, while in the 1920s he was speaking in favour of 
parliamentary practices and policies of accommodation and appeasement, and against any 
dictatorial solutions, his attitude towards parliamentarism changed radically in the 1930s, 
when he was the most active supporter of a permanent dictatorship.63 Judging from 
Metaxas’ lack of parliamentary “success”, he did very poorly in terms of electoral support, 
with the exception of the 1926 elections. In addition, Metaxas was never associated with 
any of the minor Greek fascist organisations and sought to dissolve them when he became 
dictator. His political philosophy was his own and he was not surrounded by a team of 
political theorists with a consistent fascist political programme. However, he was 
constantly conscious, even later as a powerful dictator of his lonely position and a very 
indicative statement made by him, as early as 1935, was a prophesy as to the fate of his 
own dictatorship:
61 Spyros Linardatos in his book How We Reached the 4th o f August Regime examines in detail the 
political events a year prior to the imposition of the dictatorship.
62 “Fortunately” for Metaxas' political career, a number of major political figures died in the first months 
of 1936. Venizelos, Tsaldares, Kondyles and Dcmertzcs "withdrew permanently" from the political scene, 
which is considered by many to have been a crucial factor in the subsequent imposition of the dictatorship.
63 Information on Metaxas' life and ideas prior to his dictatorship can also be obtained from Metaxas' 
biographers and personal admirers. One such account is Kallonas' work Metaxas; Student, Soldier, 
Politician, Fighter, Leader, Athens 1938.
87
Are dictatorships the solution? No conscientious dictator would ever give a positive 
reply to such question. The main deficiency o f dictatorships is their inability even 
to foresee their succession.Successful or not dictatorsh ips are tied up with the fate 
of the dictator and have no other successor but chaos. 64
64 His Personal Diary, Vol.4 , p. 245, [in Greek].
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Chapter 3 : THE 4TH OF AUGUST REGIME’S IDEAS OF THE INTER­
WAR REALITY
Established at the height of international fascism, the 4th of August regime was 
contemporaneous with the rising power of the Nazis in Germany. It was the authoritarian 
sequence to the inter-war domestic socio-political crisis and to the unbridgeable differences 
between the Venizelists and the anti-Venizelists. Its imposition was helped by the 
acquiescence of the King, who, at the same time, limited the personal power of a minor 
party leader, with neither an electoral base nor with the power base of a fascist movement. 
The 4th of August regime was neither a fascist regime, on the model of Italy or Germany, 
nor a military dictatorship, on the model of the 1967 military junta; yet it enjoyed the 
support of the military higher echelons.
In the following pages I shall be viewing the set of ideas adopted by the 4th of 
August regime, i.e., the way that the founders of the dictatorship perceived the inter-war 
reality. The official ideology of the 4th of August regime contained both domestic 
conservative/traditional features and fascist/radical elements. The traditional elements 
involved the manipulation of the previous ideological status quo, regarding the place of 
national history, and the orthodox church within the content of nationalism. The fascist and 
radical elements were seen in the ample dissemination of a fascist rhetoric, the Greek use 
of imported themes and the implementation of some reformist policies.
To attempt to define precisely the character of fascist ideology is an exceptionally 
difficult task, as it is to define fascism in general, although it is clear that it consisted in a 
specific fusion of ideas which were professed passionately by their followers. The task is 
even more difficult given that the fascist regimes were highly anti-intellectual and opposed 
any form of theoretical constructions. Fascism was principally characterised by a 
nationalistic activism, which is why fascist societies were organised militarily and geared 
towards the prosecution of wars. The ideological allure in each case was the revival of 
grand civilisations and the birth of the "new man". Parallel to the use of ideology there was 
the wide use of repressive mechanisms inherent in the exercise of authoritarian power by
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dictatorships. The most striking feature of fascist ideology was the negative character of its 
political philosophy.1 It has been repeatedly pointed out by various analysts that fascist 
ideology was based on a set of negations, with respect to a number of social and 
philosophical questions, concerning the development of society. There was a fundamental 
negation of the two most widely accepted international doctrines, liberalism and 
communism, which led fascists to the further negation of a broad spectrum of well estab­
lished notions of the industrialised nations of Europe, professing their anti- 
parliamentarism, anti-intellectualism, anti-clericalism, anti-urbanism, anti-materialism, anti­
individualism, anti-modemism, among others.2 Most important, fascists rejected the 
notion of intellectualism and based their ideas on practical activism rather than on some 
form of theoretical/philosophical conceptual framework. The proposed fascist alternative, 
far from being a positive third way to surpass those two established models of social 
development, consisted in a reaction against the world of matter and reason and the ideas 
of positivism, a romantic revision of social values and a reactionary turn towards 
traditional ways of life.3 Broadly the fascist interpretation of social reality, common to 
most fascist regimes and movements, consisted in anti-liberalism, anti-communism, an 
aggressive, even violent nationalism, close control of society and economy by the state, 
and the extreme exaltation of youth. But more important than theory, was the practical side 
of fascism, in that fascism promoted a new style of politics based on the principle of strong 
leadership, mass mobilisation through the party and, ultimately, the aggrandisement of the 
nation through aggression. The paradox was that although fascist ideology claimed to be a 
highly nationalistic and xenophobic philosophy, it ended up by attracting international 
attention and influence.
1 What Linz calls the "'anti' character of fascism" and fascism an "anti-movement" in his article "Some 
Notes Towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective" in Fascism; A 
Reader's G uide , op.cit., pp. 3-121.
2 According to Poulantzas, fascist ideology consisted of an amalgam of contradictory' elements, the internal 
contradictions of fascist ideology, whose articulation was reflected in the practices of the various state 
apparatuses, with which the petty-bourgeoisie, the main supporter of fascism, could easily identify and 
therefore grant its support to the fascist elites. Ideological elements such as anti-intellectualism, anti­
elitism, nationalism were notions congruent with the petty-bourgeois aspirations. Fascism and 
Dictatorship, pp. 252-256.
3 On the nature of fascist ideology see among others, Stemhell “Fascist Ideology”in Fascism; A Reader’s 
Guide, Weber, Varieties o f  Fascism, Mosse, The Culture o f Western Europe, Hagopian Ideals and 
Ideologies, and James Joes Fascism in the Contemporary World.
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Metaxas never used the term "fascist" or "national socialist" to describe his 
regime's ideology, but made an extensive use of certain fascist rhetorical and 
organisational themes which he tried to incorporate into the official ideology of his 
dictatorship. Metaxas above all tried to convince the Greek people that the regime's ideas 
were something uniquely Greek, based on Greek national ideals, irrespective of the 
international context of fascism, as was the case with most fascist leaders.
Anti-communism: A conventional authoritarian theme
The idea of anti-communism per se was not just a typical feature of fascist regimes 
given that it has been shared by most of the authoritarian regimes of the 20th century, 
which did not profess themselves to be communist. It was a common feature of the fascist 
dictatorships as well as of the post-war dictatorships in Latin America and Southern 
Europe. Anti-communist feelings were also widely shared by the parliamentary regimes of 
Western Europe and America as a basic element of their liberal philosophy. The difference 
was that while authoritarian regimes openly excluded and suppressed communist activities, 
parliamentary systems have to accept that communists have the right to participate in the 
democratic process.
Anti-communism, as part of the official state ideology was not introduced by the 
dictatorship of Metaxas in 1936. In 1929, the Liberal Venizelos government, by the 
"Idionymon Act" (Special Law) gave anti-communism legal status.4 Law and practice had 
already been used by both liberals and conservatives alike to enforce a more authoritarian 
interpretation by the time the 4th of August regime came to power.5 What the 4th of 
August regime initiated, was the blatant and indiscriminate use of authoritarian and 
repressive practices against communists which were continued, long after its downfall by 
the post-war so-called democratic governments and, naturally by the military junta. 
Emergency Law 117/1936 "On the fight against communism " of 16 September 1936,
4 Law 4229 of 1929 specified that"whoever intends to promote ideas with respect to the violent overthrow 
o f  the status quo or the detachment o f part o f the Greek territory will be punished"[in Greek].
5 During the period of 1929-1934, the application of the Idionymon involved 13,050 arrests, 2400 
sentences, and 27 murders of syndicalists and communists. See Newspaper Eleftherotypia, October 28, 
1990.
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provided the anti-communist state of Metaxas with the legal framework within which to act 
against any sort of subversive ideas or actions, followed by the severe punishment of those 
involved in them. In practice this law was implemented by the “certificate of social 
beliefs”, the “declarations of recantation”, by house arrests, censorship of written or pub­
lished material, burning of books considered unsuitable by the regime, the use of torture 
by the military police, exile on remote islands, prisons, and the use of an informer's 
network by the military police following the example of the Nazi police.
According to the regime's rhetoric, communism was imported from Europe by 
Greek intellectuals who had come into close contact with the idea while abroad. It had 
managed to infiltrate the state machinery, the armed forces, education, and had highly 
influenced sections of the working classes, the peasantry and youth. The very pretext for 
the imposition of the regime was offered by the imminent workers’ strike scheduled on 
August 5, 1936.
The regime has intervened promptly to save the country from a forthcoming 
disaster.The effervescent situation in Greece is due to the upsurge in communist 
propaganda, which, having infiltrated the civil service, threatens to paralyse the 
state machinery, to penetrate the national armed forces, and to cultivate a spirit o f
anarchism in its ranks having absorbed the leaders o f the conservative working
class and the peasantry, it has caused a series o f unjustified strikes, aimed at 
overturning the social status quo and the disintegration o f Greek society. 6 
So there was nothing fascist or radical in the anti-communist rhetoric of the 4th of 
August regime, apart from the overt and general purge of all communists and the creation 
of a secret police on the models of Nazi Germany or fascist Italy. Maniadakis, the chief of 
Security, established a wide network of informers and borrowed ideas and methods of 
torture from Himmler and applied them in Greece.7 He even corresponded with Himmler 
concerning a common international war against communism.8
6 Preamble to the first royal decree "On the Suspension o f  Constitutional Rights", in Linardatos, The 
Fourth o f  August Regime, p. 34, [in Greek].
7 See Close “The Police during the 4th of August Regime”, in Greece 1936- 1944, Dictatorship, 
Occupation, Resistance, pp. 77-91.
8 Correspondence between Himmler and Maniadakis, in Andrikopoulos op. cit., p. 86-87.
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Anti-parliamentarism: The fascist influence
It was in his explicit ideas on anti-parliamentarism that we observe Metaxas1 
ideological similarity to the European fascist regimes and the difference between him and 
the modem dictatorships of the post-war period. The fascist regimes and movements, in 
their opposition to parliamentary practices in general, declared their faith in the permanent 
imposition of strong leadership, which would derive its power directly from the people, 
and would safeguard the interests of the whole nation. Modem post-war “liberal” 
dictatorships, on the other hand, although they have used dictatorial methods, have tended 
to avoid the open use of an anti-parliamentary ideology and to declare the necessity of their 
authoritarian rule for a short period of time, while they promise the return to parliamentary 
institutions when the political crisis is passed.
The overtly anti-parliamentary stance of Metaxas, a radical element in the regime’s 
ideas, contrasted sharply with Greece’s previous experience of and predilection for 
parliamentary government and party politics. It was also the main point of disagreement 
between the two instigators of the dictatorship. The King considered the regime as an 
interlude, a temporary diversion from parliamentary democracy, as a means to provide the 
country with the strong leadership so badly needed at that time of political instability. At 
the same time, having lived in England and having been educated there, he was an admirer 
of English traditions and practices and favoured the British influence in domestic Greek 
politics. This was a similar case to that of Prince Paul and Stojadinovic in Yugoslavia, in 
that the former was Western educated and lacked a real understanding of Yugoslav politics, 
while the latter, as Prime Minister, introduced fascist style institutions and pursued a policy 
of rapprochement with Italy and Germany.9
9 In fact, Prince Paul did not particularly feci at home in Serbia and showed greater understanding towards 
the Croats. This led Serbs to regard him as not a “proper Serb” and say that he had no real understanding of 
Yugoslav politics. On the other hand, Stojadinovic’s fascist inclinations received hardly any support and 
were resented by many Serbs who leaned towards France and Britain. Prince Paul w as forced to dismiss 
Stoyadinovic in 1939 after the German invasion in Czechoslovakia, due among others to the fear that a 
similar development would take place in multi-national Yugoslavia. See Polonsky, op.cit., pp. 102-106.
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Metaxas was a military man, educated in Germany, an admirer of Prussian 
militarism, who saw the imposition of the dictatorship, from the very beginning, as a more 
or less permanent affair, which he declared openly in his speeches.10
Parliamentarism was the system o f the middle classes and flourished at a period 
when capitalism kept the economic development o f society and the development of
the state separate.....Capitalism itself has abandoned the system o f free
competition, to request the state's protection Nowadays the States exercise
totalitarian control over the economies, and in which case parliamentarism is too 
weak a system to respond to the new problems in the people's lives. We have 
witnessed its downfall in many countries o f Europe. 11
The dictator saw a strong connection between communism and parliamentarism, the 
“second evil” of Greek national politics, in that both ideas were the result of intellectualism 
which had come from abroad and had contaminated Greek society. His ideas on 
parliamentarism and liberalism, discussed above, had been quite clear since 1934, when 
Metaxas had declared that he was in favour of a dictatorial organisation of power and a 
strong executive. Parliamentarism, according to the 4th of August regime’s ideology, 
represented, through the political parties, the interests of the political oligarchy; it was a 
system which promoted the petty interests of politicians; it was the cause of the 
Dichasmos, the division of the Greek people into opposing factions; through its practices, 
it had brought the country to the verge of communist take-over.
In Greece, according to Metaxas’ ideas, constitutional rights had been given to the 
people prematurely, after independence was won, and this had been detrimental to the 
progress and the development of the country. Under the Greek parliamentary system, the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers clashed with each other while there was an urgent 
need for an arbiter over and above these powers, to promote the national interest.12 The
10 From the beginning of his regime, Metaxas stated that the regime was there to stay in power 
indefinably. In Linardatos, op.cit., p. 85, and in Four Years o f Metaxas’ Rule, Vol. 4, p. 209.
11 "Where was Greece Driven by Parliamentarism" in Four Years o f Metaxas' Governing, Vol. 4, pp. 184- 
196, [in Greek].
12 In Kathernerini, January 6, 1934, His Personal Diary, pp. 593-595, [in Greek].
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right to vote, instead of being a sacred right used for the good of the nation, was used 
solely as a means to attain personal ambitions and interests.13 On the contrary,
the State o f the 4th o f August regime is formed by the people united, not any more 
divided into parties or groups, one people with a single desire, wherethe king is 
the bearer o f the national will and with a head o f government who does not belong 
to any parties ,14
Inter-war nationalism: The aggressive fascist context
Fascist movements were, above all, nationalistic, fighting against the 
internationalist tendencies of both liberalism and communism. Nationalism however was a 
concept neither invented nor solely employed by fascists. It is based on a specific in­
terpretation of common cultural values which during the 19th century found its political 
expression in the formation of the nation-states in Europe. It was its aggressive and violent 
aspect which in the cases of Germany and Italy provided the ideological framework for a 
remarkably authoritarian organisation of power and a different perception of their nations’ 
foreign relations with other states. More important was the notion of "the nation" as a 
living organism, omnipresent, over and above all individuals. Fascists tried to create what 
amounted almost to a religious faith in the power of the national state for which everyone 
should be ready to sacrifice his entire existence. Important in the development of fascist 
nationalism was the specific perception of history, which was very selective in its 
emphases and interpretations.
The case is most clearly illustrated with Germany, by far the most destructive 
nationalist state of the inter-war period. Nationalism during the period of Nazi rule was 
interpreted in a radically different way than had previously been the case. Germans were 
taught by the Nazis to read their history in a very selective way, to perceive the role of 
religion differently and to adopt a new understanding of the idea of the "nation" closely
13 His similarity to Salazar’s position on parliamentarism is striking, the latter declaring that with the 
exception of some of the northern countries of Europe, “parliamentary democracy has become a despotic 
domination o f the nation by political parties”, in Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal, p. 70.
14 Speech in Jannina, June 13 1937, in ‘The Ideological Content of the National State of the 4lh of 
August” in Four Years o f Metaxas' Rule, Vol. 4, edited by the Ministry of Press and Tourism, No. 35, p. 
139.
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connected to the concept of the ’’race”. The interpretation of history served the Nazis’ 
imperialistic designs and had a manipulative purpose. It involved the selection of the most 
glorifying aspects of the country's past while the role of heroic personalities was 
considered the driving force behind grand historical events. This encouraged Germans to 
regard their leader as a hero, to try to imitate his example and ultimately to make heroes out 
of themselves. Moreover, Nazi interpretation of history legitimated the country's grandiose 
foreign policy aspirations and the belief that the destiny of the German nation was to 
acquire a superior position in world affairs, under the guiding force of its leader who 
would change the course of the German history for the better. The radically new aspect of 
the Nazi interpretation of history was that it was studied in close connection with racial 
biology. This allowed the Germans to view themselves as a superior race compared with 
the other races and provided justification for the condemnation of the Jewish race as the 
most harmful race in the world.15
Hitler's "ethnic-biological interpretation" of history, in other words, was 
expounded in parallel with racial issues, and totally rejected the previous "socio-political" 
or "socio-economic" approaches of marxists and liberals. The Nazi interpretation of 
German history reflected very clearly the Nazi attitude towards nationalism, characterised 
by fanaticism, aggression and hate towards suspicious enemy races which were perceived 
to threaten the existence of the German race. The nation's history was composed 
principally of warfare while the warrior-type hero became the symbol of the new cultural 
identity. Moreover the Germans largely underestimated the role of religion in that their faith 
had to concentrate on the adoration of the nation. The Nazi aim was to superimpose the 
ideal of the nation on individuals and to suppress class, religious or any other divisions 
within German society. As Mosse has rightly put it the essence of the Nazi ideology was 
"the reduction o f individual ideas to generally held notions; Jews or Slavs (the enemy
15In Blackburn's book Education in the Third Reich; Race and History in Nazi Textbooks (State University 
of New York Press, 1985), there is a very interesting account of the way Nazi ideas penetrated school 
textbooks. See also Mosse's article on "National Socialism and the Depersonalisation of Man" in the 
Culture o f  Western Europe , pp. 357-373.
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races) were seen as abstractions, robbed o f all individuality, the anti-type to the Aryan 
abstract ideal V 6
The Italian type of fascist nationalism also emphasised the glorification of past 
events, militaristic and aggressive, and accordingly justified a foreign policy of territorial 
expansion. Italian nationalism adopted the exaltation of the Roman era and aimed at the 
creation of a New Roman Empire in which Mussolini perceived his role as the New 
Caesar. So Italian, fascist nationalism saw its “historic mission” in its rightful position of 
influence in the Mediterranean sphere and so justified further imperialist, i.e., goals like the 
Abyssinian and Albanian invasion. It lacked however the racial element so important in 
Nazi nationalism, at least until 1938 when Mussolini was forced by Hitler to adopt some 
racial policies for the sake of good foreign relations with the Germans. Racism however 
was never embedded in Italian culture and could not infiltrate the mentality of the Italians.
A case in which anti-Semitism was prominent was the Romanian Iron Guard. 
However, Romanian anti-semitism was not racist in the Nazi sense, for Romanians did not 
have any scientific notion of enemy races in their ideology. It should rather be seen in the 
context of traditional Romanian xenophobia, which had to do with the country’s historical 
occupation by great powers (Ottomans, Austro-Hungarians and Russians) and with the 
prosperity of the middle class Jewish community in a country with a great number of poor 
peasants.17
The Spanish fascist nationalism of the Falange was the distinctive feature which 
distinguished the movement from the other radical or conservative parties in Spain. It was 
the Falangist programme of imperial expansion that gave the Falange its special character, 
the drive for imperialist adventures in the African, Portuguese and Latin American 
directions, the last of these intended to be more economic and cultural in character. The 
policy of Franco however, was never expansionist, although his administration included
^  Mosse Nazi Culture; Intellectual, Cultural and Social Ufe in the Third Reich, New York 1981, p. 270.
17 Zeev Barbu, “Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspectives on the Iron Guard, the Fascist Movement 
in Romania” in Who Were the Fascists, p. 383.
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Falangist members, but a cautious one of non-intervention in the world war and a realistic 
one, given the country’s weak economic position following the end of the civil war.18
Portugal, under Salazar, a case resembling more the Greek regime, pursued a self- 
contained form of nationalism, in the context of her position of isolation from the rest of 
Europe. The period of Portuguese history most widely glorified by the regime was the 
period of colonisation when Portugal assumed the role of civilising the new lands, 
spreading Roman and Christian values. Portugal did not follow the German, Italian or East 
European expansionist creed, although she had territorial grievances against Spain and 
Britain.19 Far from professing an imperialist/expansionist attitude in the European sphere, 
she was more concerned with her existing colonies in Africa -Angola and Mozambique- 
and, following the principle of national autarky, she pursued a policy of exploitation of 
African labour.20
Greek nationalism under the 4th o f August regime: A defensive perception 
The principal feature of Greek nationalism, in stark contrast with the Italian and 
German fascist regimes and similar to the Portuguese one, was Metaxas' self-contained, 
non-aggressive nationalism. It is in the 4th of August regime’s perception of nationalism 
that we observe the fascist influences, and in the regime’s actual policy that we discern the 
conservative essence of Metaxas’ intentions. His idea of the nation, in agreement with his 
political philosophers Koumaros and Mantzoufas, was defined as,
a living organism with its own civilisation. It comprises a total o f people connected 
by social', historical, physical, biological and psychological relations. The nation 
consists in the unity o f the past, the present, and the future. It is not identified with 
the numerical strength o f the living people because it is a historical reality, the
18 Sec Herbert Rutledge Southworth, ‘The Falange: An analysis of Spain’s Fascist Heritage” in Spain in 
Crisis, edited by Paul Preston, The Harvester Press, 1976,
pp. 1-22.
19 Gallagher, Portugal; A Twentieth Century Interpretation, Manchester University Press 1983, p. 95.
20 On Portugal see Antonio de Figueiredo Portugal Fifty Years o f Dictatorship, Penguin 1975, Gallagher's 
Portugal; A twentieth Century Interpretation, and “Conservatism, dictatorship and fascism in Portugal, 
1914-1944” in Fascists and Conservatives, and Hugh Kay Salazar and Modern Portugal, 1970. Metaxas 
frequently referred in his speeches to the ideological connection between himself and Salazar.
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product o f a historical evolution over many generations, the unifying element o f 
which is national consciousness.21 
It was influenced by Gentile’s elitist and organic conception of the nation, according to 
which the nation was distinguished from the living people, in that it was an idea above 
individuals and social groups and whose will could be identified with that of the single 
leaden
It may be possible that the will o f the nation is not identical to the totality o f the 
people nor even with the majority but only with a minority or just one person. 22 
In this way the theorists of the regime hoped to justify the imposition of the rule of 
one leader over the whole of the population by identifying his will with the will of the 
nation at large. The masses were presented as misguided by the ideas coming from abroad 
while Metaxas and his government embodied the true national spirit which they tried to 
pass on to Greek society. Still, in theory, the concept of the nation remained vague, the 
task of which was to create a cultural "Third Greek Civilisation". This reflected the 
regime’s intention to concentrate on domestic stability and outweighed any idea of activist 
or aggressive territorial expansion, as well as the country’s realisation of its peripheral and 
weak international status.
Metaxas pursued a peaceful foreign policy based on a pacific relationship with the 
Turks and the Balkan neighbours, with no Greek claims on any new territories.23 On the 
other hand, he was very much concerned with the existing Greek frontiers which he tried 
to safeguard by enhancing the strength of the army. He was to put that concern into 
practice in 1940, by successfully defending Greece’s against the invasion of a country he 
had so much admired. His type of nationalism could be labelled "defensive nationalism", 
as opposed to the "aggressive" German and Italian types. His non-imperialistic policy was 
supported by the majority of the Greek population, given that the Asia Minor disaster and
21 From the periodical The Youth, extract from an article "On the Nation", October 1939, p. 3, [in Greek]
22"The Political Philosophy of the National State" in The New State , 1939 and in Alivisatos’ Political 
Institutions in Crisis, pp. 120-121, and in “‘Nation’ vs ‘People’ after 1940” in Hellenism and Hellenicity, 
pp. 83-84, [in Greek].
23 Indeed, the foreign policy expeditions were divided between the King and Metaxas, in that the first dealt 
basically with the country’s relations with the Western powers while the second concentrated on the 
promotion of Balkan cooperation and neutrality.
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the subsequent population exchange had ended the Megali Idea territorial project in the 
minds of the Greek people.
Although Metaxas’ nationalism was not racist, in the Nazi sense, it discriminated 
against the minorities within Greece, in Macedonia and Thrace. His discrimination against 
Slavo-Macedonians was the most systematic repression of a minority ever in Greece.24 
The methods of Hellenisation of the Northern Greek minorities included the stem 
prohibition of the use of the Macedonian dialect, a ban on Bulgarian songs, the 
compulsory display of the Greek flag on national holidays, the foundation of mixed 
schools for Slavophones and Turkophones, while the minorities were compelled to paint 
their houses’ walls in the national colours of blue and white.25 On the other hand, the 
Metaxas regime did not discriminate against Macedonia’s Jews and during his period there 
was a relaxation of the previously harsher treatment of them.26
"Third Greek C iv i l i sa t i onThe  Metaxist Megali Idea
The Third Greek Civilisation, the grandiose project of the 4th of August regime, 
aspired to be the major national ideal of the Greek people. It was intended to be a combina­
tion of the two previous Greek civilisations, the ancient and the Byzantine. Such hyper­
charged rhetoric and the use of over-ambitious schemes are better appreciated in the context 
of the various nationalistic ideologies of the inter-war period. Hitler sought the 
international primacy of the Aryan race, Mussolini looked for the revival of past Roman 
glory, Szalasi of the Arrow Cross talked of the “new Hungarism” and of Hungarian 
imperial expansion, and Salazar sought the creation of the “New Era”. On the other hand,
24 As Mavrogordatos argues, this was ironical given that the Slavo-Maccdonian minority had massively 
voted for Metaxas in the 1926 elections. This discrimination resulted in the subsequent siding of the Slavo- 
Macedonians with the Bulgarians during the 1941-1944 occupation of Greece and then with Yugoslav 
communism. See Mavrogordatos, op.cit., p. 252.
25 Eleni Mahaira, The Fourth o f August Youth, p. 44.
26 In fact the conditions of the Jews are said to have improved under Metaxas who forbade discrimination 
against them. This, according to Close, was also due to the dictators’ connections with the old lands w here 
ethnic discord was negligible, and his anti-Venizclist political legacy according to which the ethnic 
minorities of Northern Greece were regarded as potential supporters of the anti-Venizelist camp (although 
this w'as not the case with Slavo-Macedonians). See Close in Fascists and Conservatives, p 208 Even his 
rhetoric towards the Jews was mild and in a speech at the University of Salonica, he thanked '"'our fellow- 
citizens the Israelites for having so readily conceded part o f their cemetery fo r the construction o f  new 
University buildings, despite their religious difficulties” in Four Years o f  Metaxas’ Governing, Vol II, p 
122
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Metaxas’ perception of Greek civilisation was also reminiscent of the 19th century 
classicist and highbrow orientation and the ambition that the independent Greek state 
would civilise the peoples of the East.
Accordingly, great importance was attached to the past in the formation of the 
regime's ideology. As with all authoritarian regimes, the 4th of August regime adopted a 
selective interpretation of past achievements by promoting specific features of Greek 
history and underestimating others considered non-suitable to the regime's ideological 
ambitions. The ancient civilisation was seen as "high in intellectual and artistic 
achievements but lacking religious fa ith”, while the Spartan political organisation and 
discipline was preferred to the Athenian democracy.
Democracy, the system o f the ancient Athenian society, is characterised by 
mediocrity. The leaders o f democratic regimes are only mediocre human beings, 
servants o f the sovereign masses, while what societies need are superior beings to 
lead their nations. Democracy derives its strength from amorphous and misguided 
masses. 27
The Spartan model, on the other hand, -a similarity to the Nazi ideal-“brings out the best 
qualities in the human character”,28 These qualities are “self-discipline, austerity, 
obedience and courage to struggle in life”. The model of ancient Sparta was presented as 
the model for a disciplined freedom, (“the key to the progress o f the totality").
The second Greek civilisation, the Byzantine one, was admired for its deep 
religious faith, and for its creation of a strong state but its intellectual achievements were 
not seen as being as great as those of the ancient Greeks.29 The Third Civilisation would 
succeed in both intellectual and religious achievements and would combine elements of the 
two previous ones. Ancient Athens was the model in cultural matters, ancient Sparta and 
Macedonia the models in social and national matters, and Byzantine Hellenism was the 
model in religious and political matters.
27 His Diary, Vol.4, p. 456, [in Greek]
28 (Speech in Sparta, May 20 1937), Four Years o f  Metaxas’ Governing, Vol.4,
p. 186.
29 (Speech to the students of Athens University on 20 November 1937), ibid., p. 86.
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The bearers of the Third Greek Civilisation were the Ministry of the Press and 
Tourism, the Ministry of Education, the Departments of Administration and Self- 
Administration and the Youth Movement. Although the regime attached major importance 
to Greek cultural development, as an essential part of the Third Greek Civilisation, 
Metaxas never created a ministry of Culture, despite suggestions to do so from advisers 
such as Nikoloudis, who was influenced mainly by Italian organisation concerning culture.
Fascists liked to claim that they achieved a "cultural revolution", a radical intellec­
tual break with the past. Their ideas were largely based on a nationalist interpretation of 
Rome’s glorious past. In that sense Marinetti’s idea that the culture of Italy should be 
permeated by the concept of "Italianita" was adopted by the fascists.30 There was an urgent 
demand for the creation of an original Italian culture on which to base the regime’s ide­
ology and the political education of the youth. Mussolini, who was personally interested in 
the new fascist culture created the National Fascist Institute of Culture, the Royal Academy 
of Italy and the new Ministry of Popular Culture, under the surveillance of the Party and 
the State. It should be noted however that Mussolini was not involved in art and culture as 
such. Instead of art for art’s sake, he substituted the idea of art for the state's sake. 
Fascist culture should be created in such a way as to serve the purposes of the fascist state. 
It was also characterised by a desire to break with the recent past, to stand against 
internationalist intellectual ideas, and to promote a new self-sufficient Roman culture.31 
The use of public symbols, ceremonies and propaganda marked fascist Italy's development 
in the arts, literature and education. The Italian fascist regime, despite its intentions, never 
attained complete totalitarian control over the cultural life of the nation, unlike the control 
imposed by Goebbels on German cultural life, and left some room for independent cultural 
developments, a sort of "imperfect totalitarianism”.32
Metaxas Firmly believed that the creation of the new civilisation was the task of the 
whole Greek population, under the guidance of an enlightened leader.
30 Cannistraro, "Mussolini's Cultural Revolution: Fascist or Nationalist" in the Journal o f  Contemporary 
History, 1972, p. 119.
31 ibid, p 125
32 Braun Emily, "Mario Sironi and a Fascist Art" in Italian Art in the 20lh century, p. 173.
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The development o f civilisation is the work o f a whole people guided by the 
animating spirit o f a leader who acts through the state and social mechanisms, 
inspires the masses and rules directly and personally. 33
In place of a ministry of Culture he created the Ministry of Press and Tourism on 
26 August 1936 (Emergency Law 45/1936). The responsibilities of the ministry varied 
from the "enlightenment” of public opinion, to the handling of the Greek and foreign 
press, art, theatre, cinema, music, radio, congresses and exhibitions and the general 
propaganda of the regime. The publishing activities of the ministry involved the printing of 
a large amount of material to promote the 4th of August ideas. Under the surveillance of 
the ministry of Press, the regime imposed a policy of massive book prohibitions and book 
burnings of the works of writers like Freud, Zweig, Heine, France, Bernard Shaw, 
Darwin, Dostoyevski, Gorky and others whose ideas were considered liberal democratic 
or Marxist. The regime imposed censorship on such Greek Classics as Thucydides and 
Sophocles, the Epitaph and Antigone being the prime examples. As regards the press, the 
regime pursued a policy of imprisonment or exile towards opposition journalists while 
only favourable newspapers continued to exist and favourable articles were allowed to be 
published. It even imposed censorship on musical records. The imposition of the 4th of 
August regime cut the free dialogue and the ideological discourse among liberal and 
socialist intellectuals by imposing a total ban on socialist thought, while liberals had to 
carry on clandestinely.34
With regard to art, the regime adopted a different rhetoric to the Italian fascist 
regime, the “art for art’s sake”. Education in art was to be promoted so that people would 
be able to distinguish "the beautiful from the ugly, the good from the evil". “The purpose 
o f art ”, professed the regime, “consists in the creation o f a better environment for our 
everyday life and in the expression o f our feelings and ideas in a beautiful and immortal 
way ”. There was a constant allusion to the cultural and artistic achievements of the ancient 
civilisation which had created the concept of art.
33 Letter to Nikoloudis, 24 August 1939, Metaxas' archives.
34 Mario Vitti The 1930s Generation, p. 51.
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Emergency Law 1215/1938 created the Athenian "House of Art and Literature" for 
the promotion of literary and artistic works and the organisation of seminars, exhibitions, 
concerts and festivities. The regime also paid much attention to the advancement of the the­
atre and supported the Royal Theatre and various independent theatres financially. It 
founded the Lyrical Stage and the open-air theatre in Salonica.35 In April 1938, it opened 
an exhibition at the Zappeion cultural centre under the label "Joy and Work". Overall, the 
regime believed that culture had a substantial role in bringing about of the Third Greek 
Civilisation and, therefore, pursued a highly patronising control over the cultural activities 
of the period. But the highly professed “aesthetic development of the individual” was 
limited by the regime’s severe censorship and by its simplistic and divisive notions of what 
was “good”, “pretty” or “ugly”.
Through its semi-official periodical the “New State”, the regime tried to promote 
the ideas of its “intellectuals” concerning Greek cultural matters ranging from articles on 
plastic arts, to music, theatre, and literature. The periodical "The New State"36 served as a 
type of semi-official ideological organ of the regime, it reflected the fascistoid nature of the 
regime’s ideology and was the main vehicle of the intellectual supporters of the regime and 
the originators of the various fascist ideas. The periodical drew on various ideas and 
experiences from abroad and used them in the creation of a specifically Greek ideology. It 
was used in the dissemination of official propaganda and as a mechanism for the creation 
of public consent. The subject matter of the periodical was divided into the two large 
categories of “politics” and “culture”. The writers of the articles were mostly the 
ideologues of the regime, the members of the government, and various European 
intellectual supporters of the fascist ideology 37
3  ^Four Years o f Metaxas' Governing, Vol 2, pp. 208-210.
36 The periodical lasted from September 1937 until March 1941 and published 43 issues. Its precursor the 
newspaper “The New State” was first issued in 1932 and had served the pre-electoral campaign of General 
Kondyles and had shared his ideas on the corporatist organisation o f the state.
37 On the periodical “The New State”, sec Panos Kokkinos, The Fascistoid Ideology in Greece. It is 
interesting to note that distinguished Greek intellectuals, such as the the painter Gikas, the photographer 
Nelly, the actress Kotopouli, the archeologist Marinatos, among many others contributed in one way or 
another in the periodical.
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Religion: The ambivalent institution in inter-war authoritarianism
There was a very strong position reserved for the church in the 4th of August 
regime's ideology, as one of the basic pillars of Greek civilisation. The atheist and anti­
clerical elements of fascist ideology were totally absent from the Greek discourse, the 
Greek regime belonging to the same category as the dictatorships of Portugal and Spain, 
where Catholic culture had considerable force and religion was a powerful bulwark of 
tradition and nationality.
The Church’s pre-eminent position in Portugal could not be challenged by any 
concept of the nation, and it retained a very special position within Portuguese society, 
creating what many analysts have labelled Portuguese "clerical fascism".38 It controlled the 
educational system and most of the intellectual life and placed its emphasis on traditional 
Christian values and institutions. Salazar, himself a deeply religious person, regarded 
Catholicism as a force of civilisation in the country’s relationship with its African colonies. 
Equally Franco had to take into consideration the deep Catholic feeling of Spanish society 
in the exercise of his authority and the implementation of his policies. During the Spanish 
civil war, references to religion were used to gain the support of traditional and 
conservative forces in Spanish society against the Republican threat. The Catholic tradition 
was a constant element in the official ideological language of Franco’s Spain. However, 
there was always a somewhat antagonistic relationship between the nationalist-syndicalist 
elements within the ruling group and the Catholic elements. The powerful organisation 
Opus Dei eventually managed to supplant the dominant role of the Falange and achieved a 
significant role in the exercise of power. In Spain however while the higher hierarchy of 
the Catholic Church was one of the basic pillars of the Franco regime, the lower ranks of 
the clergy constituted a serious force of opposition and acted as a restraint on the excesses
38 Mosse referring to the Portuguese, Spanish and the Austrian cases, op. cit.. pp. 354-356 He states that 
in these countries, Catholicism played a major role in fascist doctrines and catholic morality prevailed in 
their social theories. Based on this notion of “clerical fascism”, Gallagher claims that the corporatist 
regimes of Salazar and the Austrian Dolfuss bore striking similarities in that they developed in two small 
agriculturally based countries, overshadowed by a larger powerful neighbour and dominated by a single 
metropolitan centre; their leaders were not right-wing adventurers but conventional professional men from 
smallholding peasant backgrounds, both of them devout Catholics who rejected the secular writings of 
Hitler and Mussolini, op.cit., pp. 96-97.
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of dictatorial power.39 Moreover, the Italian fascist regime’s relationship with Catholicism 
remained very ambivalent in that while the leading figures of the Italian power elite claimed 
to be atheists and anti-clericalists, the regime was forced to take into consideration the 
strong position of the Church in Italian society and to make compromises in its ideological 
position towards the religious issue.40
As Linz argues, the special position of the Catholic Church in many authoritarian 
societies and the legal status of many of its organisations provided by the concordats 
between the Vatican and the rulers allowed priests and laymen a certain degree of 
autonomy to serve as channels for the opposition sentiments of various social classes, 
cultural minorities, etc and for the emergence of new leaders. This was due to the 
transnational character of the Catholic religion which enabled it to voice the concerns of the 
hierarchy, their moral indignation at injustices, and to assert the autonomy of religious 
organisations and the freedom of its priests. The Church as an institution outlasts any 
regime even those with which it becomes identified at a particular historical moment, and is 
generally able to disengage itself from the regime and regain its autonomy when signs of 
crisis appear.41
The omnipresence of religion continued to be influential in the orthodox countries 
of inter-war Europe. Even in the genuine fascist movement of the Iron Guard, fascist 
ideology rejected anti-clericalism. The movement’s identification with Romanian 
orthodoxy was among the prominent and quite distinctive features of its ideology. 
Naturally, orthodox religion played a pivotal role in the Third Civilisation of the 4th of 
August regime. The traditional element in the regime’s philosophy was reflected in its 
perception of the role of religion."Religion seeks the truth in faith, through belief in the 
religious ideals o f Greek Orthodox Christianity, in the expression o f man's dependence on 
God " 42 Equally, the rhetoric of Metaxas' regime emphasised "the strengthening o f the 
role o f the Church and the elevating o f the clergy, aimed at the consolidation o f the
39 On the role of the Spanish Catholic Church during Franco’s dictatorship see Dcmichcl, Les Dictatures 
Europeenes, pp. 223-225.
40 Milza/Berstein, Le Fascisme Italien, pp 256-261
41 See Linz, ‘Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes”, pp. 272-273.
42 From the Periodical The Youth , "On Religion", p. 5.
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religious sentiments which have preserved Greek civilisation for centuries ”, 43 through the 
actual exercise of control by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, as had also repeatedly been the 
policy of previous governments. The ecclesiastical policy of the 4th of August regime 
aimed to control the Church hierarchy, to draft a new Church Constitution which would 
define the relationship between Church and State, and to promulgate a law against 
foreign missionaries and their churches. Only the official Church was given support by the 
Metaxas regime, and the activities of other, foreign Churches were restricted.44 Metaxas 
founded the Apostolic Mission in order to increase the Church’s influence and took 
measures to improve the administration of church property and to raise the educational 
level of the clergy. The revival of the religious spirit and awareness of the Christian 
ethics were perceived as important factors in the rhetorical struggle against materialism. 
Existing measures such as compulsory church attendance on all children and the 
authoritarian dismissal of many teachers for alleged irreligion were pursued consistently by 
the regime, as their way of strengthening the religious sentiment of the Greek people 45 
The church hierarchy, in its turn, supported the 4th of August regime since it brought 
stability to the nation and it did not threaten the important position of the Orthodox Church 
within Greek society.
The fascist New State: Corporatist organisation
The imposition of dictatorships in Europe was seen as the solution to the acute 
crisis brought about by social conflicts, in that they would be neutralised by an 
authoritarian centralised state power. In theory, the fascist State aspired to become a 
totalitarian organism, controlling every aspect of the society, the economy and culture, a 
centralised power devoid of governmental instabilities and the previous oligarchic 
corruption. Most of the European authoritarian regimes enacted rules to reflect the 
aspiration of a classless society and to create an integrated, national economic structure
43 One of the fundamental goals of the 4th of August regime when it rose to power. "The Major Aims of 
the 4th of August Regime" in the Four Years o f Metaxas' Governing, pp. 206-216.
44 Frazee, “Church and State in Greece” in Greece in Transition, p. 144. During the period of Metaxas 
Orthodox Christians accounted for 75% of the population of Greece, while the remaining 25% included 
Catholics, Protestants, Jews and Muslims. See Mahaira, op.cit., p. 57.
43 Close, “Conservatism, Authoritarianism and Fascism in Greece” in Fascists and Conservatives, p. 206.
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under the authoritarian supervision of the State, whether this was called “National- 
Socialist”, “National-Syndicalist” or “National Corporatist”. The creation of a “National- 
Socialist State” in Nazi Germany, aimed at the alleviation of the impact of the political and 
economic crises created during the period of the Weimar Republic. The solution to social 
rivalries consisted in the strengthening of the middle classes, the regulation of relationship 
between capitalists/owners and workers and the restructuring of other aspects of social 
welfare policy.46 The “National-Syndicalist State” in Italy aimed even further, at the 
political organisation of Italian society through various corporate organisations, controlled 
by the state, which would form the National Council of Corporations to displace the 
Chamber of Deputies 47
The ideas of corporatism found their expression in inter-war authoritarian regimes 
and were professed religiously by several leaders. Corporatism was seen in the state’s 
tendency to inhibit the formation of autonomous groups and related to the state’s hostility 
towards the autonomous organisation of certain social groups. State corporatism means 
that,
spontaneously formed interest groups and associations are not merely controlled 
from above, they are outlawed and replaced by a limited number o f authoritatively 
recognised groups that interact with governmental apparatuses in defined and 
regulated ways. 48
Salazar, the ideologue of the “National-Corporatist State”, was the first to 
introduce his ideas on corporatist organisation and the development of a corporatist 
economic structure. Portuguese corporatism consisted in the creation of the “Estatuto 
Nacional do Trabalho” to replace the trade unions and workers' associations and the 
creation of the Corporate Chamber to form the regime's upper house.49 In reality however, 
corporatism proved to be an illusion in practical terms and most countries which professed
46 From Stefanides' articles on National Socialism on the periodical The New State, January 1939 and 
February 1939. Also in the reproduction of his articles on the book The Social Question, December 1989.
47 Guy Hermet emphasises the difference with Nazi Germany, in that there was no intention to create an 
all-powerful state on the Italian model, but rather to transfer the power of the previous Bismarckian 
centralised state to the new Nazi party. “Passe et Present: Des Regimes Fascistes et Nazi au Systeme 
Communiste” in Totalitarisme, pp. 140-142.
48 Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery, p. 75.
49 Figueiredo op. cit., p. 69.
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anti-capitalistic forms of economic policy in favour of the underprivileged, ended up 
creating a form of state-sponsored capitalism.50
The Greek model o f the corporate state and class regulation: A populist 
rhetoric and practice
In their particular context, Metaxas and his political associates drew up their socio­
economic and political philosophy borrowing elements from various fascist corporatist 
theories which centred around the idea of the construction of the “New State”. Metaxas is 
said to have studied the German, Italian and Portuguese cases when considering such 
matters as the corporate economy. In semi-peripheral countries such as Greece where the 
role of the state was all-embracing, and the state sector controlled a large proportion of the 
national resources, a turn towards an authoritarian centralised state by a dictator was not 
such a radical move.
Metaxas’ application of theories of the corporatist state to Greece was rather static 
and unimaginative and for the most part imported from foreign models. While fascist 
corporatism was anti-capitalistic in that it aimed at freezing society at a particular stage in its 
development, i.e., the level of social development brought about by the market forces and 
its replacement by new forms of economic organisation, the Metaxist interpretation of such 
development lacked the complications of the corporatist varieties and was based on a rather 
simplistic conception of Greek society. Greek society, according to Metaxas, as a result of 
the previous policies of democratic governments, was divided into three categories: First, 
the individualists who did not care about anything that happened to the other members of 
society and only sought their personal gain; second, those who suffered financially and 
wanted to damage society at large in return for their suffering; third those who really cared 
about Greek society, the “true nationally-minded Greeks”.51 The ambition of the regime 
was to strengthen the third category in order to include the whole of the Greek people, and 
to eliminate the first two categories. This would only be achieved through the suppression
50 Similarly in Germany old capitalist elites were effectively protected and retained their old influence.
5177i£ Ideas of Metaxas on Greece and Hellenism, Athens 1952 [in Greek]
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of individualism and the super-imposition of a strong State which would regulate all 
aspects of economic, political and cultural life. Most pronounced was the rhetoric on the 
promotion of the economic interests of disadvantaged sectors and the economically 
underprivileged.
The goal of the regime was the transformation of the state into an efficient and com­
pact corporate state which would control the behaviour of the various classes within the 
framework of self-sufficiency. The state would be in direct contact with the representatives 
of the various classes and would intervene in the labour-capital conflict and the peasant- 
landowner conflict to bring about the harmonisation of their relations. The policies to be 
pursued by the Greek corporate state included control and appeasement of the labour 
movement through the manipulation of the leadership of the Labour Unions, giving a 
minimum wage and social insurance to the workers and imposing collective bargaining and 
compulsory arbitration. The State would also forbid the right to strike and suppress the 
freedom of the Trade Unions. The intention was that all workers should be made to join 
official unions controlled from above. On the other hand, the capitalists were asked to 
make as many concessions as they could to the workers. Metaxas aimed at the 
reorganisation of the Labour Unions and the replacement of their leaders by his own 
agents.52
Metaxas professed the hierarchical division of society, in the form of a pyramid. At 
the base of the pyramid were the peasants. They had to be “pure” and healthy. They were 
the first and direct creators of economic goods. They should stay in the countryside in 
order to remain happy and should not be “slaves o f the cities”. The corporate state policy 
towards the peasants was to create Peasants’ Houses composed of the agricultural co­
operatives which were created by a 1939 law.53 The regime also sought to increase 
production and the variety of crops in order to achieve self-sufficiency, to improve 
irrigation, to reduce and alleviate peasant indebtedness, to distribute wasteland, to improve 
railway and road communications.
52 On Metaxas' labour policy see Linardatos The 4th o f  August Regime, pp. 111-141,  Kofas 
Authoritarianism in Greece, pp. 64-76, and Andrikopoulos The Roots o f Greek Fascism, pp. 28-32.
53 Close, The Character o f  the Metaxas Dictatorship, p. 8.
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Although Metaxas had, in 1935, condemned the high degree of state intervention 
in the Greek economy and in society and had demanded a more liberal and market-oriented 
approach in the government’s economic policy, as a dictator he strengthened state 
authoritarianism and intervention.54 The state, according to the regime, should not be 
confined only to the regulation of relations between employers and workers or landowners 
and peasants, but it should extend its effort to the regulation of the whole national 
economy, intervening in the distribution of wealth and creating a welfare system. Greek 
society, according to Metaxas, should not be divided into classes with conflicting interests 
but into complementary professions with complementary interests. But ultimately Metaxas 
saw the real division in Greek society in the existence of nationally-minded Greeks and 
non-nationally minded Greeks, the true cause of social conflicts. In this sense, Metaxas 
had a highly homogeneous conception of society, static and tidy, with the myth of national 
harmony as its end-goal.
The state was, according to the regime's principles, an omnipresent organism with 
the right to intervene in all aspects of the economy and polity, transcending social classes, 
political parties and interest groups. It was considered a living organism, the expression of 
the organised society which existed over and above the individual, and not a rational 
mechanical construction as in the liberal conception. The New State was to be composed of 
a united people, nationally-minded, guided by the King, the highest archon and a non- 
party leader of the government. Man as an individual had no rights separate from the 
"totality" which was embodied in the state.
Totalitarianism was seen by Metaxas, as the best form of government to serve the 
"national realities".55 Greece, according to the regime’ ideology, lacked the ruling class 
which it needed, one which would be national and highly educated; "the state class with
54 Vergopoulos, Nationalism and Economic Development, pp. 81-83. Greek economic thought, in 
general, during the 1930s was insisting on the philosophy of the free market economy at a time when the 
theory of state intervention was becoming prevalent abroad.
55 His personal admiration for totalitarian models of organisation was evident in a statement in his 
“Notebook of Thoughts” w hich he WTOte on the 2nd of January 1941, a few days before he died: “Greece 
thanks to the 4th o f  August Regime became a anti-conununist State, an anti-parliamentary State, a 
totalitarian State”. He w'as, however, disappointed with the Italian and the Nazi regimes which in his 
opinion “had started on purely ideological grounds and ended up on expansionist and selfish grounds....their 
anti-communism and totalitarianism were fake”. See His Personal Diary, Vol.4, p. 553.
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national ideals”. The aim was the creation of a "totalitarian state class" above classes and 
parties which would secure the interventionist character of the state and would correspond 
better to the needs of 20th century capitalism.56 Contrary to Metaxas’ totalitarian 
intentions, the ideologue Mantzoufas denied the totalitarian character of the New State and 
contrasted it with the totalitarian nature of the Italian and German counterparts claiming 
that,
the concept o f the Nation precedes that o f the State and is not identical to it, since
the notions o f freedom, property and private initiative do not correspond with those
professed in the truly totalitarian states 57
The corporatist philosophy of the 4th of August regime ended up as a mere populist 
rhetoric aimed at the peasants’ and workers’ support and the cause of disagreements within 
the government between the pro-German and the pro-British ministers.58 The corporatist 
orientation of the Greek regime, similar to the Portuguese regime, used corporatism in 
order to control social demands, to reinforce the already existing social order and not to 
change it radically, as did the National Socialists and National Syndicalists. Instead of an 
elaborated corporatist theory, the ideas of the regime produced a populist rhetoric focusing 
predominantly on ideological themes such as the antagonism between the ‘people’ and the 
‘establishment’, the “poor” versus the “rich”, the “nationally minded” vs the “not- 
nationally minded”, the “hard-working” vs the “idle”, manichaistic conceptions of society 
which in practice reinforce divisions rather than alleviate them. Moreover, populist leaders 
are hostile towards any intermediary institutions and place, their emphasis on the direct, 
relationship between the leader and the people, tending to stress the leader’s charisma 59 In 
that sense Metaxas pursued a type of direct communication between himself and the 
people, by-passing any other institutional mechanisms and even refusing to create a state
56 Alivizatos The Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974, p. 124.
57 Mantzoufas, “Nation, State, Law”, in The New State, Athens, May 1939, p. 249.
58 This is well illustrated by the case of Zavitsianos, the most prominent Greek theoretician of the 
corporate state, the vice-president of Metaxas’ government and the first minister of Finance, known also for 
his German sympathies. Six months after the imposition of the dictatorship, Zavitsianos tried to contract a 
substantial loan with Germany for the renewal of military equipment which was rejected by the king, as 
changing radically Greece’s relations of dependence, and was sacked from the government. Sec Kitsikis, 
Greece o f the 4th of August and the Great Powers, pp. 59-61, and Alefantis, op.cit., p. 182.
59 Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery, pp. 78-80.
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mass party. His constant concern for his popularity forced him to impose another feature 
of international fascism, i.e., the “Fuhrerprinzip”.
The Leadership principle in the Greek case: A “phony” charisma
The application of the “Fuhrerprinzip” to the Greek case was clearly an imitation of 
the fascist regimes of Germany and Italy. The adoration of the leader, on the Hitler and 
Mussolini models, was very dear to the dictator. He systematically pursued direct 
communication with the masses by organising a series of rallies and speeches in all parts of 
the country and consistently tried to diffuse his ideas through publications, lectures etc. He 
portrayed himself to the masses as the “Great Governor”, the "First peasant", the "First 
worker", a "Great Hellene", the “Leader” of the youth movement, a benevolent ruler 
concerned with the hardships of the disadvantaged. His ideologues depicted his will as 
identified with the will of the nation.60 An array of propaganda methods was used in order 
to persuade the populace of the necessity for a leader in the Greek national context. The 
attempt to mystify the genius and the personality of the leader was based upon an 
identification between Metaxas and other historic personalities such as Odysseus, 
Lycurgus, Kolocotronis and Kapodistrias.61 In addition this was accompanied by regular 
declarations of admiration coming from people loyal to the regime, in their portrayal of the 
leader's personality and deeds.
The miracle o f the rebirth o f the whole nation -the Metaxas miracle-, was 
accomplished thanks to the firm will, the deepest patriotic inspiration and the 
indomitable vigour ofloannis Metaxas. His assistants in this major task, which 
laid the foundations o f the Third Hellenic Civilisation were not just his ministers
60 The political philosophers of the regime, Mantzoufas and Koumaros, tried to place Metaxas' authority 
within a legal framework in their article "The Fundamental Constitutional Principles o f the New State" in 
The New State, 1938 which defined the powers of the Prime Minister in his relation with the king and the 
Ministers.
61 One such example, the book of Zavitsianos The Two Great Kephalonites Born in Ithaki: Odysseus and 
Metaxas where the writer finds startling similarities between the two in psycho-intellectual characteristics, 
in Christina Avlami, “The Use of History by the Theoreticians of the 4th of August Regime” in Istor, p. 
129.
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but the whole o f the Greek people, the latter having sensed the high mission o f the 
leader, entrusted to his brave hands the destiny o f the country. 62 
Adoration of the leader, in the Greek case, had nothing genuine about it but simply 
reflected once more the international fashion and the important role of the leaders in the 
various inter-war authoritarian regimes abroad. But Metaxas’ charisma was minimal, and 
all he could hope for was the support and loyalty of some faithful persons who did not 
share his ideas but rather saw their political ascendancy through the dictator’s power,63 
and of a few would be intellectuals.64 The attempt to achieve a people loyal to the dictator 
was complicated by the fact that Metaxas was very suspicious of his collaborators' 
personal ambitions and struggled throughout the course of the dictatorship to get rid of all 
those with personal motives and those who were too loyal to the King and thus created 
problems for the exercise of his authority.65 The majority of Metaxas’ personal followers 
during his dictatorship had previously been rich or well-off businessmen or newspaper 
publishers. Metaxas, due to the lack of people associated with his ideas, was partly forced 
to associate himself with bureaucrats who had long experience in their respective fields, 
who came from the previous liberal world.66 He also had a close relationship with a select 
circle of financial and business magnates, to help with the financial and industrial affairs of 
the state and to lead the economic and social welfare ministries. Still, his dependence on 
this circle of wealthy, self-seeking and possibly corrupt backers was not so much out of
62 Four Years o f Metaxas' Governing, Vol. 4, pp. 297-298.
63 Diakos is said to have been one of his closest associates and the chief go-between the dictator and the 
financial and business circles. Nikoloudis the minister of the newly founded Ministry of Press and 
Propaganda declared his belief in the victory of totalitarianism in Greece and pointed to the similarities of 
the Greek regime with the other fascist regimes of Europe.(Nikoloudis1 speech to the Metaxas1 youth, on 7 
June 1938) He was chiefly responsible for the censorship of all types of publications. Kotzias the newly 
appointed Minister-Govemor of Athens was an example of an adventurist politician who started with the 
Free Opinion party, switched to the Liberals, in 1934 became the mayor of Athens and in 1935 was an 
overt supporter of Hitlerism in Greece. He had also attempted to found a youth movement on Hitler’s 
model in Greece before the imposition of the dictatorship. Kotzias had the closest links with the Germans, 
had visited Germany several times and was known in Berlin to be the “perfect advertiser” of the Nazi 
ideology in Greece. (Renate Meissner “National Socialist Germany and Greece during the Metaxist 
Dictatorship” in Greece 1936-1944, p 53) Kanellopoulos, the son of a wealthy family and the leader of the 
youth movement, was also devoted to Metaxas and shared many of the dictator’s ideas.
64 Mantzoufas and Koumaros the ones who provided for the constitutional legality of the 4th of August 
regime. Aristos Kambanis was the editor of the regime’s main periodical The New State.
65 See Linardatos op. cit., pp 42-55 on the different tendencies within the government.
66 People like Zavitsianos and Hatzykyriakos who had been ministers under the Venizelist governments, 
and established Bank cadres, such as the Venizelist administrator of the Bank of Greece Tsouderos, were 
consulted and employed by Metaxas. In the area of education, the dictator asked for the help of the well- 
known liberal intellectual Manolis Triantafyllides in the drafting of the demotic grammar.
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conscious choice but the result of his personal isolation and lack of a strong base of social 
support and the need to create a powerful circle around him.67
The following extract from a report by Waterlow to Halifax in 1938 shows the 
extent of Metaxas’ popularity and the regime’s poor social base:
Whatever Metaxas has done for this country, it has not benefited his regime in any 
way; his creative achievements, which in two and a half years have changed the 
face o f Greece, are never praised. There is for the most part, a whining consent 
when they are mentioned. But an ungrateful people, which approves passively, 
given that there is no other option but anarchy, and which is ready to believe the 
worst o f its leaders, is a poor foundation for the New S ta ted  
Reading through the personal diary of the dictator, one is able to appreciate the 
character, the worries and the ambitions of the leader. He seems to have been a person 
with strong convictions and a firm belief in the authenticity of his ideas; an ambitious 
leader concerned with the strengthening of his personal power, suspicious of his associates 
in the government, of the king and of the foreign powers and a very devoted head of his 
family. He saw himself as the saviour and the natural leader of the Greek nation and he 
distinguished himself from the amorphous and illiterate masses. But Metaxas was neither a 
Hitler nor a Venizelos despite his desperate effort to be like them. At the most he was 
respected by the members of the regime, although it is quite difficult to tell whether his 
people really admired him for his qualities or simply flattered him in order to promote their 
own personal ambitions.
Metaxas and Salazar: Similar patterns o f behaviour
In their brand of authoritarian ideology and their styles of personalised leaderships, 
Metaxas and Salazar had much in common. They were both realistic leaders who fully 
appreciated their countries’ peripheral and weak international status, and they both chose 
the adoption of a cautious ideological discourse, marked by traditional, conservative and
67 See Close The Character o f the Metaxas Dictatorship, p. 7.
68 Report 10301/726/19/1938 from Waterlow to Halifax, on 19 December 1938 in Andrikopoulos, 
op.cit., pp. 94-95, [in Greek].
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imported fascist elements. Portugal, in the geographical periphery of the European 
continent chose a policy of isolation and national autarky in the context of the competing 
European powers. Metaxas, in a different geographical periphery chose neutrality and a 
policy of accommodation between the various influences of the European powers. Both 
leaders promoted close relations with Britain and Germany and pointed to their ideological 
differences with the Italian fascist models. They showed no willingness to create a party- 
state and were hostile towards any party concept, even towards the pre-existing domestic 
fascist organisations. They did not go in for the systematic persecution of ethnic minorities 
and dissociated themselves from any notion of anti-Semitism. Both countries possessed a 
secure national identity which was not threatened by alien minorities or foreign influences. 
Both leaders, devout Christians, chose to preserve the traditional elements in their 
respective cultures: religion, family and national history. They pursued a defensive and 
cautious nationalism, based on traditionally held cultural values and aimed at discipline and 
order indicative of their will to avoid radical solutions. They adopted a paternalist style of 
authority and extensively used an anti-plutocratic and populist rhetoric. Unlike the 
dominant charismatic personalities of the inter-war period, neither of them had a 
specifically charismatic appeal, but they promoted the picture of the “romanticised medieval 
paternalist figure” and were marked by a “fatal teaching mentality”, keen on publishing 
their speeches, ideas and interviews in endless volumes.69 Both aspired to a high 
concentration of personal power in their hands. Their aim was merely to strengthen 
existing social values and traditional modes of behaviour rather than to originate a radically 
new social order. They both used the traditional state machinery to centralise economic 
controls and promote economic growth, and Metaxas adopted many principles from the 
Salazarist corporate state. While they were both supported by the religious and the 
monarchist establishments their governments were divided between pro-Allied and pro- 
German sympathies. They both created their own youth movements, with compulsory 
membership, EON and the “Mocedade Portuguesa” which both suffered the stigma of the 
official patronage.
69 Hugh Kay, op.cit., p. 76.
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Chapter 4 : THE 4TH OF AUGUST REGIME’S EDUCATIONAL POLICY
So far we have examined the ideological factor, the system of ideas held by the 4th 
of August authoritarian regime. We have seen the 4th of August elite’s perception of the 
inter-war reality, its idiosyncratic interpretation of social, political, economic and cultural 
issues, in its effort to justify the exceptional and repressive character of its rule and to 
propose an alternative political philosophy. An important function of authoritarian 
ideology, however, is to mobilise society around its beliefs, using specific institutional 
mechanisms as means of political socialisation. Since the 4th of August regime was unable 
to create a mass movement, the mobilisational aspect of the Metaxas regime was 
exclusively carried out through the imposition from above of a youth movement, the 
“bearer of the regime’s ideas”, the “creator of the Third Greek Civilisation” and potentially 
the active base of the regime.
The mobilisational aspect of the 4th of August regime clearly reflected the 
international fascist environment of the inter-war period. Fascist regimes, due to the 
centrality of the ideological factor to their legitimation, embarked on a systematic campaign 
of political socialisation of their respective populations, through the employment of the 
party machinery and the constant use of mass media propaganda. One constant theme of 
fascist ideologies was the extreme exaltation of the youth’s potential, while a significant 
feature of their political socialisation process was their interest in the fascist education of 
the youth through the youth movement and at school.
The political socialisation of the youth by the 4th of August regime consisted, on 
the one hand, in the imposition from above of the youth movement on the German and the 
Italian models, and on the other, in the manipulation of the educational system, through the 
implementation of a centralised educational policy. The first of these represented the 
foremost fascist aspect of the regime, reflecting the influence of international fascism on 
the Greek case, and should be seen in close association with the other fascist contemporary 
youth movements. The second came about through the evolution of the dictatorial regime’s 
educational policy and was affected mainly by domestic factors and contemporary ideas on
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education in Greece. These ideas were actually implemented in a series of reforms and 
counter-reforms that had tormented Greek education during the inter-war period. The 
political socialisation of the youth and the educational policy of the 4th of August regime 
should be seen in the light of three determining factors: The international fascist context of 
political socialisation through the use of the youth movement and the manipulation of the 
educational system; the inter-war domestic Greek context of intellectual pluralism and 
pedagogical deadlocks; and the previously examined development of Greek education, 
with its highly centralised and classicist orientation.
The first was decisive in the leader’s attempt to establish a mobilisational 
authoritarian regime; the second was indicative of the perpetuation of the same deadlocks in 
a clearly authoritarian context; the strengthening of the third may be seen in the context of 
the limited pluralism preserved by the regime. Taking the above factors together indicates 
that the political socialisation of the youth by the 4th of August regime was neither solely 
fascist nor reactionary as has been pointed out by most analysts, but a combination of 
fascist, conservative and reformist elements which reflected at the same time, the mind of 
the leader, the limits on his power, the influence of international ideas, and the unstable 
and transitional character of the inter-war period.
A. Ideological mobilisation o f the youth
The functional role o f the fascist youth: Contradictions and conflicts in the 
process o f political socialisation
Fascist ideology claimed to be revolutionary and a radical break with the past. In the 
promotion of their revolutionary ideas the fascist regimes saw young people as their 
allies, the bearers of their new ideologies. The youth, according to fascist ideology, had a 
specific social function to fulfil in the realisation of the fascist revolutionary programme. 
The youth was seen by the fascist regimes as their prospective social base and was 
perceived as having a key role in the maintenance and the future stabilisation of fascism at 
large. The young generation, being the most malleable part of society, in terms of its
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responsiveness to new ideological themes, was believed to be the most flexible recipient of 
and the future carrier of the new ideology. The fact that the younger people did not have 
any ideological connection with past doctrines and practices made them, in the eyes of the 
fascists, a more fertile social sector for the infiltration of new ideologies.
Fascist regimes systematically pursued a process aimed at the political socialisation 
of the youth, based on the manipulation of the educational system on the one hand, and the 
control of the youth organisation, on the other. The fact that students played an active role 
in the development of fascist movements in countries like Italy, Germany, Spain and 
Romania, offered a fertile ground on which the dictatorial regimes could expand their 
already existing movements. The fascists saw the creation of the future fascist elite and of 
the new totalitarian class as coming from among the ranks of the youth. Both functions, 
that of the creation of a prospective social base for the regime and that of the recruitment of 
the new political elite, aimed at the long-term stabilisation and legitimation of fascist 
political authority.
The process of political socialisation of the youth, however, entailed contradictions 
inherent in the nature of the fascist regimes. As Gino Germani suggests, there was a 
contrast that stemmed from the need to foster some degree of active participation of youth, 
on the one hand, and the necessity of maintaining totalitarian controls, on the other. There 
was a "clash between certain methods required to induce youth mobilisation and the need 
to maintain a strict control on all dangerous deviations V  This was reflected in a strained 
relationship between the State-party, as a national entity, and the youth movement, as one 
of the principal expressions of this entity, which was related to the control of the Party 
over the youth organisation.
Major conflicts involved the network of political socialisation within capitalist 
societies which the fascist regimes inherited when they came to power, i.e., school, 
church, family and liberal youth organisations. The conflicts arose in large measure due to 
the particular importance attached by fascists to each one of them, in the process of fascist 
political education. Fascists attached great importance to the establishment of a single
1 Gino Germani "Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Regimes: Italy and Spain" in Authoritarian 
Politics in Modern Society edited by Huntington and Moore, p. 343.
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national youth movement, which would be the sole and true carrier of fascist ideology, and 
so the fascist youth organisation came into conflict with these other institutions. This was 
resolved in practice by suppressing and ultimately eliminating all the previous youth 
organisations, in a totalitarian organisation of the society, or by merging some of them into 
the new dominant fascist one, within the context of authoritarian limited pluralism.
While it was feasible, by simple acts of law and the use of repression, to eliminate 
the influence of the various liberal organisations, many problems arose in the fascists' 
efforts to suppress and diminish the importance of such enduring institutions as the family, 
the school and the church. First, fascism aspired to be totalitarian, and the control of the 
family, the most private institution of socialisation entailed a totalitarian inspired change of 
all individual attitudes and values. Second, fascism was anti-liberal and the control of the 
schools, the basic bearers of the liberal tradition, necessarily relied on a radically altered 
and consistent new fascist pedagogy. Third, fascism was anti-clerical and the control of the 
Church, a powerful source of fundamental belief for individuals, ran the risk of alienating 
large sectors of the population.
Hence there were unavoidable clashes between the youth movement and the other 
institutions, especially in countries where the latter held an important position in the 
development of their young people. This was natural given that the youth organisation 
emerged as a newcomer in these societies and sought to challenge the position of the other 
institutions which were used to enjoying a relative degree of autonomy in the process of 
the political socialisation of the youth. With the exception of Nazi Germany, where the 
Nazi State achieved a near-realisation of its aim of a totalitarian control over the various 
mechanisms of political socialisation, the fascist regimes had to take into consideration 
these other institutions in the formation of their ideology and the implementation of 
governmental policy. Hence, for instance, fascist Italy made concessions to the powerful 
Catholic Church, Romanian fascism incorporated in its ideology the Orthodox sentiment of 
the religious Romanians, while Spanish, Portuguese and Austrian authoritarianism formed 
a peculiar blend of Catholic clerical fascism.
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Inter-war authoritarian cases o f youth socialisation: Germany, Italy, Spain 
The priority of Nazi state policy was to instil the ideas of the regime into the the 
youth. It was therefore necessary to infuse the Nazi interpretations of nationalism, anti­
communism and anti-liberalism into the young people's minds and to activate them in the 
defence of Nazi ideals. The aspiration of the Nazi regime to be a truly totalitarian regime 
meant the moulding of the characters of the youth and the instillation of certain behavioural 
characteristics. Through the shaping of young peoples’ characters and minds, the leaders 
would be able to manipulate their views and control their actions.
The youth in the German case had to be strongly nationalistic, recognising the 
nation as the highest entity, for which they should be prepared to sacrifice their lives. 
There was a priority attached to the production of healthy bodies, next to which the 
intellectual capabilities only came second. There was a fundamental concern with the 
fitness of both the body and the character. The young character had to develop the strength 
of will and decision, as well as discipline. The Spartan mode of life was the model of 
discipline and obedience to be followed. Ideas of racial supremacy -anti-Semitism above 
all-, obedience to the national community, glorification of the leader, the belief in heroes, 
suppression of individualism, had to be adopted by every boy and girl.2 In essence young 
people had to work as a whole, while the ideas and desires of the separate individuals had 
to be suppressed, so as to form a united and nationally aggressive youth.
The main aim of National Socialist policy was to have a single Hitler Youth. By the 
end of 1933 all youth organisations were either banned or incorporated into the Hitler 
Youth. In 1939 a Hitler Youth Law made youth service compulsory. The NSDStB was the 
students' association and aimed at controlling the entire student body. The role of the SS 
was to select from among the youth, the future political elite. Even in the case of the 
German youth, however, where a high degree of conformity was achieved, there were 
clashes between the various sectors of political socialisation: between the youth movement 
and the families given that the youth activity did take the children away from their homes; 
and deviant behaviour within the Youth itself with the creation of opposition groups in the
2 On the new value system of the Nazi educational pedagogy, see Blackburn Education in the Third Reich, 
New York Press, 1985.
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ranks of the Hitler Youth. The creation of sub-cultures within the National Socialist 
ideology demonstrated that even the Nazis were not completely able to control on a 
totalitarian basis the whole of German society.3
Italy is the country which can be taken as the model of fascist political socialisation 
given the 20-year long duration of the Mussolini dictatorship. The regime aimed at the 
imposition of total loyalty to the values of the nation, submission to an all-powerful state 
and to the Duce and the bringing about of a New Roman Empire based on the traditions of 
the past Roman glory. The youth in Italy had to be physically fit, to possess the martial 
spirit, to be disciplined and brave. Like in Germany, there was a fascist youth organisation 
prior to the regime's accession to power, (Avanguardie) which was transformed by the 
regime into the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB). In 1926, this was to be the official youth 
institution of the Italian state, supervised by the ministry of Education. Its aim was the 
physical and moral education of the youth.4 Physical and military training were given 
special emphasis as well as ideological indoctrination. The University youth organisation 
was called the Gruppi Universitari Fascisti (GUF) which became, eventually, the only 
Italian students' association. In the case of Italy, there was a large network of fascist 
organisations and institutions, with rather complicated administrative apparatuses, which 
aimed at the political indoctrination of the youth in general, and specifically at the selection 
of a political elite.5
In Spain several militant fascist groups were created among the youth, providing 
significant support for the fascist Falange. A fascist-syndicalist group existed within the 
Universities of Spain before the outbreak of civil war, with the formation of the SEU 
(Syndicato Espanol Universitario) in 1933, soon after the creation of the Falange. This 
was to constitute one of the solid bases of the fascist Falange which in 1939 sided with the 
conservative forces in the imposition of the dictatorship. During the first decade of the 
dictatorship, the SEU monopolised effectively all student activities through the use of a
3 Detlev Peukert, "Youth in the Third Reich" in Ufe in the Third Reich edited by R. Bessel, pp. 25-40.
4 This was later (in 1937) called Gioventu Italiana del Littorio (GIL) and was placed under the direct control 
of the party national secretary
5 On the issue of the Italian fascist youth see Minio-Palucllo Education in Fascist Italy , pp. 132-152, 
Ostenc Michel L'Education en llalie pendant le Fascisme pp. 233-270, and Gino Germani op.cit. pp. 344- 
359.
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University Militia. The Falange achieved control over the political education of the youth, 
the SEU and the mass of students and tried to impose strict conformity to the principles of 
the Falange. Given that the Franco government was a coalition of right wing forces, the 
domination over the means of political socialisation was a joint fascist, conservative right- 
wing and Catholic venture. Therefore the aim was to instil a strong National-Catholic- 
Syndicalist spirit in the youth.6 A series of laws passed by the Franco regime insisted on 
compulsory religious instruction at all levels of education, the creation of a Youth Front 
participation in which was compulsory for all pupils in primary and secondary education, 
in the spirit of the Falangist doctrine.7
The fascist!mobilisational aspect o f the 4th o f August regime: The Youth 
Movement
Given the limits on his personal power as dictator and a lack of a social base for his 
regime, Metaxas turned to the example set by the contemporary fascist regimes, deciding 
that the creation of a youth movement on the fascist model was the only way for him to 
acquire the social base he lacked. The example of how other fascist regimes went about the 
mobilisation of their youth had a great effect upon the direction which Metaxas took, in that 
he opted for the creation from above of a youth movement, as a principal means of 
mobilising the Greek youth. The indoctrination of the youth through the youth movement 
was the main expression of the fascist influence on Greece, but the way in which the 
movement operated in practice demonstrated that this type of imported organisation was 
inappropriate to the Greek case, and the youth movement disintegrated after the dictator’s 
death. It proved impossible to achieve youth mobilisation from above without the slightest 
inclination from below.
6 See Germani for similarities between Italian and Spanish fascist education. Although Germani accepts 
Linz’s definition of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, he is quite lenient in describing Italian 
fascism as an example of totalitarian political socialisation, while he believes that the Spanish regime had 
achieved a fascist authoritarian political socialisation. Salvador Giner in his article "Power, Freedom and 
Social Change in the Spanish University, 1939-75" in Preston's Spain in Crisis, pp. 183-211, also calls 
the period 1939-1954 the "fascist period" in higher education in that the Falangists controlled the 
University mechanisms.
7 Demichel, Les Dictatures Europeenes, p. 255.
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Regime rhetoric: A healthy and disciplined youth
Much of the regime’s rhetoric on the youth issue was clearly imported from abroad, 
from the German and the Italian examples. The primary function of Greek youth, 
according to Metaxas' fascist rhetoric, was to bring about an intellectual form of Greek 
nationalism, the "Third Greek Civilisation". Young people had to have faith in their Greek 
identity, their Greek traditions and ideals and to consider Greece as their "Great Mother". 
A creative and energetic life was expected of the youth. It was even claimed that ”a man, 
when he is a mere spectator o f life, is a useless creature in the present society, an 
unnecessary burden ", reminiscent of the Nazi approach but fortunately only adopted in 
rhetoric. Influenced by the fascist notions of fitness and health, the leader tried to promote 
the exaltation of the lively youth. The exaltation of youth, while a prominent feature of the 
fascist ideology, was an integral part of a wider inter-war perception of the role of the 
youth. Youth organisations, whether of a liberal, fascist or communist nature, flourished 
during the inter-war period in most European countries. Similarly, the 1930s intellectual 
climate in Greece included emphasis on the promotion of an active and healthy youth, 
contrary to the pessimistic perception of the intellectuals of the 1920s.8 Metaxas professed 
a militaristic and very activist attitude towards life, clearly imported from the Italians and 
Germans, to accompany his "defensive" type of nationalism. Young people had to be 
healthy, strong and athletic and to possess a distinctive cultural education. The dictator was 
much more interested in developing an idealistic youth, which would create the vague 
"Third Greek Civilisation", with a theoretical knowledge than one that could sustain itself 
materially and contribute to the nation's well being.9 He stated that,
our basic task is to cultivate the general intellectual level o f our youth; to transfer to 
the young people all this ammunition which will make them distinguished people 
who will not live like animals in their humble and materialist life, but who will feel
8 In the 1930s, a new group of intellectuals attempted to adopt a more robust perception of Greek reality 
in the influential “Generation of the 1930s” as they are commonly known. This comprised a group of 
literary people with ambitions about the future and their intention to break with the past status 
quo.Ironically, Metaxas, the liberal poet Elytis and the communist poet Ritsos all from a different 
perspective, ended up by glorifying the same virtues of youth, health and joy. Vitti, op.cit., p. 198.
9 Four Years o f Metaxas' Governing, Vol. 2, p. 59.
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the necessity o f a higher, spiritual life given that the soul is in constant need o f its 
own nutrition.10
Metaxas’ paternalistic and highly moralistic teaching concentrated on behavioural 
characteristics such as discipline, obedience, struggle, the willingness to fight, 
decisiveness, which, he thought, would better enable the Greek youth to defend the 
country's traditions and ideals. As such, the youth had to work together as a whole and not 
as separate individuals. They had to have courage, audacity, and conviction in order to be 
able to prosper, since only “through struggle, which is the greatest pleasure in life, can 
man realise the true meaning o f life”. The youth could discover the new ideals by referring 
to traditional national values. The fundamental ideals which the youth had to fight for, 
were "the King, the Country, the orthodox religion, the family and the 4th of August 
regime". The most sacred ideal was devotion to the principles of the New State.11 In this 
way, Metaxas tried to reconcile the traditionally influential beliefs of the Greek people 
under the centralised supervisory authority of the 4th of August state. By retaining and 
strengthening the already dominant classicist orientation of Greek education, he presented 
the Greek youth with a selective classical interpretation of the national past.
EON: The Greek application o f fascist mobilisation
As has been stated in the previous chapter, inter-war Greece lacked an influential 
fascist movement or a powerful fascist student movement. With the exception of the 
insignificant “National Pan-Student Movement” at the University of Athens, fascist ideas 
made no impact among the Greek youth. Due to the lack of a State-party and a social base 
which could support the 4th of August regime, the youth organisation was seen by 
Metaxas as the only party of his regime and the only way to strengthen his personal 
authority and challenge the power of the King. Metaxas aimed to put his thoughts 
regarding the youth movement into practice with the formation of “Ethnikos Organismos 
Neolaias” (EON), (the National Organisation of Youth), which he hoped would become
10 "The Art within the Context of EON", periodical The Youth., p. 3 [in Greek].
11 “The Leader and the Youth” in Four Years o f  Metaxas’ Governing, Vol.2, 
p. 58.
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the “party” of the regime. While the style and organisation of the youth movement were 
clearly imported from the Italian and German models of youth organisation, the leadership 
struggled to present EON as a uniquely Greek organisation which had nothing to do with 
the Italian youth of Mussolini, a Greek system which had its roots in ancient Athens, 
Sparta and Macedon.12 Emergency Law No 334, (November 1936) brought EON into 
existence. Article 3 declared:
The aims o f EON are the profitable exploitation o f leisure time from work or 
from school in order that the young people may promote their physical and 
intellectual training; the development o f national morale and faith in religion; the 
creation o f a spirit o f cooperation and solidarity among them; and a prompt 
professional orientation relevant to each one's natural capabilities [in Greek]. 
Further articles of the law referred to the organisation’s rules, regulations, 
operations and finances. The movement was organised militarily into battalions, 
companies, platoons and squads, and a whole network of services. The members were 
divided into rank-holders: phalangites and pioneers. Those who were affiliated to Greek 
educational institutions or to the military were permitted to join EON. Applicants had to be 
between 14 and 25, Greek Christians, “faithful to the principles o f the 4th o f August 
regime ”. Membership was voluntary in theory, but after 1938 it became practically 
compulsory. A Central Committee composed of the Ministers of Education, Railways, 
Public Assistance and the Minister-Governor of Athens was set up to draft laws and 
regulations for the organisation and to supervise its operations and finances.
The first EON sector was created in Salonica and was composed of the members 
of the previous fascist National Union (EEE). In Athens EON was initially formed by 
members of the anti-communist National Pan-Student Movement. In January 1938, EON 
had only 15,000 voluntary members in all the country.13 It was during this year that 
Metaxas realised the failure of his youth project and decided that he had to fight personally
12 Nicos Tsailakopoulos, The National Organisation o f the Youth is a Greek and not a Foreign Institution, 
edited by EON, 1940.
13 The first organised phallanx was created in Patras by Diakos, its swearing in took place on 31/12/1937, 
a year and a half after the emergency law on the formation of the EON. See Linardatos The 4th o f August 
Regime, pp. 153-154.
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for its future success. He met the resistance of the King and the minister of education, 
among others, as to the organisation’s tactics and methods of recruitment. The main reac­
tion came from prince Paul, the General Leader of the scouts, who objected to the sub­
mission of the liberal scouts movement to EON. Furthermore, the King suspected that 
Metaxas aimed at controlling the youth movement in his effort to strengthen his personal 
power.
Towards the end of 1938, it was impossible to escape membership in the 
organisation. It was made compulsory, for all young people who qualified, to join. The 
movement extended gradually to include all the cities of Greece. Emergency Law 
1798/1939 "On the National and Moral Education o f the Youth " viewed the school and 
University educational mechanisms in close association with EON, under the supervision 
of the State. Any other organisation with the same purpose officially ceased to exist, 
including the previous minor fascist movements. In addition the Scouts' movement, one of 
the most important institutions under the King’s jurisdiction, which was organised on the 
British model, was incorporated into EON.14 It was during this period that Metaxas started 
taking a more direct personal interest in EON, through appearances and speeches. His 
speeches after 1938 had a more commanding force and he directed a markedly populist 
rhetoric towards the youth. Although Metaxas had achieved the consent of the king 
concerning his youth project, he was still very careful to remind the people that the king 
was the head of the state. By 1940, EON numbered just over a million members. On 30th 
March 1940 there were 1,030314 of whom some 600,000 were in primary and secondary 
education.15
14 December 11, 1938, according to Metaxas, was the "day of the miracle" when the palace gave its 
consent and an Italian style festivity took place in an Athens park, in the presence o f the prince and the 
princesses. Prince Paul agreed to become the "General Leader" of the youth movement, Princess Frederica 
the "Honorary Commander-General" o f the EON's girls’ division and Princess Irene the "Honorary 
Inspector-General". Metaxas had thus achieved the consent of the king for the project. See His Personal 
diary, Vol. 4, pp. 303-304.
15 Linardatos, op.cit., p. 169.
127
Political indoctrination within EON: A fusion o f ideas
Metaxas and the "intellectuals of the regime" embarked on a systematic socialisation 
process through speeches, "hours of indoctrination" (Wednesday afternoons), the 
magazine "Youth", leaflets and lectures on a variety of issues. The topics included lectures 
on nationalism, capitalism, parliamentarism, communism, state intervention, multi-party 
systems, the role of the family (the meaning of marriage, the importance of the mother, the 
way parents should bring up their children), religion, school, the arts and sciences. There 
was an effort to project a metaphysical adoration of the leader, who was presented as a 
divine personality with supernatural qualities. The instructors of the youth were usually 
gymnastics' teachers and military officers. A Preliminary Draft for the Organisation o f the 
Youth outlined EON's methods of organisation and the duties of its members. Courses for 
boys included military drill, air raid defence, political enlightenment, propaganda, hygiene, 
athletics, topographical orientation, map making, signalling and reading. The girls’ 
activities were limited to nursing, cooking and housekeeping.16
The regime's position towards the role of the woman in society was very 
characteristic of its traditionalist character and, in agreement with the other fascist and 
conservative authoritarian regimes of the inter-war period, it considered the woman to be 
"the ornament o f the house ”. “The aim o f the woman is to create and to look after the 
family all the time ",17 and only if additional money was needed by the family, was 
women’s work legitimised. In order to protect the girls from their association with boys, 
the regime abolished the mixed schools, “since mixed schools were part o f the moral 
decadence o f the Greek family, the corruption o f many school-girls and the loosening of 
the male character o f the school-boys>\  Women intellectuals were considered by the regime 
as a product of western feminism while the ethics of Greek society taught that the woman 
is only a basic ingredient for the continuation of the Greek race.18
The position of the National Youth was in principle complementary to that of the 
Church, the school and the family, and at the same time self-sufficient in that it consisted
16 kofas, Authoritarianism in Greece, p. 95.
17 “The Leader and the Youth”, op.cit., p. 129.
18 Mahaira, op.cit., pp. 72-76.
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of a united whole with a single national aim. The National youth was composed of 
Christians and professed the practice of the Greek Orthodox religion. It was both a 
national and a religious organisation. EON and the school were claimed to be mutually 
supportive but they also retained their distinctive characters in that,
the school does the intellectual training, EON does the moral and physical 
training; the school is compulsory, EON voluntary; in school there are social 
inequalities, in EON there is social uniformity”.19 
The Greek family should entrust its youth to the movement, for parents should dedicate 
their children to the nation and agree with their education by EON.
The family is the factory where human love and morality between people are 
constructed. It is the basis for the formation o f a healthy society. There is a special 
relationship between the Greek family and the Greek nation. Family ties are 
subordinated to the citizen's duty to the state. 20
Overall, "the family creates the human being  the school carries out their education...
the Church does the religious training EON teaches how to struggle and figh t”. The
state, the church, the family and the school together should participate in the upbringing of 
the children.21
Political practice o f EON: Patronage and corruption
The rapid growth of the youth movement was due to official coercion and 
patronage. By identifying EON with the interests of the nation, the regime tried to justify, 
at a moral level, its intimidating practices in order to recruit those who did not want to 
collaborate with EON. Registration in EON became compulsory for school children and 
those who refused to join were faced with severe sanctions, like expulsion from school or 
difficulty in finding work. On the other hand, free uniforms and free admission to the 
cinema, official parades and recreational activities, as defined by the law, were used to
19 “The Leader and the Youth”, op.cit., p. 108, [in Greek].
20 “On Family” in The Youth, October 1939, p. 11, [in Greek].
21 “The Leader and the Youth”, op.cit., pp. 151-152.
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woo the youth.22 They used blackmailing tactics, promises for jobs in public positions and 
other financial compensations for those who were reluctant to join. For the cadres there 
were more solid attractions in the form of pay, allowances, the use of cars and access to 
official patronage. Emphasis on appearances, costumes, parades, fascist greetings, songs, 
hymns and festivities, very much inspired by the Italian and German examples, 
accompanied the organisation of the movement. Members used to wear blue uniforms, 
they saluted the leader with the Roman salute and bore the emblem of the organisation, the 
double axe.
Contrary to Metaxas' declared aim of overcoming the mentality of petty-party 
behaviour, which had condemned the country to social divisions, he created a new party 
which operated in the same manner, with clientelistic networks and abuses of power. 
Moreover, there was a close collaboration between the military police, the armed forces 
and EON and the latter was heavily used as a sort of a youth police. A whole network of 
informers connected with the military police observed the actions of the members. 
Maniadakis, who declared that he admired the aims of the youth organisation and 
considered it the best creation of the 4th of August regime, was personally involved in the 
recruitment of its members.
Despite the authoritarian character of the youth movement and its imitation of the 
Nazi and fascist models, the regime did not try to create a bellicose youth, on the model of 
the Italians or the Germans, but placed a greater emphasis on the youth’s incorporation into 
the movement through games, athletics, cinema, holidays, excursions, which reflected the 
milder character of the Greek youth organisation compared to its foreign counterparts. It 
concentrated mainly on the youth’s leisure time and reproduced to a large extent the 
conservative ideology of the inter-war period by cultivating the concepts of nationalism, 
anti-communism, love of the King, religion and family.23
The Greek youth movement was a source of friction between various social sectors 
who competed in the political education of the youth. The very issue of the status of the
22 “Emergency Law 1510”, The Official Newspaper, 8 December 1938.
23 Similarly the Mocedade Portuguesa imposed a compulsory participation for those between 7 and 14, 
concentrated mostly on leisure activities, religious instruction and the adoration of the leader Salazar, and 
lacked the aggressive character of the Italian, German or even the Spanish youth movements.
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youth organisation in Greek society brought a disagreement between the King and 
Metaxas. Furthermore, the relationship between EON and the schools was seen differently 
by Metaxas and the Minister of Education, Georgakopoulos, which resulted in the latter's 
dismissal and the take-over of the Ministry by Metaxas himself in 1938.24The influence of 
the movement on the children was of concern to their families. In other words the 
imposition from above of a youth movement which did not originate with the grass-roots 
was bound to create reactions, in a country were the family and the church controlled to a 
large degree the social upbringing of its youth. As the next extract shows, the existence of 
the youth movement created a lot of anxiety in many Greek social circles:
EON is developing at such a pace that it threatens the family, the immovable 
foundation o f Greek life....oral instructions were given to teachers to threaten the 
pupils with expulsion i f  they did not agree " willingly" to register with the
movement parents in general tremble at the effects o f the organisation on the
youth's morale and health......The attempted imposition o f the youth movement on
the school population is essentially an attempt to substitute the negative social base 
o f the regime, by a positive sentimental base. But this long-term policy includes an 
offensive against family life, one o f the most sacred things in Greek culture. 25 
Overall, the National Youth Organisation was a costly and at times a counter­
productive organisation which could not be imposed on the Greek mentality. Huge sums 
of money were spent on uniforms, parades, office rentals, furnishings and salaries for the 
organisation’s officers, financed by the public treasury.26 Although the formation of a 
youth movement was achieved and its membership expanded during the duration of the 4th 
of August regime, it never constituted the army which would defend the country during a
2^ The immediate cause of the disagreement between Georgakopoulos and Metaxas lied in the election of 
the Archbishop of Athens. Georgakopoulos and the Palace supported Damaskenos for the post, Metaxas 
supported Chrysanthus. In the end Metaxas appointed his preferred candidate while he also dismissed 
Georgakopoulos from the ministry. The disagreement between the two however was more fundamental 
given that Georgakopoulos, a man who was loyal to the palace had more radical disagreements with 
Metaxas on the way educational policy was conducted and its relation to the youth movement.
25 R 10301/726/19/1938, from Waterlow to Halifax, 19 December 1938, in Andrikopoulos, op.cit., p. 94, 
[in Greek].
26 Linardatos talks extensively about the extravagant ceremonies organised for the purposes of 
demonstration, the incredible amounts of money spent on all sorts of meaningless activities, which at 
times ended in a complete disarray, and the organisation’s numerous financial and sexual scandals. Sec 
op.cit., pp. 183-203.
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war, as intended by its creator. On the contrary, the outbreak of war exposed its 
incompetence and inefficiency and brought the collapse of the organisation. Most of its 
members joined the subsequent resistance movements which were mostly organised by the 
leftist forces.
B. The manipulation of the educational system
During his premiership, Metaxas declared that he attached a primary importance to 
education and considered the Ministry of Education to be a very crucial government post. 
Due to the shortness of its tenure of power, the regime had no long-term affect on Greek 
pedagogy, and its ideas regarding education did not have time to materialise and have a 
lasting effect. Neither did the regime offer any alternative to the existing educational 
framework, the classicist orientation and the centralisation of governmental authority being 
retained. There were merely some minor fascistoid innovations and some personal notions 
of the leader himself. The regime imposed a series of emergency laws, concerning 
completions and minor or major alterations to the already existing legal educational 
framework. The educational philosophy of Metaxas should be seen as a mixture of fascist 
pedagogy within the already existing domestic context of reforms and counter-reforms of 
the Greek educational system.
Fascist educational pedagogy: Italy and Germany
One of the contradictions in fascist regimes was that although they stressed the role 
of the youth in connection with the perpetuation of their authority, they were unable to 
create a new pedagogical/educational framework, on which to base their new educational 
policies. This was basically due to the fact that fascism emphasised the activist part of its 
ideology at the expense of theoretical frameworks, which explained why they so 
consistently favoured the promotion of active and energetic youth organisations and 
regarded suspiciously any education received at school or University. The latter were 
mostly seen as sources of subversion, given that they promoted the critical appreciation of 
scientific or social issues. Moreover, authoritarian regimes of a fascist or other dictatorial
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nature, showed a marked distrust towards intellectuals, and any form of liberal or 
autonomous thinking. The school and University are the vehicles of the liberal intellectual 
traditions in Western societies, so inimical to any form of autocracy and oppression as 
professed by the dictatorships.
Again the Italian case was the best example of a model fascist educational system, 
characterised by the existence of a certain pedagogical framework, a series of educational 
policies and a succession of debates, discussions and disputes on the role of education 
within fascist society during the twenty years of fascist rule. The pedagogy adopted by the 
Italians during the Mussolini regime was initially based on the fascist philosophy of 
Gentile, the first minister of Education. Gentile, the main philosopher of fascism, 
proposed a strongly nationalistic training, with a more efficient control of the state over 
education. He insisted on the promotion of classical education Latin and Greek thinking-, 
literature, poetry, art, music, religion and history in school curicula- which would be based 
on a true understanding, rather than the memorising of the material. The real revolution in 
education, according to Gentile, was to take place in the relationship between and 
collaboration of teachers and students; "the work o f the teacher consists in bringing his 
pupils into his own sphere o f thought and making them share in his enlightened life” P
Gentile's philosophical and intellectual approach towards life demanded the ad­
vance of an all-embracing culture in the curiculum. He gave prominence to Latin, philoso­
phy and literary history. He introduced artistic education on a much larger scale. He 
supported the teaching of religion only as a first step, to be followed by other philosophical 
conceptions and studies. The first fascist innovations brought in by Gentile involved the 
introduction of a new hierarchical system following the sequence: Minister-Supervisors- 
Headmasters-Teachers; the revision of the curicula of elementary, post-elementary and 
secondary education; a freer hand to higher education; the introduction of special 
examinations at the various stages of education; a rationalisation of teaching appointments,
27 Minio-Paluello op.cit., p. 71.
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involving a reduction in the number of teaching and lecturing posts, so as to achieve 
greater efficiency.28
The real fascistisation of education however, was not advanced during the period 
of Gentile, given that his philosophical and idealist stance towards schooling and the 
educational system in general, was in sharp disagreement with the activism of the fascists. 
Fascist education consisted, according to the anti-intellectualists, in the militarisation of 
education, the adoration of the “Duce” and an extreme form of nationalism. Fascist 
education meant the passionate love of the student for his country, for which he should be 
ready to sacrifice his existence. The Italians saw the development of education within the 
wider context of the national cultural development. This required that all of those involved 
in the process of political socialisation, who had a crucial role in the nation’s cultural 
development, should be enthused with fascist ideals. According to fervent fascists the 
teachers had to be fascists themselves and not even apolitical or agnostic, but “the 
missionaries o f the fascist faith " (a “totalitarian” view on education)*29
It was during the 1930s that the regime embarked upon a more totalitarian control 
of education, under the minister De Vecchi. He introduced military education in schools 
and ended the relative autonomy of the higher institutions. He believed in the complete 
control of the State over education. The next minister of education, Bottai tried to alter 
many of Gentile's policies and was very critical of the latter's reforms. He aimed to bring 
the schools within the party and syndicalist organisation. Bottai tried to fascistise Italian 
education by placing a "new humanism" in the school charter; schools, GIL and GUF 
were to be united as one instrument of fascist education; education should consist of 
studies of a more practical and scientific nature and emphasis should be laid on courses of 
physical education, manual work and military preparation, rather than the already existing 
classical education, under the guidance of the state.
During the 20 years of fascist rule in Italy the educational system was stressed by 
continuous alterations and reforms. There was never a consistent philosophy on which to
28 Ibid., pp. 64-122.
29 Ostenc, op.cit., p. 168.
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base the new educational scheme; instead, the old system was re-shaped. The 
administrative machinery preserved many functions almost intact although it became more 
centralised. New types of schools were created while older ones were abolished. What 
was totally new about Italian fascist education was the creation a number of youth 
organisations and their relation with the school mechanisms.
In Germany, the Nazis viewed education only as a means of accelerating progress 
towards the regime's political goals. The purpose of education was to glorify the racial 
supremacy of the German nation. The Nazis introduced into the school curiculum a 
number of new courses such as family sociology, race theory and practice, genetics, 
population policy, and colonial politics among others.30 Physical education was placed at 
the centre of the schools' programmes because of its value in building character and 
discipline, as well as in helping in the military preparation for national aggrandisement. 
The content of Nazi school-books glorified the leader, emphasized the old romantic 
Germanic tradition and made extensive use of heroic historical personalities.
Domestic inter-war Greek education: An unstable process
As has been pointed out, the inter-war period was a period of ideological transition, 
in a country that had to come to terms with its new size and its enlarged population. The 
domestic intellectual climate in the inter-war period entailed a plurality of intellectual ideas 
in that a whole range of intellectuals from the traditionalists and conservatives, to the 
liberals and socialists involved themselves in the development a new understanding of the 
current Greek situation and the search for the meaning of Greekness. Similarly in 
educational matters the period 1922-1928 saw 34 governments and 25 ministers of 
education pursuing often contradictory policies. It was a period of reforms and counter- 
reforms and half-baked attempts to overhaul the educational system. Reaction against the 
imposition of the demotic language and against change away from the classicist orientation, 
demands which had occupied the Greek pedagogues for the previous four decades, 
continued to be high on the agenda. In 1925, the liberal pedagogue Delmouzos was
30 Friedrich and Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 156.
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criticised for his alleged attempts to undermine religion, language, morality and national 
consciousness. As he was the director of the Marasleio Teacher's College, the issue came 
to be known as the “Marasleiaka”. The Marasleiaka was the last battle in which the liberal 
and socialist intellectuals fought on the same side. The year 1927 marked an end to the 
unity of the reformist intellectuals, the official split of the reformist Educational Group 
“Omilos”, between the liberal intellectuals and the socialist intellectuals, who followed 
thereafter competing and hostile paths.31 While the issue of the demotic language had been 
a common demand of reformist intellectuals, and had not been a party political issue, 
following the split of the reformist intellectuals, it was party-politicised and the demotic 
language came to be identified as a radical demand, professed by the socialists.
The inter-war period period saw the first conscious attempt to reform education and 
break with the dominant previous educational trends. The 1929 reform, produced by the 
liberal government of Venizelos, was the first comprehensive and consistent educational 
scheme, which tried to create a school based on the principles of liberal democracy, in 
accordance with the aims of national integration and capitalist development. It involved 
changes in primary and secondary education as well as in the higher institutions (Law 
5343/1932).32 The Venizelist liberal refoim lasted until the electoral defeat of the Venizelist 
party by the conservative Right. An emphasis on classicism was once again established by 
the anti-Venizelist government, as a way of suspending the reforms of the Venizelist 
period. The period 1932-1936 saw alterations to the previous policies of education 
regarding the language issue and the school curiculum.33
31 This is best illustrated by the case of the liberal Delmouzos and the communist Glynos in 
Frangoudaki’s Liberal Reform and Liberal Intellectuals. Delmouzos was considered to have expressed the 
ideological deadlocks of the liberal intellectuals who directed their attacks against communist thought and 
practice, and refused to perceive Greek society in terms of class divisions, choosing to adopt the “utopian 
road” to the Supra-class State. For Frangoudaid, the neutrality of the Greek liberal intellectuals, their fight 
against communism, and plutocracy and their passivity in the face of the excesses of the anti-communist 
regimes, paved the way for the 4th of August regime’s ideas.
32 The 1928-1932 reforms included among others: abolition of hellenikon, division into six years of 
primary and six years of secondary' education, creation of practical and agricultural gymnasia, compulsory 
teaching of the demotic language in the demotiko, six years of compulsory' education, introduction of 
mixed schools in primary education, creation of lower vocational schools after the primary' education, new 
curicula for secondary education, introduction of voluntary courses, new provisions for the education of the 
teaching staff, the reorganisation of higher institutions.
33 A new programme for the gymnasium in 1935, a return to the old classicist orientation and abolition of 
various courses introduced by the previous reform.
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Education under the 4th o f August regime
Against the backdrop of the unstable development of Greek education in the inter­
war years and the context of influential fascist ideas on education, the educational policy of 
the 4th of August regime proved to be full of contradictions. It was an amalgam of fascist 
tendencies, in mimicry of the fascist models; reactionary tendencies, with respect the 
previous liberal Venizelist reform; conservative tendencies, in the perpetuation of a 
classicist content. It involved the imposition of a more centralised authority, so as to be 
able to deal with every possible aspect of education, and included some reformist 
tendencies reflecting the personal views of the dictator.34
The mind o f the leader: A fusion o f authoritarian, traditional and reformist ideas
Unlike the plural intellectual context of inter-war Greece and unlike fascist Italy, the 
4th of August regime had barely any intellectuals of its own, especially in the field of 
education. The ideas on Greek education had been expressed mostly by the leader himself, 
who in his speeches used to present some personal thoughts on how education should be 
conducted. It would be a futile exercise to try to analyse the consistency in his thought, 
given that Metaxas was not a pedagogue. He just had some strong feelings about the 
function and purposes of education. His ideas and intentions reflected slightly the influence 
of the foreign fascist school of thought, and of the intellectual climate of the 1930s, but 
mostly his personal authoritarian predilections and his will to control the educational 
mechanisms. On the day that he took over the ministry of education he stated to the 
teachers:
From all the teachers, I expect full support. I would like to reveal to you a certain 
aspect o f my character which, due to my age I cannot change any more. I can 
discuss with anybody, in the process o f making a decision and I allow discussion
34 We can divide chronologically the 4th of August regime's educational policy into two periods: The first 
under the minister Georgakopoulos until November 1938; this included emergency laws with minor 
alterations and completions of the previous anti-Venizelist educational laws. The second period under the 
ministry of Metaxas included the attempt to impose more radical innovations in education and coincided 
with the enforcement of the youth movement on social life.
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and objection freely. But once I have taken a decision, most o f the time irrespective 
o f your opinions, this decision is definite and unchangeable and nothing in the 
world can make me withdraw. It goes without saying that, during the
implementation o f my policies, nobody in the world can stop me Therefore
knowing this aspect o f my character I  ask you to comply with it, which I  am sure
you will do This is my will which coincides with the interests o f the
education o f the youth and o f the State in general. 35
Metaxas saw the role of the teachers in the context of his own militaristic, 
hierarchical and authoritarian mentality and it is quite interesting to note the wide 
differences with Gentile’s approach on the subject.
The teacher has to dominate, direct and impose his opinion on pupils. Primary 
importance should be attached to national education; by learning o f the past glories 
o f the Greek nation, the children will be able to imitate their ancestors. Religious
feeling has to be developed vis-a-vis the national Knowledge has to be used for
creative and productive work. The main task o f the teacher is to generate respect, 
discipline and religious feeling in the children, to create true Greeks out o f them and 
to mould their character so that they become energetic and creative?6 
Metaxas often attacked in his speeches the idea of the social advancement of the 
Greeks through their studies at the University. He professed a more altruistic conception of 
higher education, according to which students should study for the promotion of science as 
such, and not for their personal materialistic ambitions.
Science seeks the truth through the means o f dialectics, reason, proof, experience, 
observation and experiment. The University is the temple o f science and not a 
professional school. Studies are to be done for the sake o f science and not for the 
sake o f a degree for the purpose o f gaining money and social ascendancy. 37
3  ^From a statement to the teachers when Metaxas took over the Ministry of Education on 29 November 
1938, M etaxas' diary, Vol. 4, pp. 303-304, and reproduced in Demaras A., op.cit., pp. 189-190, [in 
Greek].
36 Speech to the teachers on 28 October 1938, Four Years o f Metaxas' Governing, [in Greek].
37 Speech on 20 November 1937, at the University of Athens, in Metaxas' Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 284, [in 
Greek].
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He was however always concerned with the damage that scientific knowledge 
could do to the regime. He was afraid that too much knowledge could result in "arrogance 
and presumption " in the students, with negative repercussions for the survival of the 4th 
of August regime’s principles. He always attributed, as he put i t ,"greater importance to the 
development o f human character than the development o f scientific knowledge ". This 
reveals a real contradiction within the ideology of the regime, in that although it wanted to 
promote a new civilisation based on intellectual achievements, it saw the need for limits on 
such knowledge, which should be imposed by the regime itself.
Despite his authoritarian predilections and his conservative stance, paradoxically, 
on the language issue Metaxas became an ardent supporter of the demotiki, the foremost 
reformist aspect of his educational policy, an element of his “idiosyncratic idealism”.38 A 
few days after he became minister of education he set up a committee composed of 
demoticists, most of them discredited by the anti-Venizelist circles, to draft the new 
grammar of the demotiki. He assigned to the well known liberal pedagogue Triantafyllides 
(then a Professor at the University of Salonica, and one of the instigators of the 1917 
Venizelist educational reform) the supervision of the new grammar, the first one ever 
written in Greece. He personally wrote the introduction, which was never published. He 
introduced the parallel teaching of demotic and katharevousa in schools, in both oral and 
written work. In this sense Metaxas, who in his speeches and his diary used a mixture of 
both idioms, became the first demoticist minister of Education. His personal views on the 
language issue are shown by the following passage:
I have never thought o f imposing any constraints on the language. It would not be 
possible for our national Government to be against the language in which our 
greatest poet Solomos wrote our national anthem. The demotic will continue to 
be taught in the primary school and in the last two forms it will be taught together 
with katharevousa, since the latter is a reality which the modern Greek man will 
meet in his life, in the courts, in official documents, in sciences and even in the 
Press I believe that the contribution o f our literary people will be conducive to
38 Close, The Character o f the Metaxas Dictatorship, p. 12.
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the wider spread o f the demotic The misfortune has been that the upper class
has so far tried to confound demoticism -a clearly national language- with 
communism,39
The leader’s persistence with demotiki may be attributed either to his will to win 
over some liberal support, or to his personal antipathy towards the established and out­
dated ideas of the Philosophical Faculty.40 Be that as it may, Metaxas’ flexibility towards 
the language issue showed that he did not hesitate to consult and employ liberal 
intellectuals concerning the direction of specific educational matters or even more general 
cultural matters as is shown by the cultural content of the regime’s periodical The New 
State.
The organisation o f education: Authoritarian centralism
There are two important aspects to fascist educational philosophy. The first relates 
to the creation of a youth movement, whose stages follow closely those of the educational 
system. Youth movements and schools were intended to be connected in both fascist and 
semi-fascist regimes, and the control of the former over the latter was deemed necessary. 
As such, the foremost fascist and radically new aspect of Metaxas’ educational policy was 
the compulsory organisation of the school children into the youth movement, as has 
already been discussed earlier in the chapter. The second fascist feature relates to the 
omnipresence of the State in all national affairs, including state interference in all aspects of 
educational policy. Centralisation of the educational system was thus increased by fascists 
in their effort to control the administrative bodies, the content of the syllabus and the 
behaviour of both teachers and professors, pupils and students. Education became a means 
by which the state sought to create a youth inculcated with the principles of the 4th of 
August regime.
While some would argue that the extreme centralisation of authority was a mere 
expression of the fascist influence on the Greek regime, the whole history of Greek
39 His Personal Diary, Vol.4, p. 281, [in Greek].
40 See the article “How the Demotic Won the Dictatorship” in the newspaper To Vima, 29/12/91.
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education is one of state manipulations of the educational system. The centralising 
tendency in educational matters had been a perennial feature in educational policy since 
Greek independence. It was not only a characteristic of fascist influenced regimes. 
Moreover, centralisation of power is used by all dictatorial regimes in their effort to prevent 
deviations in the intellectual world. Metaxas increased the degree of state control over 
educational matters at the level of higher, secondary and primary education. The main 
instances of his intervention in education were: the suspension of the autonomy of the 
institutions of higher education; control over the publishing of school-books; the tightening 
of control over the central administration.
At the level of higher education, centralisation manifested itself in the suppression 
of the institutional autonomy of the Universities and the imposition of a greater degree of 
intervention in university matters by the minister.41 The legal framework for the 
centralisation of power in the hands of the minister was enacted by emergency law 
1430/1938 (October 22, 1938), which abolished the previous Venizelist law 5343/1932 
altogether.42 The regime carried out, within its legal framework, the dismissal of 
professors,43 the abrupt abolition of courses and the introduction of new ones, the 
installation of regime people in university places, the creation of new Chairs on the basis of 
a new electoral system for professors.44
41 The conflict between free thinking and state control manifested itself clearly in the context of the 
University. The regime met with resistance from a poorly organised student movement, which in a number 
of instances expressed its disagreement openly with demonstrations. An example of such an occasion w as 
the centenary of the University in April 1937 when the students demonstrated against the fascist 
dictatorship. Similar incidents happened in Salonica in November of the same year. See Lazos, Greek 
Student Movement, pp. 257-262.
42 Emergency Law 970/1937 of 26 November 1937, was the first attempt to revise and complement law 
5343 of 1932, without however any radical alteration. According to the 1938 law' the minister could decide 
upon the occupants of the University Chairs without reference to the opinion of the Faculties (article 50, 
paragraph 2), whereas previously these could be created only on the accord of the Senate and the 
appropriate Faculty. The minister could appoint assistant professors or readers upon the introduction of new' 
courses, if he judged that there w'as a specific scientific reason that required the teaching of such courses, 
(article 50, paragraph 6) He could also appoint Full, extraordinary, or assistant professors among candidates 
who received the 1/3 of the professors' votes, instead o f the 2/3 previously stated by law 5343/1932 
(article 63, paragraph 1) Assistant professors "after a year o f successful service" were able to become full 
professors. Emergency Law 1895/1939 on the 16th of August 1939 organised accordingly the University of 
Salonica.
43 According to the same law the age of retirement for professors was altered from 70 to 65, complemented 
by the removal of certain professors w ho did not comply w ith the principles of the regime.
44 New Chairs were created in "Ydrology and Medical Climatology" to which Fokas, a relative of 
Metaxas, was appointed and in "The General Principles of the New State" to w hich the friend of Metaxas, 
Koumaros w'as appointed.
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Emergency Law 886/1937 brought under the supervision of the Prime Minister the 
Panteios School of Political Sciences which became one of the higher educational institu­
tions. The purpose of the school consisted in the formation of leading cadres, the education 
of civil servants and the indoctrination of the students according to the principles of the 4th 
of August regime (paragraph 1). The administrative council was directly controlled by the 
minister of education (paragraph 2), who could intervene at any time to appoint new full, 
extraordinary or assistant professors and teachers (paragraph 3). The School was divided 
into the Department of Political and Historical Sciences and the Department of Economic 
and Social Sciences (paragraph 4).45
The model for this type of school of political education can be found in Italy where 
a new department was added to those already existing in the Italian Universities: the 
Department of Political Science ( Facolta di Scienze Politiche). In addition to that, 
Schools for Political Training ( Corsi di Preparazione Politica Per i Giovani) were created 
and involved in the selection of the highest party and government elites. They were 
accompanied by a number of courses, seminars and lectures, oriented towards all levels of 
education for the purpose of a more systematic fascist political training in the school 
system.46 In Spain the Institute of Political Studies and the Faculty of Economics and 
Political Science imitated the example of the Italian National Centre for Political Training, 
and were committed to the indoctrination in the principles of Spanish national autarky 
combined with the fascist rhetoric employed by the Franco dictatorship.
The second element in the centralisation of authority involved control over the 
printed material. Emergency Law 952/1937 founded for the first time in Greek educational 
history, the Organisation for the Publication of School Books, under the control and 
supervision of the Ministry of Education. The purpose of this organisation was the 
publication and distribution of books, approved by the Ministry, for the schools, 
universities and libraries, for the purpose of the “moral and spiritual education o f the youth
45 A third emergency law 953/1937 regarding higher education modified the status of the Teachers' 
Training Colleges, which became part of the higher educational establishment, which the regime justified 
by the special significance it attributed to the education of teachers and their relation to the pupils. The 
purpose was naturally to place the institution under the control of the ministry.
46 Germani, op.cit., pp. 346-347.
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A similar law could again be found in Italy, enacted in 1928, which imposed the use of 
state books for all stages of elementary schools. All the state books in Italy, from then on, 
exalted the spirit of war, obedience, love for the country and hymns to the Duce.
The 4th of August regime tried to attain greater administrative control over primary 
and secondary education by augmenting the number of supervisory councils and 
inspectors. The highest supervisory and administrative authority over primary and 
secondary education belonged to the Minister of National Education, exercised through the 
new central department of the Ministry, the "Supreme Counsil of Education". This was 
composed of 5 permanent members and held the administrative and disciplinary authority 
in all educational matters. Elementary and Secondary education was divided into 
"Educational Regions", controlled and supervised by Regional Inspectors and General 
Inspectors, Supervisory Councils of Elementary and Secondary Education and Higher 
Supervisory Councils in a strict hierarchical order.47 The Greek style of administration of 
an authoritarian and hierarchical structure was again reminiscent of the Italian hierarchical 
educational system.
Primary and secondary education: A series o f contradictory and indecisive laws
In the field of primary and secondary education, the regime repeatedly changed its 
policies, often radically altering its own earlier acts. With its Italian counterpart, education 
under the 4th of August regime suffered under a series of contradictory laws whereby the 
regime tried to achieve a greater degree of control over the two levels, to retain the 
classicist character of education and at the same time to introduce new forms of practical 
and professional training in agricultural or commercial fields. While in 1937 it brought 
back the four-year demotico and created two stages of secondary education (5 and 3 years 
respectively), in 1939 it divided secondary education differently (periods of 6 and 2 years 
respectively).
The first important change in secondary education came with emergency law 
770/1937 which involved the substitution of the Venizelist 6-year gymnasia by the new 8-
47 Emergency Laws 767/1937 and 1296/1938 in the Official Newspaper.
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year gymnasia. Secondary education was to be divided into a lower level 5-year course and 
a higher level 3-year course, the latter of a classical, practical, commercial or agricultural 
orientation. The former aimed to offer a general education while the latter a scientific 
preparation for higher special studies. The demotico was limited to a four-year course.48 
Secondary education was only composed of the new gymnasium, the practical lyceum and 
the civil schools. The rest of the previously created institutions of secondary education 
were abolished 49 Emergency law 1800/1939 laid the foundation for the "civil schools" 
for both sexes. These were intended to have 3-year courses, while the previous 5-year civil 
schools were to be abolished.50 Their education was of a professional and practical nature. 
They included several types of subject: commercial; agricultural; crafts; womanly arts and 
housekeeping for women. A degree from the civil schools gave access to lower public 
positions, secondary vocational schools, the infant school teacher-training college or the 
Higher Housekeeping School for women.
The 8-year gymnasium was changed by emergency law 1849/1939 which heralded 
the foundation of the "new type" 6-year gymnasium, abolishing the previous 8-year and 5- 
year gymnasia of 1937. The "new type" gymnasium was followed by a 2-year lyceum, 
practical or classical. The former aimed to give a general education, better than that of the 
previous gymnasia while the latter aimed to prepare pupils for higher education. Typical of 
the regime’s uncertainties and contradictions in its policy towards secondary education 
were a series of conflicting decrees in 1939.51
48 The first two years of the gymnasium, the previous 5th and 6th forms of the demotico, were given new 
curicula by the royal decree of 8-2-1939; the use of demotic together with the katharevousa was adopted 
while the teaching of ancient Greek was to be introduced in the second form of the gymnasium -the 6lh 
form of the previous 6-year demotico. The programmes of the gymnasia were very much the same as those 
of the 1935 programmes. The course in civic education was abolished from the 6th form of the girls' 
gymnasium. Instead there was an effort to promote courses like housekeeping, women's crafts and baby 
nursing in girls' education.
49 The regime abolished all the semi-gymnasia, the lower agricultural schools and the higher girls' schools 
created by the previous Venizelist reforms.
50 Civil schools were first founded by law 5874/1933, on a 5-year basis, for pupils with a certificate from 
the 4th form of the demotico. Under Metaxas they were entered following the examination at the end of the 
4-year period of primary education.
51 On 14 February 1939, the regime issued the new curiculum for the first two forms of the 8-ycar 
gymnasium, on 22 April 1939 a reproduction of the curiculum for the old-type 6-year gymnasiums and on 
3 November 1939 they issued the new curicula of the "new type" of 6-year gymnasia. See Noutsos, op. 
cit., p. 262.
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While a series of laws were enacted, the orientation of the school curicula was very 
much the same as that envisaged by the People’s Party programme of 1935. Some 
innovations included the introduction of the subject of "National and Moral Education" in 
the programmes of all schools, private and public, 4 hours per week in each form.52 A 
considerable priority was attributed to religious instruction in public education. The most 
important difference was that lessons in gymnastics became a major subject together with 
ancient Greek, modem Greek and maths. The elevation of gymnastics in the school 
curiculum was intended to enhance the “fabrication o f healthy and active bodies” and was a 
clear imitation of the Nazi and Italian obsessions with physical education. The regime 
aimed at the revival of the ideal type of a useful citizen with a "healthy body and soul". In 
addition to this, Emergency Law 2057/1939 founded the National Academy of Physical 
Education to educate the teachers of Physical education in the theory and practice of their 
subject. The Committee of the Olympic Games was re-organised by Emergency Law 
2018/1939, so as to facilitate the regulation of Greek athletics. Metaxas appointed himself 
the "General Leader of National Athletics", proving once more that when he was interested 
in a promotion of a certain policy, he would take over the responsibility personally. The 
regime augmented the number of gymnastics’ teachers, assisted the foundation of athletic 
clubs and set aside large sums of money for the construction of school drill halls.53
To summarise, although Greece experimented with some of the influential fascist 
notions during a brief period in its inter-war history, the ideas of the 4th of August regime 
died with its leader, with the advent of the second world war. Although not an ideology as 
such, the 4th of August regime’s ideas expressed more than the mentality of the leader but 
were far less than the authoritarian ideology adopted by Italy and Germany, during the 
same period. The heterogeneous character of the leading elite, the dominance of the anti- 
Venizelist state and the timid participation of liberal bureaucrats and professors determined
52 Minor changes were made to the hours offered in the weekly programme for modem Greek, foreign 
languages, natural sciences and maths. As in the 1935 programme, there were no voluntary courses, 
contrary to the Venizelisl programme of 1931, which had included Latin only on a voluntary’ basis, a 
situation which was ended by the 1935 school programme, ibid, pp 57-104
53 Mahaira, op.cit., p. 99.
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the authoritarian context of limited ideological pluralism. What united all these was not 
fascism but the conviction that democracy had failed in Greece and had left society 
disunited and pessimistic. In that sense, the ruling elites were able to put up with the 
leader’s fascist inclinations, as long as these did not threaten radically their dominant 
positions within the state.
The major innovation of the 4th of August regime was the introduction of a foreign 
model of youth organisation, the foremost fascist aspect of the regime’s relationship with 
civil society. However, the imposition from above of a mobilisational regime followed the 
already established tradition of clientelism and corruption, while its organisation turned out 
to be a poor imitation of the fascist experience. Education under the 4th of August regime 
retained its classicist and markedly centralised orientation. The attempt by the dictator to 
introduce the demotic on a national scale, the major reformist policy of the regime in the 
educational field, was not welcomed by the dominant elites in the Church, the Academy, 
and among the politicians and the Press, and lasted for only two years.
By the end of the inter-war period there had been no major changes in the field of 
education which was marked by: a high degree of illiteracy (27% of the whole population, 
and double that for women);54 a rising percentage of school drop-outs (10% of the entire 
population did not graduate); teacher shortages (a ratio of sixty four students to one 
teacher, nationwide); and a lack of vocational education, whereby the students of 
philosophical, theological and law studies outnumbered significantly those in the technical 
schools and academies.55 The notable features of Greek education, -diglossia, classicism, 
centralisation of authority- would continue to strain the Greek educational system in the 
post-war period, a period of higher levels of modernisation and an impressive expansion 
of education among the young.
54 We should note that the level of illiteracy, although still high by the standards of developed western 
countries had dropped from what it had been in the 1920s: 36% for men and 64% for women in 1928.
55 Kofas, op.cit., p. 85.
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PART II: THE 21ST OF APRIL REGIME
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Chapter 5 : POST-WAR PERIOD
Background factors to the 21st of April regime
The end of the second world war saw the military defeat of the fascist regimes and 
the end of inter-war European fascist authoritarianism. It also signalled the decline of the 
great European powers, the end of European imperialism and the emergence of the 
superpower bipolarity between the liberal United States and the communist Soviet Union, 
and their respective spheres of influence world-wide. This new international political and 
ideological polarisation was underpinned by the antagonism between the countries of 
Western Europe which saw the consolidation of liberal parliamentary rule, and the 
communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Spain and Portugal, the only 
remnants of the fascist era, while retaining their authoritarian anti-communist stances, 
achieved their transition to the post-war period under the personalistic rules of Franco and 
Salazar, due mainly to the aloofness of these countries in the face of international 
developments. In many respects, the dictatorship of Spain and to a lesser degree that of 
Portugal constituted the “prototypes of the post-war liberal dictatorships”, the “initiators of 
the post-fascist formula”, supportive of the capitalist mode of economic domination, 
demobilisational rather than mobilisational, basing their legitimacy on their economic 
performance rather than on an ideological mobilisation.1
Post-war Greek development stood in many respects as a microcosm of the 
international bipolarity, exemplified by the prolonged civil war in the 1940s, and the 
victory of the liberal over the communist forces. Weakened economically by the world war 
and the civil war which followed it, and divided by acute political conflicts, Greece saw the 
subsequent establishment of an exclusionary, and repressive anti-communist parliamentary 
system during the 1950s and 1960s, within the patronising sphere of the United States, 
which heavily interfered in the development of post-war Greek internal affairs. The 
imposition of the 1967 military junta and of seven years of authoritarian rule marked the
1 From the inter-war period of fascistoid/Falangist domination the “National-Syndicalist phase” (1937- 
1945), the post-war Franco regime established a Catholic domination, the “National Catholicist phase” of 
Opus Dei influence (1945-1957) while the later period of the regime was a period of modernisation and 
technocratic rule. Guy Hermet, Aux Frontieres de la Democratic, pp. 143-149.
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epilogue of the post-war anti-communist state, while its collapse signalled the beginning of 
a more pluralist democracy. The 1967 military regime was primarily notable for the fact 
that for the first time in Greek history, the military assumed the role of political rulers. The 
21st of April regime, a clear case of a military dictatorship, was neither a fascist, nor a 
mobilisational authoritarian regime, on the model of the inter-war regimes of Italy, 
Germany, and the movements of the Balkan and Iberian peninsulas. It was not a 
personalistic type of authoritarian rule on the models of Franco and Salazar dictatorships, 
or even of the Chilean case of Pinochet, despite the attempts of the dictator Papadopoulos 
to impose his personal rule over the military junta. It was not a neo-fascist regime, bearing 
no ideological similarities to the post-war neo-fascist movements in Western Europe. Its 
power structure lacked the support of the King and the conservative political world, so 
vital to the survival of the earlier Metaxas regime, and enjoyed the backing solely of a 
powerful military faction. The 1967 military junta bore few similarities to the bureaucratic- 
military models on the South American continent. Its power-bloc did not include a coalition 
of high-level technocrats, military and civilians, as was the case with the post-1964 period 
in Brazil, the periods 1966-1970 and the post-1976 in Argentina and the post-1973 period 
in Chile, where the main motivation was provided by the changing structural requirements 
of their respective economies. On the other hand, the Greek regime did in some respects 
resemble to its contemporary Latin American counterparts, in the importance of the US 
support-role, in their demobilising and exclusionary character, and in the use of an anti­
communist discourse.
The 21st of April regime lacked an organised system of beliefs, an authoritarian 
ideology to interpret its surrounding reality, and to mobilise social sectors. At the most, the 
military junta resorted to constant justifications of its repressive tactics, tom by ideological 
contradictions and different points of view among its elite. The ideological justifications of 
the military junta, far from presenting an alternative ideological framework to the already 
existing one, were a sum of various controversial and individualistic military mentalities, 
with minimum common points of reference among the top officers. Before examining the
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specific beliefs held by the military rulers, their disparate mentalities should be seen in the 
light of the following introductory factors:
1. The 1967 military dictatorship was a sequence to the 1960s socio-political crisis of the 
parliamentary system, marked by an exclusionary state and the dominance of an anti­
communist ideological discourse. This post-war climate formed the general ideological 
framework on which the military rulers based their vague ideological consensus.
2. The 21st of April regime’s ideology derived from a sum of military mentalities which 
reflected the post-war military mind, the result of the officers’ own military socialisation 
and their connection with the political world. The individualistic beliefs and attitudes of the 
officers who made up the elite of the 21st of April regime were characterised by fierce anti­
communism, typical of the military’s post-war internal ideology; a tendency towards 
conspiratorial and clientelistic behaviour which could be seen in their relations with the 
civilian elites; a “new professionalism” which derived from US influence.
3. The 1967 military dictatorship was a type of collective authoritarian rule, supported by a 
limited military faction which neither enjoyed the support of the king nor of the political 
world. This collective style of leadership resulted in differences in opinions, as to the 
specific purpose and character of the regime.
A. The post-war period: Exclusionary parliamentarism, socio-econom ic  
modernisation and the anti-communist discourse
The end of the second world war and the defeat of international fascism, was 
followed by a prolonged and bloody civil war, which further exacerbated the already dire 
economic situation which had resulted from the world war, polarised Greek politics and 
ended with the formation of a post-war state with a fiercely anti-communist ideology. The 
post-war period in Greece was marked by economic recovery in the 1950s and the rapid 
economic development of the 1960s, the gradual modernisation of Greek society, the 
political domination of the right wing, the dominant and interventionist role of the 
American superpower and a new concept of nationalism.
1 5 0
The period of post-war parliamentary rule was a period of semi-democracy, where 
political power was largely exercised by the powerful allies of the parliamentary right, the 
monarchy and the armed forces. The actual political practice was marked by the exclusion 
of the communist party from participating in the Greek political process, political 
discrimination against those associated with communists, control over the trade union 
movement, violations of the constitution, the active use of repressive mechanisms (police, 
military, paramilitary organisations). The political power of the anti-communist state rested 
on the triarchy of Crown-Parliament-Army. The king at times seemed to perceive his 
powers to be limitless and, frequently overstepping his constitutional rights, he constantly 
intervened in party-politics and/or pursued a personal policy.2 The right, through 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activities, i.e., manipulations of the electoral system, 
pre-election frauds and intimidation tactics, managed to secure its position in government 
for 11 uninterrupted years (1952-1963) and to pursue authoritarian policies to its own 
benefit. The army not solely concerned with matters of external security, frequently played 
the role of the military police in internal security matters, through the parallel networks of 
secret military groups.
At the ideological level, the legacy of the civil war changed the meaning of Greek 
nationalism and permitted the use of an anti-communist ideology by the political 
authorities, as the official and dominant state-national discourse. After the transitional 
nationalistic phase of the inter-war period and the polemic concerning a quest for a national 
identity, post-war nationalism came to be identified almost exclusively with the threat 
posed by an external communist threat, from the northern Balkan neighbours. The 
domestic expression of this was the fear of an internal communist threat. The international 
environment of the Cold war during the 1940s, 50s and 60s helped to sustain the 
legitimacy of such an ideology. One of the main preoccupations of the post-war anti­
communist state was to create a powerful official ideological framework to justify the 
exclusionary practices of the political system. According to this, Greek society was divided 
roughly in two large categories, those who were nationally-minded and those who were
2 On post-war constitutional practices and violations, see Alivizatos, op.cit., pp. 203-271.
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not, a broad schism between communists and anti-communists. Ideological polarisation 
meant rigidity on both sides of the spectrum, so that on the anti-communist side the 
dissemination of information was subjected to strict control by the governing authorities, 
while on the other side, communist intellectuals were under the firm control of the 
clandestine party apparatus. Dogmatism prevailed on both sides and contrary to the short 
but constructive dialogue during the first two decades of the 20th century between the 
liberal and the socialist intellectuals, such a cooperation became unthinkable during the 
post-war period.3
Despite the deficiencies in the democratic process and the ideological polarisation, 
the Greek economy during the 1950s and 1960s recovered rapidly from the repercussions 
of the second world war and the civil war, due mainly to massive American aid, western 
capital and direct foreign investment. During the late 1950s, and especially during the 
1960s, the rates of growth of the Greek economy were impressively high.4 The main 
characteristics of post-war economic development were the boosting of the manufacturing 
sector, the shift in investment from light consumer goods to durable and capital goods, the 
change in the structure of exports from agricultural to industrial goods and a significant 
concentration of capital in industry.5 Despite the impressive rates of economic growth, the 
main elements of Greece’s pre-war socio-economic structure continued to dominate, 
marked by the powerful state sector, the inability to develop technologically the agricultural 
sector and the ever-increasing power of shipping capital. The state sector continued to 
provide the bulk of the employment for the majority of the middle and lower classes. 
Although the economic changes of the 1960s did not affect in any radical way the 
peripheral status of the Greek economy in relation to the developed world, they brought 
about some qualitative changes in the standard of living of the Greek population and 
strengthened the degree of social organisation within civil society.
3 Tsoukalas “Ideological Impact of the Civil War” in Greece in the 1940s, pp. 339-341.
4  The 1960s recorded an all-time high rate of growth, and the Greek economy, together with the Spanish 
one, had the highest rates in Europe of an average 7%. Babanasis/Soulas, Greece at the Periphery o f  the 
Developed Countries, p. 21.
5 Mouzelis, “Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece”, pp. 66-68.
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Most crucial in the post-war development of Greek society was the overwhelming 
role of the US hegemony: in the economic field the intervention of US capital helped the 
recovery of the Greek economy and at the same time resulted in the country having a 
dependent economic status; in the political field, American domination meant serious US 
interference in the running of state affairs; in the strategic/military field, the geographical 
position of Greece meant that it was crucial to America’s superpower interests in the 
Balkans and the Middle East, which increased the role of the military and, due to the 
massive military aid which was received, strengthened the institutional autonomy of the 
military in politics; in the ideological field the victory of liberalism over the alternative 
model of communism in the western world and the existence of an acute international 
polarisation justified the existence of exclusionary and authoritarian parliamentary rule in 
Greek politics. The patronising role of the Americans was decisive in the political 
development of post-war restrictive capitalist democracy in Greece. By supporting 
politically, economically, militarily and ideologically the anti-communist Greek state, they 
secured an ally at a geographically strategic post.
The role of US power in supporting the anti-communist state and, subsequently, its 
dubious attitude towards the junta was a major similarity between the Latin American 
dictatorships and the Greek regime. However, the paramount influence and the all- 
embracing character of US intervention was much more overwhelming in Latin America 
than it was in Greece, where the European influence on the political, economic and 
ideological spheres counter-balanced the American hegemony. Indeed, the 1960s brought 
the Greek economy and society closer to the European mainstream, and were marked by 
increasing Greek economic links with the European economies and the country’s 
involvement with the EEC, a powerful alternative to the paramountcy of US domination.
While the economic recovery of the 1950s favoured the authoritarian power 
structure of the monarchy-army-parliamentary right and the predominance of the anti­
communist ideological state, the economic modernisation of the 1960s brought the 
strengthening of Greek civil society and the exhaustion of the anti-communist ideology. 
The 1960s saw the rise of the reformist Centre Union government to power, and of its
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popular leader George Papandreou, who allowed for the political mobilisation of 
previously excluded social sectors, demanded the democratisation of Greek civil society 
and the reorganisation of the power structure, thus challenging the political domination of 
the post-war triarchy.6 The Centre Union professed a more radical political philosophy, 
including the relaxation of the anti-communist ideology, the loosening of repressive 
mechanisms in the countryside, the organisation of social groups free from control by the 
right wing forces, a new radical educational reform and the submission of the armed forces 
to civilian control. The mobilisation of the mid-1960s offered the main cause for the 
military to intervene in politics and to assume the role of political governors.7
The advent of the military junta, in the context of the immediately preceding 
political turmoil, was presented as a political necessity by the powerful military apparatus 
which sought to safeguard its threatened position within the state. The years 1965-1967 
were a period of government instability, political machinations and royal interferences, 
which the military officers perceived as sufficient deadlock to justify their intervention.8 
The 1967 coup can be seen as the radical redistribution of political power within the 
triarchy in favour of the military, but most important, as the failure of the “post-war guided 
democracy”.9 Mouzelis argues that the major impetus for the establishment of the military 
dictatorship came basically from within the army and was directly linked to the threat that 
the growing political mobilisation posed to its dominance within the prevailing 
exclusionary state. The Greek colonels intervened from above principally to defend their 
own position within the state.
6 Striking is the similarity between the Greek Centre Union and the Chilean Christian Democrats. The 
latter in 1964 provided an ideological alternative to liberal capitalism and Marxist socialism, trying to 
break the polarisation of Chilean politics. Their programme promised the incorporation into the nation’s 
political life of sectors that had previously been excluded. The new Centre in Chilean society in the 1960s 
sought to undermine the previous politics of clientelism and to institute more rational planning schemes. 
The similar political mobilisation of the 1960s in Chile revolved around Frei’s Centre party of the 
Christian Democrats. See Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes, Chile, pp 34-36
7 The rising popularity of Papandreou’s son Andreas, on the leftist side of the Centre Union, exacerbated 
the perception of a threat in the eyes of the anti-communist forces. The anti-American, anti-NATO, pro­
independent ideology of the young Papandreou was the more radical reaction to the excesses of the post-war 
political arrangement and the continuous interference of the United States.
8 For a detailed account of the period prior to the imposition of the military regime see Linardatos From 
the Civil War to the Junta, Vol. 5.
9  Nikiforos Diamandouros, “Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983” in 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, p. 145
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Confronted with the rising tide o f political mobilisation, repressive parliamentarism 
characterised by the throne-army-parliament alliance, in which the army was 
dominant- could no longer survive. Either parliament, through its opening to the 
masses, had to become the dominant force in this triarchy- in which case the army 
would lose its leading position with inevitable internal consequences for those 
holding posts within it. Or else the army had to prevent this by the overall abolition 
o f parliamentary rule.10
Similar to the 4th of August regime whose intervention coincided with the 1930s 
economic recovery from the effects of the Great Depression, the military junta intervened 
in a decade of rapid economic development. The decline of the post-war parliamentary 
democracy happened in the midst the 1960s economic boom and not in the context of 
economic stagnation, as in most post-war Latin American cases. In Latin America 
perennial structural problems of high inflation, balance of payment problems and a high 
degree of dependence on the international economy, exacerbated social tensions to such an 
extent that parliamentary institutions were not able to cope.11 Both Greek dictatorships 
show that simple correlations between economic slump and political crisis do not apply to 
the Greek case for the explanation of dictatorial interventions.
It was a high level of political mobilisation and radicalisation of the masses which 
existed in the Greece of the 1960s, which determined to a large degree the reactionary 
intervention of the military junta and which distinguished it from inter-war Greek society 
and the Metaxas response to the political crisis which he perceived. Greek civil society in 
the 1960s was much more organised and integrated than it had been in the 1920s and 
1930s. On the other hand, the inter-war period was a period of ideological transition and 
intellectual pluralism, while the post-war period was one of authoritarian anti-communism 
and exclusionary pluralism. The regime of Metaxas was the authoritarian sequence to the
*0 Mouzelis, “Capitalism and Dictatorship”, p. 80.
11 Military regimes in Latin America occurred in the context of accelerating prices, falling economic 
growth rates and decline in the inflow of direct foreign investment. In 1973 for instance, Chile suffered 
from a 150% annual rate of inflation, the demoralisation of the private sector under A llien d e’s 
nationalisation scheme, a hugely augmented public sector, an extended black market, which led to the new 
orthodox economic policies of General Pinochet. See Robert Kaufman, “Industrial Change and 
Authoritarian Rule”, in The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, pp. 190-196.
155
deadlocks of the inter-war political schism, while the military junta was the sequence to the 
exhaustion of the exclusionary, semi-democratic state.
The post-war anti-communist state provided the military rulers with the general 
framework on which to base their anti-communist discourse and develop their repressive 
and exclusionary methods. The immediate political instability gave them the pretext for 
intervention and the impulse to protect their interests from any future threats by 
strengthening the role of the military in the political sphere. However, the strong upward 
surge of the Greek economy and the lack of an economic crisis in the 1960s meant that 
they could not convincingly use developmental!st economic language as an excuse for 
intervention. On the contrary, the powerful role of the military in the most advanced Latin 
American societies was connected to the new technocratic alternatives being offered for the 
remedy of the structural imbalances. The ideological framework of the 21st of April regime 
was mostly composed of anti-communist generalities in their extreme post-war usage, 
which formed the main point of consensus among the officers of the military junta. But 
most important, it was basically marked by the existence of disparate military mentalities, 
inherent in the Greek military mind, the result of the officers’ own process of political 
socialisation and their particular connection with the political world.
B. The post-war Greek military mind
The behaviour of the military within a given political environment and the officers’ 
ideological beliefs are the result of the position of the military sub-system within the 
political system itself, at a primary level, and the result of certain institutional 
characteristics of the military establishment, at a secondary level. The latter relates to the 
social composition of the officer corps, their military education, structure and hierarchy, 
and the self-perceptions and career objectives of the officers, which are all directly 
determinant of the military mind. It is therefore necessary to understand some central 
characteristics of the post-war military mind, how these characteristics shaped the 
military’s response to developments in a political system and, most important, the 
mentalities and attitudes of the officers. Based on the special relationship between
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politicians and army officers, on the one hand, and on the internal institutional 
characteristics of the military corps, the latter forms its own internal ideology, a 
differentiated system of beliefs, which shapes its particular attitude towards socio-political 
events. The officers’ perceptions of the notions of man, society, history, religion, the 
nation-state and their role within it, as well as the organisation of the military are 
interpreted by military officers differently from other social sectors. The unified, 
hierarchical and centralised system of military organisation and education comes into 
contrast with the pluralistic process of debate within democratic societies and imposes a 
distinct set of beliefs on all military officers, a selective and specifically militaristic 
interpretation of social and political realities.12
The history of civil-military relations in Greece has seen a series of military 
interventions in politics which showed that, apart from the military’s role as the guardian 
of the nation-state against any external threats, military officers were also concerned with 
the domestic political scene and perceived the balances at the level of the political elite to be 
directly relevant to their own corporate interests. Greek military interventions were never 
connected with radical demands for socio-economic reforms but mostly centred upon 
demands for political changes. The 19th century was marked by the weak professionalism 
of the military and their limited power over internal political affairs.13 The “ 1909
12 Most characteristics, typical of the professional military ethic, have their roots in the very profession of 
the soldier and are directly relevant to the formation of the military mind. According to Huntington, the 
military mind is “pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic 
and instrutnentalist in its view o f  the military profession”. The military man holds a pessimistic view of 
man and regards the weaknesses in human nature as crucial in social developments and conflicts among 
nations (Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 59-79). Janowitz translates the above notions of the 
military mind into relevant ideological themes recurrent in the professional and political ideology of the 
military officers. These include a strong sense of nationalism and national identity with pervasive overtones 
of xenophobia, a strong puritanical outlook and an emphasis on anti-corruption and anti-decadence, and the 
acceptance of collective public enterprise as a basis for achieving social, political and economic change. 
Janowitz correctly stresses that military officers are more interested in organisational forms than in 
ideological justifications and tend to be anti-introspective even when they have intellectual interests. Their 
rhetoric is marked by a “bold assertiveness” and they consider themselves “doers rather than thinkers”. Their 
mentality seems to be a mixture of half-developed but strongly held ideology and a deep sense of pragmatic 
professionalism. (Janowitz, Military Institutions in the Developing Countries, pp. 139-143.)
13 The history of military interventions goes back to the 19th century, the first important military 
intervention in Greek politics took place in 1843 when army people in co-ordination with politicians 
obliged King Othon to grant a constitution to the Greek people, to rid the country from the 
Bavarian/Austrian army which had surrounded the king upon his arrival in Greece and to end the period of 
absolute monarchy. (See “The Revolution of the 3rd September 1843”, in History o f  the Greek Nation, 
Vol. 13, pp. 89-94.) Greek officers and politicians had common complaints against King Othon’s 
absolutist tendencies in his exercise of power and both these forces acted in a concerted effort to minimise 
the excesses of the monarchist power in order to constitutionalise the exercise of political authority. In
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revolution” signalled the first major intervention of middle-ranking officers in politics and 
inaugurated a series of military interventions in political life during the course of the 20th 
century.14 The inter-war period, a period of continuous military interventions in politics 
institutionalised the semi-autonomous character of military interventions, although they did 
not result in military dictatorships, whereby the army officers intervened in order to hand 
political power either to the Venizelist or the anti-Venizelist politicians. In the tradition of 
these semi-autonomous transitional military interventions, the dictatorship of Metaxas was 
not a military authoritarian regime although it needed the support of the anti-Venizelist 
military hierarchy for its survival. The post-war period, however, saw the development of 
a completely autonomous role for the military in the political power bloc, the legacy of its 
victory over the communist forces during the civil war, which resulted in the consolidation 
of military rule in 1967.
Based on an ample examination of the Greek civil-military relations, one might 
stress four particular aspects, relevant to the post-war military mind and the mentality of 
the officers/rulers. The post-war military mind was characterised by:
- the development of a rigorous nationalist anti-communist orientation, the legacy of the 
civil war and the officers’ participation in it;
- the factionalist and clientelistic mentality of military officers, the result of their 
relationship with politicians;
1862 the military, in agreement with the politicians, intervened again, succeeded in ousting King Othon 
and demanded another constitution. The Constitution of 1864 reflected the liberal ideological tendencies of 
Europe at the time. Both coup d’etats, in 1843 and 1862, brought about important political institutional 
changes in agreement with the general civilian sentiments. (See Papakosmas, The Military in Greek 
Politics, pp. 15-32.) The initiative, however, in the 19th century military interventions rested mainly with 
Greek politicians and enjoyed no autonomous character as was the case with the 20th century military' 
interventions.
14 The “Goudi coup” was the result of an initiative by military officers, disaffected by the 1897 Greek 
international defeat, who demanded a better organisation of the Greek armed forces along with more general 
national and political demands. It was an intervention by lower-ranking military officers and its symbolic 
significance would be exploited in the rhetoric of the Colonels’ regime after 1967. This 1909 initiative by 
the newly formed Military League ended with the accession of Venizelos to power and a new era in Greece’s 
national development in the foreign, political, social, economic and ideological spheres. The character of 
this military intervention has been the subject of a wide discussion among analysts of various ideological 
opinions for its considerable subsequent domestic implications. Most Marxist analysts have labelled the 
intervention a “bourgeois revolution” according to which the political leader Venizelos secured the 
ascendancy of the bourgeois class in politics. See Voumas, Goudi; The 1909 Movement, Athens 1957 and 
Kordatos’ History o f Modem Greece, Athens 1958.
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- the adoption of a “new professional” mentality based on notions about internal war 
(against communist, anti-national elements) and the desirable form of domestic 
development, the impact of the international US influence within the army; and
- the paramilitary/conspiratorial attitude of the secret organisation IDEA, the direct 
antecedent of the militaiy junta.
All these characteristics were reflected in their subsequent ideological perceptions, as 
rulers, and their particular policies, as governors.
Military nationalistic ideology: Fierce anti-communism
Historically, the most important characteristic of the Greek military mind has been 
its vague nationalistic orientation, the military being perceived as the country’s guardian 
from external threats and the defender of the national tradition. Although the nationalistic 
orientation of a state’s army becomes an ambiguous concept in multi-ethnic societies, as 
currently in Yugoslavia, in more homogeneous countries such as Greece, the role of the 
national army has been identified with the interests of the nation-state. The Greek military 
fought, as a unified body, against the external enemies that threatened the survival of the 
country. In that respect the Greek army was crucial in the formation of the country’s 
foreign policy, while international developments, largely determined by international wars, 
influenced the army’s nationalistic identity.
The military during the 19th century was the principal expressor of Greece’s 
irredentist aspirations.15 It participated in a sequence of international crises and suffered 
the humiliation of the 1897 defeat, which led to the post-1909 reorganisation of the Greek 
military. In the first decades of the 20th century, the Greek army fought successfully in the 
Balkan wars, was victorious in the first world war, on the side of the Allied Forces, and 
was greatly influenced by the Asia Minor disaster in 1922. The death of the Megali Idea in 
1922, marked the final end of Greece’s irredentist ambitions, changed the
15 After independence and during the 19th century, the army was composed of military officers, educated in 
the School of Army Cadets -created in 1828-, where Greek irredcntism was emphasised, given that the 
country was in its process of geographical expansion. During the 19th century however the military was 
not a highly organised body and was used mainly in order to chase bandits or to repress rev olts. Preparation 
for war was for the most part occasional and sporadic.
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nationalist/irredentist orientation of the army, and saw the development of a semi- 
autonomous character in the military interventions in politics. The transitional period in 
Greek ideology marked a transition in the army’s nationalistic role, and a new interest by 
the military officers in matters of domestic political development.
In the post-war period the national enemy was called communism, and the Greek 
army stood as the principal defender of the country’s interests against the internal and 
external communist threat. The Greek civil war and the defeat of the domestic communist 
forces, the subsequent membership of the NATO alliance and the fact that Greece’s Balkan 
neighbours were communist, changed radically the nationalistic character of the military 
ideology and defined its overwhelmingly anti-communist orientation both with regard to 
the international and the domestic scenes.
The Greek army cleared of all republican/Venizelist officers presented the image of 
a united, loyal, royalist body.16 Selection to the officer corps after 1944 was based on a 
rigourous test of nationalism, as defined in the post-war Greek domestic climate, which 
meant loyalty to the king and stem opposition to communism and anyone with similar 
ideas. Through military schools, journals and conferences of highly specialised content, 
the military carried several principles and values to the new recruits which aimed at 
isolating them from any civilian influences and protecting them from the contagion of any 
radical thought which could potentially threaten the anti-communist status quo.17 The 
education provided for the military was no more based on the principles of the Megali Idea 
irredentist plan but on the principles of nationalism within the context of the international
16 The 1935 failed coup of the Venizelists against the Royalists, marked the beginning of the final 
exclusion of the republicans from the army ranks and failed ultimately to restore the liberals into power. 
During the period of Metaxas, the period when the Greek army was in the Middle East, and the civil war in 
Greece, the army was cleared of the liberals/Venizelists and was composed almost exclusively of anti- 
Venizelist royalists.
17 Abrahamsson argues that the effect of the military education is crucial to the political socialisation of 
military officers. Military education diffuses a body of theoretical doctrines and implants ethical values as 
to behaviour which is related to the military feeling of solidarity and corporateness. In other words, the 
military system has a decisive impact on the attitudes and values of military professionals and the existence 
of a particular military culture whose main features are the “nationalistic, authoritarian, alarmist and 
conservative nature o f the military mind". Nationalistic in that it centres around the security of the state, 
authoritarian in that it is impatient with dissent, inexpert in the art of persuasion while democratic 
procedures are not relevant in the context of the military characteristics of obedience, hierarchy and order. 
(See Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalisation and Political Power, pp. 59-100.) Abrahamsson 
offers some useful insights on the particular features of the military profession although his analysis 
mainly covers the cases of Sweden and the United States where a high degree of homogeneity and 
uniformity is deeply embedded in the military organisation.
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cold war.18 The enemy was not only to be found outside the country but most importantly 
was also inside the country, in the form of the communist ideology and communist 
political organisation. While the existence of a communist threat was a political reality to 
virtually all the liberal political forces, it was intentionally exaggerated by the military 
mind, in accordance with its “subjective professional bias” 19 and was subsequently 
stressed as the main cause of the abrupt military intervention of 1967.20
Military officers tend to over-emphasise their military virtues of bravery, discipline, 
obedience and dedication to the national interest. The defense of national ideals in the mind 
of the Greek military officers coincided with the defense of traditional Greek values, the 
“Helleno-Christian spirit”. Greek officers believed that the Army was the embodiment of 
national ideals, identity and consciousness. They felt that they represented and lived by a 
set of superior moral values. To them the military profession was a repository of Greco- 
Christian ideals. The Greek officers’ self-image contained an underlying element of 
puritanism and a religious moral certainty. Their conservatism was more cultural than 
political, one of form rather than substance.21 Moreover Greek military officers cultivated 
a self-perception inspired by contempt for officers who involved themselves in political 
activity and the conviction that the army was more virtuous, heroic, pious than any civilian 
group. They all condemned interventions in principle, but made special exception for 
particular coups when it suited them.
18 The ideological indoctrination of the recruits involved an extensive censorship of their reading material, 
and their own radio station which was not submitted to any governmental control, was based on 
programmes of a clearly political and partisan character. (See Meynaud, op.cit., p. 352.) Broadcasting 
centres in eveiy major military unit, special time allotted in training schedules for National Ethical 
Instruction of the troops, lectures in politics and the ideology of international communism, newspapers and 
journals, constituted the systematic methods of indoctrination o f the post-war military mind. (See 
Kapetanyannis’ unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Socio-Political Conflicts and Military Intervention; The Case of  
Greece: 1950-1967, p. 116.)
19 Based on Huntington’s use of the term, according to which the military professional holds the 
responsibility for the security of the state and thus is inclined to stress the continuing nature of the threats 
to the security of the state. Huntington observes the existence of a "subjective professional bias ", in the 
sense that at times the military man will sec threats where actually no threats exist and that if  he errs in his
estimate, it should be on the side o f  overstating the threat The objective realities o f international
politics only partially determine the military estimate o f  the situation. See Huntington’s “The Military 
Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic” in The Soldier and the State, pp. 59-79.
20 It should be mentioned that such fears and beliefs within the military were also aggravated by the right- 
wing sectors of Greek society, such as the press, which up until the moment of the military intervention, 
insisted that the country was at the threshold of another communist takeover.
21 Kourvetaris & Dobratz Social Origins and political Orientations o f  Officer Corps in World Perspective, 
p. 30.
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During its post-war development the military acted as a political institution which 
in connection with political parties and pressure groups performed in one way or another a 
variety of political functions. The military apparatus through its control of the intelligence 
and security services, had a considerable hold on the mass media, performed wider 
functions than merely ensuring the external security of the country, and became the 
guardian of the domestic political anti-communist status quo. From 1940 until 1967, the 
army was presented as a united anti-communist/royalist force which participated 
extensively in the exclusionary politics of the post-war state.
The post-war broadening of the social base of officers’ recruitment increased rather 
than decreased the latters’ political involvement.22 The requirements of the civil war meant 
the lowering of the Military Academy’s standards of recruitment and resulted, for the first 
time, in the establishment of a system of free education. As people from poorer 
backgrounds could now study in the Academy, there was a distinct difference in class 
origin between officers who had graduated before and after the war. While the urban area 
was under-represented in the army officers from the semi-urban and rural areas were 
somewhat over-represented. The post-war army, being dominated by officers of peasant 
background, embraced middle class values with enthusiasm. But they also developed a 
sense of isolation which was due to the widening gap between their own social importance 
and that of other prominent professionals, technocrats and businessmen in the 1960s, 
contrary to their Latin American counterparts who developed closer links with the 
technocratic-civilian elites. Greek military officers adopted an amorphous mentality made 
up by active resentments against threats to their discipline, their military honour and the 
politicians who often threatened their interests. As Veremis states,
22 While during the second half of the 19th century, the army had been composed mainly of the offspring 
of noble families and had enjoyed the King’s patronage, the 1909 military intervention signalled a radical 
change in the army’s composition. There followed a sharp increase in officer recruitment and admissions to 
the Military Academy. In order to realise the Greek irredentist aspirations, Venizelos mobilised the 
country’s civilian and military' forces and within a period of three years, he tripled the armed forces from 
60,000 in 1909 to 170,000 on the eve of the First Balkan War in 1912. (See Kourvetaris, “Greek Service 
Academies; Patterns of Recruitment and Organisational Change” in The Military and the Problem of  
Legitimacy, Harries-Jenkins & van Doom, eds, p. 125.) Following these developments the army became 
thereafter a means for social ascent for the officers of petty-bourgeois and peasant origins.
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A sense o f inferiority among officers vis-a-vis civilian elites was compounded by 
their frustration at missing out on the development bonanza. Their role in the Greek 
civil wars between nationalist and communist forces became their chief claim to 
prominence, and they strove to perpetuate the memory o f the confrontation long 
after its culmination in 1949 23
Military factionalism: The clientelistic mentality
In presenting the officers’ corps as nationalistic/anti-communist and loyal to the 
king, one runs the risk of presenting the military as a unified body, with a private code and 
values, which was not the case in Greece and particularly in the military’s relationship to 
civilians. The Greek military was not a unified body with a coherent set of attitudes and 
principles, with respect to the political development of Greek society. On the contrary, 
military officers perceived the political environment through the spectrum of the different 
factions and groups to which they belonged. The military institution was internally a 
divided and factionalised corps, with allegiances to different political rulers and different 
political ideas as to the position of the military within the power establishment. The result 
was the creation of a special clientelistic relationship between army officers and political 
rulers.
The clientelistic aspect of the military mentality relates to the special relationship 
between politicians and army officers, a relationship of interdependence between the two, 
whose principal nexus was a network of mutual help. Politicians secured their military 
clients’ corporate interests and army officers guar anteed their allegiance to their political 
patrons, a situation which had its roots in the inter-war period.24 This special relationship 
between officers and politicians determined the politicisation of the Greek officer corps and 
resulted in the soldiers’ disrespect for the parliamentary process and constitutional forms
23 Veremis, “Greece and Nato: Continuity and Change”, in Nato’s Southern Allies, p. 248.
24 Veremis’ analysis of the military establishment during the inter-war period is based on the existence of a 
clientelistic network among politicians and military officers. During the whole of the inter-war period a 
special relationship developed between army people and politicians who needed the support of each other for 
their existence. Veremis sees the creation o f patron-client networks between politicians and the army 
hierarchy and between the army ranks themselves. See his book The Intervention o f  the Army in Greek 
politics 1916-1936, Athens 1983, and his article “Some Observations on the Greek Military in the Inter- 
War Period, 1918-1935” in Armed Forces and Society, Vol.4, No.3, May 1978, pp. 527-541.
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and the disrespect of politicians towards the military hierarchies, which they frequently 
overturned in order to secure their military power bases. Moreover, clientelistic allegiances 
superseded the strongly held internal ideology of the military, despite the vital importance 
of the latter to the unity of the officer corps. A whole network of patron-client relationships 
was created between politicians and officers and among officers themselves, the latter 
forming their political affiliations according to private gains, personal interests and 
advancement. The actual practice of such clientelistic relationships resulted in the 
engagement of military officers in conspiratorial tactics, and this caused the sceptical 
attitude which soldiers tended to have, both towards politicians and their fellow officers. 
The extensive involvement of military officers in conspiracies was largely explained by 
their professional insecurity. A system of patronage, very typical of the country’s political 
development was thus adopted within the army as well, which ceased to be solely and 
unconditionally the country’s guardian in face of external threats, but pursued its own 
corporate interests, while factions and individuals within the army did the same.
During the post-war period, deliberate endeavours were made by political leaders to 
develop and perpetuate the clientelistic networks within the military upon which they could 
rely, if and when the more traditional sources of support were exhausted.25 Domestic 
political forces allowed the ultra-conservative factions in Greek society to take over 
complete control of the military and repressive mechanisms and thus contributed to the 
development of the armed forces’ autonomous role within the political sphere. The 
officers’ personal progress was secured through their allegiance to the conservative 
political establishment which largely explains their interference in politics in 1967. As 
Veremis has aptly put it:
In no profession other than in the armed forces was allegiance to the crown or to 
conservative members o f government more vital to personal advancement. 
Paradoxically, this very dependence o f the officers on royalty or political patrons 
became a source o f resentment even among those who were most eager to profit
25 Constantine Karamanlis, for instance,the leader of the ERE conservative party largely relied upon 
clientelistic connections in the military and police forces to win the elections of 1961. See George 
Zaharopoulos, “Politics and Army in Post-War Greece”, in Greece Under Military Rule, p. 24.
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from it. Officers formed clandestine organisations in order to purge the army o f  
leftist elements, while simultaneously promoting their own corporate interests and 
waiting for the opportunity to assert their autonomy
The international influence: The “new professional” mentality
The major influence on the post-war military was the important role of the United 
States in Greek domestic political affairs and the country’s participation in the NATO 
international security alliance. This brought about the institutionalisation of a military 
machine dependent US interests. The patronage of the United States encouraged a new 
professional mentality within the military and offered the officers the ability to assume as 
their primary function counter-insurgency roles and civic defence.27
During the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, the 
professionalisation of the Greek military had remained at relatively low levels.28 Although
26 See Veremis, “Greece and NATO” p. 248.
27 Stepan’s distinction between the “old professionalism of external warfare” and “new professionalism of 
internal warfare and national development” basically applied to the Brazilian and Peruvian cases, may be 
applicable to the Greek case, to a certain extent, especially as a result of the legacy of the civil war during 
the 1940s and the army’s extensive participation in it. In theory, this means that the army’s focus shifts 
from interstate conflict to domestic war which encourages a different pattern of civil-military relations. 
(Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Expansion”, p. 49.) The classic 
formulation of military professionalism and its relation to the political activity of the military by Samuel 
Huntington, rests on the assumption that a professionalised army concentrates all its efforts to perfect its 
fighting ability, becomes a “politically sterile and neutral” servant of the state, functionally specific and 
unconcerned with domestic political events, with a technocratic outlook. Technical innovations and 
achievements lead to the professionalisation and democratisation of the military and its further neutrality in 
politics. (Huntington, The Soldier and the State.) Contrary to this approach, Janowitz believes that the 
technology of the military' in the new nations maximises its propensity to intervention in domestic politics 
given that the capacity of the military to intervene in domestic politics derives from its distinctive military 
format, i.e., its control over the instruments of power. (Janowitz, Military Institutions in the Developing 
Countries., pp. 107-108.) New professionalism, a phenomenon of the developing countries, lies in the 
assumption that there is a fundamental inter-relationship between civil and military spheres, “with the 
military playing a key role in interpreting and dealing with domestic political problems owing to its greater 
technical and professional skills in handling internal security issues....the new professional military man is 
highly politicised ” (Stepan, “The New' Professionalism”, p. 51.)
28 Trikoupis was the first Greek leader who introduced some form of organisation to the Greek army in the 
1880s. Being a liberal minded politician he made the first genuine efforts to set the foundations of a 
professional military organisation. He abolished by law the right o f an officer to actively engage in 
politics; he managed to secure a 40 million drachma loan from France for the army’s needs; he established a 
system of compulsory military service for the armed forces; he created new military schools and expanded 
the military academy; he sent a number of officers abroad for further military training, among other 
measures concerning the organisation of the Greek army. (See Kourvetaris “Greek Service Academies; 
Patterns of Recruitment and Organisational Change”, p. 124.) Although Venizelos later tried to 
professionalise and organise the Greek armed forces, military frustration over the Asia Minor disaster, the 
series o f coups and counter-coups during the inter-war period and intense military factionalism did much to 
weaken the professionalisation of the Greek military services, which on the eve of Mctaxas1 dictatorship 
w'as characterised by military officers as “lamentable”. Metaxas attempted to modernise and unite the army
165
the Greek military had obtained professional advice, weapons and supplies from the 
French, British and Italian, these inducements were neither persistent nor massive enough 
to professionalise the services. The scale and duration of the American military and 
economic aid that flowed in through the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan 
(proclaimed initially in June 1947) had a decisive impact on the professionalisation of the 
Greek military.29
Due to the military assistance of the United States during the post-war period the 
Greek military became one of the professional armies of the West.30 Many
military officers lost the old heroic pre-war mentality associated with the Balkan wars and 
the Albanian expedition of 1940 according to which the officer was first a “cavalier” and 
then a professional. Under NATO influence, through high wages, lengthy trips abroad and 
co-education with foreign officers, the military mentality changed radically. There was an 
international cast of military officers who having interests in common, lived like the 
diplomats: a “new military aristocracy”. The narrow identity of the army devoted to the 
defence of the national frontiers was substituted by a wider identity as part of an 
“international family”.31 Through their influence over the Greek military establishment, 
the United States managed to place the country into the inferior position of a client.
behind the king but, with the declaration of war, it was evident that the army lacked substantial technical 
equipment and manpower.
29 Greece’s total receipts through the Plan were 1.7 billion dollars in economic aid (loans and grants) and 
1.3 billion dollars in military aid between 1947 and the 1960s. See Veremis’ “Greece and NATO”, p. 231.
30 Janowitz suggests that a gradual transformation has taken place in the countries of the Western world 
from the heroic self-image of the military person to the managerial self-image, a result o f technological and 
nuclear innovations in their armies. The modem military man seeks to combine traditional national heroic 
values with scientific management. He is a bridge with the past and is concerned with the drawing upon 
cultural values, real or imagined. (The Professional Soldier, pp. 139-143.) Based on this distinction 
Kourvetaris suggests, after a series of interviews with military officers, that, in the Greek case, there is a 
synthetic self-image of the military professionals composed from indigenous cultural/social influences and 
exogenous western managerial professional influences; a fusion of the “heroic” self-image and the 
“specialist-technical-managerial” self-image. (See Kourvetaris “Professional Self-Images and Political 
Perspectives in the Greek Military”, American Sociological Review  36, 1971.) The officers’ self-image 
however should not be taken at face-value given that military' people tend to exaggerate the heroic character 
of their identity, to downgrade the corporate identity of their social group and tend to justify their 
intervention in politics out o f the highest objective of the national salvation. As Markoff rightly points 
out “Social scientists must examine the self-interpretation o f  social actors but it does not follow that these 
interpretations must be also theirs”. (Markoff/Baretta, “Professional Ideology and Military Activism in 
Brazil” p. 186.) Moreover, perceptions are subjective and it is difficult “to draw the line between self- 
deception and deliberate misrepresentation” (Veremis,’’Veto and Impasse”, The Political Dilemmas of 
M ilitary Regimes, p. 42.) On the other hand although self-images involve a considerable amount of 
wishful thinking, it would be too simplistic to disregard the weight of national ideals in the officers self- 
perceptions and concentrate exclusively on their self-seeking motives.
31 See Karagiorgas, From the IDEA to the Junta, pp. 9-10.
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American policy towards Greece was dictated primarily by defence considerations. 
American missions favoured politicians eager to cooperate but lacking in stature and 
principles, outspoken advocates of strong-armed efficiency, sometimes even preferring 
authoritarian regimes.32 The operations of the Greek army were coordinated and 
supervised by the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) 
which advised that the military be isolated from the rest of society and protected from the 
ideological contagion which could destroy the unity of the forces. Many Greek officers 
shared this view and believed that for the sake of operational effectiveness the army should 
become an autonomous body answering only to its foreign advisers. Skills in ideological 
warfare and intelligence were carefully disseminated among officers who would later use 
them to promote their corporate interests. But most important, US involvement in Greek 
domestic affairs had its repercussions on the military mentality, given that military 
expenditure and technological innovation in the military field were given a high priority in 
the national budget, thus giving the military a strong sense of their importance in relation to 
other sectors.
Similarly, in the Latin American context, where the presence of the US was 
overwhelming, the US government’s aim during the post-war cold war period had centred 
around the attempt to export anti-communist ideology and with it the emphasis on counter­
insurgency, and through military arms, financial and technical assistance and extensive 
educational programmes, the United States achieved a monopoly of control over other 
foreign military missions in Latin America. Relations between the US and the domestic 
military never reached the extent in Greece that they did in Latin America, and neither did 
Greece have anything comparable to the Brazilian War Academy.33
32 See Veremis, “Greece and NATO”, p. 249.
33 In the case of Brazil, the military relations between the two countries were more than close. Through 
their interference in the Escola Superior de Guerra, the US advisory mission secured a firm hold on the 
education of the Brazilian officers. The school brought military officers into close contact with civilians 
and established a wide field o f education. The contribution of the Brazilian School of War in creating the 
new military ideology of “national security and national development” was paramount and the school’s 
concern with Brazilian political, economic and social life. It resulted in the politicisation of the Brazilian 
officers and the latters’ connection with the civilian and technocratic elites. The central idea of the Brazilian 
military ideology was that development and security issues were inseparable. See Stepan, The Military in 
Politics, pp. 172-187.
167
The creation o f IDEA: Paramilitary and conspiratorial behaviour
In many developing countries, the expansion of the political activity of the military 
rested on and was facilitated by the internal paramilitary police control system. These 
mechanisms provided a basis for social and political control and increased the ability of 
political regimes to maintain their power.34 Post-war Greece saw the emergence of 
paramilitary organisations which functioned with the secret backing of the national 
government and were held widely responsible for the forceful exclusion of leftist groups 
from the political process. The dictatorship of the colonels was connected to the existence 
and the activities of such paramilitary forces, in the exercise of the anti-communist political 
authority. These forces were said to exist within the larger context of a so-called “para- 
state”, the “hidden”, unofficial state behind the official Greek state. The existence of 
conspiratorial officers’ cliques within the military establishment meant the breakdown of 
civilian supervision and control, a dangerous decline in discipline and widespread 
factionalism within the army.
Post-war Greece saw the development of an influential paramilitary organisation, 
known as IDEA (“Holy Bond of Greek Officers”), whose members effectively imposed 
their domination over the army and the whole of the Greek political establishment in 1967. 
Although the IDEA never enjoyed high membership among army officers, it managed to 
create an influential paramilitary conspiratorial organisation and to secure the necessary 
posts and connections to enable ifjsubsequent intervention in politics.35 The history of the 
IDEA had its roots in the period of the German occupation of Greece. It was originally
formed by Greek officers in Palestine under the name of the “Union of Young Officers”
\
(ENA) and in October 1944 was transformed into the IDEA, an ideologically “pure” union 
of officers, who wanted to promote their corporate interests. In their initial proclamation, 
the members of IDEA asked for the ‘forceful exclusion from the armed forces o f officers
34 Morris Janowitz, in his analysis of the military institution in developing nations, examines the role of 
paramilitary forces and police agencies in the internal coercion of such nations and their relationship to the 
military power bloc. Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations, 
1977.
35 See Veremis, “Veto and Impasse”, pp. 29-30.
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with internationalist beliefs and nationally doubtful convictions”.36 They considered as 
their model the “revolutions of 1909 and 1936” and were obsessed with the “imminent 
communist danger”. IDEA was not a royalist organisation and in their programmes there 
was never any mention of their faithfulness to the king. Royalist officers never became 
members of IDEA. In that respect, the IDEA officers initiated a latent antagonism within 
the ranks of an apparently anti-communist/royalist military between the royalists, on the 
one hand, and the militaristic/ultra-conservative officers, on the other.
Unavoidably IDEA developed into an interest group for the promotion of the 
corporate interests of a group of officers who accepted as members only those who shared 
their ultra-conservative political philosophy. Many members of the IDEA were educated in 
the United States, they had espoused “new professional” doctrines of “anti-insurgency and 
internal security ” . Having managed to secure crucial posts in the Greek Intelligence 
Service they were considered the main link with the CIA. They managed to infiltrate and to 
influence the policy of party leaders, Church figures and foreign powers. IDEA was a 
closed club of faithfuls to its vociferous slogans, its oath, full of fanaticism, in the post­
war period. The members of this club formed a paramilitary organisation, in which the 
members assisted each other with the objective purpose of occupying the whole pyramid of 
the hierarchy from bottom to the top.37
Their power and influence became apparent in 1951 when, as an act of support to 
their leader, Marshal Papagos, they staged a coup, but due to the latter’s refusal to 
participate in it, a military dictatorship was avoided, while the subsequent electoral victory 
of Papagos and his secure position, tamed the IDEA officers. Thereafter, the IDEA 
organisation ceased to exist, but its ex-members, by maintaining their hard-core principles, 
continued as the ultra-rightist faction of the army and were ready to intervene as soon as 
they perceived a threat coming from the non-rightist elements in the political world. In 
1958, the ex-IDEA officers, following the achievement by the leftist EDA of a 24% 
percentage of the national vote, formed a new paramilitary organisation called EENA
3^ Stavrou, Allied Politics and Military Interventions, p. 116.
37 Karagiorgas, op.cit., p. 3.
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(“Union of Young Greek Officers”) under the leadership of Papadopoulos, which in 
subsequent years pursued a reactionary and at times violent policy towards the 
progressive-leftist political elements in Greek society. The organisation of IDEA due to its 
conspiratorial activities during the post-war period, became the subject of discussions in 
parliament and criticism from the press.
The immediate causes for the breakdown of democracy in Greece and the army’s 
determination to intervene directly in the political process came after the 1964 electoral 
victory of the Centre Union, when right-wing parliamentary domination was threatened by 
the centre-left political forces. In the context of a major threat to the post-war anti­
communist political arrangement, the military hierarchies, and more specifically the ultra- 
conservative forces of the military, felt that they had to intervene in politics.38
C. The power structure o f the 21st o f April regime: A military-supported 
dictatorship
The military intervention of 1967 grew out of conspiratorial activities of two 
different military groups: the “big junta” of the generals and the “small junta” of the 
colonels. Although the army was in agreement as to its intervention in parliamentary 
politics, at that particular historical point, it was divided on the question of the nature of the 
established regime. The big junta of royalist, higher-ranking officers decided to stage their 
coup on the 24th of April 1967, in order to present the king with a “fait accompli”. It was 
a coup planned by the top elite of the military, a sort of “palace coup”, which would 
respect and maintain the hierarchy of the military apparatus under the higher political 
command of the king. A second coup d’etat of April 1967 was master-minded by the 
“small junta”, a group of colonels with a common IDEA background, with strong anti- 
royal and anti-communist sentiments, who were from a lower social background than the
38 The Prime Minister o f the Centre Union tried to diminish the influence of the reactionary ex-IDEA 
members within the army by sending them to remote military posts away from the army centres. 
Moreover, the activities of ASPIDA, an anti-IDEA, leftist conspiratorial army organisation and an alleged 
sabotage of Evros created a climate of a communist threat within the army itself. For a detailed presentation 
of these events. (See Linardatos From the Civil War to the Junta, Vol. 5.) To a large portion of the army 
officers this type o f situation, aggravated by governmental instability, created a sense of threat for the 
nation as a whole and an aversion towards parliamentary tactics.
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members of the big junta, which they set for the 21st April, in order to pre-empt the 
forthcoming coup of the royalist generals of the “big junta”.39 This coup, planned by 
middle-ranking officers proved to be the more successful and organised.40 The deep 
political disagreements between the two army factions became apparent with the accession 
of the military junta to power.
Apart from the deeper ideological differences between the two conspiratorial 
factions of the military, there was also an immediate corporate reason which had to do with 
the promotion structure of the post-war army. While career advancement is a slower 
process in times of peace, a “promotional freeze” had generated dissatisfaction among 
young career officers who accepted the 21st of April coup more easily and resented the 
interference of politicians in their professional careers 41 This climate of discontent among 
military officers helps to explain why many officers, during the dictatorship, chose to 
accept the junta in exchange for higher military posts, governmental or other administrative 
positions.
The April coup d’etat involved a declaration of a “state of siege” which suspended 
basic constitutional rights and imposed martial law. It was blatantly unconstitutional since 
neither the king nor any minister of the previous civilian government was conscious of this 
act; it was imposed without the knowledge of either the prime minister or the king.42 While
39 Of the 12 members of the 1967 coup d’ etat, 7  were members of the Military Academy class of 1943 
and 4  had graduated with the class of 1940, having entered the Academy during the Metaxas dictatorship; all 
of them came from peasant or lower middle class backgrounds, from villages or small towns, and were sons 
of peasant farmers or petty government functionaries. 5 of the 12 had been faithful IDEA members and 
there is a strong possibility that all 12 had belonged to that organisation at one lime or another. The “small 
junta” of the IDEA officers having been informed about the exact big junta plan intervened promptly on the 
21st to place political power in the hands of middle- ranking army officers. Details of the conspiracies of  
the two juntas are discussed among others, in Karagiorgas’ op.cit., in Degiannis’ The Trial, and in S. 
Gregoriades’ The History o f the Dictatorship Vol.l.
40 A main feature of the 1967 coup was the fact that it was bloodless and it did not meet resistance from 
the rest of the officers. The coup d’etat managed to get on top of eleven thousand Greek officers in a single 
night which reveals the secrecy and high organisation of the conspiracy.
During the civil war, due to the need for more military officers, standards were lowered and many 
officers were held up at the bottom, with few chances for promotion, while the number of top posts was 
limited. The top leadership at the time of the coup belonged to the pre-war group while the majority of 
low- and middle-ranking officers belonged to the post-war group. The level of corporate dissatisfaction is 
shown by the fact that prior to the 1967 coup, 200 captains had formed an association for the advancement 
of their personal interests. Mouzelis “Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece”, p.74 and Politics in 
the Semi-Periphery, p. 144.
4-  The manner in which the coup was carried out showed that the middle-ranking officers who organised 
the coup had fewer connections or ties o f loyalty to individuals or institutions outside the army than the 
other higher-ranking conspirators and therefore a lack of support from a political elite for the stabilisation 
of their rule. Edward Feit in The Armed Bureaucrats, p. 122.
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initially the colonels succeeded in getting King Constantine’s acquiescence, following 
the failed attempt by the king at a second coup d'etat on December 13 1967, the king fled 
the country. However, the junta did not immediately abolish the monarchy, instead 
imposing the regency of Zoitakis. It had however lost royalist support, and alienated a 
large proportion of the army.
The seven-year military rule was mainly the affair of a certain faction within the 
army, led by a small band of conspiratorial officers. The other two services tolerated the 
Colonels’ regime, but never harboured any warm feeling toward it.43 The collective type 
of political authority exercised by a certain faction of the military and the attempt by the 
leader of the “Revolutionary Council”,44 Papadopoulos, to transform the military 
dictatorship into a personalistic type of dictatorial/presidential rule, resulted in conflicts 
within the power bloc, whereby officers in the government attempted to use their posts to 
further their own political interests.
The military junta having seized power, did not stop thinking and acting in a 
conspiratorial way, lacking the necessary political organisation or experience to be able to 
pursue a sound governmental policy. The military junta carried out a purge of senior 
officers, offered accelerated promotion to those at the bottom of the hierarchy, while with 
the military in government there were ample opportunities for patronage. Following the 
king’s coup attempt in December 1967, the officer corps was purged of all royalist 
elements to a degree that adversely affected the operational capabilities of the armed 
forces 45 Most of the officers supported the coup knowing that their chances of promotion 
would increase given the numerous dismissals that would inevitably follow:
43 Note the difference with the Chilean case where the coup installed a four-man junta of the army, the air 
force, the navy and the paramilitary police. Also in 1966 the Argentinean coup was planned by the chiefs 
of staff of the three armed forces, rather than by one faction within the military. On the contrary, the 1976 
military intervention in Argentina did not enjoy unity in the armed forces and the 1976-1983 regime can be 
seen as “semi-factional”. See Guillermo Makin “Argentina: The Authoritarian Impasse” in The Political 
Dilemmas o f Military Regimes, p. 160.
44 The highest executive organ of the military government composed of the initiators o f the coup.
4~* Some three thousand officers in all were retired or dismissed between 1967 and 1972, while congestion 
in the middle ranks reached a high level. By 1974, officers of the ranks of lieutenant and captain formed 
43% of the entire corps, w'hile those in the middle ranks of major and colonel amounted to no less than 
54%. (See Veremis, “The Military” in Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels, 
Featherstone & Katsoudas, eds., p. 220.) Much of the blame for the Cyprus debacle in 1974 was due to the 
weak organisation of the Greek armed forces which were debilitated because their most skilful officers, 
belonging to the higher ranks, refused to cooperate with the military rulers.
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The new means o f advancement was the overthrowing o f the hierarchy. Discipline 
collapsed. Higher officers were transformed into puppets in the hands o f the lower 
officers. Very capable officers were dismissed on the grounds that they were not 
liked by the conspirators. 46
On the whole the colonels neutralised the danger of a counter-revolution either from 
the military or the political world by establishing a system of informers, who belonged to 
all social groups, from the very top down to servants and porters, thus enabling the regime 
to control the pro-royalists and anti-royalists, the Church, financial circles and the Armed 
Forces. Within the civil service, the military government carried out an extensive purge of 
several thousand unreliable or opposition elements, replacing them with retired army 
officers, soldiers and their kin and introducing into each ministry and bureau a military 
“watch-dog” to monitor the activities of the civil servants.47 The situation was similar in 
the officers’ corps and as one general has aptly put it,
In every military unit in the country, there was a governmental officer, with the 
rank o f the captain, imposed by the military regime, who told his superiors how to 
conduct their military affairs. The most important value o f the military institution is 
discipline, which was abolished by the regime o f Papadopoulos. I f  discipline 
does not exist then the army loses its character and its tenacity. 48 
For their part the politicians of the right and the left were overwhelmingly against 
any collaboration with the dictatorial regime, even when the junta, in its effort to liberalise 
its authority, asked for the partnership of ex-politicians. The military governors’ proposals 
to the politicians that they should participate in a partly civilianised government were all 
rebuffed.49 Instead, the military rulers, during their seven years in power, tried to act as
46 See Karagiorgas, op.cit., p. 61, [in Greek].
47 On the relationship between the military rulers and the civil bureaucracy see Danopoulos’ “The 
Military and Bureaucracy in Greece, 1967-1974” in Public Administration and Development, Vol. 8, 
pp.219-231, where he argues that the military as political governors, due to the nature of their military 
profession, which emphasises discipline and strict subordination, created an atmosphere to which the less 
regimented and more give-and-take oriented bureaucrats had difficulty becoming accustomed.
48 Personal interview with General Nikiforos Karavellas, November 1990, [in Greek],
49 Karamanlis, from France, had stated from the beginning that he would only be involved in Greek 
politics once the military had completely stepped aside. Kancllopoulos, the leader of the conservative party 
and Mavros the leader of the centre union had openly voiced their disagreement with the liberalisation 
measures. Averoff of the conservative party was one politician who wanted to act as a bridge between 
politicians and the junta. The rest of the political personalities were either exiled in the country or abroad
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civilian governments and to persuade the populace of their capabilities to rule better than 
the civilians whom they had replaced. Their experience as professional soldiers however 
did not provide the military rulers with the necessary skills to be effective initiators of 
political change.50 Although the military rulers tried to act as civilians in their policy­
making, the mentality of their professional soldier hampered them. The military 
background did not provide the military rulers with sufficient organisational and 
educational skills, or adequate political flexibility to pursue or even to formulate 
government policy. While in other cases, there may be increased transferability of the 
professional officers* skills to domestic political activity, the Greek military profession, 
showed a limited ability to bargain and to communicate, skills which are crucial if political 
power is to be retained.51 Moreover, Greek military officers had a tendency to be “anti­
politics” and even to be hostile to politicians and politics groups, because they distrusted 
the bargaining process of party politics and tended to believe that any problem is amenable 
to a direct and simple solution. Such contradictions came to be more than obvious in the 
military rulers’ perception of the Greek realities, while all the specific features of the Greek 
military mind were reproduced in both their ideological discourse and their policy towards 
the youth.
and/or had formed resistance movements. The only notable cases of collaborators included Pipinelis, the 
foreign affairs minister, and Markezinis, the puppet prime minister in 1973.
50 This was most clearly seen in their inability to produce a stable government. During seven years of 
military rule, there was a sequence of six different governments and seven partial reshuffles. Kremmydas, 
The People o f the Junta after the Dictatorship, pp. 215-228.
51 Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations, p. 116.
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Chapter 6 : THE 21ST OF APRIL REGIME’S IDEAS OF THE POST-WAR 
REALITY: MILITARY MENTALITIES
The ideas of the military junta reflected the “mentalities and prejudices” of the post­
war military officers, the guardians of the official anti-communist state. It was a sum of 
contradictory themes expressing the personal views of the various officers participating in 
the “Revolutionaiy Council”, and of those associated with them. These themes did not 
constitute an ideology as such, but a type of “pseudo-ideology”, unable to present a 
coherent authoritarian discourse in order to mobilise society and legitimise authoritarian 
rule. The absence of an authoritarian ideology, the lack of coherence in the guiding 
principles, and above all, the mentality of the rulers, the military elite, were serious 
obstacles to the process of mobilisation and attempts to encourage participation. Instead, 
the ideological priority and the political practice of the regime aimed at the depoliticisation 
of the masses in order to leave them politically apathetic.
The various military officers held some vague ideological notions in common. 
These general ideological commitments included their rhetorical attachment to the 
traditional Greek values of the Helleno-Christian civilisation, hostility to the threat of Pan- 
Slav communism and to the heresies of Western neo-anarchism. These vague, commonly 
held notions were presented as if they constituted the ideology of a united elite, thus 
papering over the conflicting tendencies within the junta. Due to the inability of the military 
junta to achieve unity in its ideology, the regime tried to create a constitutional legitimacy 
based on a new constitution, a type of a “pseudo-liberal regime”, following the model of 
the constitutional democracies of Western Europe. Ultimately, the military regime was 
unable to provide itself with any sort of ideological or constitutional legitimacy, and this 
resulted in conflicts within its ranks and the downfall of the military regime.
Disregarding their own internal ethos and their highest military values of discipline, 
obedience and the unity of the military corps, the military rulers sought to impose their will 
through conspiratorial tactics and evinced a total disrespect towards the previous 
hierarchies, the military itself, the Church, the civil service and the educational apparatus.
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Due to the lack of an organised political base, the junta aimed to impose its own clientelistic 
network of people iyj the policy-making machinery, which typically reflected their post­
war patterns of para-military behaviour, and to create a new political establishment to 
replace the previous one. In the place of an ideological legitimation, the Greek military 
regime based its connection with civil society on the imposition of a clientelistic network of 
people loyal to the regime, a clear case of authoritarian clientelism. Overall, there was an 
unbridgeable gap between the rhetoric of the military rulers and their actual practice, 
between their declared predilections and their political actions, which became even more 
apparent in the educational field where their ultra-conservative rhetoric contrasted with the 
urgent need for modernisation, following the other advanced liberal industrialised 
societies.
Right wing military ideology
A model case of a right-wing military ideology, as such, as with fascist ideology, 
does not exist, given the variety of military interventions in politics in various parts of the 
world, and the variety of national contexts within which interventions occur. Some 
common themes however do appear in the various cases, points of convergence between 
the different right-wing dictatorial military regimes. In general, military governments 
evoke the danger to the social or political order, in their effort to justify their intervention in 
politics. Law and order, therefore becomes the main rhetorical objective, which indicates 
the vagueness of military’s conception of its function when it takes on the role of 
authoritarian ruler. In most cases the danger to the political order is really a cover for their 
own corporate vulnerability and the objectives of law and order mean the securing of their 
position within the power bloc.
A prevalent theme in right-wing military ideology is the ample use of an anti­
communist and anti-socialist rhetoric, which leads them to the outright repression of 
perceived subversive persons and social groups. They identify their nationalism with the 
promotion of traditional values, the exaltation of national military glory and the emphasis 
on traditional institutions such as the family and the Church. At the extreme, their
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nationalism reaches the level of xenophobia and the exaggeration of foreign threats which 
endanger the national identity. The right-wing nationalism of the military however, has 
never attained the racist proportions of fascism, or the imperialistic/expansionist tendencies 
of the fascist inter-war regimes. If military rulers engage themselves in external wars, as 
was the case with 1974 Greece and 1982 Argentina, this is in order to distract the people’s 
attention from the internal problems which threaten their stability as governments. In both 
cases, the external warfare led to the revelation of the military’s inability to govern 
effectively and the overthrow of military regime.
Contrary to the fascist antipathy towards parliamentarism and liberalism, right- 
wing military regimes emphasise the temporary character of their rule and promise a return 
to liberal democracy. Most important, however, has been the lack of an international 
authoritarian context, an acceptable authoritarian alternative, which provided the inter-war 
authoritarian regimes with some sort of legitimacy. Looming in the background was 
always the international dominance of liberal democracy, which was never contested and 
which resulted in the most notable contradictions between the military’s rhetoric and its 
dictatorial practice. Overall, military regimes tend to set forth very vague objectives in 
order to mask their inability to form a specific political strategy. On the other hand, the lack 
of an assertion of specific, articulate and explicit commitments facilitates their ideological 
adaptation to changing conditions.
Due to the abnormal character of military intervention, a rupture with the previous 
parliamentary development, military governors feel compelled to make a wide use of the 
ideological apparatuses, in order to justify the exceptional character of their authority. But 
they lack the systematic use of fascist propaganda methods and are therefore unable to 
adopt the mobilisational aspect of fascist regimes. Thus their main effort is to demobilise 
and depoliticise their respective populations, to promote a general apathy. They are 
therefore tom between an accepted limited pluralism and a need to keep an authoritarian 
control over the harmful deviations. As the Greek case of the 21st of April regime will 
show, all these elements attest to the lack of an ideological framework, the inability to 
employ ideology in order to interpret reality, to mobilise society or to legitimise their rule,
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while, on the contrary, they use a constant rhetoric for the justification of the authoritarian 
exercise of power.
“Revolution”: The junta’s explanation of the coup d ’ etat
The military rulers rejected the descriptions of fascism, totalitarianism, and even 
dictatorship, as an explanation of the nature of their intervention, while they used the term 
“revolution” to such an extent, that it became a very common word in the official 
vocabulary of the military regime, and was perpetually used by the military officers and 
their intellectuals, in their effort to persuade the populace of their intention to alter radically 
the political life of Greece. The leaders of the 21st April intervention and their theorists, 
also rejected the notion of the “coup d’ etat”, and presented their intervention as a 
necessary “revolutionary change”, brought about by a group of nationally-minded, middle- 
ranking officers.1 Their political revolution aimed at the salvation of the country from 
“chaos and red totalitarianism ” and at a “national renaissance” in the political, intellectual, 
social and administrative life. Furthermore, the term “revolution”, was defined more “as an 
attitude o f mind and a moral stand, an expression o f the soul rather than as a material 
expression ”2 and in no sense did it go against the established status quo, but only against 
the corrupt political parliamentary system. They defined their action as,
the dynatnic seizure o f power by a dynamic minority which seizes power in order 
to exercise it. In a revolution, those who carry out the dynamic seizure o f power 
reflect the wishes, hopes and ideals o f the larger masses. 3
1 The actual intervention took place on the basis of the NATO project “Prometheus”, which foresaw 
military intervention in politics in the case of a perceived communist threat. At the top of the conspiracy 
stood the triumvirate: Colonel Giorgos Papadopoulos, Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos, Colonel 
Nikolaos Makarezos, who acted in agreement with the Revolutionary Council formed by Colonels, 
Lieutenant Colonels and Lieutenant Generals. According to the verdict by the special court, appointed al ter 
the downfall of the military junta, 24 officers had planned and executed the overthrow of the parliamentary 
government. The members of the triumvirate were charged as “instigators and leaders of the rebellion”. {The 
Trial by Degiannis)
2 Newspaper Eleftkeros Kosmos, 21/11/72.
3 See Giorgos Giorgalas’ The Ideology o f  the Revolution, the main ideological document on the purposes 
of the dictatorial regime, p. 5, [in Greek].
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The revolution was also classified as political and not social or economic. The intention of 
the military was to change neither the social and economic status quo, nor the liberal 
system, and was to encourage private initiative and private property.
It is a political revolution which has swept away the old political establishment; the 
old parties, the electoral fiefs, the political oligarchies, the mentalities, the inner- 
relations and the organisations o f our political world. 4 
Moreover the military officers perceived themselves,
as children o f the working class, not from any aristocracy or plutocracy, but from  
petty-bourgeois and peasant families and they compose the most sensitive parts o f 
the national consciousness.5 
Although they presented their “revolution” as one which enjoyed the acceptance of the 
people at large, they also proclaimed the inferiority of civil society vis a vis the military 
body by claiming that,
the people accept the revolution on the basis o f their instincts and intuition, without 
having realised the necessity or the cause o f it, but when the revolution develops 
and reaches its aims, then the people can realise its necessity, faced with a 'fait 
accompir. 6
As was the case with the Metaxas regime, the 1967 dictatorial rulers expressed their 
aversion to the political establishment and the way parliamentary politics were conducted, 
not in the context of an internationally organised anti-parliamentarian and anti-liberal 
philosophy, but in the context of their own disrespect for politicians, which had marked 
their behaviour during the post-war period, and of the threat to their power position within 
the post-war political establishment. It was clear however form the beginning that the 
Greek military rulers had a very vague perception of what their role was, as political 
governors, and a sense of confusion as to their particular goals as policy-makers.
Who are we? We belong to no political party and are not disposed to favour one 
political group or another. We belong to the working class and we remain on the
4 Ibid., p. 6.
5 Ibid., p. 3.
6 “Theoretical Positions on the Revolution” by K.Vryonis in Thesis kni Ideai, May 1968, p. 5, (in 
Greekf
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side o f those o f our brother Greeks who are least well-off. We are activated solely 
by patriotic aims and we hope to abolish deprivation, to cleanse public life and to 
create a healthy basis so that the country may quickly return to a normal 
parliamentary life. Our essential object is social justice, equitable distribution o f 
income, the moral and material resurrection o f all society and particularly o f the 
peasants, the workers and the poorest classes.1
Anti-communism: The conspiratorial attitude of the military mind
The “threat from below” is the common denominator in all right-wing military 
regimes, whether of a personalistic character like the Pinochet, Salazar and Franco 
regimes, of a bureaucratic-authoritarian type, as in Argentina and Brazil, or of a purely 
military authoritarian type, as with the Greek case. It is the vague theme that holds the 
authoritarian coalitions together and supplies them with the constant justification of their 
exercise of authoritarian rule. In the Latin American cases, the Cuban Revolution provided 
the actual example of a communist takeover, the case to be avoided at any cost.8 In the 
Greek case, the Balkan neighbours and the proximity of the cold war in Europe remained a 
permanent reminder and pretext for the anti-communist rhetoric. The strongest element 
in the official ideology of the post-war state was anti-communism, which was perceived as 
the major enemy of the nation as a whole, and to the armed forces in particular. This was 
the principal legacy of the civil war of the 1940s, and was fuelled by the international 
climate of the cold war. In this respect, the military junta had nothing new to offer in the 
anti-communist orientation of their official discourse. The military rulers, and their 
ideologues, deliberately exaggerated the danger of such a threat, despite the fact that the 
dictatorship coincided with a the period of relative detente internationally, towards the end 
of the 1960s.9
7 William McNeil, The Metamorphosis o f  Greece Since World War II, p. 120.
8 Robert Kaufman, “Liberalisation and Democratisation in South America”, Unpublished draft, September 
21, 1984, p. 6.
9 The officers’ education during the post-war period aggravated their anti-communist hysteria, having been 
done by ex-communist theoreticians w ho had lived in the countries of Eastern Europe and had become the 
wildest opponents of socialism. Among such ex-communists Giorgos Georgalas, Theofylaklos 
Papakonslantinou and Demetres Tsakonas had been the military propagandists and were subsequently
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I shall merely present a recent statement by Zoitakis, the Regent of Greece during 
the period 1968-1972, concerning the way the military regarded communism in Greece, to 
illustrate the typical military perception:
KKE is an ally to our enemies. One such example is the civil war when the 
communists were helped by the Bulgarians and other communist states. The danger 
to the country is not the external but the internal one. It is the Greek communists 
that we have to eliminate in the first place, and then we can consider the external 
enemies. In the School o f General Education, where military people were educated, 
a lecturer by the name o f Stavrides, an ex-communist who had lived in the Soviet 
Union used to tell us about the strategy o f communism. International communism 
strives to attain its dominance in all the countries o f the world by following three 
stages: the first stage is the creation o f a united front by collaborating with 
ideologically similar parties, in order to attract followers and increase its influence 
through the means o f propaganda; the second stage is to collaborate with the 
government in order to infiltrate the state apparatus; the third stage is to overturn the 
government through secret illegal machinations and to attain the exercise o f power 
and the imposition o f communism. The best way to avoid communism is to prevent 
communists from having any contact with the other parties so that the communist 
movement is left isolated.
Greece has suffered more from communism than other countries. The first round 
with the communists took place during the occupation, with the creation ofELAS; 
the second round came in December 1944, with the attempt by the communist 
movement in Athens to seize power; the third round was during the umob war ” of 
1946-1949. A few  years later the party o f George Papandreou initiated a 
collaboration with the communists. The communists started infiltrating the state 
apparatus, they terrorized the people o f the countryside. They even infiltrated the 
army by creating the ASPIDA; the rest o f the officers were very worried about the 
situation. In 1967, the communists were ready for the fourth round. The situation
employed by the junta with the task of placing the authoritarian discourse into a more systematically 
organised form.
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was ungovernable and that justified the government o f the 21st o f April in its 
suppression o f the fourth communist attempt to seize power. 10
What interests us here is the way the anti-communist idea influenced the mentality 
of military officers, who felt above all that their corporate interests were threatened by the 
relaxation of the post-war anti-communist state. The military perceived communism as a 
threat to the country and to their existence as a corps, and were not at all interested in the 
philosophical analysis of marxist theory. They saw an element of conspiracy, very 
common in their own way of thinking, in the process by which communism infiltrated 
state mechanisms and, most importantly, the military apparatus.11
Concerning the actual practice of anti-communist policies, at the domestic level, the 
junta devoted all its effort to the creation of an exclusionary and repressive state apparatus, 
aimed against those who were communists or with communist affiliations. At the foreign 
policy level, however, the Greek dictatorship restored diplomatic relations with Albania 
and China, encouraged commercial and economic deals with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European states, and kept a low profile and good neighbourly relations with the Balkan 
countries and the Eastern bloc, under the pressure of the international climate of detente. 
Whatever the anti-communist hysteria at home, the regime stated through its propagandist 
Georgalas, that Greece belonged to the West, to NATO, that it wanted peace and 
cooperation internationally and the legitimacy of the international status quo.
Anti-westemism: The puritanical xenophobia of the military mind
The second negative perception in the military’s way of thinking involved hostility 
to the western world, to what was seen as its neo-anarchism, and to the modem western
10 Personal Interview, November 1990, [in Greek].
11 The rhetorical persistence of the emphasis on a communist threat was common to all military officers 
from those who opposed the 1967 military intervention to the hard-core anti-democrats. General Zoitakis 
was among the mildest in contrast with Colonel Ladas who in his innumerable speeches used the w ildest 
descriptions when he referred to the phenomenon o f communism. Ladas attacked both internal and 
international communism and his allusions to the December events during the Greek civil war were very 
descriptive in horrific details of tortures, killings and fights, in his struggle to prove what crimes were 
committed by the “murderers, the criminals, the human-like beasts o f K K E \ (“Speech to the Students of 
Athens”, 10/12/70, in Ladas’ Speeches, p. 31.) The leader Papadopoulos presented communists as much 
w'orse than the Nazi occupiers, stating that “the victims o f the Greek communists were greater in number 
than those o f the Germans” (Our Creed, Vol. 1, p. 27).
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values and life style. The military regime of 1967 did not object to the ideas and practice of 
economic liberalism and capitalism, given the international ideological acceptance of 
western liberal ideology and Greece’s position within the western capitalist bloc. 
Moreover, the military’s role in the victory over the communist forces in the 1940s and its 
position within the post-war power structure, as the main guardian of the anti-communist 
state, testified to its capitalist predilection. On the other hand, the extremely puritanical 
orientation of the military mentality, focused on an attack against western cultural values, 
and obstructed the officers’ ability to accept any new movements, innovations, or modem 
expressions of the western world. In his book, The Crisis o f the Consumerist Society, 
Georgalas, the main propagandist of the 21st of April regime, makes an outright offensive 
against the values of the western world, against the practices and ideas of the western 
youth, whose decadence was expressed in the events of 1968 in France, the hippies in the 
United States and the various anarchists and nihilists of western societies. The notion that 
there was a conspiracy against the cultural self-sufficiency of the Greek nation and against 
the regime of the 21st of April sprang both from hostility to eastern communism and to the 
decadent values of the west, such as the hippies’ movement, anarchism, nihilism, 
eudemonism, which was common to the way of thinking of all the junta officers and to the 
theoreticians of the regime.
Greekness and Christianity, the two sources o f Greek life, were covered by the 
leaves o f ‘Europeanism ’ , which has resulted in the fact that the Greeks have been 
drinking the muddy water o f European atheism and anarchism- and nowadays o f
modernism Our national heritage will either vanish within the western
European mob or it will win and will have the lead. 12
Colonel Ioannis Ladas, a hard-core military officer, a fervent anti-liberalist and 
anti-communist went even further in condemning western modem civilisation in all its 
intellectual forms:
The Greeks are threatened by insignificant subjects who, through the press, the 
cinema and the theatre, among other means, bring to our society the decay o f other
12 See E. Papadopoulos, The Portrait o f  a Leader or Five Years o f Revolution, Athens 1972, p. 8, [in 
Greek].
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societies, to our people the corruption o f other peoples and to our values the 
filthiness o f other values. It consists o f an organised traitorous conspiracy against 
Greek civilisation. 13
The gap between rhetoric and practice is even more pronounced here, given that the 
junta actually pursued the complete opposite of what it professed. Contrary to the officers’ 
anti-consumerist rhetoric, the military governors promoted a consumerist attitude for the 
majority of the Greek population, based on the import of luxurious goods from abroad, 
while 30% of the total national savings went on the construction of luxurious and semi- 
luxurious buildings.14 The military junta abolished all limits on the supply of consumer 
loans. As to the junta’s anti-westemism and distrust of western decadent values, the 
regime, through the promotion of tourism (and the intensive construction of hotels), 
brought these values into close contact with the most remote and isolated parts of the 
country and introduced the peasant community to foreign ways of life.15 Borrowing for 
tourist hotels and facilities went up six times during the period 1967-1973. By pursuing 
policies aimed at the encouragement of consumerism and the development of tourism, the 
regime struggled to give the impression of prosperity, thus hoping to induce political 
apathy among the population and to secure the regime against any reaction from the various 
social sectors.
The nationalism of the junta: The vague and out-dated theme of “Helleno- 
Christianism”
Against the threatening values of the eastern communist and the western 
consumerist worlds, the military put forth the values of the “Helleno-Christian 
civilisation”. Both Greek dictatorial regimes made ample use of the nationalist and religious
13 See Ladas' Speeches, p. 47, [in Greek].
14 Each year the country' spent approximately 150 million dollars on the import of luxurious goods; the 
total of imports quadrupled during the period 1967-1973, creating a huge deficit in the state budget. See 
Dionysis Karagiorgas’ “The Economic Consequences of the Military' Dictatorship” in Polilis 1, 7/9/74, pp. 
41-45.
15 The military’s purist and moralistic rhetoric was contradicted in actual fact by the massive inflow of 
hippy tourists into various summer resorts, while as regards their sexual morality, their period was 
characterised by the explosion of pornographic periodicals on open view in the kiosks and the massive 
production of pornographic films for export to the countries of Western Europe.
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elements in Greece's cultural heritage, expecting that emphasis on such themes would 
strengthen the support for their regimes from traditionally-minded Greeks. Since 
nationalist and religious feelings are essential elements in the Greek cultural identity, the 
dictatorial regimes tried to convince the people that the national and religious parts of their 
Greek identity were in danger and needed to be safeguarded by a nationally-minded 
authoritarian government. The dictatorship of Metaxas took place in a period of a wider 
philosophical anxiety in Greece, regarding the rediscovery of the Greek identity, following 
the rapid changes of the 1920s, and coincided with the international climate of authoritarian 
fascist (aggressive or defensive) nationalism. Although Metaxas’ dream of the creation of 
the “Third Greek Civilisation” sounded hyperbolic and excessive, it was typical of the 
European nationalisms of the day.
The military junta, on the other hand, promoted the theme of “Helleno-Christian 
Greece” as their main idea, in a period of economic, political and cultural cooperation 
among the countries of the Western world. Its evocation was another expression of the 
narrow traditionalistic military mentality and the officers’ metaphysical fear of the 
cooperation and inter-connection between different cultures. The Greek nationalist spirit 
was perceived by the military to be in a continuous historical struggle against the 
conspiratorial activities of the different cultures surrounding the Greek nation. The 
officers’ inability to form a coherent nationalist philosophy, resulted in the production of a 
series of nonsensical rhetorical statements, typical of their ill-based intellectual skills and of 
their ideological confusion, for example: “The Greeks have always been Greeks o f Greece, 
Greeks o f the Greek nation”.16 The ideological motto of the junta government was 
expressed in the “Greece o f Christian Hellenes”. A Greek-Christian person should be 
“philopatris ” (to love his country), “philonomos” (to abide by the law), “leventis ” (a 
brave and “macho” figure), a high moral person, proud, hospitable and a “good 
Christian”, he should go to church, pray etc. The military officers believed that they 
possessed such qualities and offered themselves as exemplary models to the Greek people.
16 Papadopoulos in his “Speech to the Students of Salonica”, 29/3/69, in Our Creed, Vol. 2.
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The officers’ perceptions of history are of crucial significance under military 
regimes, given that the significant role played by the armed forces in the development of 
the nation and the great responsibility of the army in the shaping of the nation’s destiny 
gives military regimes rich opportunities to legitimise and justify their interventionist role in 
politics, by emphasising the importance of the armed forces in the nation’s history. The 
military mind regards history, in general, and military history, specifically, as “the most 
effective means o f teaching war during peace time ”. The military ethic places unusual 
value upon the “ordered, purposive study o f history ” .17 It tends to emphasise the 
importance of force as opposed to ideological and economic historical facts.
Following a very subjective interpretation of history the colonels and their 
intellectuals never ceased to compare the 1967 military intervention with the Greek 
revolution of 1921, to symbolise the “heroic character of the 1967 revolution” with the 
coup of 1909 in Goudi, the only real similarity being that the latter had also been also 
instigated by lower and middle-ranking officers. Colonel Ladas’ fanatical rhetoric was an 
extreme case of the bellicose perception of history, as when in his speeches, he identified 
history with military history, and perceived Greek history exclusively as a sequence of 
military events: “/  have to fight in life in order to achieve Salaminas, Marathons, '21s and 
‘40s, since only these events offer historical vindication to struggles, to peoples and to 
Nations”. The same Colonel went so far as to believe that Greece was surrounded by 
enemies and that the destiny of the youth (“beyond education which is useless in the long 
run”) was to be ready for war, since war was inevitable given that “there has not been any
generation who lived without her own battle History shows that the Greek man exists
only when he proves to the others the superiority o f his existence ”.18 Ladas’ ideas 
represented an extreme perception of the historical process, but even the best that the 
theorists of the regime could come up with was a very simplistic perception of the world 
history:
17 See Huntington’s The Soldier and the State, p. 64.
“Speech to the Students of the Pedagogical Academy of Larisa”, 27/11/71 in Ladas’ Speeches, p. 83, [in 
Greek].
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The basic theme in European history has been the continuous fight o f the Greek 
civilisation against the asiatic totalitarian spirit, which was later transformed into a 
European fight against Asia and lately against communism ,19
“New Democracy99: The alleged transitional character o f the junta regime
Most military rulers deny the authoritarian character of their regime and, in order to 
convince the people of the benevolent nature of their rule, claim the temporariness of their 
tenure of power and declare their allegiance to the true principles of democracy. While 
Metaxas declared openly his distrust for liberal democracy and his admiration for 
totalitarianism, the military rulers could not admit such a purpose and justified their 
intervention as a necessity for the creation of a “healthy democracy” or the “new 
democracy”, as they called it. They sought to persuade people of their allegiance to the 
principles of democracy.
The revolution o f the 21st April regime did not overturn democracy since this was 
nonexistent in reality. It was abolished by the irresponsibility o f the enemies o f 
freedom, the corruption o f most o f the rulers, the deep undermining o f the 
institutions, the unscrupulous cooperation with the enemies o f the country, and the 
wholesale infiltration by the latter through the body o f our national
organism The 21st o f April revolution overthrew this situation and is
considered an anti-dictatorial, anti-totalitarian regime for the purposes o f true
freedom  True democracy is legal freedom, a power which is limited by the
Law, is bound by the institutions and controlled by Public Opinion -20 
Like most of the post-second world war military dictatorships in Latin America, 
the military junta promised a return to democracy as soon as the government judged that 
the time was ripe for it.21 The leader Papadopoulos frequently announced that he would 
personally decide when uthe level o f maturity o f the Greek people ” was right for a return
19 See Giorgalas, The Ideology o f the Revolution, p. 44, [in Greek].
20 See The Ideology o f the Revolution, pp. 36-38, in Greek],
21 Similarly General Pinochet had announced in 1974 that the military would remain in power for no more 
than five years, turning out to be one of the longest dictatorships in the Southern Cone. Skidmore/Smith, 
Modem Latin America,
p. 142.
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to the electoral, party system. Papadopoulos used to refer to the country, “as a sick 
patient, who needed to be operated on by the surgeons o f the 21st April Revolution and 
was put in a plaster for the process o f recovery ”. 22
The constitutional framework: The pseudo-liberal facade
Whereas inter-war mobilisational authoritarian regimes were mostly based on their 
ideological formulations, post-war authoritarian liberal regimes, relied mostly on the 
imposition of a legalistic framework, by enacting constitutions after the liberal model, and 
demanding obedience on the basis of their own legal authority. This is what is known as 
the “rational-legal” formula of legitimation under military regimes which is based on the 
adoption of a set of constitutional and procedural principles. Hence military rulers try to 
base their new form of authoritarian rule on the rational-legal legitimacy, of imposed 
authoritarian pseudo-liberal institutions. As Nordlinger argues,
There are various ways in which the praetorians have provided themselves with a 
constitutional-democratic facade: a national legislature that can do little more than 
discuss and approve legislation introduced by the government; elections for 
national, state and local officials that are restricted to officially approved candidates; 
elections for the presidency featuring a single candidate; plebiscites in which the 
government asks for and 4receives' the approval o f more than 90% o f those who 
cast their ballots; and the ‘civilianisation ’ o f the regime, whereby the head o f 
governmenfsheds his uniform in order to look more like a constitutional president 
or prime minister. But whatever form it takes, such a facade does not provide a 
legitimising mantle. 23
The military junta was an authoritarian regime existing in the western, liberal 
sphere, in a world in which western liberal values were accepted and legitimised, with the 
exceptions of the authoritarian regimes of Spain and Portugal. Much of the preoccupation 
of the military regime was to persuade its international partners of the necessary and non-
22 It was said that George Papadopoulos wanted initially to become a medical doctor while many of his 
colleagues believed that his obsession with clinical images, drugs and operations was the result of his deep 
rooted disappointment. “Who’s Junta”, in Hellenic Review, June 1969, p. 28.
23 See Nordlinger’s Soldiers in Politics, pp. 133-134.
188
exceptional character of the regime. Evidence of that was their perseverance in the 
construction of a liberal constitutional framework. The main concern of the military was to 
avoid relinquishing political power, and although they promised a return to “democratic 
rule”, at the same time they imposed a constitutional framework which gave the armed 
forces a permanent and legal share in future governments. The Greek junta struggled to 
persuade the Greek people and the outside world of the democratic intentions of the 
military rulers. Judging from its rhetoric, it would appear that they were respectful of 
individual liberties and committed to the application of the laws. The Greek military 
constitution was based, theoretically, on universal suffrage and the sovereignty of the 
people and it even included clauses providing for the existence of political parties.24
As regards the Constitution, the dictatorship was divided into two periods: from 
September 1967 until June 1973, the “royalist phase” and from June 1973 until July 1974, 
the “presidential/parliamentary phase”. On September 29, 1968 the junta organised a 
referendum on a new constitutional framework, which according to military official 
records, was accepted by 91.87% of the Greek population. The classical parliamentary 
system was preserved, while the role of the king in relation to the government and the 
armed forces was diminished. Administrative autonomy was provided for the armed 
forces, and the government was excluded from matters directly involving the personnel of 
the armed forces. A very strong position was secured for the Chief Commander of the 
Armed Forces within the decision making process, by making him a sort of uncontrollable 
“super-minister” within the “Council of the Nation”. The concept of national defence was 
defined as vaguely as possible, so as to allow the intervention of the army whenever the 
circumstances demanded it. The application of the 1968 constitution was a marked contrast 
between the letter and the actual practice and the regime ended up by being “a monarchy 
without a king, a liberal regime without liberties and a parliamentary system without a
24 Similarly, the Portuguese constitutional framework was republican and conservative in character, with 
the use of western classical democratic principles to disguise its authoritarian nature. See Demichel, Les 
D iclatures Europeenes, for a comparative study of the Portuguese, Spanish and Greek dictatorial 
constitutional frameworks.
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parliament”.25 Its basic intention was to achieve a measure of international and domestic 
support and, at the same time, to secure the role of the armed forces in politics.
A new constitution in 1973, following the Navy conspiracy of May 23, 1973, 
introduced the new powerful office of “President of the Republic”, directly elected by the 
people every seven years, and abolished the Monarchy.26 The regime declared a 
referendum, similar to the 1968 one, on July 29 1973, for the approval of the new 
constitution, according to which the prime minister Papadopoulos and the leader of the 
armed forces, Angelis, became president and vice-president of the “Republic” respectively, 
and included among other things, clauses on the role of parliament in the future and the 
degree of democratisation. The second military constitution was full of contradictions, in 
its effort to emphasise the power of the president and, at the same time, to preserve the 
parliamentary character of the regime. The central purpose of the new constitution was to 
define the relationship between the president and the army.27
The referendum on the constitution was followed by the lifting of the state of 
emergency throughout the country, the granting of a general amnesty to political prisoners 
and the recognition and application in practice, for the first time since 1967, of 
constitutionally guarranteed rights. That was the first attempt by the junta to liberalise and 
civilianise its authoritarian rule, by appointing on ex-politician Markezinis, one of the very 
few politicians willing to collaborate with the military rulers, as premier. The liberalisation 
phase was short-lived and ended with the student Polytechnic uprising in November 
1973.28
25 Ibid., p. 200.
26 Traditionally the navy was a royalist stronghold and the main source of military opposition to the 
military government. The navy conspiracy showed the reluctance o f the royalist forces to accept the 
dictatorship and forced the colonels to do away with the royal institution altogether. At the December 1974 
referendum, under the parliamentary government of Karamanlis, the monarchy was abolished once and for 
all, showing that the colonels feelings towards the monarch were not sharply different from the Greek 
public’s at large. Indeed, in retrospect, it is often been said that the only positive contribution of the 
military junta was the fact that it prepared the ground for the abolition of the monarchy.
27 According to the interim provisions Papadopoulos was to remain president until 1981 and it was his 
responsibility to appoint the leaders of the army, the navy and the air force and the eleven permanent 
members of the Constitutional Court, an institution on which depended the future formation and the 
constitutionality of the political parties.
28 On the Greek dictatorial constitution see the relevant chapters in Alivizatos, Political Institutions in 
Crisis, 1922-1974, Catephores, The Legislation o f the Barbarians, Gregoriades, op.cil., Dcmichel, op.cit., 
Anastasiades, “Constitutional Stage-Designing and Ideology of the Dictatorship” in Anti 344, pp. 21-28.
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Other attempts to demonstrate the liberal intentions of the regime and its loyalty to 
the western liberal model included the formation of an Advisory Committee on Legislation 
in January 1971, composed of 56 individuals selected by the prime minister from a short 
list “voted” by a college of 1,240 electors, who were regime nominees to local 
government, professional and union organisations -the mini parliament which discussed 
draft laws but had no authority to generate legislation. Moreover, the regime tried to create 
parties which would compete in elections, as was the proclaimed intention in the new 
Constitution, but it was not clear whether the newly formed parties would constitute 
governmental or opposition parties.29 Yet despite the liberal facade, the military governors 
were unable to respect their own legal formulae, which came into broad conflict with the 
authoritarian structure of their authority. By closing off opportunities for mass 
participation, political competition and the public airing of demands they were contravening 
the very laws from which they had proposed that their constitutional legitimacy would 
derive.
Political socialisation under the military regime: Limited pluralism and the 
promotion o f mediocrities
The 1967 junta made an ample use of the ideological mechanisms and engaged in 
the dissemination of their ideas through speeches, journals, newspapers, radio and 
television.30 It is at this level that we observe the inability of the regime to create a new 
political discourse or even to articulate its intentions, regarding some of the more basic 
ideological and cultural questions. One of the initial acts of the military governors was their 
decision to censor a long list of printed publications, i.e., books, newspapers and 
periodicals. The first official act came from the ministry of education (12/5/67), which 
forbade the circulation of 647 books by both Greek and foreign authors (mostly marxist, 
historical and literary works), 44 periodicals and 83 newspapers.31
29 The new parties were the Greek Cultural Movement (EPOK) and the Social Union of Scientists. 
McDonald, ‘The Colonels’ Dictatorship”, in Background to Contemporary Greece, pp. 290-291.
30 It is ironic that both radio and television in Greece started their lives during periods of authoritarian rule. 
Radio broadcasts commenced in 1936, and television came with the colonels. See Katsoudas, ‘The Media: 
the State and Broadcasting” in Political Change in Greece, p. 189.
31 See Nicos Molyviatis ‘The Junta’s First Act on Censorship”, Anti, 19/4/91, pp. 28-29.
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The relationship between the junta and the press was a very delicate one for the 
colonels, who did not trust the journalists but thought that they could manipulate them 
through the fear of terror, on the one hand, and the use of promises, on the other. Their 
conspiratorial mentality extended to the way they perceived the role of the press. As 
McDonald points out,
the Colonels mistrusted the press and were afraid o f it. They had an image o f 
publishers as ruthless, unscrupulous press barons prepared to do or say anything 
to turn a profit and they believed newspapers to be manipulative instruments 
irresponsibly influencing public life from behind-the-scenes32 
Preventive censorship was lifted in October 1969 and the Book Index was abolished in the 
Summer of 1970. In their place a very severe and meticulous Press Law was imposed, 
with the threat of stiff sentences on any writer or newspapermen who might offend the 
colonels.33 The result of this press policy was, on the one hand, that rumours, which 
tended to form the basis of peoples’ information, flourished, while on the other hand, the 
press used insinuations, transpositions and metaphors which it would be difficult for the 
authorities to prosecute. Foreign Press and foreign radio stations, like the BBC, and 
Deutsche Welle were the main objective and u n cen so red  sources of information for the 
Greeks.
The person responsible for the regime’s propaganda was Georgalas,34 who 
suggested the creation of a Central National Office of Propaganda, which would finance 
the publication of books, periodicals and newspapers. His personal conviction was that 
there should exist a limited degree of pluralism in the diffusion of information which
32 McDonald, Pillar and Tinderbox, p. 30.
33 See Rodis Roufos ‘The Culture and the Military” in Greece under Military Rule, p. 155.
34 Georgalas was appointed the junta’s junior minister in charge of public relations, propaganda and Press 
services. Georgalas, a professional propagandist, became the regime’s chief spokesman, and the prime 
intellectual of the 21st of April regime. A communist in his youth he was educated in propaganda methods 
as a communist refugee in the countries of Eastern Europe. Following the death of Stalin he defected to the 
opposite camp and became “special adviser to the Higher Military Administration for National and Political 
Indoctrination” and editor of an army journal “Sovietologia” (Soviet Studies). (Robert McDonald, 
‘Typoktonos Tyranny” in Anti, 344, p. 30.) He was a fervent anti-communist, attacking at the same time 
the values of the modern western consumerist society. He was assigned the task of popularising the aims of 
the Revolution.
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would prevent strong reactions against the regime. Theophylactos Papakonstantinou, the 
regime’s press director and one of the ministers of Education (November 1, 1967-June 20, 
1969) wrote the book “Political Education”, which was distributed at all stages of primary, 
secondary and higher education and was considered religiously as the statement of the 
political philosophy of the regime.35
The military made use of some so-called theorists, all people loyal to the regime, 
who aimed at placing the official ideology into a more organised theoretical framework. In 
desperate need of theoreticians, the junta realised the hopes of several second-class authors 
who were writing to argue in its favour and to deliver speeches in support of it. For all 
these “pseudo-intellectuals”, the “Helleno-Christian” theme was at the core of their ideas. 
Some newspapers and periodicals which were set up during the period, offered the space 
for their ideas. As such, the regime’s newspaper Nea Politeia had only a very limited 
circulation and influence.36 In addition, a new publishing house, the Neos Kosmos (New 
World) published titles such as the memoirs of the daughter of Stalin and books and 
articles on how repressive communist methods were. Finally, the periodical Theses and 
Ideai aimed to become the intellectual standard bearer of the regime and “to promote a 
radically new perception of society”, a similar effort to the 4th of August’s Neon Kratos. 
As Clogg argues,
the regime's principal spokesmen and theorists have deliberately been allowed to 
speak as much as possible for themselves, although in trying to tabulate their 
thinking in a reasonably intelligible form , there is a danger o f making the regime’s 
ideology sound more coherent than it in fact is. For the speeches o f those 
empowered to theorise on ideological matters contain numerous inconsistencies, 
ambiguities and downright obscurities. 37
35 Papakonstantinou, a former militant communist, and an author of two books on marxism, had 
abandoned the communist party during the period of Metaxas’ rule and became a fanatic anti-communist 
thereafter. Although he had initially declared himself to be against the military intervention, he was very 
soon among the principal propagandists o f the 21st of April ideology.
36 Another ex-communist Savvas Konstantopoulos was the editor of the pro-junta newspaper Eleflheros 
Kosmos (Free World), founded six months before the coup.
37 See Clogg, ‘The ideology of the Revolution of 21sl April 1967” in Greece Under Military Rule, p. 51.
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The most important thing to be realised about the cultural awareness of the military 
officers was their lack of connection with such matters, due to their own one-sided and 
limited education. Even in cultural matters, they applied their clientelistic mentality, 
compensating loyal officers with administrative posts.38 Contrary to Metaxas’ sensitivity 
on such matters, the military junta flattered popular taste, promoting football and bouzouki 
nationwide as Greece’s most precious cultural activities.39 Most leading Greek intellectuals 
during the period of the military regime either chose silence rather than submission to 
censorship, or fled abroad. An art-historian and critic, Alexander Xydis wrote about this 
situation:
Discrimination against, and attacks upon, the most important currents in modern art 
are increasing...Mediocrity alone is recognised, because it alone is harmless, 
poses no problems, lacks impetus, looks backward. 40 
On the other hand, the junta tried to create an illusory climate of freedom in cultural matters 
by allowing the controlled circulation of ideas. Neutral art and literature were tolerated in 
order to give a liberal facade to the regime.41
Factionalism within the military junta: Hard-liners vs soft-liners
The previous section was devoted to the selection of some representative themes, 
the points of agreement among the officers, and the military’s ideological effort to present 
itself as having a unified body of ideas, the official ideological framework of the regime. 
Despite the apparent ideological unity among the leaders of the military regime, with 
respect to some very general and vague ideas and objectives, the junta was a military
38 The directorship of the National Opera, for instance was awarded to a Brigadier of tanks. McDonald, 
“The Colonels’ Dictatorship”, p. 277.
39 See Katsoudas, op.cit., p. 195.
40 See Andrews Kevin’ Greece in the Dark, p. 31.
41 It is interesting that, Axelos talks of a publishing “eruption” during the second period of the dictatorship 
starting in mid-1970 shown by the plethora of new publishing houses and the reconstruction and 
reorganisation of the already existing ones. “The gain in this period, over and above its negative aspects, 
was extremely important. Because fo r the first time in Greek history, there was the appearance o f  such 
publishing variety, and for the first time in the fie ld  o f the circulation o f written ideas there was an 
extraordinary concentration o f peop le”. It was the period of the beginning of the end of the cultural, 
ideological monopoly exercised by the traditional left and the traditional right in the movement of ideas and 
books, the crumbling of their post-war unchallenged hegemony and the beginning of a limited pluralism in 
the diffusion of ideas that would affect the subsequent decade. Loukas Axelos “Publishing Activity and the 
Movement of Ideas in Greece” in The Journal o f Hellenic Diaspora, Vol xi, No 2, Summer 1984, pp. 5-46.
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power bloc composed of a number of middle-ranking officers, most of them with a 
personal perception of the purposes of the regime. The mentalities and ideological 
commitments of the various leading officers are better understood through an appreciation 
of their differences, and the different mentalities behind the various tendencies. Contrary to 
Metaxas’personalistic authority and the man’s personal ideological influence on the 4th 
of August regime’s ideas, the non-personalistic and collective character of the 1967 
dictatorship (despite the fact that Papadopoulos tried to impose his personal authority on 
the rest of the military elite and the Greek society as a whole), resulted in the diffusion of a 
variety of personal points of views and differences between the officers, and their inability 
to present a coherent ideology. This led to the derision of their pseudo-ideology which was 
composed of a mishmash of opinions often contradicting one another. Each officer who 
regarded his position as central within the power structure, tried to impose his personal 
mark on the wider official ideological framework, which therefore became a “medley” of 
ideas and perceptions. In that respect, the military junta never managed to give the 
impression of an ideologically united body of officers that might have contributed to the 
ideological justification of their rule. On the other hand, the vagueness of their mentalities 
and prejudices blurred the lines of cleavage in the coalition, allowing the rulers to retain the 
loyalty of disparate elements. Contrary to the unified stance of the royalist officers in 
supporting the regime of Metaxas, the military junta, during the period 1967-1974, faced 
contradictions at the level of the military elite and ideological disagreements as to the role of 
the military governmental affairs.
Common to almost all military regimes of a collective character is the broad 
division between the “hard-liners” and the “soft-liners”. The first believe in the permanence 
of military rule and condemn the ills of democratic politics, while the second seek some 
degree of constitutional or electoral legitimation, eventually favouring the partial 
civilianisation of the government and attempting some liberalising measures. Contrary to 
the hard-liners, soft-liners promise some form of democracy for the future, as a necessary 
development of their authoritarian rule.42
42 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “Political Life after Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Transitions”, Unpublished Document, pp. 24-28.
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The most characteristic tendency of the junta’s hard-liners, the neo-fascist 
tendency, identified itself as the ideological successor of Metaxas’ ideology. It was openly 
opposed to bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism, favouring, in some cases, the 
ideology of national socialism and fascism and proclaiming the permanent rule of the 
military regime. This faction supported the creation of a fascist youth movement, an idea 
which was not implemented due to the more general rejection of fascism among the 
majority of officers and specifically to Papadopoulos’ personal veto.43 Takis Plevris, a 
theoretician of this tendency espoused such fascist notions in his book The Anti-Democrat, 
where he openly voiced his support for the imposition of a fascist dictatorship in Greece.44 
The neo-fascist rhetoric resembled in many respects, the ideas and rhetoric of Metaxas in 
professing the indefinite duration of military rule 45 Colonel Ladas once said to a prisoner: 
“We talk about democracy, but we do it only in order to calm the Scandinavian fools. This 
word excites them. ” 46 Bach representative of this orientation however, perceived the 
fascist notions in his own idiosyncratic way, a very typical case being Lieutenant General 
Aslanides, the General Secretary of the Ministry of Sport. He believed that social and 
political problems would only be solved with arms and that young people should 
concentrate on football without any worry over politics or ideologies, while the primary 
role would be attributed to the satisfaction of material needs. He stated that,
thanks to sport, the man is more pure. I f  the body is not pure, man has complexes
which end up in revolting behaviour. Sport makes him a better person Every
Sunday the people vote for the government. Before, the pools brought in 2 million 
drachmas every week; now it brings in 15 million ,47
43 See Mcletopoulos “On the Ideology of the Colonels” in Anti 344, p. 35.
44 In 1960, Plevris had created the 4th o f  August organisation, which achieved a very small membership. 
It was only to its connections with the leading member of the junta Colonel Ladas, the most notable 
supporter of this tendency that this tendency acquired some significance. Its periodical, the 4th o f August, 
circulated freely and published articles by members of the regime such as Ladas. Plevris was appointed by 
the junta, as professor in the School of General Education of the Army, in the School o f the Army Cadets 
and the City Police and Gendarmerie and he took over the organisation and education of his youth 
movement, Alkimoi. Plevris was also intimate with Pino Rauti, of the Italian Social Movement, the 
Italian neo-fascist party. See Neo-fascism in Greece, Athens 1978, p. 135.
43 There was also a link, although this was not officially admitted, between this tendency and war-time 
Nazi collaborators. Former officers in the Security Battalions created during the occupation, obtained 
important posts under the regime. See “Athenian”, Inside the Colonels' Greece, p. 118.
46 L 'Express, 945, 18-24 Aout, 1969.
47 Ibid, /in French].
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Another faction of hard-liners, led by Lieutenant Colonel Ioannides, the “invisible 
dictator” who overthrew Papadopoulos in 1973, held no particular doctrine, and became 
dominant during the latter stage of the junta period, assuming power immediately after the 
Polytechnic uprising. They believed in the indefinite continuation of military rule, objected 
to the 1973 liberalisation policies of Papadopoulos and viewed the “revolution as 
incomplete”. Ioannidess and his group’ s rhetoric resembled the rhetoric of Libya’s 
Kaddafi and the group came to be known as the “Kaddafites”. They accused Papadopoulos 
of the betrayal of the the revolution, of corruption and of having close links with big 
business and the Americans.48 This tendency completely lacked any political strategy and 
brought about the tragic political epilogue of the military junta, by leading the country to a 
political and economic disarray.
Another ideological tendency within the regime, of which Tsakonas was the 
principal ideologue, was connected with traditional religious beliefs. Tsakonas had been a 
sociologist in Bonn and a propagandist in the Greek military academies. He became a 
professor in the Greek University during the period of the junta, and was made Under­
secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1970. This tendency favoured close 
relations between the army and the church, and emphasised Hellenocentrism and 
Orthodoxy. It professed to be anti-capitalist and against the former Greek parliamentary 
system. This tendency was rejected by the junta given that it was believed that it would 
lead lead to a third world-like theocratic socialism.49 Close connections with the Orthodox 
Church were advocated by several members of the junta, the most vociferous being the 
other member of the Triumvirate, Brigadier Pattakos, a member of the religious 
brotherhood, Zoi (Life), an organisation which had close links with the regime and 
influenced the regime’s policy in Church and educational matters.50
48 See Kitsikis, The Third Ideology and Orthodoxy, Athens 1990, p. 281.
49 See Meletopoulos, op.cit., p. 36.
50 Pattakos had been given the command of the Armed Units in Athens and because of holding this 
position at the country’s nerve centre, he was initiated into the junta’s conspiracy. His speeches were 
infamous for their incoherence and contradictions while he held confused ideas about issues concerning 
human rights, liberties and democratic concepts of government. For example, in a speech at the Athens
Stadium he said: “People o f  Greece; Reinember Leonidas’ heroic words to the Persians Remember
Constantine Paleologue’s answer to the Turks Remember M etaxas’ proud NO to the foreign
ultimatum And hear the new credo o f  the 21st o f  April! Halt or I ’ll shoot” (See “Who’s Junta”,
Hellenic Review, September 1968). Pattakos’ rhetoric, full o f inconsistencies, was typical of the regime,
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The soft-liners within the military junta were those who voiced liberal ideas on 
economic policy and supported the eventual democratisation of the regime. Colonel 
Makarezos, a member of the triumvirate, was the officer responsible for the regime’s 
connections with the senior politicians. He was considered the “intellectual” officer of the 
junta, holding only a bachelors’ degree in economics and was assigned the government 
ministry of Co-ordination. The retired Lieutenant Colonel Stamatelopoulos advocated the 
army’s return to barracks, and the leaving of politics to civilians as soon as order was 
restored and a constitutional framework in place. He and his group believed that the role of 
the armed forces should be limited and they were called the “parenthesis closers”. This last 
group seems to have been the smallest and was effectively neutralised quite early on.51
Against the background of these various tendencies, Colonel George 
Papadopoulos, the “leader of the revolution”, tried to transform the dictatorship into a 
personalistic type of rule and to act as a bridge between the hard-liners and the soft-liners. 
Papadopoulos had been an artillery officer without a distinguished combat record,52 and 
had held a post in the Greek Intelligence Service (KYP). He was recognised as a capable 
conspirator and was open in his admiration for dictators, something which earned him the 
nickname among his fellow IDEAists of the “Nasser of Greece” 53 People who knew him 
well stated that he was a man
disposed towards conspiracy...... never a sincere royalist and neither a sincere
friend o f the allies nor a dedicated anti-communist. He is a plotter and he uses with 
great ingenuity all the tricks o f the trade, all he has learned in Intelligence and 
Information bureaux, an excellent spy. 54
and he was considered a ludicrous personality even within the military ranks. He and Ladas were the main 
military rivals of Papadopoulos in the formulation of an “ideology” for the regime.
51 See Danopoulos’ “From Military to Civilian Rule in Contemporary Greece” in Armed Forces and 
Society 10, 1984, p. 235. Stamatelopoulos resigned to become a critic of the regime when transferred 
from his position as a Secretary-General at the ministry o f Communications to the job of the director- 
general of the National Tourist Organization. Robert McDonald, ‘T he Colonels’ Dictatorship”,p. 276.
52 Three months in the Greek-Italian War and six months in the Greek Civil War, much less than his other 
colleagues, some of whom had had an active fighting career in the Resistance, in the Near-East, in Italy and 
in Korea.
53 See Danopoulos, Warriors and Politicians in Modern Greece, 1984, p. 58.
54 Descriptions from people who knew Papadopoulos personally in“Who’s Junta”, pp. 28-29.
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Papadopoulos favoured the partial civilianisation of the 21st April regime and the creation 
of a civilian-military system based on the 1968 constitution. He perceived a strong and 
permanent role for the armed forces in Greek politics, based on and guaranteed by a 
constitutional framework. Papadopoulos was among those who favoured the exercise of 
an authoritarian power, promising a great deal for the future in the way of liberalisation, 
and creating a general confusion as to his real purposes.
Within the junta there were marked disagreements among officers as to the way 
government policy should be conducted. Papadopoulos, who had his own personal 
ambitions, hoped to weaken the position of the other officers within the Revolutionary 
group and to strengthen his personal rule in both the government and the army.55 So he 
pursued a policy aimed at the separation of government and military, forcing all the officers 
in the government and the general secretariats of the ministries to resign from the 
military.56 This process of the politicisation of the officers, a way of minimising reaction 
from the army, especially after the royal coup of 1967 and the departure of the King 
Constantine from Greece, triggered disagreements and conflicts among the various 
officers, who aimed at strengthening their own position in the government, some of who 
favoured a collective type of authority like Ladas, Pattakos and Makarezos.57 Moreover, 
there was a substantial circle of junior officers who had secured the regime’s control over 
the armed forces, and had themselves formed cliques, divided between those who 
supported Ladas’ idea of a permanent authoritarian rule and those who supported 
Lieutenant General Angelis -the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and a close 
associate of the dictator Papadopoulos himself- who wanted to progress towards the 
restoration of elected government under the new guided constitution.58
55 in 1970 he managed to enhance his position vis-a-vis the other officers and became, at the same time, 
the President of the government, the minister of government policy, the minister o f Foreign Affairs, the 
minister of Defence, the minister of Education, and later nominated himself as Regent.
56 Royal Decree, February 16,1968, The Official Newspaper.
57 Through changes in the officers’ governmental posts Papadopoulos aimed to weaken the position of 
those officers who hoped to strengthen their personal authority within the junta. Ladas for instance was 
transferred in December 1968 from the post of Secretary-General in the ministry of Public Order to the post 
of Sccrctary-Gcneral at the ministry’ of the Interior under the more loyal Pattakos. See Grcgoriades op.cit., 
pp. 233-259.
58 Robert McDonald, ‘T he Colonels’ Dictatorship”, p. 275.
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The ideas associated with the 21st of April regime were typical of a right wing 
military discourse, clearly reflecting the mentalities of the “military mind” and the effort of 
its members to perpetuate the ideological themes of Greece’s post-war, right wing political 
life. The main themes used by the Greek military were an appeal to the values of the 
Hellenic nation, a call for the preservation of the “authentic” Greco-Christian tradition and 
an extensive use of anti-communist and anti-anarchist slogans. The goals, as vague as the 
themes, involved the restoration of a “new democracy” and the creation of a “healthy” and 
“regenerated” political system. The presentation of such themes reflected, on the one hand, 
the puritanical and narrowly nationalistic orientation of the post-war Greek military 
mentality which, at times, reduced the traditional national cultural values to the level of the 
absurd and, on the other hand, the inability to form a political programme, to replace that 
of the overthrown parliamentary governments. As Clogg argues,
To attempt to define a coherent ideology underlying the actions o f the Greek 
military regime is a somewhat futile exercise for the very good reason that such an 
ideology simply does not exist. What does exist is a pseudo-ideology or, more 
accurately, a number o f pseudo-ideologies which the Colonels, or rather their 
ideologues, have hastily thrown together as the regime has steadily retreated from 
its initial justification for the coup.59
Comparable cases of right wing militaiy ideas in Latin America presented as many 
similarities as differences in their respective ideological discourses. In Argentina, the 
Ongania government (1966-1970) held similarly vague commitments to purge the 
politically divided Argentine society, to end inflation and to exploit the productive potential 
of the country’s economy. His policy was pursued through a stabilisation programme and 
the attraction of foreign capital. Similarly in Brazil, stabilisation programmes with 
authoritarian controls were adopted by the military elite. In the case of Chile, the Pinochet 
regime professed a total opposition to the previous parliamentary pluralism and state 
interventionism in economic matters, adopting the notions of authoritarian democracy and 
the market oriented economy, the Chilean dictatorial regime being the Latin American
$9 Clogg, “The Ideology of the Revolution of the 21st of April regime”, p. 36.
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experiment of the “Chicago economic theories”. Pinochet tried to halt government 
intervention in the economy, promoting his “nation of entrepreneurs”, importing the strict 
monetarist model together with “laissez-faire” doctrines.60 Hence, the more advanced Latin 
American countries, right-wing military ideology employed a mixture of developmentalist 
themes and national security doctrine, indicative of the bureaucratic-authoritarian nature of 
the regimes. Some cases revolved around the notion of state enterpreneurship, as in 
Brazil,61 while others aimed at the dismantling of the state’s economic activities, such as 
Chile. All of them however declared their long-term developmental goals of economic 
stabilisation and growth, under the guidance of a highly exclusionary and authoritarian 
state.
The instrumental perception of power: Corruption and clientelism
Military rulers tend to justify their coups on the ground that their civilian 
predecessors were dishonest, corrupt and self-serving. They profess their aversion 
towards the corruption of politicians, and attack the clientelistic system with its basis in the 
promotion of personal interests. They consequently project the officers’ image as honest, 
incorruptible and self-denying, resort to the excessive exaltation of their puritanical virtues 
and attribute a great importance to formalistic appearances which might persuade the 
population of the honesty of their ideas.62 However, contrary to their rhetoric, military 
rulers usually fall prey to similar kinds of clientelistic practices in their effort to create an 
artificial support for their rule.
Unable to persuade on purely ideological grounds and incapable of respecting their 
own legal/constitutional formulae, the military junta of 1967 resorted vastly to clientelistic 
means of gaining support, a perennial theme in the military’s relationship with politicians. 
Having absolutely no support from the previous political world, the military rulers tried to
60 Skidmore/Smith, Modern Latin America, pp. 142-143.
61 In Brazil, the period of the Costa e Silva government was marked by a successful recovery of the 
economy and the military regime could base its legitimacy on the so-called Brazilian “economic miracle of 
the period 1967-1974, a growth at an annual rate of approximately 10%.
62 As will be shown later in the junta’s educational policies military governors tried to enforce a dress 
code, prayers in the schools, and laws on sexual morality which were considered of great symbolic 
importance by the regime.
201
create a new political environment based on promises and positions, the only persuasive 
formula left to the regime, intent as it was on institutionalising its rule. The Greek military 
regime never managed either to attract the political world or to create cleavages among the 
politicians of the pre-dictatorial right. It only achieved superficial contacts with politicians 
and cooperated with the most conservative elements of the church, the throne, big capital, 
the workers’ syndicates and with ambitious people from social groups such as 
professionals, peasants, and those looking for advancement. It approached all these 
through clientelistic networks, offering gifts and promises in return for support. The most 
typical application of the clientelistic and short-term political mentality of the military junta 
could be seen in the military rulers’ policy towards the military institution at large. They 
created a military power base on clientelistic networks and kinship, restricted for the most 
part to reliable army officers, their relatives and associates. Each officer or tendency within 
the power bloc aimed at the promotion of its own people, in order to stabilise its position 
at the higher levels of political power. These ambitions led to the evolution of a 
conspiratorial climate within the military, which became the practice also in the exercise of 
governmental power, according to which one faction intrigued against the other faction by 
illegitimate and underhand means. The result of such authoritarian clientelism was the 
disappearance of the basic values upon which the military establishment is based: order, 
hierarchy and discipline. The policy of clientelism of the military junta was characterised 
by the dismantling of the previous military hierarchies, in order to create new ones 
subservient to the military rulers.
The Armed Forces were not occupied with their profession. Others tried to guess 
the wishes o f the junta and to please them in order to secure their position. The 
officers o f yesterday, who had come out o f their barracks, occupied public 
buildings and posts in public administration, expelled the directors, took their 
positions and launched an arbitrary administration, unprecedented in a civilised 
country.63
63 Karagiorgas, op.cit., p. 125, [in Greek].
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Contrary to the Chilean case, where a belief in the notions of order and discipline and the 
maintenance of an effective hierarchy and military unity under General Pinochet’s 
leadership accounted for the long duration of the latter’s personal dictatorship,64 the 
military junta disregarded totally these principles and fell victim to its own internal factional 
struggles.
The body of military officers who came into close contact with the exercise of 
political power, enjoyed higher pay, new uniforms, a new style of life which removed 
them from their military profession and allowed them to indulge in the excesses of political 
power. Moreover, as has been the case with similar military regimes, Greece’s military 
rulers viewed political power in purely instrumental terms, as a means to further their own 
goals and, being no less corrupt than the previous civilians, they tried, while in power, to 
enrich themselves. They found themselves enjoying power for power’s sake, as well as 
high status and material rewards that go with it. They were consequently highly reluctant to 
give up the privileges of high governmental office by returning to the barracks. As a Group 
Captain of the Air Force wrote on November 28, 1973, a few days after the second coup 
by Ioannides, in his report to the Chief of the Air Force:
Political power corrupts those who exercise it. Politicians come and go but this is 
their job. When the army exercises political power, it gets corrupted and the 
damage is irreparable. Since 1967, the paths o f army and people have been 
separated with unpredictable consequences for the Nation. People tolerate us out of 
fear. In a little while, however, they will be objecting to us 65
Clientelism and conspiracy in the regime's relation with the Church
A clear example of clientelism, conspiracy and factionalism could be seen in the 
junta’s policy towards the religious establishment. The colonels sought to control and
^  Through political manoeuvring Pinochet achieved supreme authority and the initially military regime in 
Chile ended up by being a highly personalistic regime, under the overwhelming domination of one leader. 
Alongside the removal of many of his peers, the control of promotions and a close watch on the security 
service, he tried to legitimise his rule mostly by means of referenda. In times of crises, Pinochet used to 
rely more on his personal advisers than on the military junta, which acted only as a weak legislative body. 
Pinkney, op.cit., pp. 58- 60.
65 See Kakaounakis, 2650 Days and Nights o f Conspiracy, p. 73, [in Greek].
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manipulate the church hierarchy in order to secure the consent of the religious 
establishment. As in other fields, the military mentality was prevalent in the Church policy 
of the 1967 regime, which was also characterised by conspiratorial/clientelistic methods 
and the overthrowing of the existing hierarchy. The result of such a policy was that the 
Church, during the 1967-1974 period,was identified in the eyes of the Greek people with 
the military regime.
In May 1967, following the colonels’ coup, a second coup took place in the 
Church when the Holy Synod was dismissed by the junta and the Archbishop 
Chrysostomos was forced to resign on the grounds that the law of retirement should be 
extended to cover all the bishops of Greece. A new Synod was formed, composed of 
people sympathetic to the regime, while the archbishopric was assigned to a protegee of the 
palace Ieronymos Kotsonis, the choice of the military junta.66 A new constitution for the 
Church was imposed, which spelled out in detail the role of the Church in national matters. 
Papadopoulos claimed that the new charter would allow more freedom to the Church in 
deciding upon personnel, the education of the clergy and the control of its finances and 
property. As was the case with all the liberal documents of the junta, the actual application 
of the Charter was postponed indefinitely, in that whereas it provided for the supreme 
authority of the Hierarchical Synod, the first meeting of the Synod was scheduled for 
1972. The constitution enabled Papadopoulos to oversee those aspects of church life 
viewed as important to the state while allowing the internal affairs of the church to be 
administered by the archbishop and the synod. Several church ministers were dismissed 
for claiming the document illegally centralised power in the hands of the archbishop and 
the synod. There was strong opposition to Ieronymos within the church.67 His legacy, 
however, was an impressive one, in that he broadened educational opportunities for the
66 Ieronymos Kotsonis was a previous member of the brotherhood “Zoi” which played a vital role during 
the military dictatorship, due to its connections with prominent military officers (a type of a Greek Opus 
Dei). In order to get rid of the 87-year old and sick archbishop Chrysostomos, the military officers as soon 
as they assumed power, visited him in hospital with a letter of resignation, ready for signature. Due to the 
archbishop’s refusal to resign, the junta issued emergency law' 3, 1967, on retirement at the age of 80. 
Then the New' Holy Synod, composed o f bishops loyal to the junta, voted for the new archbishop 
Ieronymos. Sakellariou, “Church-Junta”, in Anti 344, pp. 17-20.
67 On the Church policy of the junta see Frazee, op.cit., Fischer, Rondholz, & Farandos, Revolution and 
Counter-Revolution in Greece (1936-1974), pp. 113-122, Sakellariou, op .c it., Mouratides, The 
Schizophrenic Ecclesiastical policy o f the Dictatorship.
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clergy; but since he was supported by a dictator he never managed to unite all the bishops 
behind his programme. He was criticised for his relationship with the militaiy junta, ie. for 
having collaborated with them and for having created his own clique within the church.68
The overthrow of Papadopoulos included another conspiratorial rearrangement in 
the church’s organisation and leadership. The 1973 coup by Ioannides ignored the 
principle of canonicity in church affairs, replaced unwanted bishops created a new Holy 
Synod and elected a new Archbishop.69 A decree in January 1974 convoked what was 
termed a major synod of the hierarchy to draw up yet another constitution, to choose a new 
archbishop for Athens and a Holy Synod and to rule on the “uncanonical” acts and 
appointments made since 1967. The new Archbishop Seraphim and his synod began the 
scrutiny of the bishops appointed during the time of Ieronymos and by early summer 
several had been deposed. The new Archbishop who had collaborated with Ieronymos 
during the period of the previous military junta, rejected and acted against the same policies 
he had helped to implement.7*?
68 In his autobiography Kotsonis claimed to have accepted the post from the junta because the church 
needed deep changes with regard to the education and specialisation of the clergy, the decentralisation of the 
church’s administration, the finances and property of the church and the raising of the clergy’s prestige. He 
admitted that when the military' government made concessions to the church, it expected as a reward the 
unreserved support o f the church hierarchy. He recognised that the junta dismissed many clerics from their 
posts, based on their political convictions and complained that there were deep divisions within the Church 
and clerics who were strongly opposed to his leadership. Ieronymos Kotsonis, The Drama o f  an 
Archbishop, Athens 1975.
69 The new dictator Ioannides had also a deep personal hatred for the archbishop Ieronymos Kotsonis.
70 An interesting point in the history of the post-dictatorial church is that archbishop Seraphim, the choice 
of the Ioannides junta, is still the archbishop of Greece having survived through the conservative 
government of the 1970s, the socialist government of the 1980s and beyond. He is currently criticised by 
many Church people, for having created his own clique just like his antecedent had done and for his 
authoritarian attitude in many church issues.
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Chanter 7 : THE 21ST OF APRIL REGIME’S EDUCATIONAL POLICY
The educational policy of the military junta stands as one of the most representative 
expressions of the mentalities of the rulers and their total lack of ideology. A blend of 
militaristic nationalism, conspiratorial clientelism and puritanical authoritarianism, typical 
of the Greek military mind, found its practical expression in the regime’s policy towards 
education. An amalgam of reactionary practices -towards the previous liberal and reformist 
domestic climate- and measures aimed at necessary modernisation, -on the model of the 
western industrialised nations- were implemented in a series of lengthy laws, based on 
short-term political intentions.1 For the most part, the military rulers, based on their own 
belief system, treated the sensitive sector of education in the same way that they handled 
the military apparatus. Isolated from the previous political world and secluded from any 
intellectuals and pedagogues, the military rulers interfered in educational matters through 
conspiratorial and clientelistic methods, overthrowing the previous educational hierarchies, 
establishing new educational networks, relying on opportunistic supporters and promoting 
mediocrities to crucial educational posts.
The educational policy of the 21st of April regime consisted of the demobilisation 
of the youth, and of the student movement in particular, the complete disrespect for 
intellectuals and the exercise of a centralised authoritarian governmental policy, mostly 
through the imposition of a long series of laws. The military junta’s attitude to the youth 
and the educational institutions, in general, was directly affected by the previous climate 
brought about by the reforms of the Centre Union and the student mobilisation, and by the 
international context of 1960s student mobilisation.
1 Typical of the military regime’s undecided and vacillating educational policy was the appointment of 8 
ministers and 8 junior ministers of education each of a different professional background in seven years of 
military rule: Among others, K. Kalambokias, a member o f the Supreme Court of Justice, Th. 
Papakonstantinou, the regime’s political theorist, G. Papadopoulos, the leader of the Coup d' Etat, Nikitas 
Sioris, a businessman and an economic adviser, N. Gantonas, a military officer, one o f the ring-leaders of 
the regime, P. Sifnaios, the civilian minister of the Markezinis government, during the Polytechnic 
uprising and P. Christou, ex-rector of the University of Salonica, and very unpopular among the students, 
who assumed the ministry during the last phase o f Ioannides, all these contributed to the climate of general 
incompetence in educational matters.
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Conflicts in the process of political demobilisation under post-war liberal 
dictatorships: Authoritarianism vs modernisation
As we have seen, fascist regimes are tom by their internal contradictions and actual 
conflicts inherent in the process of the fascist mobilisation of the youth. These arise out of 
the necessity to actively involve the youth while preserving a totalitarian control over the 
dissemination of ideas. Post-war right-wing authoritarian regimes in semi-peripheral 
societies such as Greece, the Iberian peninsula, and the more economically developed Latin 
American countries, governed within an international climate of accepted liberalism and 
advanced capitalism, and within a domestic climate of more advanced, organised and 
mobilised societies. In the cases of the prolonged dictatorships of Spain and Portugal, both 
dictatorships, while in power, had to come to grips with the developing international and 
domestic contexts, and with the educational advances in their respective societies: the drop 
of illiteracy; the organisation of Universities; the mobilisation of the student movements, 
within the wider domestic authoritarian context of accepted limited political and cultural 
pluralism. Both Iberian regimes, during the post-war period, became more pragmatic than 
ideological, especially after their phase of consolidation was over and after the defeat of 
fascism and the discrediting of fascist ideology. In Spain, the inter-war ideological 
domination of the Falange eroded, especially after 1959 when the Catholic Opus Dei 
displaced the Falangists from power and led the country into a more pragmatic neo­
capitalism. Salazar, on the other hand, kept his population more isolated from the liberal 
turn of post-war Europe in order to sustain his personal authority and to keep away as far 
as possible the international influences of advanced liberalism.
In the Latin American context and in Greece, on the other hand, the military 
intervened at a time when more advanced levels of social and economic organisation had 
already been attained. In the more developed Latin American countries the post-war period 
was marked by the modernisation and industrialisation of their respective economies, the 
breakdown of the traditional monopoly of the Catholic Church in the ideological field and 
the decisive impact of the secularising and modernising forces of liberalism. They 
developed a high degree of industrialisation, high urban concentration, social
207
differentiation and a relatively more organised and autonomous civil society. This was 
accompanied by educational advances and reforms, lower levels of i l li4 e ra ttjJhigher levels 
of enrollment in primary and secondary education, the better organisation of the 
Universities and a more politicised student population.
The intervention of the military in politics cut short the educational advances and 
reforms, due to the military rulers’ attempt to control the intellectual world. But, caught in 
the middle of a rapidly modernising world, these military regimes were tom between their 
authoritarian/reactionary predilections and the objective need to modernise. Having 
accepted the liberal rules of the game, military regimes were divided between the need to 
demobilise and depoliticise an already mobilised and politicised intellectual world, and the 
objective necessity to pursue liberal reforms in education, as required by the needs of 
capitalist development. While modernisation in advanced capitalist societies is the product 
of democratic education, in authoritarian “liberal” regimes of limited pluralism, the need for 
modernisation comes into conflict with the necessity to control the intellectual dialogue. In 
a period of the internationalisation of information, marked by the rapid spread of 
international liberal ideas, the task of control became even more difficult for military 
regimes to achieve.
Some social scientists believe that the military can be an effective bearer of 
modernisation and development in developing and under-developed countries. Based on 
the military’s monopoly of force and its organisational unity and through its connection 
with the latest technological military achievements, they believe that the military is able to 
use its position in government to bring about modernisation. This is mostly explained by 
the fact that the army in these societies has been influenced by contemporary military 
technology. The argument is supported by Lucien Pye, who went as far as to say that in 
some cases “the officers often find  that they are in tune with intellectuals, students and 
those other elements in society most anxious to become a part o f the western world”. 2 
Such generalisations may be partly true in some underdeveloped, post-colonial societies, 
or in developing countries such as Turkey, where the military has admittedly played the
2 Lucien Pye, “Armies in the Process of Political Modernisation”, in The Role o f  the Military in 
Underdeveloped Countries, p. 77.
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role of moderniser and nation-builder. However they can also be misleading, in that they 
present the military as a unified and disciplined body, isolated from the larger social and 
political divisions, and at the same time they overestimate the intellectual capabilities and 
rationalism of soldiers.
The reality is, however, different and the actions of military regimes regarding 
universities, teachers and student movements are heavily influenced by the fact that 
soldiers are generally isolated from them, resulting in the military’s perceptions of 
Universities as centres of subversion requiring drastic purges. Hence, the classic military 
reaction to the educational system is to cancel any university autonomy, to intervene in the 
schools and colleges and to dismiss personnel. Although universities are the places which 
suffer most under such policies, primary and secondary schools are also affected. For the 
most part repressive mechanisms are used in the universities, towards professors and 
students, while ideological mechanisms and indirect indoctrination are used in primary and 
secondary schools. Unavoidably, in the course of their rule, military regimes are also faced 
with the necessity to expand the educational system and the school and university 
population of their countries, while at the same time seeking to maintain control over it 
through a variety of repressive means. This process generates contradictions at the elite 
level and in the elite’s relationship with the educated population.
Even in the bureaucratic-authoritarian cases of Brazil and Argentina, the 
connections between the military and the business community and technocrats, did not 
prevent the army from acting as an anti-modemising force, contrary to the needs of the 
country to modernise. The Latin American military authoritarian governments included 
military and civilian elites with radically different world views in the decision-making 
process. The armed forces highlighted the danger to national stability and security, 
prevailing before their intervention and emphasised national, military achievements. 
Religious groups emphasised the priority of religious education and the promotion of 
traditional religious values. Economic advisers, who saw the link between the educational 
system and the needs of the economy, gave special attention to free economic activity, 
emphasising the positive contribution which private enterprise could make to development
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and the negative effects of state control.3 The balance of power varied from country to 
country, and while in authoritarian Argentina the Catholics were allowed to run education, 
and the business and the technocrats took over the economic ministries, in Chile Pinochet’s 
ideology of “privatisation” penetrated the school system, with its emphasis on the 
technological and business fields at the expense of humanities and social sciences.4 Be that 
as it may, post-war western military dictatorships were nevertheless faced with the 
apparently contradictory tasks of, on the one hand, achieving order and, on the other, of 
promoting a sound economic policy.
The Greek military junta was the victim of its own factional divisions and 
clientelistic practices and the fact that the military had access to modem technology did not 
push it in the direction of modernisation and rational decisions on education. Due to the 
military’s lack of an alternative ideological framework, the military rulers ended up 
contradicting their own pronouncements, violating the constitutional provisions which they 
intended to give them legitimacy and support from the student world, and presenting an 
unbridgeable gap between rhetoric and practice. What is mostly remembered of the 
military’s impact on education is the reactionary and out-dated character of their educational 
philosophy.
The post-war educational climate: Reform and mobilisation
The rapid socio-economic development of the late 1950s and 1960s was not 
matched by corresponding advances in the educational field, leaving an urgent need for 
reform in the educational system, to accompany the capitalist development of Greek 
society. While there was a quantitative advance in the number of educated people, at all 
three levels, this was hardly accompanied by any qualitative advances. The old features of 
the centralised Greek education system, the classicist orientation, language diglossia, lack
3 These different tendencies at the policy-making level are expressed in the cases of B-A rule in 
O’Donnell’s analysis “Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy” in 
The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, pp. 285-318, and in the specific field of educational policy in 
Sanders, “Education and Authoritarianism in the Southern Cone”, in TGS-1-81, South America, 1981/No.
12, p. 11.
4 Sanders, op.cit., p. 12.
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of vocational training persisted, as they had done since Greek independence.5 The content 
of knowledge was equally backward-looking and retrograde. While the advanced western 
societies saw an even further development of social sciences and humanities, in Greek 
higher institutions the topics of sociology, political science and contemporary history were 
regarded with suspicion, due to the damage it was believed they could do to the status quo. 
The teaching of history in schools, reflected the one-sided approach of the post-war 
political elite: modem Greek history terminated abruptly with the First World War, while 
the inter-war period, the resistance to the Germans and the recent civil war events were 
omitted, as if they had never happened. As had always been the case with the nation’s 
ambivalent approach towards its past, the post-war state authorities regarded suspiciously 
the recent past, and its examination provoked polarisations, disagreements and divisions. 
The Greek reading books for the early forms of primary education never ceased extolling 
the values of the family, religion and Greece’s heroic military history.6 Moreover, the 
subjects of mathematics and physics continued to enjoy only secondary status in the school 
curiculum. In many respects the reality of post-war education was a regression to the state 
it had been in prior to 1929, and the main aim of education, as was defined in the 1952 
constitution, was to “create honest citizens within the framework o f the Greco-Christian 
civilisation”.7 Finally, the percentage of GDP spent on education was very low, at around 
2%, similar to the levels in Spain and Portugal, compared to around 5% in other western 
European countries. The level of expenditure on research and development was even 
lower, at around 0.2%.8
Towards the end of the 1950s, came the first timid post-war attempts at 
transforming school programmes and reorganising education towards a more technocratic
5 In 1958, 273,000 pupils were in general secondary education as opposed to only 35,000 in vocational 
education. Moreover, in 1962-63, classical gymnasia accounted for 74% of the-total student population, 
vocational schools 20.3%, merchant schools 2.9%, schools of foreign languages 1.9%, naval gymnasia 
0.6% and schools of household economy 0.3%.
6 An interesting study of the primary education reading books is given by Frangoudaki in her book,The 
Textbooks o f the Demotic School, where the writer argues that primary education during the period 1954- 
1974 disseminated an ideology loaded with “feudalist” values, regarding such matters as family, work, 
religion and history.
7 Tsoukalas, “Ideological Impact of the Civil War”, in Greece in the 1940s, p. 336.
8 Stefanos Pesmazoglou, Education and Development in Greece, 1948-1985, p. 144.
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orientation.9 However such attempts were half-baked and due to the strong demands by 
the liberal-minded intellectuals, education became one of the hottest issues again during the 
first half of the 1960s. A major development in the post-war period in the educational 
sphere was related to the increase of the Greek student population, its organisation and its 
politicisation. Slowly during the 1950s and more intensely during the 1960s, the student 
movement started to mobilise and demanded specific changes in the educational system.10 
Demands associated to changes in administrative matters, the school curicula, the creation 
of new schools of higher education, the inadequacy of the teaching staff, the improvement 
of technical education, previously topics for distinguished intellectuals and pedagogists, 
had been taken up by students and intellectuals alike, within the context of an increasingly 
organised student movement.
The accession of the Centre Union of George Papandreou to power in 1963 
resulted in the enactment of a comprehensive and all-encompassing educational reform, a 
response to the needs of the capitalist economy, on the one hand, and the demands of the 
student movement, on the other. The Centre Union’s educational reform was the most 
radical so far in the development of Greek education and involved reorganisation at all 
three educational levels. Some measures were reminiscent of the 1929 reform (when 
Papandreou was minister of education), but the majority of them went even further, to 
reflect the changes which had occured in Greek society since the war. Among the most 
significant were the expansion of the institutions of higher education, changes in the forms
9 In 1957, a “Commission on Education” was constituted to examine the needs of the Greek educational 
system. Its resolution involved demands on the teaching of the demotic language, the creation of a new 
University, the adequacy of the teaching staff, closer links between economy and education and the need to 
create technical schools. In 1958, Industrial Colleges were upgraded to the higher educational level and in 
1959, new technical colleges were created in Athens and Salonica. In 1961, a new programme for secondary 
education modified the previous one which had been based on the 1935 program of the People’s Party.
10 In 1952-55, the first student mobilisations were connected with the Cyprus issue and in 1957-58 student 
associations were founded officially. In 1957 was the first Pan-Hellenic Conference of Students, in 1962 
was the beginning of student uprisings, and the demand for 15% of the national budget to be spent on 
education (7.5% went to education) became nationwide. In 1963 came the formation of the National 
Students Union of Greece (EFEE), at the Fourth Conference of Greek Students, with a demand for the 
“Rebirth of Education”, emphasising issues such as the language, the illiteracy levels and specific higher 
educational issues. See Christos Lazos, op.cit., pp. 315-340.
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of primary and secondary education, new curicula, the introduction of the demotic and the 
emphasis on vocational education.11
The junta found itself faced not only with a democratic reformist climate and the 
rising tide of student mobilisation at home, but with a period of student uprisings in other 
European countries and in North America, which it feared might make an impact on the 
Greek student movement. The international youth situation of the 1960s differed radically 
from that of the 1930s in form, content and organisation. While during the inter-war period
ktMy
the European fascist youth organisations made a positive impression on Metaxas, inducing; 
to form a similar movement in Greece, the late 1960s student demonstrations in the US, 
France and Germany among other countries, made a negative impression on the 1967 
military regime, in that the latter tried to avoid their potentially revolutionary effects on 
Greek society. While in the fascist case, we have noted the manipulation of the youth’s 
revolutionary fervour by the inter-war authoritarian regimes, in the case of the post-war 
period, the youth’s revolutionary fervour was not open to any manipulation by the state, 
and the organised youth maintained its autonomy, making it very difficult for the 
authorities to impose any control on them. Initial demands for educational reform grew into
11 Law 4379/1964, prepared by Papanoutsos, a famous liberal pedagogist, covered a wide range of issues 
concerning the primary and secondary levels of education: free public education provided at all levels; the 
extension of compulsory education to nine years; the division of secondary education into two stages, the 
gymnasium and the lyceum, of three years each; official recognition of demotiki, elevated to the status of 
katharevousa; reformation o f the curicula in primary and secondary education; more emphasis given to 
mathematics and the natural sciences; teaching of ancient texts from translations while original texts 
studied only at the lyceum; introduction of new courses in secondary education, such as economics, 
sociology, philosophy and law; a marked reduction in the emphasis on classics and an increase in the hours 
devoted to modern Greek, foreign languages, physics and mathematics; the introduction of voluntary 
courses at the lyceum; Latin on a voluntary basis at the lyceum to be studied only by those who intended 
to specialise in theology, literature and law; abolition of half-term semester examinations in secondary 
education; introduction of a free meal service for primary school children; reorganisation of the entrance 
examinations for higher education; the school leaving certificate (Akadimaiko Apolytirio) could be taken 
from some fifty provincial examination centres instead of, as previously, only in Athens and Salonica. In 
addition the Centre Union government pursued the formation of the Universities o f Patras and of the 
Philosophical Faculty of Jannina; the Teachers’ Training College was reorganised and its period of study 
extended from two to three years to improve the quality of the teaching personnel; the Athens Educational 
Institute was set up to undertake fundamental research into Greek educational and pedagogical issues. In 
1966 a draft law on higher education proposed the connection of economic development with the role of the 
University, gave a further emphasis to the creation of new Universities, and challenged the strong and 
authoritarian institution of the Professor’s chair. The general character of the educational provisions was a 
clear sign of a need for a radical government intervention in educational matters which needed to be 
reorganised and put on a different basis. For information on the Centre Union educational reform see 
relevant chapters in Alexis Demaras, The Reform Which did not Take Place, Vol 2, and “On Education” in 
the History o f the Greek Nation, Haralambos Noutsos, Programmes o f Secondary Education and Social 
Control 1931-1973, Spyros Linardatos, From the Civil War to the Junta, Vol. 5, and Vrychea/Gavroglou, 
Attempts to Reform Higher Education 1911-1981.
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demands for social and political change. In France they led to the weakening of the 
authority of de Gaulle’s government. Student demonstrations in the United States included 
demands on the country’s foreign policy in Vietnam. In the authoritarian case of Spain the 
student fervour of the 1960s contributed to the subsequent weakening of the Franco 
regime. Even in the long established one-party state of Mexico, the 1968 student 
demonstrations led to a fierce confrontation between students and troops, developing to a 
crisis for the nation’s political system and the bankruptcy of the PRI monopoly in power. 
Student action in various European and American countries seemed to pose a threat to the 
established order and, as Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the leader of the French student movement 
in 1968 argued:
The student, at least in the modem system o f higher education still preserves a
considerable degree o f personal freedom if  he chooses to exercise it when a
minority o f students takes conscious advantage o f their freedom to attack the 
established order, they can become a catalyst activating a larger section of the 
population,12
Regime rhetoric: An anarchistic and dangerous youth
The 1960s climate, domestic and international, defined the regime’s perception of 
the youth and the military rulers confronted the youth with scepticism, fear and aversion, 
regarding them as a type of disobedient social group that needed to be constrained. The 
regime’s principal propagandist, Giorgos Georgalas, regarded the youth as vulnerable to 
the ideas of communism and anarchism, as a result of frustration that had led young people 
to disobedience and a desire to overturn the status quo. In the Crisis o f the Consumerist 
Society he stated that:
The youth is turning towards other leftist orientations, with a tendency to anti­
conformism.... Although, the new generations are being educated and exposed to
12 See Daniel Cohn-Bendit in “The Student Revolt” in Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative, 
p. 47.
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more knowledge, they remain immature and are being seduced by the idea that they 
are entitled to impose their opinion. 13
The younger generation and especially the students “who are unbearably bored ”, 
were considered a persistent bearer of a revolting tendency influenced by “well fed  
intellectuals ”.14 This is the analysis of a theoretician of the regime, who was not a 
military person, but totally shared and expressed the military’s scepticism towards the 
youth. His attack was directed towards the western youth and its anarchism, and his whole 
work was pervaded by a negative attitude towards the youth and a romantic perception of 
earlier generations. The conversion of the international student movements from orthodox 
marxism to more radical forms of revolutionary action, inspired by the examples of Mao, 
Castro or Che Guevara, had persuaded Georgalas in the early 1970s that communism had 
ceased to be a major threat, and he perceived that anarchism had come to hold greater 
attraction for young people, given that
communism seeks to take advantage o f a situation in which decadence has taken 
root, but when communism had itself been discredited there is a revival o f 
anarchism.
Among the military, colonel Ladas’ rhetoric was the most reminiscent of Metaxas 
in his alleged adulation of the youth and his superficial belief in its potential. It was 
obvious, however, that his only purpose was to encourage an extreme anti-communist and 
anti-liberal discourse and he simply wanted to fanaticise the youth rather than to organise 
it. He declared that “the youth has a historical mission in life and it should not bother with 
politics, economics or any social events ”15 and that “the first task o f the youth is to build 
characters with qualities rather than deficiencies”.16 He considered the youth to be misled 
by marxism, liberalism, anarchism, “hippiism”. There were also some ridiculously 
fanatical references to the youth with their long hair and “the things that these people 
symbolise, a movement o f decay and immorality ”. He asserted that “the state should
13 Sec op.cit., pp. 80-86, [in Greek].
14 Ibid., p. 139.
13 See Ladas’ Speeches, (8/4/71), p. 44.
16 Ibid,, (7/12/71), p. 87.
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intervene to do something about this phenomenon”.17 The military rulers addressed the 
young people, students and pupils, in a patronising manner as their mature fathers who 
were able to sympathise with and understand their worries and to guide them in the right 
direction.18
Apart from the reactionary rhetoric of the regime regarding the youth, the laws 
passed by the regime showed most clearly the military’s attitudes in pedagogical matters. 
Royal Decree 702/69 was a typical example of an attempt to impose a dry, unimaginative 
mentality on to pupils at a very sensitive and susceptible age in primary education. A few 
articles from this decree were very representative of the officers’ way of thinking:
- Regarding writing ability, it was stated that “the teacher should insist that the pupils write 
in their notebooks in clean, equal size, calligraphic and legible letters ”,
- Regarding reading ability, that “the teacher should be careful that fairy tales should not 
arouse the imagination o f the children to any extreme degree”,
- Regarding measuring ability, that “the quantitative illustrations should be optically easy to 
measure, so that in the presentation o f the number ‘9 ’ one should arrange the circles in the 
following manner:
000 or 0000 and not 0 0
000 0 0 0 0 0
000 0000 0 0 0”,
- Regarding religious instruction, that “the intention is to intensify the religious feeling of 
the pupil and is not the objective study o f the subject ”,
17 Ibid., pp. 169-172. While such statements may not have sounded uncommon even in some western 
countries at the time, their adoption as the official language of a country, professed constantly by state 
officials, indicated the one-sided approach of the military junta and its overwhelmingly reactionary attitude 
towards all youth demands.
18 Papadopoulos often mentioned in his speeches that his own father had been a teacher, which he thought 
brought him closer to the needs of the youngsters. It should be noted however that the education of the 
dictator was very poor in that he did not get his degree in the Polytechnic school and could not speak any 
foreign language, at all. (“Who’s Junta’’, Hellenic Review , 1968) He used a paternalistic tone in his 
speeches and tried to give the impression that he was very understanding of the young people’s wishes. His 
effort however fell short o f an ability to persuade them and in 1972 after a series of student demonstrations 
he openly declared in a public speech “if  I ’d  had the people behind this strike in my armed unit, I ’d  have 
smashed their heads in with a revolver”. McDonald, “The Colonels’ Dictatorship”, pp. 288-289.
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- Regarding musical instruction, that “the musical education should compose of 
ecclesiastical hymns to be chanted in the schools, folk and patriotic songs, some o f them 
referring to the peasant life and the struggle o f our people” .
Naturally history concentrated on the wars of ancient, Roman, Byzantine and modem 
times and the existence of international enemies threatening the life and survival of the
Greek nation.”77te narration o f history has to be natural, graphic and gripping while the
pupils have to attend the national commemorations o f those who have died in wars and 
should look after “tidying up” o f heroes” (!).
This law, meticulously worked out and covering every single detail of primary 
school life, was full of allusions to religion, laid emphasis on formalistic primary learning, 
and left no room for teachers’ initiative. It represented a very interesting example of the 
pedagogical beliefs of a military government and of its ignorance of child psychology. As 
if to emphasise the puritanical character of the military mentality, the military rulers 
imposed a ban on the wearing of miniskirts,19 beards and long hair; compulsory church- 
going for pupils and teachers, the ceremony of saluting the flag every morning in all 
schools, and the compulsory carrying of satchels by schoolchildren.20 These measures 
reflected a belief, common in the military, that the success or failure of an educational 
system can be judged by the appearance and external characteristics of the students, and 
betrayed a total lack of any philosophy regarding educational matters.
Education under the 21st o f April regime
The legacy of the educational changes of the 1960s weighed heavily on the military 
junta’s policy-making, which exposed immediately the reactionary and anti-modernising 
character of the officers’ ideological preferences on the issue of education. The 1964 
educational reform and the 1960s mobilisation of the student movement were the two main 
features of a decade which had signalled a radical change in the orientation of Greek 
education, both being symptoms of the modernisation of post-war Greek society. At the
19 Very similar to the infamous law of 1926 on the length of skirts by the one-year dictatorship of 
Pangalos, probably the only aspect of that dictatorship which is still remembered.
20 See Demaras A ,,op.cit., p. 132.
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same time, the issues raised by these two developments determined the main priorities of 
the junta in its initially negative and reactionary educational policy. The immediate reactions 
of the military junta to the state of education were to block the previous democratic/liberal 
reform of the Centre Union government of George Papandreou, to pursue an extensive 
purge of anti-regime university professors and school teachers and to curtail the liberties of 
the student movement. In their place, they imposed a tighter governmental control at all 
three levels of the educational apparatus, appointed regime people, the majority not 
particularly acquainted with educational matters, to high administrative and educational 
posts, and created an infamous “student code of behaviour”. The military junta tried to 
demobilise and depoliticise the already politicised student movement through the 
penetration of loyal people into the student unions and councils, their aim being to create an 
a-political student body, indifferent to the regime’s authoritarian policies.
The educational policy of the 1967 military regime, during the seven years of its 
tenure of power, was marked by three distinct dimensions regarding education, typical of 
the militaiy’s connection with the intellectual world:
1. Initial negative/reactionary attitude towards pre-1967 educational context characterised 
by the repeal of the 1964 reform, the purge of anti-regime intellectuals from the educational 
establishment and the demobilisation of the student movement;
2. the imposition of the dictatorial centralised state authority on to the educational apparatus 
and their infiltration through clientelistic promotions of regime people to crucial school and 
University posts;
3. some half-baked modernising innovations designed to aid the country’s development. 
The mixture of negative/reactionary, authoritarian/clientelistic and reformist/modernising 
dimensions demonstrated the incoherence of the military junta’s policy towards the youth, 
which, at the same time, reflected the military mind, the isolation of the military rulers from 
the civilian world, and the country’s post-war socio-economic development and the climate 
of international liberalism.
The general educational directives proposed by the military rulers included vague 
objectives which were interpreted by the military in a specifically authoritarian manner but
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also indicated their own attitude towards the need for modernisation of the inadequate 
educational system:
The nationalist orientation o f education; purification and elevation o f the teaching 
staff; the need to meet as far as possible immediate needs; offering to all youth the 
same opportunities in education; the systematic creation o f the preconditions for the 
expansion, modernisation and development o f education at all levels. 21
A.The reactionary dimension o f the 21st o f April Regime
Repeal o f the 1964 Reform: the meticulous regression to the pre-1964position
The first and immediate reaction of the military rulers was to reverse the specific 
changes initiated by the 1964 reform and bring the education system back to its pre-1964 
status. Thus they believed that the goals of order and stability would be better achieved, 
since they perceived the previous changes as threatening the viability of their regime.22 
This reaction was another example of the normal pattern of forward and backward steps in 
Greek educational development, a further aspect of a vicious circle of reform and counter- 
reform which had troubled the history of Greek education. It was also reminiscent of the 
reaction to the 1929 reform by the People’s Party and the dictatorship of Metaxas during 
the 1930s.
Emergency Law 129/1967 “On the Organisation and Administration of Education” 
completely and systematically reversed the 1964 reform. Rhetorically it was based on the 
concept of the “Helleno-Christian” spirit and it represented the outright abrogation of most
2  ^ See Papakonstantinou’s Politiki Agogi, translation from “Traditionalism and Reaction in Greek 
Education” in Greece Under Military Rule, p. 133.
22 Similar initial reactionary educational policies were pursued by most Latin American dictatorships. In 
Chile pre-coup educational reforms had been carried out by the centrist government of Frei and the socialist 
government of Allicnde. As was the case with the Papandreou government, the Frei administration in 1965 
introduced reforms at all three educational levels and greatly increased the expenditure on education. Alliende 
sought to reform the educational system so as to make it more egalitarian, providing education for the 
workers as well as for the elites. As in the Greek case, Chilean education was highly politicised, especially 
at the University level, marked by intense student activism and the increase of the student Marxist 
movement. The regime of Pinochet acted strongly against such developments and his educational policy 
was a reaction against the previous dcmocratisation of the educational system. The Frondizi period in 
Argentina (1958-1962) had inaugurated a pluralist system of education, with enormous emphasis on science 
and technology, followed by Ongania’s Catholic, nationalistic and authoritarian orientations. Thomas 
Sanders, op.cit, pp. 6-7.
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of the previous changes.23 A new scheme was introduced which changed once again the 
orientation of secondary education,24 and abolished the concept of “general education” 
which had guided the spirit of the 1964 reform. The Pedagogical Institute, created in 1964 
to conduct pedagogical and psychological research, with the intention of elevating the 
standard of teaching in Greece, was abolished, and all of its members were dismissed or 
demoted.25 This Institute, which had attracted the participation of famous Greek scientists, 
was abolished because, according to the military rulers, its spirit was “contrary to the 
national traditions and the long history o f the Greek people ”.26 In its place the pre-1964 
Higher Council of Education was re-established, according to the 1914 regulations, and 
was given overall supervision of educational matters. A further decree which provided for 
the entry of 10% of those sitting the September examination into higher education on the 
basis of their “high moral character and irreproachable behaviour” ?1 was not applied, but 
all candidates were required to have a “certificate o f good conduct” in order to be admitted. 
(Royal Decree 454/67, article 5) A free meal service for primary schoolchildren was 
abolished and measures concerning the appearance of pupils in schools strictly applied.
23 Return to six-year compulsory education, a school leaving age of 12 instead of 15 (article 3); abolition 
of the lyceum and re-imposition of the pre-1964 unified gymnasium divided into the lower and higher 
gymnasia, one of a classical orientation, and the other of a vocational orientation; return to the system of 
exams which the previous system had abolished; simple katharevousa was recognised as the only official 
language of instruction to be taught from the fourth grade in school (Article 5). The period of teacher 
training was reduced from three years to two (article 13). They also abolished the baccalaureat and returned 
to the previous system of entrance examinations.
24 The curriculum of the gymnasia based on law 129/67 did away with the new school-books introduced by 
the 1964 reform, and published under the surveillance of the Pedagogical Institute and replaced them with 
textbooks published before 1963, similar to those w hich had existed before the reform of 1929, and re­
introduced the half-year semester examinations; they re-imposed Latin as a compulsory language once 
again, increased the hours of studies of ancient Greek and reduced the hours of mathematics and modem 
Greek; they abolished courses such as the “Elements on the Democratic System”, “Education of the 
Citizen”, “Introduction to Sociology” and “Elements of Economic Science”, and replaced them w ith courses 
such as “the principles o f the 21st of April regime”. Ancient Greek was given a renewed emphasis at the 
expense of modem languages and all the voluntary courses were abolished; the teaching of ancient Greek, 
through passages of 10 to 15 lines was re-introduced without the substantial analysis of the content, but 
based on the study o f grammar and syntax. The demotic language was only to be taught during the three 
first years of primary education. (See Decision by the minister Kalambokias published in the new spaper 
Vima, 13/6/67). In 1969 a new' programme for secondary education was introduced to replace the previous 
1967 one. For all three types of secondary education (classical, vocational, economic) the curicula were 
meticulously defined by the new program, without offering any major change, but only a rearrangement of 
the hours of the study of ancient Greek and the hours of maths and physics while the priorities remained on 
classical and religious courses. (Royal Decree 702/69,31/10/69, The official Newspaper)
25 See Dimos Anastasiou “L’ Enseignement Grec et son Demantelement par la Junte” in Les Temps 
Modernes, p. 184.
26 Declaration of the Minister, in the newspaper Elefiheros Kosmos, (30/6/67).
27 Article 4, Law 40/67 “On the Entrance Examinations for Higher Institutions”, The Official Newspaper.
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Long lists of banned books were circulated by the Ministry of Education, while 
booksellers who continued to sell the forbidden books made themselves liable to 
imprisonment under the 1912 law ”On the establishment of a state of siege”. Among many 
curious items included on the list were George Finlay’s History o f the Greek Revolution 
and an edition of Constantine Paparrighopoulos’ book History o f the Greek Nation, the 
author of the latter having been one of the principal ideologists of the concept of “Helleno- 
Christian civilisation”.28 Even pre-school kindergarten books were stamped before military 
censors would allow their circulation.29
It should be noted, however, that in general, the school textbooks approved by the 
junta were not radically different from their predecessors’ books, i.e., the pre-1964 
textbooks. In the history textbooks there were a few additions and changes concerning 
modem Greek history so as to provide the necessary justification of the military 
intervention. Greater emphasis was put on periods of warfare in the study of Greek 
history, thus presenting the national history as a series of militaiy victories, and giving the 
army the leading role, the heir to the ancient spirit and guardian of the national heritage. In 
the history textbooks the depiction of the splendour and glory of war was pursued 
systematically while the underestimating of other important political and intellectual 
accomplishments, revealed the one-sided military perception of history.30
As to the language issue, the colonels allowed the use of demotiki in the first three 
forms of primary education, under the general provision that it should be “void of 
extremities and idioms, and corresponding to the perceptive capacity o f the pupils in these 
forms in the other forms the use of katharevousa was imposed strictly.31 Contrary to 
Metaxas’ favourable predisposition towards the demotiki, military rulers used to call the 
demotic a “semi-barbarian Turko-Hellenic language” 32 They employed their own version
28 See Hellenic Review, August 1968, pp. 25-26.
29 Moreover Royal Decree 95/69, which imposed the centralisation and the control over the University 
textbooks was used as a means to enhance the central power of the state over the dissemination of 
University knowledge.
30 See Alki Kyriakidou-Nestoros “George Papadopoulos, History and the Teaching of History to the Greek 
children” in Anti 26-27, 6/9/75, pp. 18-22.
31 From personal experience as a pupil in the 4th form of primary education in 1971, the transition from 
the demotiki of the 3rd form to the katharevousa of the 4th form was very frustrating for the majority of 
pupils.
32 Polychronopoulos Education and Policy in Greece, Vol. II, p. 546.
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of katharevousa in their speeches, legal documents, and regime books, and at times their 
language did not even make sense. Due to their own poor educational achievements, they 
perceived the use of the katharevousa idiom as a sign of education, as a status symbol, 
reminiscent of the 19th century perception of the language issue.
Demobilisation o f the youth: “Stick and carrot” tactics
The regime’s policy towards the youth, based on the above set of ideas, involved 
the dissolution of all youth organisations of every political persuasion, be it the “Lambrakis 
youth movement” which was connected with the Centre-Left, or the EREN, the youth 
organisation of the Conservative party, ERE.33 School pupils at primary and secondary 
school level were not allowed to attend any youth organisations with the exception of the 
Greek Scouts, the youth section of the Greek Red Cross and the Sunday Schools. 
Moreover, school communities, involved in various sorts of extra-curicula activities, were 
not allowed to exist at all by the junta 34 In 1968 the dictatorship created a special 
department in the General Secretariat of the Prime Minister under the title “Direction of the 
Youth” (law 551/20-9-68), which aimed at the formation of a special policy on the 
supervision of the youth, the student movement and its various organisations. It involved 
the financing of supervisory councils and the publishing of magazines in the government’s 
effort to control the student movement.35 The only attempt by a few members of the 
military elite to create a youth organisation was the formation of Alkimoi, whose leadership 
was given to Plevris, the leader of the u4th o f August movement, but it had -no
appeal within the military circles at large.
The regime issued Law 93/1969 “On the Rights and Duties of the Students” 
creating the “Student Code”, involving sanctions for disobedient students. This was a 
clearly and explicitly disciplinary and intimidating document, after the style of the 1929 
“Idionymon”, with similar vocabulary and ideas concerning students. The disciplinary
33 On April 30, 1967 the governmental newspaper Eleffheros Kosmos proclaimed that the government 
had dissolved the EDA party, the Lambrakis youth, EREN and EDHN, while a few days later Angelis, the 
Leader of the General Army Staff, ordered the dissolution o f 279 organisations and associations. See 
Andreas Lentakis, “Staff for the Fascistisation of the Youth, in Anti 18, p. 32.
34 Message from the Minister Kalambokias in the Newspaper Eleftheros Kosmos, 13/5/67.
35 Lentakis, op.cit, p. 22.
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punishments in cases of offences such as the dissemination of subversive ideas, incitement 
to strike and disrespect for the principles of the state varied from reprimand to permanent 
expulsion from all institutions of higher education.36 Article 120 and 123 stated that,
a student will be punished if  he aims at the implementation o f ideas having as an 
obvious goal the overthrow, by whatever means, o f the existing social regime or 
tries to convert others to those ideas, or propagates such ideas in whatever way and 
by whatever means, or propagandises ideas o f organisations aiming at detaching a
part from the whole o f the State students intending to call students o f one or
more schools, or a group o f students to a meeting should, 24 hours in advance, in 
writing, ask for permission from the Rector stating the place the day and the hour 
as well as the purpose o f the assembly....otherwise they will be punished. 37 
The policy towards the students was a policy of “stick and carrot tactics”. On the 
one hand, the regime tried to intimidate them by promulgating authoritarian laws such as 
the “student code of behaviour” and others concerning the interruption on the deferment of 
military service for disobedient students 38 Police surveillance and police informers among 
the students were used to control university life and to suppress the student movement, and 
there were even threats not to grant passports, scholarships and tuition fees, to students in 
foreign countries. On the other hand, the abolition of the “certificates of good conduct”, the 
offers of free books, scholarships, exam accommodations, interest-free loans, free medical 
care, new halls of residence, were used among other things, to woo the students. The 
military rulers intended through the Governmental Commissioner and the Committees 
appointed to run the Student Unions, to exercise an overall control over student 
movements and to tame any tencencies to mobilise.
36 The 5-member Disciplinary Council set up by a decision o f the Minister of National Education was 
composed of 4  professors and the Government Commissioner (article 122).
37 Translation taken from the article “Education: A Farewell to Freedom” in the Greek Report, February 
1969, pp. 5-6.
38 Laws 720/1970 and 1347/1973. The second followed the student uprising in the Law School in 1973, 
as the dictatorship tried to get rid of the revolutionary students and especially the leadership of the student 
movement, through the promulgation of intimidating laws.
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Purges o f professors and teachers
A significant authoritarian feature of the military regime’s educational policy was 
the harassement of the educational hierarchies, the dismissals and purges of professors. 
One of the Ministers of Education, Theophylactos Papakonstantinou declared in one of his 
speeches that:
The National Revolutionary Government, considering the modernisation and 
reorganisation o f education as one o f its principal objectives, has judged that it 
should begin with the cleansing o f its highest level. For it is at this level that the 
intellectual and scientific leadership o f the nation is moulded. 39 
A series of Constituent Acts defined the conditions according to which the teaching 
staff might be considered disloyal to the regime and so be dismissed or forced to resign. 
The purge of school teachers, while on a relatively small scale, was highly selective, 
concentrating on the leadership of the profession, in order to terrorise the rest and deprive 
them of their leadership.40 The purge of University professors was also achieved by the 
lowering of the retirement age from 70 to 65, while deans and rectors could also be 
appointed directly by the ministry, without the application of the normal electoral 
procedures.41 The junta obliged professors to sign “declarations of loyalty” to the 
regime.42
A series of ministerial acts dismissed long lists of professors on the grounds that 
they have in a number o f ways in the course o f their professional and social lives 
attacked the established political and social order and its institutions. They have 
carried out propaganda in favour o f communism or furthered its objectives and, in 
a general way, followed in political matters the subversive and anti-national line of
39 See “Greek Education on the Operating Table Part 1” in Hellenic Review , Vol. 1, No 2, July 1968, p. 
12.
40 During the whole of the dictatorship 56 professors and readers, 90 teachers at the secondary' school level 
of education (out of 10,000 teachers), 211 at the primary school level (out of 30,000 teachers) and 13 
administrative employers of the Central Service were dismissed.
41 The Official Newspaper, No 30, January 27, 1968.
42 Furthermore the military junta based on Constituent Act No 5 “On the Cleansing and Restoration of 
Order in the Higher Educational Institutions” stipulated the suspension for six months or more of 
University Professors by a simple decision of the President or Vice-President of the Government and the 
Minister of Education, when among others “professors do not comply with the established social status quo 
and the national directives" (articles 1&2).
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the communists indulged in manifestations and activities in favour o f a certain
political party, have in a number o f ways canvassed support for that party, have 
morally supported and approved every demagogic and political activity o f the 
students,
and in general been guilty of “political activism, professional incompetence or moral 
turpitude ” which justified their dismissal.43 With the purges of the professors the regime 
aimed at the lowering of the public perception of the whole academic body by including 
allegations of corruption (financial, sexual etc) among the purported reasons for the 
dismissals, which reflected the military’s disrespect towards and fear of the intellectuals. 
The long list of dismissed professors included a large number of distinguished intellectuals 
in various scientific and educational fields. Many of them were offered chairs in European 
and American Universities, which they accepted and fled the country.
B. Stabilisation of authoritarian rule
Administration o f Education: The centralisation o f authority
The Constitution of 1968 stated that the general directives of national educational 
policy to be, as prescribed by law, after consultation with the National Council of 
Education.44 The competence of the National Council of Education was to give its opinion 
on the general guidelines on educational matters, its aims, mission and ideological 
orientation. This was composed of the Archbishop of Athens, the President of the 
Constitutional Court, the Leader of the Armed Forces, the President of the Academy of 
Athens, the rectors of the Universities of Athens and Salonica and of the Polytechnic of 
Athens, and the senior General Inspector of Secondary Education.45 The Church 
hierarchy, specifically, intervened in a number of ways and at several instances to prevent 
these changes in education not favourable to the Church, or to promote others 46 The
43 Translation from “Greek Education on the Operating Table”.
44 Articles 2&3 which were additions to the previous 1952 Constitution.
45 Law Decree 793/1971 (1/1/71) “On the National Council of Education” in The Official Newspaper.
^  This is repeatedly stated in Archbishop Ieronymos’ personal account in The Tragedy o f an Archbishop. 
Moreover, the church’s influence was guarranteed by the ex-Brigadier Pattakos, deputy Prime Minister of 
Greece during the junta period and a member of the Triumvirate, who had grown up in the “Zoi” sphere
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jurisdiction of the government Commissioner was also prescribed constitutionally and 
defined by law.
Law Decree 651/1970 (29/8/70) “On the organisation of general education and the 
administration of its personnel” defined the Higher Educational Council as the highest 
administrative and supervisory body under the minister of education. Whereas the 
previous Institute of Education had four members specialising in the problems of 
technical/vocational education, the National Council of Education had only one seat for a 
representative of technical education, which could be filled by someone with no specialist 
technological or economic training. By contrast, teachers of theology had two seats on the 
Council.47 In each educational region one gymnasium was to be promoted into a model 
gymnasium, attended by the selected “best” pupils. A whole series of inspectors were to 
supervise the functioning of the educational system and to report on its development.
Clientelistic appointments: The infiltration o f regime people into education
The regime appointed regime people to the professors’ and the teachers’ Unions so 
as to be able to control their actions and decisions. The vacant seats created by the series of 
dismissals in the Universities were filled by people “in agreement with the social status quo 
and national ideals”.48 The new professors were chosen by the ministry of education and 
the military government. Governmental control over the institutions of higher education 
became stifling, reaching its peak with the infamous institution of the Government 
Commissioner, and with the appointments of retired army officers to higher educational 
institutions. The Government Commissioner exercised state surveillance over higher 
educational institutions by seeing that laws and governmental policies were being applied. 
He was present at the meetings of the various administrative bodies, he offered his opinion
which acquired a very significant role in church and national matters under the junta. This overtly 
puritanical church organisation contributed to the imposition of some of the most prudish education 
measures enforced by the regime, such as the ban on beards for schoolboys, miniskirts, draconian film 
censorship, etc. ( “Zoi, Solir, the Greek Bishops and the Junta” in Hellenic Review , Vol 1, No 4, p 27)
47 See Hellenic Review , August 1968, p. 26.
48 46 professors and readers were appointed at one stroke by the regime without any elections or normal 
procedures, most of them not meeting the adequate prerequisites for such positions. See Solon Grcgoriadcs, 
History o f  the Dictatorship, Vol. 1, p. 115.
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and made propositions (Law Decree 180/69,30/4/69).49 The institution of the Government 
Commissioner was written in the constitutions of both 1968 and 1973. The military 
government intervened in the elections of professors either by refusing to appoint the 
choice of the competent schools, or by making appointments without any electoral 
procedures.50 Moreover, the minister could announce the occupant of a vacant seat 
whenever he wished to do so.51
Following these purges and the subsequent appointments of regime people, there 
was a long list of professors, readers and assistant staff who collaborated with the military 
junta, aiming at their personal professional ascendancy. The military governors, in their 
effort to intervene in the affairs of the Higher Education, received a positive response from 
some University professors. By appointing professors, the so-called specialists, to the 
ministries, the military elite tried to give a technocratic outlook to the government. 19 
professors became ministers or Deputy ministers, while other professors became general 
secretaries of ministries, general directors, prefects, governors of Banks, presidents of 
administrative councils etc.52
The collaboration of some professors with the military rulers took various forms: 
There was cooperation over ideology and propaganda, with publication of pro-government 
books and articles, laudatory speeches and membership of pro-dictatorship associations; 
the task of the security police in the University was facilitated by the passing on of 
information on students and professors; people who were highly regarded by the regime 
were appointed and promoted; students were sent to disciplinary councils of the AEI. The
49 Furthermore, Royal Decree 322/69 (17/5/69) defined the details on the seat of the Commissioner and the 
people working around him in the Universities of Athens and Salonica, the Polytechnic of Athens, the 
Higher Agricultural School of Athens, the Higher Industrial School of Athens and Salonica, and the Higher 
School of Fine Arts. While the post of the Governmental Commissioner had first been introduced in 1931, 
the aims, content and the person responsible in this post changed completely under the dictatorship. The 
person appointed became a sort of a police inspector in the Universities.
50 See Giorgos Papademetriou, “The Legislation of the Dictatorship Regarding the Educational 
Institutions” in Politis No 2, June 1976, p. 21.
51 Law Decree 429/1970 “On the Proclamation of a University Seat”. Law Decree 672/70, (14/9/70) stated 
that deans and rectors were no longer elected by their respective Senates but were appointed by the ministiy 
from a list of three candidates chosen by the Senates. The same principles were applied for the assistant 
teaching staff based on Law 553/68. All the candidates had to submit their applications for appointment to 
the ministry of education accompanied by a signed curriculum vitae on their and their families’ political 
convictions and affiliations.
52 See Dcmetres Daveas, “The Facts about the Cooperation of AEI Professors with the Dictatorship” in 
Politis No 2, June 1976.
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cooperation of many professors with the junta and the appointment of regime people to 
AEI places created a serious problem for those responsible for the post-dictatorial cleansing 
of the Universities of collaborators, the “de-juntafication”.53 All those who were dismissed 
from their University posts during the junta period were automatically reinstated. All those 
directly appointed to posts by the regime without being elected to their posts by the 
Faculties were dismissed.54
The equivalent in the educational establishment of the “para-state” and the 
paramilitary organisations of the post-war period, which had such an important role in the 
imposition of the 21st of April regime, were the “para-student” organisations, which 
played an active role in the destabilisation of the parliamentary climate, in general, and the 
demobilisation of the student movement, in specific. The EKOF (National Social 
Organisation of Students) had actively participated in the University environment as a 
counter-balance to the growing centre and left wing student movement during the 1960s. 
EKOF had been the creation of the conservative government of ERE, and had been 
supported financially by that government.55 It was composed of hard-core conservative 
students against the growing tide of Centre-Left student mobilisation. During the period of 
the junta, EKOF was the only student organisation which was not dissolved, while the 
military rulers made extensive use of previous EKOF members in crucial ministerial, 
prefectural, diplomatic and other posts.56
53 A long list of 92 professors and readers was charged by the Special Disciplinary' Council and were either 
convicted or acquitted of the charges. See ibid., pp. 23-28.
54 Henry Wasser “A Survey of Recent Trends in Greek Higher Education” in The Journal o f the Hellenic 
Diaspora, Vol. VI, No. 1., Spring 1979, p. 87.
55 See Lentakis “Para-stale Organisations: ERE’s Boomerang” in Anti 17, p. 17, on the existence of 
financial and communication links between the government party, ERE, and the student organisation, 
EKOF The former financed the latter’s newspapers, played its rents in Athens and Salonica and organised 
its indoctrination tours throughout the country.
56 Some characteristic promotions of EKOF members to pow erful posts were, among others, the case of 
Lakis loannides who had been the president of EKOF in Salonica during the period 1965-1967 and had 
published student periodicals in w'hich he had invited opinions of people such as the Metaxist Maniadiakis. 
During the dictatorship of 1967 he became an attache at the Embassy in France, he published the periodical 
ldeai, w'as the President of the Cultural Movement of the Greek Youth in Western Europe and w rote several 
books. Another ex-member, Pavlos Manolopoulos, president of EKOF during the period 1960-1963, 
became a prefect and in 1970 a minister of Labour. (See Lentakis, ibid., pp. 20-22.)
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C. The need for modernisation
The immediate and foremost concern of the junta was the control of education and 
the imposition of its own conspiratorial-clientelistic network so as to control and 
depoliticise the student body, in specific and the intellectual world, in general. The 
accession of the regime coincided with a period of industrialisation which had started in the 
1960s and continued with the advent of the military government to power.57 The junta was 
forced to respond to the new situation created by the process of industrialisation by 
introducing changes in the country’s education system to correspond with its educational 
needs.58 The educational policy of the military junta involved, on the one hand, the need to 
control the school and university mechanisms and, on the other, to introduce innovations 
which would modernise the Greek educational system. These two priorities resulted in a 
controversial type of policy by which authoritarian measures, typical of the military’s 
mentality, were mixed with modernising westernised notions, which expressed necessary 
and unavoidable choices at the elite level, the country being part of the industrialised 
western European society.
Towards the end of the 1960s, came the first organised response by the World 
Bank to the matter of technical education in Greece. Its primary findings concerned the 
inability of technical education in Greece to respond to the needs of the diversification of 
the economy 59 A new institutional arrangement came into existence in 1970, with law
57 Economic growth in the secondary sector continued during the junta and in 1973, the gross product of 
this sector reached a peak of a rapidly increasing development, which had started from 1958. Similarly 
employment in the secondary sector increased dramatically and a change in the composition of industrial 
production took place as well. See Stefanos Pesmazoglou, Education and Development in Greece 1948- 
1985 , pp. 205-212.
58 Similarly in Spain the period 1965-1971 was characterised by an anti-democratic modernisation of the 
educational mechanisms, as a response to high levels of industrialisation, economic growth, foreign 
tourism, and urbanisation. The period saw the decreasing influence of traditional Catholicism, the 
increasing number of University students after a long period of relative stagnation in University 
enrollments. The response of the government was the implementation of a plan of educational development 
which recognised the anachronisms of the Spanish educational system and demanded increased educational 
budgets. (Spain was spending only 2.46% of its national income in education -among the smallest 
percentages in Europe). See Salvador Giner, “Power, Freedom and Social Change in the Spanish 
University, 1939-75 in Spain in Crisis, pp 195-202.
59 See Pesmazoglou’s references to the “Staff Appraisal Report of the World Bank”. It was stated that 
Greece spent the lowesf amount in Europe on industrial and technological research and placed its emphasis 
on the traditional sectors of nutrition and textiles. (op.cit., p 301) The lack of technical and professional 
education contributed to the production and reproduction of the already existing traditional structures of the 
Greek economy, without creating the circumstances for the development of technically advanced and 
dynamic sectors, {op.cit., p331)
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652/1970 (29/8/70) “On the creation of KATE for Technical and Professional Education” 
based on the World Bank report, and with the financial assistance of the Bank to respond 
to the need for specialised studies in agriculture, industry, health and the processing of 
food.60 On the other hand, the creation of KATE was also indispensable to the absorption 
of the surplus of candidates for higher education, which could potentially have created 
social pressures.
In 1971, a “Committee on Educational Matters”, composed of professors loyal to 
the regime, investigated the state of education in Greece. Its suggestions included the 
raising the number of mandatory years of education to eight, the abolition of entrance 
examinations to the gymnasium, and the need to develop further the level of technical and 
professional education. It was suggested that secondary education should be divided into 
two cycles, a lower one of two years and a higher one of four years. With respect to the 
teaching of the Greek language, the Committee proposed the use of the demotic up to the 
sixth year of primary education, and the simple katharevousa in the six-year gymnasium. 
In these propositions there appeared to be a similar liberal ideological orientation to that of 
the 1964 reform, although the liberal ideological climate was clearly missing from Greek 
society. Parallel to that Committee, another Committee on Higher Educational matters 
proposed the diversification and expansion of the institutions of higher education, on the 
one hand, and a long list of administrative changes, ie the meticulous control of the higher 
educational institutions by the National Council of Education, composed of members 
appointed by the ministry, clauses on the powerful role of the Government Commissioner 
and on the control of the student movement, on the other hand, most of them authoritarian 
in character.61 Such proposals were accompanied by a few measures such as the creation 
of the University of Jannina, composed of Schools of Philosophy, Physics and 
Mathematics, which were previously departments of the University of Salonica 62 and the 
creation of the Universities of Thrace and Crete and the department of Chemistry in 
Salonica in 1973, to meet the needs of the chemical industry there. In addition, a new
60 It involved the creation of five Centres of Higher Technical Education in the cities of Athens, Salonica, 
Patras, Larisa and Heraclio in Crete.
61 Vrychea/Gavroglou, Attempts at Reform o f Higher Education, 1911-1981, pp. 68-71.
62 Law Decree 746/70, (12/12/70), The Official Newspaper.
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educational curriculum for secondary education was prepared in the same year, including 
elements of the 1964 programme, which was never applied.63
In general, the rhetorical tendency of the military governors during the 1970s was 
to create a constitutionally legitimate, self-administered university which in reality was 
controlled and suppressed by the government, and a modern school system which in 
reality was strictly supervised. As was the case with the “liberal constitution” of the junta 
(which was not respected), so it was in the field of higher education where the junta was 
unable to adhere to rules and constitutions. The military regime tried hard to present a 
legitimacy based on a constitution and a series of liberal legal documents, which it only 
partially applied, trying to combine modernisation with methods of control, intimidation 
and demobilisation. This type of policy led to the student uprising in the Law School in 
February 1973 and the Polytechnic revolt in November 1973, the latter being the most 
notable organised opposition to the military regime to originate from civil society. It 
signalled the beginning of the last phase of the military regime, and it certainly brought 
about the immediate downfall of the Papadopoulos dictatorship and his overthrow by the 
hard-core faction within the junta. The student grievances at First concentrated on internal 
matters such as democratic elections and free discussions on their educational curriculum, 
demanding their democratic rights as members of the Greek University community, but 
expanded by November 1973 to include open demands for the fall of the military junta, 
thus rejecting any liberalisation measures coming from a military government.
A period of apparent frustration and contradiction between the two imperatives, 
modernisation and authoritarian control, characterised even in the latter stage of the hard­
liners, immediately after the Polytechnic uprising. During that last period, it had become 
plain that the higher educational apparatus was very much politicised, despite the intentions 
of the militaiy rulers, and presented the regime with the most serious source of opposition. 
Hard pressed to discover the causes of the revolutionary student mobilisation, the hard­
63 See Noutsos, op.cit., p. 290. According to the same author, the 1967 provisory programme of 
secondary education was the one which reflected the ideological and political orientations of the newly 
established regime and tried to do away with the 1964 liberal and radical reform of the Centre Union 
government. The subsequent programmes of 1969 and 1973 were an attempt by the dictatorial regime to re­
introduce the spirit of reform initialed in 1964 and abolished in 1967. (p 285)
liners took part in a series of nine ministerial councils between February 1974 and June 
1974, “On Youth”. Among the variety of opinions, some ministers tried to associate the 
student anti-dictatorial struggle with the movements of Western Europe and the ills of the 
consumerist society, while others blamed unemployment, the decreasing influence of the 
Church and the lack of ideals. But most important were the propositions on reform of the 
AEI, which ranged from very reactionary and backward-looking ones, along the lines of 
the first dictatorial policies, to some very radical innovations, which included among 
others, the abolition of university chairs, student participation in the administration of the 
AEI, the reevaluating of the professor’s work every seven years, the introduction of 
marxist philosophy in teaching, the need to use the modem Greek language and changes in 
technical education and the infrastructure of the University apparatuses.64 None of these 
suggestions was ever implemented by the hard-liners, within the economically frustrating 
climate of 1974, but they revealed the conflict of opinions and influences in military 
regimes and the contradictory process of their incorporation under conditions of limited 
authoritarian pluralism.
64 Proceedings of the Ministerial Councils on educational matters in Sarafianos/Loverdos “From the 
Dictatorship until Today” in Anti 442, 13/7/90, pp. 54-56.
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Chapter 8: CONCLUSION
In the preceding chapters, I have been dealing with two periods of dictatorship in 
Greek political history, which had an openly authoritarian discourse and political practice. 
The common denominator was the abolition of parliamentary institutions during the course 
of both these authoritarian regimes. I concentrated on the ideological domain of the 
authoritarian regimes, the perceptive, interpretative and rhetorical ability of the dictatorial 
elites, on the one hand, and on the crucial field of education, which directly reflected these 
ideas, on the other. Common to the two regimes were their attempt to manipulate the 
ideological sphere through their discourse, emphasising traditional elements in their ideas, 
adopting a one-sided perception of history, stressing their anti-communist orientation, 
suppressing the freedom of social and political organisation, censoring free speech, 
pursuing anti-parliamentary and exclusionary forms of authoritarian domination. Also in 
common was their aim to pursue an authoritarian educational policy, reacting to previous 
attempts at reform, controlling all levels of education, purging professors from their chairs, 
and banning youth associations. Despite these features, similar to every type of 
authoritarian rule, the two regimes perceived differently the nature of their rule, interpreted 
differently the Greek past and their contemporary realities, proposed different forms of 
political organisation, perceived the role of the youth in a radically different manner and 
faced different conflicts over their educational orientations.
I carried out an extensive analysis of the Greek historical context in ideological and 
educational matters, as well as of the immediate background as regards the domestic and 
international settings of the two regimes, in order to show the similarities in and 
differences between the influences on the ideas of the two regimes and their connection 
with the field of education. The Greek ideological context centred around the issues of the 
Greek identity -religion, history, language and nation-, under conditions of guided 
democracy, imported parliamentary rules and dependent economic development. In the 
field of education, which had similarly imported characteristics, the emphasis was on 
classicist, religious and generally non-vocational studies. Under nominally democratic
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institutions, Greek ideology and education progressed in a context of pluralism, which 
allowed lively and, at times, fierce debates concerning the role of religion, the perception 
of history, the essence of nationalism, the adoption of a common language and the 
orientation of education.
With respect to the climate immediately preceding the onset of the two regimes, one 
can observe wide differences in the domestic and international context, and this directly 
affected the orientations and ideological choices of the dictatorial elites. The domestic 
climate that preceded the 4th of August regime was marked by a pluralist democratic 
process of mass politics, with the Liberal Venizelist party and the royalist, anti-Venizelist 
People’s Party alternating in power. The background climate to the 21st of April regime 
was marked by the existence of an exclusionaiy and authoritarian parliamentarism, with the 
dominance of right-wing forces in power. The international climate surrounding Metaxas’ 
rule was marked by the influence of international fascism. The international context of the 
military junta was marked by the acceptance of liberalism. The dictatorship of Metaxas was 
the authoritarian reaction to the previous climate of inter-war socio-political instability in 
the country’s domestic affairs. The 1967 militaiy junta was the authoritarian reaction to the 
exhaustion of the post-war anti-communist exclusionary state, and to the mobilisation of 
Greek society. The power structure of the 4th of August regime was based on the personal 
power of the dictator, enjoying the King’s acquiescence, with a civilian government, the 
support of the dominant anti-Venizelist elites and of the military hierarchy. The power 
structure of the military junta was based on the collective leadership of a certain faction of 
the military, enjoying support neither from the king nor the civilian political world. The 
ideas of the 4th of August regime reflected largely the mind of the dictator Metaxas, while 
those of the 21st of April regime reflected the minds of the military officers.
The ideological perceptions of the two authoritarian regimes differed widely. The 
regime of Metaxas gave great emphasis to the ideological legitimation of the dictator’s rule 
and, for that reason, he embarked on the adoption and the diffusion of an ideological 
discourse which was largely influenced by the powerful fascist philosophy. The 21st of 
April regime’s authoritarian discourse, reflected merely the mentalities of the military
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rulers. Similar differences are observed in the way the two regimes perceived the world of 
education, the role of intellectuals and the position of the youth within Greek society. Their 
rhetoric towards the youth was very indicative of their authoritarian ideas, whether they 
were conservative, reactionary or, even, reformist as regards the previous domestic context 
and the contemporary international influences. The educational policies pursued by the two 
regimes were very different with an emphasis on the mobilisation of the youth in the case 
of the 4th of August regime, and on the demobilisation of the youth and the imposition of 
authoritarian clientelism, in the case of the 21st of April regime.
Authoritarian ideas: 4th o f August ideology vs 21st o f A pril m ilitary 
mentalities
The 4th of August regime, by giving the impression of unity at the elite level, made 
an extensive use of the ideological mechanisms and tried to propagate a new authoritarian 
ideological framework. Metaxas’ regime was an authoritarian regime at the periphery of the 
European ideological centres, which felt the pressure to imitate, incorporate and manipulate 
dominant ideological themes and styles. This was exemplified by the adoption of some 
new fascist ideas and forms of organisation, on the one hand, and the pursuance of some 
reformist policies connected with the fascist corporatist state, on the other. While the ideas 
of the 4th of August regime did not enjoy the consistency and the all-embracing character 
of the fascist and Nazi ideologies, they sought to encompass a large number of issues, 
regarding the form of political system, the organisation of the economy and society, and 
the cultural standing of the nation.
The international climate of the time was crucial to the ideological orientations of 
the 4th of August regime. The authoritarian ideological alternative in Europe, in the form of 
the model fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, the fascistoid regimes in the Balkans, and 
the Iberian Peninsula, and the fascist movements in almost all the countries of Europe 
offered many things to imitate for the 4th of August regime, in its ideological interpretation 
of the existing reality. Most important, the international existence of authoritarian fascism
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served as a legitimising pillar to the regime’s perception of reality and to its mobilising 
ambitions.
International fascism employed a particular ideological discourse within a concrete 
historical international context, and its influence was apparent in most European countries. 
It consisted in the articulation of various ideological themes, prevalent in most 20th century 
western societies, such as nationalism, ethnicity, religion, anti-communism and anti­
parliamentarism. In each national environment these influential fascist themes acquired a 
different significance, corresponding to the specific socio-economic, political and 
ideological circumstances that preceded the dictatorships. Thus, in the German context, the 
legacy of the wartime defeat, the country’s subsequent inferior international status, the 
instability of the Weimar Republic and an economy in ruins produced a Nazi ideology 
which consisted of an aggressive and anti-semitic form of nationalism, advocated the 
adoption of openly totalitarian ideas and practices, concerning all aspects of public and 
private life, and enjoyed a high degree of popular consent and organisation. In the Italian 
context, the aftermath of the first world war was marked by the failure to fulfil its 
irredentist ambitions, by the revolutionary dynamism of the working classes, and by the 
political deadlocks of the Italian parliamentary system, which led to the formation of the 
prototype fascist ideology. Fascism in Italy evolved in the time-span of 20 years, its 
ideology appeared both idealistic and pragmatic, but it never achieved, despite its 
intentions, the totalitarian dimension of the Nazi example. It emphasised the omnipresence 
of the state, it downgraded the anti-Semitic and stressed the imperialist aspect of Italian 
nationalism. In Spain, authoritarianism was the reaction to the ascendancy of Liberals in 
power and to the subsequent bloody civil war which had sharply divided and polarised 
Spanish society. Spanish authoritarianism was mainly connected with the influential 
ideological role of the fascist Falange, which was dominant during the first period of the 
Franco regime. It gave an influential position to the Catholic Church, while at the same 
time it avoided the aggressiveness of the Nazi and fascist models and pursued a neutralist 
and more pragmatic foreign policy during the second world war. In Portugal, unstable 
parliamentarism, military interventions and a very weak economy confined the Salazarist
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nationalist ideology within the national frontiers and colonies of the country. The Salazar 
regime attached great importance to the corporatist organisation of the economy, while, at 
the same time, it retained the traditional features of Portuguese culture.
The Greek case has been mostly seen in the light of the influence coming from the 
model cases of Italy and Germany, and in the light of its similarities with the countries of 
the Balkan and the Iberian peninsulas, with emphasis on the resemblances between the 
leadership style of Metaxas and Salazar. Naturally, the history of the Iberian peninsula had 
been very different from that of the Balkans, in that the first was composed of two 
historically imperialist states, with strong national identities, at the periphery of the main 
European developments; while the second was composed of a number of hostile 
nationalities and states, previously subjects of the Ottoman Empire, with a strong Ottoman 
historical legacy and a peripheral position, similar to that of the Iberian peninsula. 
However, the development of Greece, the oldest independent nation-state in the Balkans, 
did have some things in common with Portugal and Spain, in terms of its socio-economic 
experiences, political divisions and ideological polarisations, especially during the second 
half of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, which makes them, in 
many respects, comparable. Political life in the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek cases was 
marked by clientelistic relationships, in a context of electoral politics, an army with a 
heavily political role and a series of military interventions.
The 4th of August regime imported fascist ideas, which centred on the adoption of 
the leadership principle, open anti-parliamentarism and the corporatist organisation of the 
state. The lack of a pre-existing indigenous fascist culture, however, exposed the imitative 
and derivative character of the regime’s ideology, whose application contrasted with the 
lack of social support for such fascist notions. The leadership principle, a mere imitation of 
the fascist model contrasted with the non-charismatic personality of Metaxas. Anti- 
parliamentarism rested on the dictator’s belief in the bankruptcy of Greece’s parliamentary 
institutions, and on the public’s belief in the exhaustion of the previous, polarised 
parliamentary system, and not on any more elaborate theory of the defects of liberalism, as 
was the case with fascism. The development of the corporatist state was in any case
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characterised by the overwhelming power of the state in national life. Its application by 
Metaxas fovisis.JeJl of little more than a populist rhetoric towards peasants and workers 
and the timid adoption of some reformist policies. Anti-communism, the other fascist 
component, shared by both liberals and fascists everywhere, not just in the Greek case, 
had already been excessively employed by the domestic parliamentary political forces of 
the inter-war period, and the Metaxas regime had nothing new to offer apart from a more 
organised and repressive police state.
The Greek nationalism of the regime, on the other hand, although it reflected the 
grandiose megalomania of the other inter-war authoritarian nationalisms, did not contain 
any aggressive or imperialistic resonance, but expressed the pragmatic beliefs of the 
dictatorial leadership. Moreover, the 4th of August regime’s nationalism did not include 
any racist or anti-Semitic components, due to the lack of significant minorities within the 
Greek boundaries and the small number of Greek Jews. The foremost inter-war national 
tension had been confined to the relationship between native Greeks and the refugee new­
comers refugees, but this was principally expressed within the wider political division of 
the inter-war National Schism of Venizelism vs anti-Venizelism. But the inter-war refugees 
were ethnic Greeks and not a hostile alien minority, and so did not provoke a racist 
ideology. The Metaxist Third Greek Civilisation centred on the promotion of traditional 
Greek values, the king, the family and the orthodox religion, and rested on a selective 
interpretation of Greek histoiy, expressing the intellectual perceptions of the leader and his 
theoreticians. The 4th of August regime perceived the development and modernisation of 
Greek society as coming through the promotion of Greek tradition, and it was fearful of 
the modernising influences of the materialist western civilisation. It was somewhat static in 
its perception of the future and retrograde in that it foujkt inspiration in the glorious Greek 
and Byzantine past.
In contrast with the ideological content of the 4th of August regime, the 21st of 
April regime did not achieve anything that could be called an ideological discourse and its 
pronouncements were mainly marked by the mentalities of the military rulers. Such 
mentalities were based mostly on the officers’ attitudes towards social and political
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realities, which were determined largely by the particularities of the Greek military mind 
and the general anti-communist ideological context of the post-war period, and not on any 
elaborate ideological interpretation of their contemporary reality. The mentalities of the 
military rulers were characterised by fierce anti-communism, both internal and external, a 
puritanical xenophobia towards western culture, and a vague and out-dated “Helleno- 
Christianism”. Their main objectives involved the restoration of law and order, a typical 
theme in their own professional socialisation. Greece’s military rulers did not have 
adequate connections with the technocratic-bureaucratic elites and therefore lacked the 
developmentalist language of the Latin American military dictatorships. The collective 
character of the military junta resulted in ideological differences between hard-liners and 
soft-liners, and the military rulers were never able to arrive at a unity of purpose. Their 
rhetoric regarding the transitional and democratic character of the military regime, and the 
necessity to construct a new constitution, never enjoyed a full consensus among the 
military rulers and the 1973 attempts at liberalisation met with a counter-coup by the hard­
liners.
While the international climate acted as a legitimising pillar to the authoritarian ideas 
of the inter-war regimes, the post-war authoritarian regimes existed in the Western sphere 
of influence and within the context of the unquestioned legitimacy of pluralist and liberal 
democracy, and these international links with advanced, stable, and democratic industrial 
societies served to undermine the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, given that they were 
subjected to scrutiny in the light of these liberal influences. This contributed to the 
undermining of the legitimacy of the military regimes, offering to their citizens the 
alternative liberal political model and encouraging them not to give their full allegiance to 
the authoritarian regime.1 In the case of the Greek military junta, the western democratic 
values of the industrialised societies sharply contrasted with the backward-looking, 
puritanical and stratocratic mentalities of the military elites.
1 See Laurence Whitehead in his article “International Aspects of Democratisation” in Transitions from  
Authorilarian Rule; Comparative Perspectives, where the writer assesses the weight of the international 
organisations’ reactions to the authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe and Latin America, and their 
pressures to democratise.
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Lacking a pre-existing ideological framework, and within a liberal international 
context, the mentalities of the military rulers and their strongly-worded rhetoric were 
constantly at variance with their actual practice. The anti-communist, anti-western, 
puritanical, narrowly nationalistic and religious rhetoric of the military elite contrasted 
sharply with the consumerist and western orientated policies, their own corrupt political 
practices and their instrumental perception of power. The constitutional framework, which 
represented their claim to liberal credentials, was not implemented or respected by them. 
The only attitude common to all the military officers who intervened in 1967, was their 
ideological allegiance to the principles of the post-war official anti-communist discourse. 
Their intervention was a last and desperate effort to save the anti-communist political 
arrangement from the danger of a more westernised and open liberal discourse, which 
would have allowed for the existence of a greater pluralism in the realm of ideas, and 
would have threatened their central position as the guardians of the state. The military 
junta, by taking the post-war anti-communist discourse to a farcical and absurd extreme, 
helped Greek people to realise better the deficiencies and the fanaticism of such an ideology 
and revealed the dangerous political consequences of the existence of such extremities.
Authoritarian education: Ideological (i mobilisation by exam ple” vs 
“demobilisation by reaction”
Although the regime of Metaxas did not try to create a mass party on the model of 
the fascist mass movements, the ideological mobilisation of the Greek youth was clearly a 
case of an “ideological mobilisation by example”, on the model of the fascist youth 
movements in Europe. The inter-war concept of a mobilised youth context made a great 
impression on Greek authoritarian policy, in that the dictator attempted the ideological 
mobilisation of the youth on the basis of a blatantly authoritarian discourse, and the 
imposition of a fascist youth organisation, intended to be the future pillar of the regime.
The ideological mobilisation of Metaxas’ regime represented the effort of a dictator 
to activate the youth around a traditionalist, nationalist discourse in a manner and with an 
organisation totally alien to Greek society and experience. However, such mobilisation
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from above required a certain level of pre-existing youth mobilisation from below, which 
was non-existant in the inter-war social context. The derivative character of the 4th of 
August regime’s ideas, the lack of a pre-existing domestic fascist organisational context, 
the limits placed on the power of the dictator by the king and the lack of a charismatic 
leader, were the main impediments to the successful spread of the youth movement and the 
decay in the mobilisational component of the 4th of August regime. With respect to the 
educational policy of Metaxas, the leader simply reproduced the previous wavering 
between reformist and counter-reformist tendencies.2 The authoritarian control by the state, 
the introduction of gymnastics lessons, as an element of primary importance in education, 
the promotion of the demotic language and the contradictory laws concerning the 
educational curicula demonstrated that the regime’s thinking on education expressed an 
amalgam of various ideas, and that it was unable to overcome the previous instability in 
education.
Contrary to the 4th of August attempts at mobilisation, the military mentalities of 
the leaders of the 21st of April regime and the complete lack of an ideological framework 
presented serious obstacles to a mobilisation from above of the 1960s youth population. 
Instead the military regime faced a student mobilisation from below and, consequently, 
aimed at its “demobilisation by reaction”, and the depoliticisation of the Greek youth, as 
the optimum level of consent. Through a complete disrespect towards the previous
2 There is a tendency among analysts of educational matters, to see Greek educational reforms and counter­
reforms in the context of an endless effort to promote a bourgeois transformation in education which, due 
to the strong role o f the traditional forces, failed to materialise. Noutsos, for example, in a rather 
mechanistic, class reductionist interpretation o f educational developments in Greece from the 1930s 
believes that the struggle over education was directly connected to the struggle between the conservative and 
liberal factions of the bourgeoisie. The first professed the classicist orientation while the second espoused a 
more practical one in educational matters. The turn towards classicism following the defeat of the 
Venizelist forces in 1932, Noutsos believes, was clearly due to the political and ideological domination of 
the conservative faction. Similarly, the traditionalist leaning o f the 21st of April regime educational policy 
is seen as a result of the weak ideological and political position of the domestic bourgeoisie (the concept as 
defined by Poulantzas) and its inability to impose its domination. (Noutsos, Programs o f Secondary 
Education and Social Control, 1931-1973.) In that sense, political and ideological phenomena are solely 
view'ed in terms of the interests of the economically dominant classes. It is, in the w'ords of Mouzelis, as if 
the dominant classes are “omniscient and omnipotent anthropomorphic entities mysteriously regulating 
everything on the political scewe.”(M ou zelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery, p. 200.) To perceive debates 
over ideological and educational matters as the conflict between the various fractions of capital, means that 
the ideological choices within the Greek national context were reduced to a polarised conflict between 
traditional and modem, capitalist and pre-capitalist feudal social forces, both of them adequately aware of 
their perceived interests. The ideological struggle, however, is not a clear conscious struggle of dominant 
class factions, especially in peripheral civil societies w'ith weakly organised social forces.
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educational hierarchies, the banning of most youth associations, the suppression of the 
student movement, the promotion of loyal regime people to crucial posts, the military junta 
sought to control the educational system. While the educational policy of the 4th of August 
regime was mostly guided by influential international ideas and the leader’s personal 
inspirations, that of the military junta was a series of laws void, for the most part, of any 
ideological orientation, but very significant of the rulers’ mentalities, aiming at the 
promotion of demobilisation based on mediocrity and political apathy.
The contradictions in the military elite’s educational policy became more acute, 
given that the regime coincided with a period of industrialisation and economic growth in 
the country, which required an urgent modernisation of the educational mechanisms as 
well. The military government proved unable to form a coherent policy of modernisation in 
education. This was due to the military mind of the rulers, on the one hand, which was ill- 
suited to act as a policy-maker in an area outside its competence, and to the fact that the 
military rulers alienated themselves completely from the previous political establishment 
and their civilian associates. The contrast between the perceptions of the military mentality 
and the need for a more rational orientation in the educational apparatus had its effect on 
education as a whole, resulting in a contradictory policy of control, demobilisation and 
misconceived modernisation.
The military junta’s educational policy revealed the inability of the military to act as 
an energising force for modernisation and to make rational decisions, as a governmental 
entity. While the military, in more under-developed societies may be able to act as a 
modernising force, in more developed polities, and civil societies such as Greece, the 
military is incapable of bringing about any change at all. As Huntington points out, the 
military can be both an energising force and a retarder of social change, depending on the 
country’s stage of development.3 However, to examine the ability of the military to bring 
about social change as compared to the abilities of civilian governments, views 
modernisation as the final end, irrespective of the specific means used for its achievement 
and falls into the trap of viewing the military as a professional, neutral force which
3 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 219-221.
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intervenes quite naturally in the political process because of the irresponsibility of the 
civilians.4 As Valenzuela claims “it is simply a distortion o f reality to conceive o f the 
civilian side in the same light as the military side”. This is not so, he believes, because 
civilian rule involves a multiplicity of institutions and state structures, within the 
framework of a whole range of formal and informal rules and mechanisms of conflict and 
accommodation which define the interaction of groups and individuals in a society. The 
military in power, on the other hand, is by definition an abnormal situation. It is only a 
single authoritarian institution, which imposes its rule from above and keeps under control 
the other institutions.5 Even in the Latin American cases of the military-technocratic- 
civilian elite coalitions, with a relatively high civilian participation and a sufficient degree of 
initial consensus, eventually B-A rule came to lose the consensus within its elite structure 
and to rely solely on mechanisms of coercion.6
The Greek junta of 1967 established by a military coup by more or less isolated 
middle-ranking officers who enjoyed neither the support of the conservative right, nor 
connections with established and well-known Greek technocrats. Despite their attempt to 
present the regime as having technocratic outlook, most technocrats of the period of the 
junta had a meteoric rise at the advent of the regime, and had no previous experience or 
recognition by Greek society. In the field of education the gap between civilian capabilities 
and military capabilities was even more accentuated. While the military rulers were forced
4 Danopoulos has concentrated on the effectiveness of the military decision-making process and the ability 
of the regime to convince the public of its capacity to make rational decisions and to perform to their 
expectations. He asserts that the military regime failed to enlist the commitment and the allegiance of the 
Greek people, due to its inability to implement effective policy and to attain the goals it had set itself to 
bring about. It also failed to manage conflict within its own ranks, as well as conflicts within the socio­
political and administrative arenas. Under such circumstances the making and implementing of efficacious 
decisions became problematic. This led to the “incongruity, incoherence and inconsistency of decisional 
behaviour”, which prevented the military from acting as rational governors and attaining the goals they had 
set when they intervened. Sec Danopoulos and Patel, “Military Professionals as Political Governors: A 
Case of Contemporary Greece” in West European Politics, May 1980, pp 188-202.
5 See Valenzuela, “A Note on the Military and Social Science Theory”, pp. 132-143.
6 The members o f the ruling coalition, according to O’ Donnell, had, at the beginning of the authoritarian 
period, approximating interests and they supported each other in the imposition of authoritarian rule. 
During the course of the dictatorships, however, their interests diverged and the army lost its initial support 
from the middle classes, the local and the transnational bourgeoisie, and became isolated form the rest of 
society. Therefore, the authoritarian state had to rely exclusively on the legitimacy of fear and coercion. O’ 
Donnell’s analysis stands as an interesting argument of how tensions within the ruling elite cannot be 
reconciled internally and lead to an eventual liberalisation, a democratic opening, or to violent overthrow of 
the military regimes. “Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy” in 
the New Authoritarianism in Latin America, pp. 285-318.
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to adopt modernising policies, their domination within the power structure, given the lack 
of a pluralist discourse and the absence of cooperation from the civilians of the previous 
political world, resulted in a contradictory series of laws. The dictatorship of Metaxas, on 
the other hand, came closer to such a ruling coalition, of the bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regime type, since the dictator enjoyed the support of the conservative anti-Venizelist right 
and made use of established professionals from the period before the dictatorship. Most of 
the ministries during the Metaxas regime were allocated to people with no political 
experience but with professional expertise in the relevant area. By contrast, the military 
junta discriminated against the whole of the political spectrum, from civilians of the right, 
to those of the extreme left. Unlike Metaxas’ regime, which in the main, only excluded 
communist factions from the political process, and even made use of politicians of a liberal 
bent in the government, the military junta was unable to woo civilians and promoted a 
series of people who were loyal to the military rulers, but who did not necessarily share the 
authoritarian ideas of the regime and were simply interested in their personal advancement, 
and who therefore complied with the regime’s dictatorial policies, i.e., authoritarian 
clientelism.
Authoritarian clientelism
The subject of clientelism has enjoyed a vast amount of literature, as a particular 
mode of social and political organisation in semi-peripheral and peripheral societies. The 
specific cases of Latin American and Southern European clientelism have also provoked 
works by many authors, within the context of electoral participation and parliamentary 
forms of political organisation, permeated by clientelistic, informal and reciprocal 
agreements. As Mavrogordatos points out,
although clientelism does not require electoral politics, it develops at a tremendous 
pace once liberal institutions and mass suffrage are introduced into a predominantly 
peasant society, which is totally unprepared to adopt them in their original meaning 
and content, but quite prepared to adapt them. 7
7 Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, p 11
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Hence the subject of clientelism has been seen in the context of the way electoral politics 
functioned in these societies. In many respects, the Greek political system can be seen as a 
constitutional democracy superimposed upon a traditionalist clientelistic polity, a society 
where modem patron-client ties have permeated modem institutions.8 Moreover the 
tendency has been to regard clientelism and the advent of military intervention in 
association, whereby the collapse of civilian politics is associated with the corruption of 
politicians, and the army comes to power in order to act against the clientelistic practices of 
the politicians.
Equally significant is the existence and perpetuation of clientelism as the basic 
source of regime stability in non-electoral authoritarian regimes. As Legg argues, political 
clientelism may be nurtured by electoral competition, but this has not precluded its 
vigorous existence elsewhere. Non-elective officials, regardless of level, location, or 
specific function, can act as patrons with or without electoral politics.9 Most relevant to our 
analysis is the non-ideological aspect of clientelism. Clientelism is deliberately non- 
ideological since it rests on benefits, inducements and personal loyalties, informal 
networks and secret agreements. Patrons seek specific favours for their clients, in return 
for specific demands, in systems where general ideological formulations and programmes 
remain weak.10 This therefore has great appeal to the dictatorial rulers and their civilian 
connections, as government is not based on party programmes or specific ideologies, but 
on the mere demand of unconditional solidarity.
As Clapham and Philip argue, on the issue of authoritarian clientelism11:
The institutionalisation o f a military regime depends on its capacity to acquire 
civilian allies who are willing to accept subordination to military leadership, in
8 Keith Legg, “Political Change in a Clientelistic Polity: The failure of Democracy in Greece”, in Journal 
o f Political and Military Sociology 1973, Vol. 1, p. 223.
9 Keith Legg, Patrons, Clients and Politicians: New Perspectives on Political Clientelism, Working 
Papers on Development, Institute of International Studies, University of California, pp. 41-42.
10 Peter Flynn, “Class, Clientelism and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control” 
in the Journal o f Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, XII, July 1974, Number 2, p. 139.
11 To be distinguished from “repressive clientelism”, a situation prevalent in the colonial countries of 
Africa and Asia, in the process of social transformation, referring to a coercive response to the assault of 
modernity, the attempt to get something for nothing with impunity. See Rene Lemarchand, “Comparative 
Political Clientelism: Structure, Process and Optic”, in Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development, 
Eisenstadt & Lemarchand, Contemporary Political Sociology, Vol. 3, 1981, p. 17.
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exchange for some share in running the state and especially some shares in the 
benefits which it provides.
The relationship is one of a purely clientelistic character which may be defined as 
a transactional arrangement in which the military patron offers some o f the 
resources derived from its control over the state and in return receives political 
support from the civilian client...These subordinate clients must not be sufficiently 
strong and independent to be able to threaten the military's power.12 
In other words, authoritarian clientelism under military regimes describes the 
relationship between military patrons and military and civilian clients. It may offer material 
rewards to favoured civilians without giving them much involvement in national political 
decisions, and as such it is a way of by-passing politicians and parties.13 Authoritarian 
regimes, lacking a coherent ideological framework and based on the short-term benefits 
they can offer to clientelistic networks of support, miss political strategy, and while they 
are strong in the short-run, they tend to be very vulnerable in the long-run. As Salvador 
Giner has aptly put it, in the Southern European authoritarian context,
recruitment into the sphere o f state employment tended to become more pragmatic
than ideological.......Members o f the service classes -mayors o f towns, high and
middling civil servants, university professors- were asked to express allegiance to 
the official doctrine, yet what was decisive was their personal royalty to the chief or 
arbiter o f the reactionary coalition and their explicit compromise not to question the 
legitimacy o f the dominant political arrangement. 14
The clientelistic, non-ideological form of association with civilians was the 
principal way in which the 1967 military regime attempted to underpin its legitimacy. Due 
to the lack of an ability to form a coherent ideological framework for the legitimation of 
their authority, the military rulers resorted to mechanisms of clientelism, as a way of 
promoting political apathy and passive acceptance of their authority from civil society. A 
clientelistic type of legitimation by itself, when not sustained by party or electoral
12 See Clapham/Philip, The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes, p. 12.
13 See Pinkney, Right-Wing Military Government, p 45
14 Salvador Giner, “Political Economy, Legitimation and the State in Southern Europe” in Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, p. 28.
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mechanisms, is only a short-term strategy in the context of modern, western military 
regimes and proves insufficient in the longer term due to the short-term nature of the 
reciprocal agreements. Moreover, clientelistic politics were exacerbated by the factionalism 
of the military junta, where each member tried to promote his personal status at the expense 
of the rest, and therefore was connected with conspiratorial practices, as well.
Clientelism, the non-ideological formula, was amply used in the predominantly 
ideological field of education, in that the military junta tried to control and manipulate the 
educational apparatus through the use of loyal people, acceptable to the regime, in order to 
control, rather than to modernise Greek education. This is not to say that the 4th of August 
regime acted against the clientelistic tendencies of the Greek polity, although Metaxas’ 
rhetoric might have suggested that. Indeed, Metaxas too appointed some of his personal 
sympathisers to University posts, although he never attained the levels of clientelism of the 
military junta. Some distinguished academics were not purged and were allowed to retain 
their positions. In the case of the 4th of August regime, the ideological mobilisation of the 
youth was superseded by clientelism within the youth movement. Clientelism and 
corruption permeated the youth movement to such an extent that even the dictator was 
appalled by it. Many cadres of Neolaia saw their participation in it as a way of gaining 
personal promotion, in the form of high pay, allowances and access to official patronage. 
In the case of the 21st of April regime, on the other hand, the gap left by the lack of any 
ideology was completely filled by clientelistic practices. Authoritarian clientelism in the 
case of the military junta educational policy aimed at the complete overthrowing of the 
previous educational hierarchies, the imposition of regime people in high posts and the 
eventual creation of a new educational establishment in accord with the mentalities of the 
rulers.
In the end, neither dictatorship was able to legitimise its authoritarian rule, either by 
means of ideological mobilisation or through the practice of clientelistic politics; they 
merely exacerbated the existing ideological polarisations and deadlocks in the educational 
field. Moreover, neither dictatorship enjoyed the support of the youth or of the 
intellectuals, who sought a more pluralist context for their expression. Although the Greek 
dictatorial rulers proclaimed themselves to be the true champions of Hellenism, they failed 
to persuade the people that their aims and programmes were what was required, they were 
unable to overcome the previous political deadlock, and they were unsuccessful in their 
attempt to penetrate and mobilise Greek civil society. Each of them, however, managed to 
survive for some years, i.e., four in the case of the 4th of August regime and seven in the 
case of the 21st of April regime. They were able to prolong their rule due to the lack of 
more attractive political alternatives, the stability of their rule being based mostly on 
passive acceptance of the people. As Przeworski argues, what matters for the stability of a 
certain political system is the presence or absence of preferable alternatives. A regime does 
not collapse unless and until an alternative is presented in such a way as to give people a 
real choice. There can be regimes which can last for a long time and be illegitimate, 
surviving by the sheer threat of force and coercion.15 This was true of Greece, in that in 
neither case was there a viable alternative offered by the civilian political world. In the end, 
external events acted as catalysts for the downfall of the two regimes. The 4th of August 
regime collapsed due to death of the dictator and the German occupation of the country. 
The 21st of April regime was marked by internal discord within the military elites; it finally 
collapsed in the face of the disaster in Cyprus.
15 Adam Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy” in Transitions from  
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, p. 47.
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APPENDIX
List o f Interviews
1. Desypris Thanassis, General, interviewed on November 12,1991.
2. Karavellas Nikiforos, General, interviewed on November 17,1991.
The General was offered a ministerial position by the military rulers which he refused. He 
was not purged by the junta from the military corps.
3. Papoutsakis Christos, editor of the periodical Anti, interviewed on November 10, 1991. 
One of the most vociferous dissidents of the military regime, the editor published the first 
issue of the periodical in 1973, which was immediately banned from circulation and the 
editor imprisoned.
4. Pappa Elli, writer, interviewed on December 16, 1991.
Mrs Pappa had been a pupil and a reluctant member of EON during the Metaxas 
dictatorship and was a dissident during the military regime.
5. Rokkos Pandelis, professor of Mathematics at the Athens Polytechnic School, 
interviewed on October 30, 1991.
The Professor was among the first to be purged by the military junta and fled to France 
where he continued his teaching career.
6. Vidalis Orestis, General, interviewed on October 15, 1991.
The General, totally rejected the advent of the military regime, he was discredited by the 
military rulers, he fled the country to the United States where he published a series of 
articles and organised anti-dictatorial conferences.
7. Wassenhoven Nausica, architect and sociologist, interviewed on October 26, 1991.
Mrs Wassenhoven was a student at the Athens School of Architecture, during the military 
regime.
8. Zoitakis Georgios, interviewed on November 13, 1991.
A General then, he was the junior minister of National Security in the first military 
government and “Regent” from 13/12/67 to 21/3/72.
